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CENTRAL EURASIA

FBIS Report: Central Eurasia

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DEUTSCHE WELLE To Broadcast TV to CIS States

924C1133A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by Yevgeniy Bovkun, Bonn: "DEUTSCHE WELLE's New Dimension: The Radio Station Branches Into TV"]

[Text] **The well-known Cologne radio station that broadcasts around the clock in various languages of the world will from now on disseminate information not only via sound, but also in color. As DEUTSCHE WELLE management told journalists at a press conference in Bonn, on 1 April the station started television broadcasts.**

The programs are broadcast via satellite in such a way that they can be received by residents of different countries: from the Canary Islands to Russia, from Argentina to Kazakhstan, from Sweden to Israel. They are aimed, however, at Germans or German-speaking people. In time, there will also be an English-language channel.

The list of programs is such that it would make any serious television company proud. The daily magazine has information on current political events, news from German stock exchanges and stadiums, reviews of newspapers, and commentary. The Pallas science program airs on Mondays; its host is a well-known scientist, Harro Zimmer. The space review Jupiter is aired bimonthly. There is an economic magazine "Made in Germany" and a program called "Neue" dedicated to protecting the environment and enhanced by current clips on environmental issues.

The topic of the next youth program 100 Degrees is AIDS and drug addiction. The first Focus on Europe will have a portrait of well-known writer Judith Kerr [as transliterated], author of the book "When Hitler Stole the Pink Rabbit." This is, of course, far from a complete list of programs that will now be available for viewing on domestic television screens (provided, of course, that one has an appropriate antenna).

The DEUTSCHE WELLE anchors and program hosts will report on a variety of international events; however, their main task is to present Germany to television viewers, to open the country to them and make it easier to understand.

Report on Mistreatment of German Journalists in Khabarovskiy Kray

924C1175A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Apr 92 p 8

[Article by Sergey Ponomarev: "Hooligan Acts of North Korean Workers"]

[Text] Khabarovskiy Kray—Hans-Peter Martin and Ottomar Seihauser, correspondents for the German magazine DER SPIEGEL, will long remember their trip to the Far East. They had come to Khabarovskiy Kray in order to prepare materials on the life and work of North Korean workers, who are here to procure timber in accordance with an intergovernmental agreement.

The first incident took place in the settlement of Tyrma, where the helicopter rented by the German journalists made a landing on the way to the regional center of Chegdomyn. Seihauser had taken no more than a few frames when they hurled themselves at the reporter, ripped the camera from his hands, and stripped out the film. A "warm welcome" awaited them in Chegdomyn as well: After taking the guests to an official building, employees of the North Korean Government forcibly detained them there for an hour and a half. The prisoners were released only after the local authorities and the chief of the regional department of public safety intervened.

The main events unfurled, however, the next day, once again at Tyrma. At the lower storage area of the logging camp, the journalists were told: "You may be on Russian land, but this territory belongs to us, and therefore it is forbidden to take photographs." Seihauser, being a true professional, nevertheless managed to snap his shutter a few times. Then all hell broke loose!

MI-8 commander Ivan Kuzmenko described to reporters from the newspaper PRIAMURSKIE VEDOMOSTI and independent radio station Vostok how a group of about 40 citizens of the DPRK prevented them from pulling in the ladder of the helicopter, which was ready for take-off. One of the attackers demanded the surrender of the film, while the others were beating on the portholes and trying to tear off the hatches. Several more men ran up with a Druzhba chain-saw and a hammer sharpened to a chisel point; the attackers were about to use them to punch holes in the fuel tank of the rotary-wing aircraft.

The aircraft mechanic—who, naturally, could not stand aside—was knocked down on his face in the snow and dragged for several dozen meters. Kuzmenko himself, who had tried to calm the raging mob, was dragged from the helicopter and firmly blocked, his hands pinned behind his back. They tore the camera away from the German photojournalist, knocked him down and dragged him off also. Kray Soviet Deputy V. Cherepanov, who was escorting the SPIEGEL correspondents, met the very same fate.

In analyzing what took place, the Russians and Germans who were involved in the incident spoke about how well-planned and organized it was. The siege, which had gone on for half an hour, might have gone on even longer, if a local motorist who happened to be passing by had not reported it to the police.

Incidentally, the Khabarovsk and Russian press have already reported more than once on the customs at Korean Lumber Association No. 1: On its territory they even have something like a prison in which they isolate those "guilty of committing an offense" before sending

them back to their motherland. Environmental protection authorities of Verkhnebureinskiy Rayon and Khabarovskiy Kray have been sounding the alarm for a year in connection with the "economic activity" of the citizens of the contiguous country, who are leaving a dead Taiga in their wake and are destroying everything living in their path. But the demands of the local citizens to halt this plunder of natural resources are met by the kray authorities and the Russian Government with the standard responses of "traditional Soviet-Korean friendship and the advantages of mutual cooperation."

What can one say? The Druzhba chain-saw has not yet, I think, become a traditional instrument of neighborliness. But it has been used for the first time against foreign guests, who had been given guarantees in advance by the local authorities, and who had not violated a single rule for visiting Russian territory.

Rayon and kray prosecutors and kray law-enforcement organs are currently conducting an investigation of the circumstances of what took place.

'Transnational Market' To Begin in May

924A0963A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Apr 92 p 4

[Report by "Z.I.": "A Transnational Exchange Will Start Trading in May"]

[Text] The council of directors is still calling the Transnational Exchange [TNB] "a fine project that we shall implement come what may."

What they have in mind is a system for entering the international market through permanent middlemen in the form of the Transnational Exchange.

TNB's initial sponsor in the world market will be Bulgaria, with which almost all the documents have been signed. The TNB partner in Bulgaria will the Sofia Central Exchange, which should insure penetration into the Turkish, Italian, and Near East markets.

It is planned to set up a special mechanism to handle the account with Bulgaria; this is essentially the creation of a stabilization fund in Bulgaria and the use of a freely convertible lev to transfer it into hard currency, and, through one of the international banks, transfers of assets into Russia with subsequent conversion to the ruble.

It is obvious that during the first stage of TNB activity quite good incomes are expected. They will be guaranteed by access to the inexpensive markets of the Third World and the availability of Baltic loopholes into the customs space of Russia opened up by Gaydar until 1 June.

Customs Official Wants Tougher Regulations

924A0963C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Apr 92 p 4

[Report by Ivan Zasurskiy: "Russia Is Strengthening the Customs Service"]

[Text] **"Otherwise It Is Threatened With Serious Trouble," Says Chairman of the Russian Main Customs Committee Anatoliy Kruglov**

The trade war and the disruption of economic links will have serious consequences for Russia even though it has the lion's share of industrial production among the CIS countries and large-scale and abundant raw materials. This is the view of the chairman of the customs committee regarding the continuing disintegration of the borders of the CIS.

The Customs Union was set up to prevent this process; it includes all CIS states except for Ukraine, through whose signature a line has been drawn.

The powers of the Customs Council are quite broad—from coordination of foreign trade policy to changes in and confirmation of customs tariffs with respect to third countries.

The priority task for the Customs Union is to standardize customs legislation for the states that signed the agreement. In addition, Russia, in whose state structures a larger number of professionals have been retained than in any other post-Soviet state, faces the difficult task of bringing the republic's overall customs service up to a more or less high level.

It is the opinion of Anatoliy Kruglov, however, that some of the Commonwealth states are manifestly not about to continue with full cooperation, but regard the creation of the Customs Union as an interim measure along the path of avoiding a fuel-and-energy crisis by taking advantage of Russian raw materials as an inexpensive addition for their own economies and a product for re-exporting. And according to the Customs Union Treaty that has been concluded, re-exports are permissible only with the agreement of the state from whose territory a commodity originated, and, moreover, this agreement must be reached at government level. Control over possible re-exports also remains one of the most serious problems and requires a true desire for cooperation and also a high level of development in customs statistics where the interests of the Russian Federation Main Customs Committee clashes with the monopoly of the State Committee for Statistics when the interests of latter are purely commercial. However, the submission of customs statistics to the State Committee for Statistics is hardly possible because de facto information from the customs on border crossings is intended exclusively for the information of the Russian Government.

In general the creation of a single customs territory presents Russia with the question of demarcation of borders, both state and customs. And it does not free

Russia from the need to reinforce and strengthen its own customs service and create detachments or militarized customs posts at railroad stations, airports, and all more or less public roads.

Anatoliy Kruglov states that in the forests along the borders with the Baltic republics there are many gasoline tankers that offer small amounts of gasoline for sale at speculative prices and that wait for darkness to cross the border.

Although in the foreseeable future it is not planned to inspect citizens' personal belongings there will be very strict control over the movement of other freight from Russian territory, namely, total declaration. And on Russian territory and everywhere, in every oblast and kray center. This will also mean that the final formation of the Russian Federation Main Customs Committee in October of last year as a body exercising control over commodity exchange and payment of foreign trade taxes is a unique foreign trade tax inspection body.

With respect to the makeup of the member states of the Customs Union the possibility is not excluded that Georgia will join, if we take into account the main avenues of foreign trade in a renewed republic. Moldova's membership in this organization raises the same question.

However, apart from foreign policy problems on the road to the agreement "On Principles of Customs Policy," there are also domestic policy problems. These include, for example, Chechnia and Tatarstan, which have openly stated their wish to have their own customs services with their own sets of duties and tariffs. These republics will be regarded as third countries with their own taxes and commodity exchange.

In addition to the macroeconomic issues falling within the competence of the customs, there is also the impermissibility of carrying drugs and weapons onto the territory of the Russian Federation, and to this end purchases of special equipment will be made. According to Anatoliy Kruglov, a special burden will fall on the department that deals with narcotics; after the virtual opening of the borders with Central Asian republics, and also after internal convertibility has been achieved for the ruble, when the enormous market of the former USSR will be in the sights and interests of the international drug mafia.

Anatoliy Kruglov touched in particular on relations with Ukraine—Russia's largest competitor in the international arena. Evidently Ukraine will be able for some time to re-export Russian goods. As in the Baltics, customs tariffs were abolished personally by Yegor Gaydar for the period through 30 July 1992.

It is suggested that in these three months the Russian Government and the customs council that has been set up should complete their work on a new doctrine for a strict economic policy that will also be the start of the creation of a new economic macrostructure and a basis for strengthening economic links.

Venture To Market Nuclear Technology

924A0963B Moscow KOMMERSANT No 13, 23-30 Mar 92 p 13

[Report by Aleksandr Safronov and Olga Utesheva: "The Nuclear People No Longer Believe That Silence Is Golden"]

[Text] **Russia's nuclear industry is ready to share its secrets with domestic and foreign entrepreneurs on conditions favorable for itself. On 23 March, the Institute of Management, Economics, and Information (TsNIIatominform) under the Russian Federation Minister of Atomic Energy started to draw up documents for the creation of a joint venture with the participation of the Haus fur Informatik, Research & Netzwerkbau AG (Switzerland). The joint venture will engage in sales and exchange of top secret technologies in the world market.**

The chief engineer of TsNIIatominform, Oleg Shilyayev, reports that the institute has a data bank on highly efficient technologies that until recently were completely closed. He said, in particular, that since 1965 the nuclear industry has been engaged in the mining of gold (which is found along with uranium) and has at its disposal a unique technology for obtaining 99.99-percent pure gold even from ore with a very low content, as little as 1.5 grams per metric ton. At 1991 prices the prime cost of obtaining a gram of gold in the sector was 3.04 rubles [R], while the best world indicators (in the Republic of South Africa) are $4.70 a gram.

According to Shilyayev, the nuclear people also possess a technology that has no analogues in the world for obtaining uranium and other fissionable materials that can also be used to obtain very pure silicon and gallium arsenide. This is very important because the domestic electronics industry is now using methods that do not make it possible to obtain semiconductor materials of sufficient purity, and it is this that largely determines the lack of competitiveness of the Russian electronics people in the foreign market.

TsNIIatominform experts claim that the institute has data on all avenues in the scientific, technical, and production activity of enterprises in the nuclear industry, and also other defense sectors, and is prepared within reasonable limits to use this information for commercial ends. The joint venture that TsNIIatominform is setting up with the Swiss company Haus fur Informatik, Research, & Netzwerkbau AG plans to offer information in the world market and at the same time control it. The joint venture will be registered as an open joint-stock company. Its possible founders include VNIIEF (Arzamas-16), the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, and ITAR-TASS.

According to Shilyayev, the joint venture will monitor activity to insure that military technologies of the former

Union are not transferred to "unreliable" regions, protect the priority of domestic development people, and insure mutually profitable exchange of technologies with foreign partners. The organizers of the joint venture intend to attract domestic commercial structures for cooperation, in particular Konversbank and the large exchanges.

Shilyayev reports that the Informatom association has been set up with the participation of the institute to provide information services on a commercial basis to the Ministry of Industry and to smaller companies.

TsNIIatominform:
Telephone (095) 976-79-76
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Informatom:
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WWII Lend-Lease Operation Remembered

924A0922C Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 7

[Interview with B.S. Adamov, participant in lend-lease operations, by S. Mushkaterov; place and date not given: "On Lend-Lease 50 Years Later"]

[Text] **Fifty years ago, at the very height of World War II, the United States and USSR concluded agreements which became one of the first and largest events in the military and economic cooperation of the two countries. This was the lend-lease program under which the United States delivered for leasing by its allies in the anti-Hitler coalition military equipment, arms, ammunition, strategic materials, food, and medications. The United States sent to the USSR 14,500 aircraft, 7,000 tanks, 8,000 anti-aircraft weapons, and 131,000 machine guns. And the overall cost of deliveries, including automotive equipment, food, and other goods, was $9.8 billion.**

Later, during the Cold War, both sides expended a good deal of effort to "correct" the significance of this operation in the victory over Germany: The Americans somewhat exaggerated its importance and we, conversely, understated it. As a result, the lend-lease operations are seen in the eyes of the majority of our people as a small fragment of the war's history. And yet they not only played a significant role in the defeat of Nazi Germany but also were to become one of the first experiments in communication among the simple people of two states separated by an ideological abyss.

Little-known facts concerning the lend-lease operations are discussed by B.S. Adamov, who participated in them directly for two years.

[Mushkaterov] When the deliveries of cargo under lend-lease from the United States to the USSR are mentioned, most frequently three main ports are named: Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, and Vladivostok...

[Adamov] That is actually right, although it is not clear why. As far as I know, only about 30 percent of the overall volume of freight came in through these ports. There are explanations for this. It was not very convenient to transport cargo through Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. Caravans of ships, although they were accompanied by military vessels, were subjected to frequent air attacks from the enemy and they did not always reach their destinations. I heard that about 40 percent of them were sunk, without even reaching the ports.

Vladivostok, although it was preferable from the standpoint of safety, was too far from the front lines. This port and the Far Eastern Railroad, which was loaded because of the shipment of products produced by enterprises that had been evacuated to the east, could not handle the freight coming in from the United States. Therefore from 1942 through 1945 about 70 percent of the freight went through the Persian Gulf region or, rather, through the ports of Bandar-e Shahpur and Khorramshahr in the south of Iran, which was occupied by the British at the time. There were also 25,000 Americans there who received the ships, unloaded them, assembled the aircraft and trucks, and prepared other freight for shipment by rail and automotive transportation to the south of the USSR. Soviet specialists, 20-25 in each port, also worked with the Americans. I happened to work there from 1943 through 1945.

[Mushkaterov] But were there really ports in these places?

[Adamov] What was there before the Americans arrived, of course, it would be difficult to call ports. But the American soldiers very quickly carried out reconstruction. And at the same time, literally in a few weeks, they built compounds for the military servicemen and aircraft and automotive assembly plants out of standard panels they had brought with them. But that was not all.

Many of us were impressed by the fact that in addition to well-built housing they constructed hospitals, houses of prayer, and even plants that produced ice cream, and they also provided Coca-Cola and beer. We even asked them: "Can you really not do without ice cream or beer in times as hard as these?" And they would answer: Only a Russian soldier will fight with just a piece of herring. And they were also surprised: How is it that you are not supplied with everything you need. (We were given everything we needed by the Americans and paid nothing for it.)

Generally speaking, the Americans had much that was new to us. For example, the officers' rations, in spite of what seemed to us at the time to be such a great assortment (they had to have fruit and juice) was the same as the soldiers', although the officers were given more alcohol. Their pay was much higher than ours. And, of course, there was democracy in spite of their high level of discipline. A sergeant, for example, would be quite at ease speaking with a colonel or general, and in the bar the soldiers would sit right down at the same

table with the officers. It was only later that I understood that this kind of democracy in communication might be easily explained: The level of democracy was linked not only to the maturity of the society but also largely to its well-being. And, indeed, many of the sergeants were sometimes much richer than, say, the officers.

[Mushkaterov] And was everything different among the Soviet military servicemen?

[Adamov] I shall tell of just one case. I recall one party meeting at which a junior officer decided to criticize a colonel. The colonel was beside himself. And after a certain amount of time the "offender" was sent home. After that, of course, everyone kept a very low profile.

[Mushkaterov] And how were relations between our military servicemen and the Americans?

[Adamov] Although we lived in a separate building, of course, we were in close communication with the Americans both at work and play. They invited us to movies and concerts of American artists who came there frequently, or simply to sit in the bar. Naturally, we could not live in isolation, but we were rather afraid to visit American drinking establishments frequently since, as you can understand, contacts with Americans during nonworking time were not encouraged then. And there were members of the security service among us who reported our contacts with the Americans to the proper authorities.

But in spite of that we remained friends with the Americans. I, for example, became close friends with one doctor. And once in 1947 a neighbor dropped in to our Moscow apartment—the wife of the director of an aircraft plant. And she announced in a hysterical voice that a letter to me from America had come to their address. It turns out that the doctor had mixed up the apartment number. Naturally, there was nothing compromising in the letter. It said, in particular, that if I were ever in America the doors to his home would always be open to me. Many years have passed after that, and in 1978 when I was deputy chief designer of a special design bureau I had to go on a long business trip to America. And suddenly my boss said: You are not going anywhere, the Central Committee is against it. I, of course, asked why. And he answered: The reason is that you have had foreign correspondence. There you have it...

[Mushkaterov] Can you tell us the strongest impression the Americans made on you at that time?

[Adamov] Of course, it is difficult to choose, but here are two episodes. During one meeting an American officer while making a toast said: You Russians are very similar to Americans—the way we used to be.

The second episode took place in 1945 when both we and the Americans had already been relieved of our hard work. Then we met together very frequently. And once we happened to be speaking with an American officer. Euphoric over our imminent victory, we said that the war would end soon and all problems would be solved. And he suddenly said: You have no reason to think that. So many difficult problems will arise between our countries after the war. We, of course, did not believe him. And it was only after the war that we became convinced of how right that officer was.

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Shakhray's Powers, Accountability Viewed

924A1192A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Apr 92 p 2

[From ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA information service: "How Heavy You Are, Shakhray's Hat"]

[Text] *The GPU [State and Law Administration]: Itself writes draft laws and decrees...*

"II. Tasks of the Administration. 3. The main coordinating and analytical tasks of the Administration are: development of proposals within the concept of the legislative policy and legislative support of the reforms currently underway in the Russian Federation; formulation of programs for law-drafting efforts; organization of the preparation of Russian Federation laws and the decrees and instructions of the president of the Russian Federation; analysis of court and administrative practices of application of the law in the Russian Federation."

From the statute on the State and Law Administration of the president of the Russian Federation, approved by the president's decree of 27 December 1991, No. 332.

Itself edits them...

"1. For the purpose of improving the quality of acts issued by the president of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation, to establish a mandatory preliminary (until their official approval) editing of the drafts of such acts. 2. To make the preliminary editing of the draft acts the responsibility of the State and Law Administration of the President of the Russian Federation."

From the order of the Russian Federation president "Issues in Preparation of the Acts of the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation," 26 March 1992, No. 128-rp.

Itself publishes them...

"1. For the purpose of providing on a more complete and timely basis normative-reference and other literature for the law enforcement organs, ministries, and departments, as well as to the population, and the propaganda of law-related activities of the organs of executive power, to transfer the former YURIDICHESKAYA LITERATURA (currently ROSSIYSKOYE PRAVO) Publishing House, with its entire capital assets and working capital as of 1 February 1992, and its personnel payroll, from the Russian Federation Ministry for Press and Information to the Russian Federation president's administration.

"2. To make the coordination of activities of the ROSSIYSKOYE PRAVO Publishing House the responsibility of the state adviser on legal policy, the deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Government, S.M. Shakhray."

From the order by the president of the Russian Federation of 18 March 1992, No. 112-rp.

The administration's head is empowered by the president to personally:

"Present to the president...draft laws; initial texts of adopted laws of the Russian Federation before they are signed...; make recommendations on the use of the continuance veto; initial the president's draft decrees and orders, as well as the government's decisions...; initial drafts of interstate treaties and agreements; represent the president's interests...at the Congress of People's Deputies..., in the supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, and their organs; send requests for attached duty assignment to the Administration of military personnel and commanding rank persons from the internal affairs and state security organs."

In addition—

The GPU ensures the conduct of a "single state policy of the Russian Federation in the area of national relations."

The total number of the GPU staff is set at 304 people, including 25 military personnel and commanding rank persons of the internal affairs and state security organs.

The administration with such a frightening abbreviation is charged with "coordination of work related to normative and other regulation of the operation of organs of security and internal affairs, justice, and other law enforcement organs, organs of military command and control, civil defense, as well as other state structures of the Russian Federation operating in the area of defense, security, and state reserves."

From the Statute of the State and Law Administration of the president of the Russian Federation.

People's Deputy Views Sixth Congress Events

924C1214B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 16, 15 Apr 92

[Article by Vladimir Fomin, people's deputy of the Russian Federation and LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent: "Behind Us Is RUSSIA"]

[Text] 1930 hours, 13 April 1992—When I was writing these lines, the congress' resolution on the course of the economic reform had yet to be edited with the amendments. But it may already be said that not once was there a vote to remove B. Yeltsin from the presidency nor had he been deprived of his supplementary powers.

The well-known People's Deputy S. Shakhray is right: The concentration of all power in the hands of the

Supreme Soviet, as of any other soviet, is not in the least better than the concentration of all power with the president and the government. It is for this reason that many of us deputies supported the presidential amendment to the resolution, in which he proposed a tightening of the coordination of the work of the Supreme Soviet and the government and prohibition of the latter's interference in the legislative prerogatives of parliament, and of the Supreme Soviet and its organs, from interference in the operational and economic activity of the government.

But does the congress' decision—to instruct the Supreme Soviet within three months to have devised and enacted a law on the government—contradict this? The question of the combination of the offices of president and chairman of the cabinet and the procedure of formation of the government and its accountability would be decided in accordance with it also.

Why such noise, such hysteria?

I put myself in the place of Burbulis, Gaydar, and the young ministers. They have been at work for hardly any time at all—a few months—they inherited a most burdensome legacy and they have only just begun to come out of the tailspin. And... the course of the reforms has been deemed unsatisfactory in almost all key respects.

Insulting. But to proceed from life's realities, from the situation of the surgeon of a leading clinic receiving a wage at Metro-cleaner level? To stand in the shoes of a farmer who is just starting out, who was promised both equipment and credit and who has been given nothing, but it is spring outside, and the sowing needs to be done?

Is this normal?

Were we, the congress, to recognize this situation in the economy and people's living standard as unsatisfactory and to deem the course of the reforms not to require adjustments, the people would have a right to tolerate us people's deputies and, together with us, the government and, possibly, the president also no longer.

We are continually talking about balances and the separation of power, but when these actual balances are manifested at the congress, in parliament, in the independent press, in the law court, they begin to impede matters for some reason or other, and a desire to get rid of them as soon as possible is manifested.

It is hard to predict how events at the congress will continue to develop. But I believe that advising the president now (in the event of all his demands as head of the government not being satisfied) to dissolve parliament and appeal directly to the people via a referendum would be at least inopportune. Whether we like it or not, such representatives of the opposition as A. Tuleyev, S. Baburin, and V. Isakov are, unfortunately, far from making unfounded statements in their assertions to the effect that people are ceasing to believe in the president and the policy which is being pursued. Account has to be taken of the social consequences of the reforms, the growth of dissatisfaction in society, and the possibility of an explosion. Embitterment and lumpenization and, consequently, bolshevization are growing. To see this for oneself it is sufficient to cross even once the lively corridor from the Rossiya Hotel to the Kremlin, see the half-forgotten slogans, see how S. Goryacheva is being handed bouquets of flowers and how Yu. Slobodkin is being greeted for his bold action—insulting words about the president from the high rostrum.

The so-called patriotic forces are bestirring themselves, and the thud of their boots is audible at the congress in almost every vote, particularly when it is a question of the new constitution.

Holding new elections of the representative and executive authorities in this situation is more than risky. The president would not, in my view, get in the immediate future a better parliament than today. Other solutions need to be found.

I see nothing so terrible in the idea of the formation for the time being of a government of national trust made up of representatives of various parties and movements. Let the opposition assume some of the responsibility. We will come to this sooner or later. The main direction would be preserved. Even the Communists of Russia, were the present opposition to come to power, would not call on its people of yesterday.

The condition which our society is in today is reminiscent of a rocket frozen on the launch pad. The engines have been ignited and are roaring There is dust and chaos all around. The body shakes. It is awesome. Suddenly there is insufficient power for takeoff, for reaching orbit.

Perhaps things should be set aside before it is too late?

No, press on. We have sat here too long as it is.

After the lunch break, information leaked through to the congress' meeting hall that Vice Prime Minister Ye. Gaydar had announced at a news conference for national and foreign journalists that the cabinet had tendered the president its resignation en masse.

...At the end of the evening session S. Filatov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, notified the deputies that the ministers had signed the resignation statement on 12 April—after the congress had approved a resolution, many of whose points blocked, in the opinion of members of the cabinet, further progress of the reforms. In this situation members of the Supreme Soviet Presidium held talks with the government. It was decided to propose that the congress adopt a declaration or statement which would express adherence to the policy being pursued by the government.

S. Filatov read out the draft declaration.

Here also, in my view, a sense of proportion failed R. Khasbulatov, who is presiding at the congress. He commented in derisory and ironical terms on the actions of members of the cabinet: "The boys have lost their heads...."

Secretary of State G. Burbulis and members of the government walked out. Clamor, whistling....

The fragile, barely established mutual understanding had collapsed.

Sociologist Forecasts Near-Term Political Trends

924C1214A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 16, 15 Apr 92 p 1

[Report by Andrey Bistritskiy, sociologist of the All-Russia State Television and Radio Company: "Tomorrow's Weather"]

[Text] Following the congress peripeteias, a number of Russian politicians will most likely have an increased desire to "finish off the congress."... But this is a very dangerous trend, it would lead to agonizing and fruitless clashes between the representative authority and the administration.... The consequences of these clashes promise us nothing good inasmuch as this is not a normal civilized struggle but a confrontation of two clans fighting for unlimited influence.

In the next few days we will, possibly, witness a split within the government itself also, although, granted all its heterogeneousness, it is the most civilized force in our state. Nonetheless, two entirely different trends are shaping up increasingly distinctly in the government. On the one hand, the advent in haute politique of a new generation and the switch to a new way of political life has clearly been identified, on the other, a trend toward the solution of complex problems by arbitrary administrative enactments and the spurring of "war hysteria" is being perceived increasingly.

Despite all the numerous difficulties in relations between Russia and Ukraine, serious conflicts and, even more, military clashes are hardly to be expected in the near future. There is at this time no real social force which would want such conflicts.

But conflicts may be provoked by individual politicians on either side who are by personal ambition covering up the lack of a clear social policy.

Secret Funding of Political Parties Alleged

924C1153A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by S. Sokolov and S. Pluzhnikov under the "The Party's Gold" rubric: "The CPSU's Generosity Knew No Boundaries"]

[Text] Former members of the CPSU Central Committee's Politburo now have an unpleasant duty. They go to interrogations. And the meticulous investigators from Russia's Procuracy in lengthy sessions ask them boring questions that are quite routine for the Politburo members: how they were spending state money. While the Politburo members, as a rule, answer in monosyllables and excuse themselves on the grounds of being uninformed. Yes, there was such an International Fund for Aid to Leftist Labor Organizations. Yes, there was more than $200 million passed over to foreign comrades in 10 years. Yes, they signed resolutions. As to the fact that the money delivered from the USSR Gosbank [State Bank] belonged to the state rather than the party—it turns out the thought never came to their mind. And the question regarding the illegal transfers of money across the border also should be asked not of them, but of the Committee for State Security. And in general, it was not their business to get into bookkeeping details—they were in charge of political leadership.

The latter interests the Procuracy the least. Especially considering that the logic of this leadership definitely would have confused them. The year of 1990: On the one hand, an all-out disarmament, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and other embraces with hawks-imperialists. On the other, none of the state leaders—Politburo members—has ever voted against the financing of the "outposts of communism" all over the world, of the parties that sharply disagreed with their "new political thinking." One can somewhat understand Kryuchkov and Ligachev, but why were the others always "for?" What made them vote this way? The sum of circumstances?

Today, in order to at least somewhat sort out these circumstances, we publish for the first time a practically complete list of our communist party's paid friends (excluding those already known). Realistically speaking, this list opens a second, hidden dimension of USSR foreign policy in 1990-91:

Excerpt from Protocol No. 176 of the meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo of 10 January 1990. Agenda item brought up by the CPSU Central Committee's International Department.

1. To render financial assistance in 1990 from the resources of the International Fund for Aid to Leftist Labor Organizations: Portuguese Communist Party—$1 million; the Communist Party of Greece—$900,000; the Communist Party of Israel—$800,000; the Communist Party of Chile—$700,000; the Communist Party of India and Lebanese Communist Party—$500,000 each; the Communist Parties of Venezuela, Argentina, and El Salvador—$450,000 each; Brazilian Communist Party and the Communist Party of Colombia—$400,000 each; the Communist Party of Uruguay and Iraqi Communist Party—$350,000 each; Peruvian and Spanish Communist Parties and the Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus—$300,000 each; the Norwegian Communist Party and the Workers Party—Swedish communists—$275,000 each; the Communist Party of Luxembourg—$270,000; the Communist Parties of Ecuador and Bolivia

and Swiss Labor Party—$250,000 each; Egyptian Communist Party—$230,000; the Communist Party of Canada and the People's Party of Panama—$200,000 each; Syrian Communist Party—$175,000; Dominican Communist Party and the Unified Party of Haitian Communists—$150,000 each; the Morocco Party of Progress and Socialism—$140,000; Paraguayan Communist Party, the Communist Parties of Sri Lanka, and Honduras, Socialist Party of Chile, Popular Vanguard Party of Costa Rica, the Costa Rican People's Party, Guatemalan Party of Labor, the African National Congress of South Africa, South African Communist Party—$100,000 each; the Communist Party of Bangladesh and the Socialist Vanguard Party of Algeria—$80,000 each; Tunisian and Palestinian Communist Parties—$75,000 each; National Progressive (Left) Party of Egypt and the Independence and Labor Party of Senegal—$70,000 each; People's Progressive Party of Guyana—$60,000; the Communist Party of Ireland, the Workers Party of Jamaica, the Workers Party of Ireland, People's Party of Bangladesh—$50,000 each; the Communist Party of San Marino and the Socialist Unity Party of New Zealand—$45,000 each; the Communist Party of Malta—$40,000; the Democratic League-Movement "For Labor Party of Senegal" and the collective press organ of the communist parties of Arab countries magazine AL NAHJ [as transliterated]—$30,000 each; the Communist Party of Saudi Arabia—$20,000; the Nepal and Lesoto Communist Parties and the Vanguard of Somali People party—$10,000 each.

2. To charge the USSR KGB with the transfer of the money.

"I do not see in this any implications particularly damaging for our state," remarked Boris Koval, deputy director of the Institute for International Labor Movement and Comparative Political Science, whom we asked for comments of the duplicitous foreign policy of the Politburo. "With the rare exception, these are toy organizations, small in numbers, who had absolutely no influence of the policy of their countries. It is rather funny to read about the existence of workers parties in Senegal or in agricultural Bangladesh. The activities of the Paraguay and Dominican communist parties are in name only. The parties in Algeria and Egypt are illusory...."

As a matter of fact, neither did the serious communist parties in France, Portugal, and Italy bring the USSR any particular geopolitical advantages lately. Big policy was made by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in disregard of the friends and often against them. "The international communist movement has no future. And no financial help will save it," concluded Boris Koval, echoing the opinion of American Sovietologist Brzezinski. "Parties, whose programs are based on the idea of revolutionary struggle and violence, cannot be popular in our times."

It is unlikely that Valentin Falin, the fund's curator and chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, did not see this collapse. Perhaps in his memoirs, which he is writing during the breaks in his lectures somewhere in West Germany, Falin will tell the purpose of supporting so staunchly the illusion of the international communist movement. Why were our diplomats and intelligence officers given assignments to regularly refurbish these "Potemkin" parties?

One of the answers to this question we found right there in the business correspondence of the Central Committee International Department:

One of the members of IKP [Italian Communist Party] (in the interests of investigation, the name is withheld for now), who supports the Marxist-Leninist position, petitioned the CPSU Central Committee for emergency help in connection with the decision of the Rome court regarding the payment of debts connected with the 1982-83 publication of the PAESE SERA newspaper... The sum in question is 900 million Italian lira, which is an equivalent of $633,765.85, and which needs to be paid as soon as possible.

During the period of sharp disagreements between the former IKP leadership and the CPSU, the PAESE SERA newspaper played a certain positive role. At the time, the CPSU supported Comrade N., including material help, in the publication of this newspaper, which was technically under the management of M. Benedetti. Being, as all Italian newspapers, a money-losing enterprise, PAESE SERA was not able to strengthen its material base.... The societies that published the newspaper declared themselves bankrupt. The court decided to hold the owners liable for the debts; the IKP is supposed to pay 3.5 billion lira, and 900 million lira is due from the newspaper's last owner, M. Benedetti. He does not have this kind of money. As Comrade N. reports, the latter is facing a prison term and, what is even worse, as Comrade N. points out, "scandalous disclosures may be made in regard to organizations and persons whose directions M. Benedetti had been carrying out." Taking into account that such a turn of events would be highly undesirable, we believe it appropriate, on an exception basis, to satisfy Comrade N.'s request. A draft of the CPSU Central Committee's decision is enclosed.

31 December 1985

[Signed] A. Dobrynin

All this unsophisticated blackmail by Italian comrades leads us to an equally unsophisticated conclusion—was it perhaps the fear of "scandalous disclosures in regard to organizations and persons" that compelled the members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo to pay such a burdensome tribute as late as 1991? Especially considering that lately the procedure of siphoning money out of the state budget had become much more difficult. Politburo directives such as: "To the USSR Gosbank governing board (Comrade V.V. Gerashchenko)—to provide Comrade V.M. Falin with $22 million for special purposes" were being carried out more and more reluctantly. At the same time, the demands of foreign comrades kept growing from one year to the next. Many of

them put the level of activity in their party work in direct correlation with the dollar amounts passed to them via the KGB.

U.S. Communist Party General Secretary Gus Hall: "In order for us to continue to operate effectively, $2 million is required at the current level; however, to get out of a special crisis that has emerged as a result of special circumstances, we need another $2 million."

Vilner, general secretary of the Communist Party of Israel: "Dear comrades, there is a real danger that we will be forced to cut in half the already small number of our staff, as well as all of our activities."

Of course, looking carefully into the organizational and ordinary life problems of foreign communists, one wants only to sympathize with them. It is unlikely that the general secretary of the Israeli communist party, M. Vilner, was lying when he wrote to the CPSU Central Committee that "by law, our functionaries have a right to apply for social assistance on the grounds of poverty. However, as Communists, they cannot do it for political reasons." We have no doubt that Gus Hall does not overestimate his colleagues' selflessness, either, when he writes that "we have cadres who are willing for a minimum wage to devote all their time to the work on the upcoming elections..., on organizing the unemployed into various groups of movements for peace and for distribution of the press...." It is true—if anybody profited from the help from the USSR, it was clearly not the rank-and file members of communist parties.

Still, we should not confuse Western humanitarian help with the things that more often than not need to be looked at in terms of international law. First of all from the point of view of interfering with the internal affairs of another state.

We do not even have to describe what scandal would have flared up if, for instance, right now documents were to be published in the United States on the CIA financing an election campaign of one of the candidates for the Russian presidency. But why not? After all, our special services, at the direction of the Politburo, took the liberty of financing "our" candidates at the elections in India (late 1980's), France (1988), and Pakistan (1988). All intelligence services in the world work in similar ways, so it cannot be dismissed that American and other special services have their "own" candidates.

One can hardly qualify as proper our policy in the Middle East, where we not only for many years financed the Israeli Communists, but also passed money through them directly to the Palestinian Communist Party.

And is there any way to justify purchasing arms for the Communists of Sri Lanka?

All of this, one can easily guess, is a far cry from brotherly interparty assistance and belongs more with what Lenin and his People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin called "dirty politics." Are we to continue to console ourselves with the idea that such methods are used by all governments and that it is in our national and state interest?

The procuracies of Hungary and the CSFR have initiated criminal proceedings and charged members of the leadership of their communist parties with the illegal transfer of money out of the country. A similar investigation is being conducted by the Russian Procuracy. It is possible that the investigation will be able to charge officials under such articles of the Criminal Code as violation of the rules of hard currency operations and exceeding official powers.... Leaders of many foreign communist parties are also expecting big trouble. First of all for flagrant violations of tax laws. It is clear that the millions of dollars passed to them by our rezidents in "briefcases," were not subject to any tax. In addition, the fate of many "friendly firms" is unenviable. Such as one Italian firm which with the help of Soviet state organs engaged in the same trick in hiding its profits from 1978 to 1989. The essence of it was that the company regularly paid large fines for various nonexistent transgressions during the unloading of Soviet ships, and then received the same money back from us through European banks.

Interference in the internal affairs of other countries, secret "special measures," creation of a transnational shadow economy with the participation of companies belonging to left-wing parties, export of capital—as you can see, the leaders of our state have set up a considerable front for the procuracies of a number of countries to apply their efforts to. First and foremost, though, we hope it will be Russia's Procuracy.

And you are wrong if you think that it will be just turning up old dirty linen. Some facts show that CPSU traditions are being eagerly copied by many parties that are not yet well established in Russia. Suffice it to recall a recent survey conducted by our newspaper, where we asked representatives from about ten parties the same question: "What is the source of your finances?" The answers were on par with the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs. The Democratic Party of Russia [DPR], Christian Democrats, cadets, Rutskoy's party—the NPSP [People's Party for Free Russia], Zhirinovskiy's party—all answered more or less similarly, and, most importantly, mysteriously: "We are supported by private individuals and organizations, whom we refuse to name."

So, frankly, we are already morally prepared that about five years from now materials with familiar stamps on them will leak to the press: Top secret. Agenda item brought up by the International Department of the Central Committee of the ...DPR? ...LDP [Liberal Democratic Party]? ...NPSR? ...VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)]? ...etc.

ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Land Reform Issues Explored, Impact Assessed

924A0987A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 17 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by A. Korniyenko, president of the "Region" Association and Candidate of Economic Sciences, Odessa Oblast: "How Should a Kolkhoz Be Reorganized?"]

[Text] Today, in various regions of the country, exceptional interest is being displayed in searching for the most effective methods for reorganizing the kolkhozes and sovkhozes or, more accurately, for creating, based upon their material base, completely new collective forms of management. People's enterprises which operate on a share form of ownership, joint-stock companies and associations of cooperatives are being created. Unfortunately, many mistakes are being tolerated when determining the structure of the fixed capital being distributed among kolkhoz members, when evaluating the labor contribution of a worker in the creation of fixed capital and when defining the conditions under which a particular worker is deprived of the right to obtain a share of the capital and the right to withdraw it. Serious flaws are being observed in connection with the development of a system of intraorganizational accounting.

The leaders often forget about the dominant role played by this problem, an incorrect solution for which will negate all of the expenses incurred for reorganization. The share form of ownership can manifest itself only through a system for distributing newly created value for the savings and consumption fund, in association with the proportion of capital for each individual and the measure of his labor. How can a worker be taught to understand that he is now primarily an owner and that his well-being tomorrow will depend upon his work, upon the savings fund that has been created and upon his interest in solving priority problems? All of these problems are extremely urgent.

The "Region" Association, created by oblagrosoyuz in Odessa Oblast, leading agricultural firms and a number of other organizations, after having analyzed the experience accumulated in various regions of the former union, developed a system for reorganizing the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Based upon this system, they are creating collective (people's) enterprises which are based upon the share form of ownership, joint-stock companies and associations which bring together farmers, cooperatives, small enterprises and other formations. The experience of the first farm to be reorganized based upon the proposed system was published in the journals "EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN," "APK: EKONOMIKA, UPRAVLENIYE" [Agro-Industrial Complex: Economy, Administration] (Issue No. 10 for 1991) and "DOSTIZHENIYA NAUKI I TEKHNIKI" [Scientific and Engineering Achievements] (Issue No. 11 for 1991). This experience was examined at seminars and schools and is already being introduced on many farms. It provides a moral right to discuss its recognition by practical workers.

Each kolkhoz member (sovkhoz worker) becomes an owner of a definite share of the fixed capital. All of the structural subunits of a collective enterprise or joint-stock company, to which the required means of production are assigned, are being converted over to intraorganizational accounting. All interrelationships between structural subunits are being converted over to a financial basis. Towards this end, a system of indicators is being prepared for evaluating the volume of goods produced and the amount of work and services carried out (quintal of product, ton-kilometer, kilometer of run, conventional can and others). Each unit of product produced or work or service performed, depending upon its quality, has an intraorganizational accounting price, which is considered together with the conditions of each structural subunit or brigade and based upon the soil differences, level of mechanization, livestock productivity and so forth.

The accounting price is formed based upon generally accepted items of expenditure, with the exception of planned profits, insurance payments, interest payments for the use of short-term loans, general economic expenditures and other expenses that are not dependent upon the subunit's workers. The prices are established as stable for a number of years and are subject to change when there are considerable increases in the wholesale prices for the resources consumed or if costly measures are introduced.

Cost accounting enterprises turn over their products based upon accounting prices. The resources consumed by them are regulated by planned accounting prices. A special system is employed at an enterprise for developing, considering and approving those prices and penalties which are compensated fully from the personal account of the guilty subunit.

Collective ownership and collective labor require a special system for the distribution of profit and the consumption fund. The following system was developed.

A portion of the profit remaining at the disposal of an enterprise is used for the formation of a reserve fund (in volume of five percent up to the 15 percent level of the official fund).

A portion of the profit is used for financing objects of the social infrastructure (schools, kindergartens, nurseries and others), in accordance with an expenditure estimate prepared by the executive board and approved during a general meeting.

A portion of the profit is used for issuing dividends proportional to the capital shares regardless of whether or not a participant is working or on pension. This serves to protect the interests of a holder of a share of ownership. The dividend level must be in keeping with the bank interest rate so as to stimulate the members of a

collective enterprise into investing additional funds rather than withdrawing the interest due them.

The remaining portion of the profit is distributed among the cost accounting enterprises proportional to their cost accounting incomes and within them—to the personal accounts of the workers proportional to their wages. This is done owing to the fact that the wage level today does not compensate workers for their contribution and thus it cannot guarantee the needed material interest and responsibility. This applies in particular to those who have a negligible share of the official fund and who by their labor ensure dividends for participants with large shares. In the future, when wages in the newly created value will be more meaningful, there will no longer be a need for distributing profit proportional to wages and it will become possible to convert over to a joint-stock company system.

Within a subunit, this portion of profit is distributed taking into account the labor of each individual and if penalties are imposed upon a particular worker, they will be reimbursed from his share. If the share is not sufficient, the reimbursement will be carried out using funds withdrawn from his personal account. Thus, at the reorganized "Zapoved Ilicha" Kolkhoz in Odessa Oblast, a drunken tractor operator demolished a tractor and 6,000 rubles were withdrawn from his personal account.

An enterprise's participants are authorized to withdraw a portion of the profit as dividends and to add it to their personal accounts. This circumstance basically changes the orientation of the problem of distributing newly created value to the fund for savings and consumption. Expanded reproduction is ensured through interest being instilled in the owner-worker. In the case of a high dividend level for expanded reproduction, there will be dividends, a portion of the profit and additional payments from personal savings. The latter circumstance is especially important, since following payment of the mentioned savings a worker radically changes his attitude towards both labor and the future development of the enterprise.

Government Subsidies for Press Criticized

924C1160A Moscow KURANTY in Russian 28 Mar 92 p 1

[Article under the heading "Authorities Take Note" by Vladimir Somov: "Is It Easy Buying a Newspaper?"]

[Text] Strange question! Newspapers are sold on every corner, at every stand, and to every taste. But they may be purchased not only retail, but apparently wholesale as well. Together with the journalists and their beliefs. The government had only to hint at a promise of subsidies before the chief editors of newspapers which had declared themselves independent and popular rushed to fall at the feet of the authorities. The amounts of the subsidies are already being quoted: TRUD and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA have allegedly been promised R1 billion each. Other zealots of the freedom of speech have lined up for the handout, too.

Perhaps a subsidy is indeed the sole salvation for bankrupts? But KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA has found a solution, for all that: It has announced a resubscription. Of course, the number of subscribers will decline—not everyone can shell out R41 a month. But a newspaper is, after all, a commodity. And why does the government intend making an exception for this commodity when all basic necessities (even matches and salt!) are being sold at free prices?

A fourth estate purchased by the government ceases to be an estate. A press which has acquired billions in subsidies cannot perform the role of opponent. It is on this, it would seem, that the present authorities are counting. Those who so dislike the sweeping criticism (as can be seen from their reaction). References to the need to preserve a single information space are a bluff. In all developed countries this space is assured by regional newspapers. And where national publications have appeared of late, there are, all the same, no newspapers with circulations of 15-20 million. Whoever intends buttering up the press with handouts essentially aspires to preserve the newspaper empire nurtured by the totalitarian system. To preserve and subordinate to himself.

Are ideological interests with us once again being placed above the interests of man? The government has ruthlessly released the prices of absolutely everything. And wishes to leave only the newspapers immune. If "surplus" billions have been found in Gaydar's deficit-free budget, would it not be better to give them to the elderly and invalids for whom today a glass of milk has become an impermissible luxury? And the mourners for a single information space are behaving simply unconscionably: They wish to live an easy life at the taxpayer's expense. This is inconceivable in any civilized society.

Journalists Debate Need for Central Press

924C1133B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Apr 92 p 6

[Report by Marina Levashova: "There Is No Longer Central Press in a Single Space: The Plenum Criticized Minister Poltoranin"]

[Text] Last week at the council plenum of the Confederation of Journalist Unions, the debate on the issue of preserving a single informational space went on for about four hours. The plenum decided to prepare a number of documents to be discussed at the upcoming Tashkent summit of the heads of the CIS countries. Unexpectedly an idea emerged to publish a special digest representing the political, economic, and other views of the journalists of the entire commonwealth. The chairman of the Journalists Union of Russia, Eduard Sagalayev, remarked that the well-known publication ZA RUBEZHOM could serve the noble cause of preserving

a single informational space. He even enumerated the names of potential rubrics—"Our Overseas," "Nearby Overseas," and so on.

Those speaking at the plenum noted that the concept of the central press practically has not changed—the "view from Moscow" is still present. This is one of the reasons why central newspapers are currently losing readers in other republics. However, judging by the absence at the plenum of many chief editors of central newspapers, they are not particularly concerned with this problem.

The plenum attempted to define the principles of preserving a single informational space. But a clear answer to the question "what to do?" was not found. The consolidating center (mentioned in the decisions of the plenum of the Confederation of Journalist Unions) can no longer influence the critical condition of the national and regional press: Local economic and political diktat is growing; local newspapers are closed or their output is cut to the minimum.

The semblance of a single informational space is possible when, for instance, a Ukrainian can subscribe to a Moldovan newspaper without difficulty. In other words, subscriptions should not require payments in hard currency—this is precisely what at the time destroyed informational ties between the COMECON countries. A smoothly operating exchange of reliable information through an interstate agency is needed. And one of the most important points is to preserve the Russian language as a means of communication, casting off nationalist ambitions. A huge percentage of those living on the territory of the commonwealth speak Russian. It is illogical for everybody to study the international language—English.

The plenum participants criticized the latest actions of Russia's minister for press and information, Mikhail Poltoranin, who was also absent that day from the House of Journalists. Rumor is he is busy putting together a list of "good" newspapers that will be eligible to receive subsidies from the state budget.

Staffers Protest Removal of PRAVDA Sign

924C1096A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 1 Apr 92 p 2

["Statement for the Press" by PRAVDA staff personnel]

[Text] Esteemed Colleagues!

We come to you with an appeal to express your attitude regarding the arbitrary rule which is today being directed against PRAVDA and which may tomorrow be applied to any other creative collective. Glasnost and democracy are in danger. Another in a series of provocations has been perpetrated against PRAVDA: Early on the morning of 28 March, furtively, surreptitiously, in compliance with instructions from V. Leontyev, director of the Press publishing house, the sign bearing the name of our newspaper was taken down from the publication's entranceway. The first attempt at "depersonalizing" the editorial office was undertaken the evening of 25 March. Leontyev lied, trying to convince the editor in chief of PRAVDA of his sincerity in dealing with the newspaper, of the impossibility of vandalism. And once again militia forces were used against journalists who tried to prevent outrage from being inflicted on the paper. They did not interfere with the vandals, but rather protected those who executed the instructions of the publishing house director and prohibited journalists from entering the building. We appeal to the labor collective of the publishing house to demand Leontyev's immediate resignation from his position as director. We appeal to V. Stepankov, Russian procurator general, demanding that criminal charges be instituted against Leontyev for exceeding his powerful authority, and that proper judgment be rendered of the leadership of the militia detachment which indulged execution of the illegal order of the publishing house director and prohibited journalists from entering the editorial office building. This is in no way the first time the militia has conducted repressions against PRAVDA personnel. We appeal to the Russian Ministry of Press and Information, under whose jurisdiction the publishing house falls, requesting a proper assessment of the illegal actions against PRAVDA, the conduct of an independent professional audit, and the compilation of separate balance sheets for all newspapers and magazines whose profits are the result of the printing, sports, and social base of the publishing house. We appeal to our colleagues, requesting that they deliver the text of our statement to the world public.

SELSKAYA ZHIZN Sign Removed From Premises

924C1096B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 1 Apr 92 p 1

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN report: "'Design,' but Not Very Pretty..."]

[Text] Last Saturday morning, the sign disappeared over the entranceway to the publishing building in which SELSKAYA ZHIZN is located. What was it—perhaps someone became disenchanted with the name of the newspaper? Or perhaps someone noticed lopsided letters in the sign? It turns out neither is the case. When they tore down the PRAVDA sign that day on instructions from the publishing house directorship, they decided while they were at it to have a shot at ours.

No one at SELSKAYA ZHIZN—not its editor in chief nor its managers—was informed of this. M. Troshin, deputy director of the Press publishing house, explains such a technique quite simply: Other publications appeared in the building, "and so we decided to change the design a little." But, excuse me, when new publications appeared in the old building complex—including RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA—it never occurred to anyone to tear down the sign from the entranceway of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA or SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

"A tempest in a teapot" is what the publishing house directorship has termed the reaction of journalists to this occurrence. But it is sad that the tea—in each teapot—is being poured by none other than the Press publishing house. There is one consolation—traces of the letters of our sign, along with the awards, remain even after the "design." In stone... And so our readers will find us.

SELSKAYA ZHIZN on New Subscription Drive

924C1096C Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 1 Apr 92 p 4

[Kolos Publishing House report: "Additional Subscriptions"]

[Text] Dear Reader!

The unchecked increases in cost of paper, typographic, postal, and other services have brought many agrarian publications to the brink of closure. Editorial offices presently have no other way out except to raise the subscription price if the magazines are to be published the second half of the year.

Do not be too severe in your judgment, dear reader. Try to understand and provide us a helping hand.

Additional subscriptions to the following magazines for the second half of the year were made available in April.

	1 month	3 months	6 months
70013 APK: EKONOMIKA, UPRAVLENIYE [THE AGROINDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: ECONOMICS, MANAGEMENT] (six issues will be published the second half of the year)	10.00	30.00	60.00
70300 ZHIVOTNOVOD [THE STOCK BREEDER] (six issues)	6.00	18.00	36.00
70800 SADOVODSTVO I VINOGRADARSTVO [GARDENING AND VITICULTURE] (six issues)	7.50	22.50	45.00
70815 SELSKIY MEKHANIZATOR [THE AGRICULTURAL MACHINE OPERATOR] (six issues)	3.00	9.00	18.00
70818 SELSKOYE STROITELSTVO [RURAL CONSTRUCTION] (six issues)	4.50	13.50	27.00
71100 EKONOMIKA SELSKOKHOZYAYSTVENNYKH PREDPRIYATIY [ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES] (six issues)	10.00 (2 months)	30.00 (4 months)	60.00 (8 months)
70426 KARTOFEL I OVOSHCHI [POTATOES AND VEGETABLES] (three issues)	6.00	12.00	18.00
70533 MEZHDUNARODNYY SELSKOKHOZYAYSTVENNYY ZHURNAL [INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL JOURNAL] (three issues)	7.50	15.00	22.50
70809 SVINOVODSTVO [PIG BREEDING] (three issues)	5.00	10.00	15.00
70794 RYBOLOV [THE FISHERMAN] (four issues)	—	—	40.00
70449 KROLIKOVODSTVO I ZVEROVODSTVO [RABBIT BREEDING AND FUR FARMING] (four issues)	—	—	20.00
71100 TSVETOVODSTVO [FLOWER GROWING] (four issues)	—	—	30.00

Subscriptions for the last three magazines are available only for the half-year period.

If for some reason the post office rejects your subscription request, show perseverance and cite the RPA ROSPECHAT information letter 21-12/72, dated 26 February 1992, as well as this material.

Company to Broadcast Via Soviet Satellites

924C1096D Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Mar 92 p 1

[Unattributed article under the rubric "TV News": "One Television Channel More?"]

[Text] On 12 March the Ostankino Television and Radio Company of the RSFSR Ministry of Communications and the United States Federal Contracts Institute [Federalnyy Institut Dogovorov SShA] signed a contract on creation of the Russian-American television and radio company "Moscow Global."

Some time ago, our system of satellite communications came into being by decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, relaying broadcasts of Central Television's Channel One to Soviet embassies abroad. Probably so that they would not forget the faces of their leaders. An unprecedented luxury, of course. The unique satellite system encompassing almost the entire world was not really used, and has been transformed into the new company.

Now the "Moscow Global" channel must find its personality on worldwide television. It can afford a unique

opportunity to those who have left our country and are now dispersed all over the world to have contact with other people of one language, one culture. In time people in the CIS states will be able to see the new television channel as well.

In the meantime, Alex Greenspan, a representative of the United States Federal Contracts Institute, is highly optimistic: "Imagine you have a truck in which you are hauling a single watermelon, because you have no more. Well, we know where to get watermelons and where they have to be transported so that it is advantageous to everyone."

Perhaps this action will improve the current sad financial state of the former Central Television and help preserve the single information space of the former Union. Imagine, you turn on the television and watch together with the entire world.

Decree on Activities of Afghan Vets Union

925D0323B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Apr 92 p 2

[Ukase: "Ukase of the President of the Russian Federation Concerning the Activities of the Union of Afghanistan Veterans"]

[Text] For purposes of creating the conditions for resolving social tasks in the interests of individuals who fulfilled their military or official duty in the Republic of Afghanistan or in other countries where combat actions were carried out, and also expanding the opportunities for the philanthropic, humanitarian, and patriotic activities of the Union of Afghanistan Veterans, I decree:

1. The approval of the activities of the Union of Afghanistan Veterans in uniting the citizens who fulfilled their military or official duty in the Republic of Afghanistan or in other countries where combat actions were carried out, and also in implementing social programs in the interests of those individuals and members of the families of persons who died or were declared missing in action.

2. It is deemed to be desirable to support the following initiatives of the Union of Afghanistan Veterans:

—the expansion of the benefits established for participants in the Great Patriotic War as military personnel to the citizens of the Russian Federation who executed their military or official duty in the Republic of Afghanistan or other countries where combat actions were carried out;

—the granting of tax benefits to enterprises and organizations that are the property of the Union of Afghanistan Veterans.

Within a one-month period the government of the Russian Federation is to submit, for forwarding to the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, drafts of legislative acts dealing with these questions.

3. The recommendation is to be given to agencies of the executive authority of the national-state and administrative-territorial formations of the Russian Federation to render to the territorial departments of the Union of Afghanistan Veterans the necessary assistance in the creation by them, in the established procedure, of enterprises and organizations, as well as in the execution of the tasks in the sphere of social development that are specified in the charter.

4. The Ministry of Economics of the Russian Federation is to establish for 1992 the quotas for the exporting of commodities in accordance with a products list that has been coordinated with the Union of Afghanistan Veterans.

5. The enterprises and organizations that are property of the Union of Afghanistan Veterans are to be freed in 1992 from the payment of export duties and from the mandatory sale to the Republic Currency Reserve of the Russian Federation or to the stabilized currency fund of a share of the currency proceeds obtained from the exporting of commodities within the confines of the established quotas, as part of the expenditures to be channeled into the fulfillment of the tasks specified in the charter for resolving the veterans' social and everyday problems—the giving of assistance in finding a job and in vocational retraining, in organizing medical assistance, and the psychological and social adaptation and rehabilitation of veterans.

6. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties of the Russian Federation is to formalize in the established procedure the licenses for exporting commodities in conformity with the established quotas, and also to render to the Union of Afghanistan Veterans all kinds of assistance in implementing its foreign-economic activities.

7. The Ministry of Economics of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Trade and Material Resources of the Russian Federation is to consider, starting in 1992 (when establishing the volumes of shipments of output to be regulated in a centralized manner), the allocation to the Union of Afghanistan veterans, as part of the state republic needs for material-technical resources, in the volumes corresponding to the effective demand of the enterprises and organizations that are property of the Union of Afghanistan Veterans.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation
Moscow, the Kremlin
4 April 1992
No. 362

Changes to Criminal Code on Administrative Violations

925D0323A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Apr 92 p 2

[Law: "Law of the Russian Federation Concerning the Making of Changes and Additions to the RSFSR Criminal Code and the RSFSR Code Governing Administrative Violations"]

[Text] Article 1. The following changes and additions are to be made to the RSFSR Code (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RSFSR, 1960, No. 40, Article 591):

1. Article 175 is to be augmented by adding after the words "corrective labor for the same period of time" the words "or by a fine of up to 10,000 rubles."

2. The Code is to be augmented by adding Article 175.1 with the following content:

"Article 175.1. Violation of Antimonopoly Legislation.

"Failure by an official at an agency of authority, administration, or an economic entity to execute the legal injunctions of the Antimonopoly Committee of the Russian Federation or its territorial administration, if that failure to act was perpetrated by a person who, during the course of a year, has been subjected to administrative punishment for the same actions:

"—is punished by corrective labor for a period of up to two years, or by a fine of up to 10,000 rubles, or by deprivation of the right to occupy definite job assignments or to engage in definite activity for a period of up to three years."

Article 2. The RSFSR Code Governing Administrative Violations (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RSFSR, 1984, No. 27, Article 909) is to be augmented by adding Articles 157.1, 157.2, and 224.4, with the following content:

"Article 157.1. Nonpresentation of Information to the Antimonopoly Committee of the Russian Federation.

"Failure by an official at an agency of authority, administration, or an economic entity to present, in response to a request by the Antimonopoly Committee of the Russian Federation or its territorial administration, documents or other information necessary for carrying out their legal activity:

"—results in a warning or the imposition of a fine in an amount up to six minimal rates of the payment of labor.

"Article 157.2 Nonexecution of Injunctions of the Antimonopoly Committee of the Russian Federation.

"Failure by an official of an agency of authority, administration, or an economic entity to execute the legal injunctions of the Antimonopoly Committee of the Russian Federation or its territorial administration results in a warning or the imposition of a fine in an amount up to eight minimal rates of payment of labor.

"Article 224.4. Agencies That Consider Cases Involving the Violation of Antimonopoly Legislation.

"The Antimonopoly Committee of the Russian Federation and its territorial administrations consider cases involving the administrative violations stipulated by Articles 157.1 and 157.2 of this code.

"The individuals who have the right to consider cases involving administrative violations and to impose administrative punishments on behalf of the Antimonopoly Committee of the Russian Federation are: the chairman of the Antimonopoly Committee of the Russian Federation; his deputies; and chiefs of the territorial administrations of the Antimonopoly Committee of the Russian Federation. Chiefs of the territorial administrations of the Antimonopoly Committee of the Russian Federation can impose administrative punishments only in the form of a warning."

[Signed] B. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation
Moscow, House of Russian Soviets
13 March 1992
No. 2509-1.

Decree of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation Concerning the Procedure for Implementing the Law: "The Making of Changes and Additions to the RSFSR Criminal Code and the RSFSR Code Governing Administrative Violations"

The Supreme Council of the Russian Federation decrees:

The implementation of the Law of the Russian Federation, entitled: "The Making of Changes and Additions to the RSFSR Criminal Code and the RSFSR Code Governing Administrative Violations," effective the moment of its promulgation.

[Signed] R. I. Khasbulatov, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation
Moscow, House of Russian Soviets
13 March 1992
No. 2510-1.

Discrepancy Between Criminal Accusations, Convictions Increasing

924C1202A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Andrey Illesh and Valeriy Rudnev, IZVESTIYA correspondents: "How and Why They Judge in Russia"]

[Text] **The press service of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation has produced for the press the results of the legal statistics for 1991, which show that far more offenses are recorded in Russia than are guilty verdicts subsequently handed down.**

Last year, for example, some 2,173,074 offenses were recorded, some 1,131,967 cleared up, and, as noted in the militia statistics, some 958,662 criminals unmasked. But not all of them have been found guilty: some 2,233 persons (1,708 in 1990) were vindicated by Russian courts last year, which comes to 0.3 percent of the total number of defendants. And some 594,000 persons were found guilty and sentenced, which is 56,000 more than in 1990.

MODES OF CRIME. The basic motive of many of them is cupidity. Every fifth person convicted had criminal proceedings instituted against them for theft, embezzlement, and other familiar methods of appropriating state and public property. Thefts from stores, warehouses, bases and other depositories enjoyed especial "popularity" last year (probably because of poor protection). The growth of convictions for this category of cases amounted to almost 50 percent.

Violent crimes, the most dangerous in our opinion, alas are not a rarity. About 200,000 of those convicted achieved their "aims" by beating up the victims, threatening them with violence, and by using a knife and a gun.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE CONVICTED. About who are in our prisons. In 1991 guilty verdicts were handed down in regard to almost 85,000 minors, whereas in 1990 there were 79,000 convicted juveniles. Some 38 percent of the total number of criminals are recidivists. The crimes of more than half of the convicted were committed while drunk. Group crime increased from 34.6 percent to 36.5. There is a distinctive record in this section of legal statistics: for the first time in the last 20 years the number of persons who had never worked anywhere when the crime was committed reached 21.5 percent of the total number of those convicted.

PUNISHMENT. Some 65 percent of the defendants were condemned to measures of punishment not linked with deprivation of freedom. Alas, the area of serious crime has not avoided humanization. For grave crimes of a violent character (murders, grave bodily injuries, rape, especially malicious hooliganism, robbery with violence, banditism) a punishment less than the sanction of the law was chosen with respect to every sixth person convicted and for every tenth (!)—without deprivation of freedom altogether. Only half of those convicted for misappropriations while in office and bribery were sentenced to deprivation of freedom and the majority, about three-fourths, received measures lower than prescribed by law.

The use of additional measures of punishment has continued to decline. The use of the obligatory under the law confiscation of property has decreased from 77.1 to 71.7 percent, and loss of the right to occupy certain posts from 52.3 to 42.6 percent.

THE DEATH PENALTY. Although being retained in Russia, the level of its use is gradually declining. However, judge for yourselves.

	1989	1990	1991
Total convicted for crimes for which use of the death penalty (DP) is permitted	2814	4035	4977
Of which condemned to DP (on the basis of sentences which had come into legal force)	100	223	147
Carried out	93	76	59

CIVIL PROCEDURE. The total number of suits dropped from 1,703 in 1990 to 1,599 in 1991. Although the number of applications to a court concerning restoration to work increased by a fourth. Some 12,930 such suits were satisfied and the people restored to their previous post. The number of divorce proceedings in the courts has also increased, although suits for the recovery of alimony have declined. Citizens have begun to more actively apply to the courts for protection of their rights from the unlawful actions of bureaucrats and collegial organs of administration.

Situation in Corrective Labor Colonies Examined

924C1201A Moscow TRUD in Russian 11 Apr p 2

[Article by V. Loktev: "In Places Not So Far Removed, or a Portrait of the 'Zone' in the Statistical Interior"]

[Text] The sadly notorious Gulag has been nonexistent for a long time, but this abbreviation is constantly encountered in publications on the present-day "prison theme." Moreover, often in a context which identifies the old and new procedures in the system for the execution of punishments. But, you see, the Stalin camps of the '30s-'50s and the corrective labor colonies of today are far from being one and the same.

So, what do the "places not so far removed" and their "inmates," who have broken the law and are "doing time" not by their own will out of touch with their relatives and friends, with our joyless but free life, represent today? It should be said that it is a big "business" in the Main Administration for the Execution of Punishments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. There are 764 corrective labor colonies, 13 prisons, 60 labor educational colonies, 160 investigatory solitary confinement blocks, 495 special commandant's offices, 2,332 corrective works inspectorates and 147 labor therapy clinics.

Almost 1.3 million persons are in the care, or more precisely under the jurisdiction, of these institutions! Of course they all have committed an offense before society and the law to a varying degree; therefore both the measure of the punishment and the conditions of serving it are different, almost diametrically opposed. There is among the hardened criminals a special group—330 villains sentenced by the court to an exceptional measure of punishment—execution by firing squad. Completely "harmless" against the background of the brutal acts of these nonpersons is the contingent of the labor therapy clinics—the alcoholics and drug addicts put into forced treatment.

If one is to talk about the bulk of the convicted held in the colonies (and there are more than 500,000 of them, including 19,000 women and 20,000 minors), it should be emphasized that the types of crimes represented in the corrective labor colonies have changed drastically in recent years. Moreover, in favor of a significant increase of the share of those doing time for the most dangerous crimes. Almost every fourth person has been convicted

of premeditated murder or the inflicting of grave bodily injuries; every fifth of robbery with violence, stealing, and rape. More than 60 percent have been convicted more than once and more than 45,000 have been pronounced especially dangerous recidivists.

The bloody hue of this frightening statistic is a reliable symptom of the profound socioeconomic crisis under whose condition various bandit and mafiosi structures, armed with far from just knives and brass knuckles, feel themselves perfectly well. There is an axiom verified by historical experience: the weaker the economy and state power, the lower the moral and ethical criteria in society, the more powerless is Themis [translator's note—a Greek goddess of law, order and justice] and the stronger and more insolent is the criminal world.

The echo of our changed life in its own specific tonality has reached even the colonies. Disorders, group excesses and the seizure of hostages are more and more frequent there. The total number of offenses in corrective labor institutions has passed far beyond 4,000 during the past year, including 169 premeditated murders, 390 grave bodily injuries, 208 acts of hooliganism, and 1,900 escapes.

In this situation, however deplorable, those who in the performance of their duties work directly with convicts suffer ever more frequently. About 200 cases of attacks on employees of corrective labor institutions have been recorded during the past two months of this year, 21 of which ended with the seizure of hostages. The result of these extraordinary events has been tragic—six persons have been killed and 62 have been wounded. Three internal affairs officials were killed just recently while arresting escapees from special commandants offices.

The daily risk, the social disorder, the heavy moral and psychological burdens in combination with inadequate wages—all this has a pernicious effect on the prestige of the profession of employees in the organs for the execution of punishments. But perhaps the most annoying thing for them—no, it is not the wild outburst of "prison" abandon but the ease with which some journalists (whether through lack of understanding or in the pursuit of a sensation) shape a negative public opinion around the employees of corrective labor institutions, put them in the position of "brutal jailers" and, on the contrary, represent hardened criminals as persons innocently suffering, such "lost little sheep," deprived of our care and compassion.

Of late ever more persistently on the part of both human rights defenders and convicts just demands have been heard for a review of the conditions of the serving of sentences and for bringing them closer to international standards. And here the ice has melted somewhat. Changes and additions regulating the rights and obligations of convicts have been made in the corrective labor legislation at the initiative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. Reduced nutrition norms for rule violaters have been abolished and such types of punishment as deprivation of packages, parcels, the right to acquire foodstuffs, and meetings with relatives have been eliminated. Women are to be permitted short-term leave to go to their place of residence. The wearing of sports clothes, watches, combs, etc. is to be allowed.

Now as for living conditions, the norms and assortment of food products, opportunities for leisure and other international penetentiary system standards. Here special changes cannot be anticipated in the next few years. No emotional references either to American or to West European prisons will help. One can look at and talk about how prisoners serve their sentences "among them" and bring our "zones" "into line," alas—you, yourself, know what a state the Russian economy is in. Yes, both the living standard and the material situation of citizens living in freedom leaves much to be desired. One will have to, obviously, wait a little with the individual comfortable cells, the "vidicams," the substantial grub and other attributes of the "daily prison life" of the western countries.

It would be possible to improve the supplying of convicts with food products, kits, necessities, and medicines through the economic activity of the colonies. But how is this to be done if production is grinding to a halt even there. Until recently the corrective labor institutions and labor therapy clinics had firm business ties with thousands of enterprises. Now they have been broken off with 450 plants for various reasons and as a consequence the delivery of raw material and components for production in the colonies is being curtailed. In short, the financial position of corrective labor institutions is deplorable and, what is even worse, if this tendency lasts about 150,000 convicts may be left without work by the end of the year. Well then, additional subsidies from the state budget will be required for their maintenance and this is billions of rubles. The cost feeding a single convict alone already has jumped to 700 rubles a month while wages do not exceed 550 rubles.

This is far from a complete portrait of the present-day "zone." Naturally, it does not pretend to completeness. But is not this a reason for us to also meditate about the problems of the penetentiary system. It is not for nothing that the folk wisdom says: you don't say no to prison or money.

Child Mortality on Rise, Medical Care Scarce

924A0989A Moscow TRUD in Russian 17 Apr 92 p 4

[Interview with Professor A. A. Baranov, president of the International Fund for Protecting the Health of Mother and Child, conducted by A. Semenov: "Children Are the First To Die"]

[Text] **Five years ago we were shocked when we first learned the true figures on child mortality, at that time still in the USSR. The country was not even in the top 30 of comparatively favorable states. As it turned out, it was much worse! But today the backsliding is continuing, and**

proceeding at an accelerated rate. Professor A. A. Baranov, president of the International Fund for Protecting the Health of Mother and Child, talks about this.

[Baranov] The interest in the problem of mothers and children which arose in the mid-80's has absolutely faded. At the same time, the objective indicators of the health status of mothers and children have begun to decline. Since June of last year there has been an increase in infant mortality. While from 1988 through 1990 this sad indicator had declined by 14 percent and the number of abortions had declined by 10 percent, according to the results for 1991 this tendency has stopped in Russia as well as in the other countries of the former USSR. And some indicators have even increased as compared with 1990. Specifically, maternal mortality.

In comparable prices, financing of public health has declined sharply. For example, the budget has doubled, while prices have increased tenfold! According to the most conservative estimates, the state funds allocated for mothers and children in Russia are sufficient to meet only 40 percent of the needs. As a result, the large problem of treating the seriously ill is arising. While in Russia there are 2,500 children who contract oncohematological illnesses each year, we are able to help only 10 percent of them.

There is also an increase in hereditary and congenital diseases. In previous years we were able to set up around 500 laboratories for prenatal diagnostics. Today all of them stand idle due to a lack of reagents. There are no funds to buy them.

Infectious diseases are being seen more frequently. Outbreaks of diphtheria have been recorded in Moscow and Ukraine. There has been an outbreak of poliomyelitis in Azerbaijan and Turkmenia. For many years we have not had meningococcal infection, yet today there have already been recorded cases of children dying from this dangerous disease in Moscow. The explanation, on one hand, lies in the weakening of sanitary inspection, and on the other—in the social troubles which have gripped millions of families.

[Correspondent] What should we do: The coffers are empty, public health cannot count on any serious support from the state, and small handouts to it are like putting a poultice on a dead man?

[Baranov] Many are pinning their hopes on the system of social insurance. However, this is a far-off prospect, while children are dying today. I believe that the word belongs now to the commercial structures, which could within the framework of an equal partnership, and not on a charitable basis, bring the problem of mothers and children out of the dead end. If we create the most favorable conditions for those domestic and foreign companies which increase the level of protection of mothers and children through their products, then very soon Russia and the other CIS countries will emerge from that suicidal condition where the future of the nation is placed in doubt. I might add that our fund is currently working in this direction.

[Correspondent] Excuse me, but the very word "fund" evokes a certain aversion in many people: There has been everything—noisy telethons, charity raffles held by various funds. But what good have they done?!

[Baranov] We have not held any telethons, or "collected for charity", nor do we plan to. Our primary task is to give practical aid to the state projects of Russia and other CIS countries on reducing mortality and improving the health, treatment and nourishment of mothers and children.

There is no need to tell about the harm which abortion does to a woman's health. We are ahead of many other countries in the number of abortions performed. And so, the fund is implementing a special program for the development of the contraception industry. An agreement has been reached with the German "Shearing" firm—a leader in the production of hormonal contraceptive preparations—to build a plant for the manufacture of this product in our country. We are already selecting the site for the enterprise, and the Germans will perform the building work and supply the technology. We also have a similar agreement with the Dutch firm, "Organon," which produces top quality intrauterine devices.

A joint Soviet-Italian enterprise in Nizhniy Novgorod is already operating and manufacturing its products—ultrasound apparatus for intrauterine study of the fetus. A Soviet-Swiss enterprise is producing incubators for newborn infants. Negotiations have been held with the American "Abbot" company regarding the joint production of baby food. The Americans are ready to invest considerable funds in this project.

We are not trying to solve the "eternal" problems. All the projects may realistically be implemented in the next two years.

[Correspondent] And nevertheless we are speaking once again about tomorrow. Yet what can we do already today to help mothers and children?

[Baranov] Here you are: Recently we began making repairs on a building in Moscow on New Arbat Street, where a modern Well Diagnostic Center will open already this summer. Leading geneticists, specifically Academy of Medical Sciences Academician N. P. Bochkov, will perform unique studies here on the pathology of pregnancy.

A children's nutrition center will be opened next door, and will be supplied by the world's leading companies. Part of this baby food will be given out free of charge to low-income families. Similar centers have been proposed in other rayons of Moscow. It is a good thing that the capital's government understands the importance of this work and tries to meet us halfway.

In the next few days, on the eve of the sixth anniversary of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, an

expedition of leading medical specialists will go to the disaster area under the aegis of the fund. Alas, the state of health of the children's population in this region continues to decline, while medical services to children and mothers remains at a low level. The expedition will provide whatever aid it can to local doctors in organizing their work, and will also compile a long-term program for our participation in solving the complex medical problems of the Chernobyl zone.

Fundamentalist Orthodox Circles Attempt To Ally With Church Abroad

92UN1165A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Apr 92 p 6

[Article by Dmitriy Shusharin: "The Church Abroad: NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's Prediction Confirmed; Archbishop Mark Has Scruples"]

[Text] Not so long ago NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, in analyzing tendencies which had been taking shape in the development of the Russian Orthodox Church, noted that fundamentalist orthodox circles are apparently attempting to approach the Church Abroad. However, the intellectual and cultural level of the clergy of the Church Abroad will be a serious obstacle in the path of their unification.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's prediction has been fully confirmed. As we have already reported, on 19 March at the joint press conference of Father Aleksiy Averyanov and the leader of the national patriotic society Pamyat, Dmitriy Vasilyev, it was announced that parishes of the Church Abroad are asking the chairman of Pamyat to "create a detachment of fighters for rapid response to conflicts and the support of law and order." Dmitriy Vasilyev promised help to "those abroad."

However, on 1 April the statement of Mark, Archbishop of Berlin and Germany, "To Guard the Dignity of Christ's Church..." was transmitted to Moscow by fax. Archbishop Mark disavows Father Aleksiy. "The statement of certain priests cannot express the opinion of the entire Russian Church," it says in the document. What has occured, in the Archbishop's opinion, "can be used for the usual discrediting of the Russian Orthodox Church and especially the portion of that is free."

"We remind all believing orthodox Christians who are willing to hear our voice that we cannot use violence as we cannot use a lie to fight a lie." These are the concluding words of the statement of Archbishop Mark. Evidently the hierarchy and clergy which have been born and brought up abroad understand better than some Moscow fathers with whom one can and with whom one cannot have dealings in Russia.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Proceedings of Krasnoyarsk Congress of Siberian Deputies Reported

Economics, Autonomy Issues Dominate Agenda

924C1121A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Apr 92 p 2

[Report by Valeriy Yaroslavtsev (Krasnoyarsk): "How We Must Rebuild Siberia"

[Text] **Economics Is the Main Policy.** So the leader of the world proletariat asserted in his time. And this postulate was fully confirmed during the Congress of the Deputies of Siberia, which concluded last Saturday at Krasnoyarsk. The main demands on the center that were expressed in the reports and speeches and recorded in the resolutions were the decentralization of administration, economic independence of the territory, a one-channel system for formulating the budget, and freedom in foreign economic activity.

The congress's resolutions, even those which were toned down by the efforts of the editorial commission, reminded one of an ultimatum. One can judge the heat of the emotion by, for example, this quote from one speech:

"We are living not in an area of conducting reforms but in a natural area and we should act according to its laws: 'Do not believe, do not be afraid, and do not beg!"

Do not beg, demand! Such a decisive mood was imparted by the organizing report of Vyacheslav Novikov, chairman of the congress's organizing committee and chairman of the Krasnoyarskiy Kray Soviet, and by other reports that were dedicated to Siberia's legal, economic, social, and foreign-trade situation, the course of privatization, and agrarian reform.

As a Siberian by birth, upbringing, and conviction, I well know the sad effects of the colonial policy of the former Union's Center, having felt and, moreover, continue to feel the effects, on myself and on the lives of my relatives and friends. A province in good working order, a raw-materials adjunct, an ecological settling tank—these are not the strongest expressions for describing these consequences. The Russian Center, unfortunately, is to a great extent repeating the Union Center's mistakes, persistently coming on those same collecting hayrakes. Moscow does not make a distinction between, let us say, Krasnoyarski[illegible] Krasnodarskiy krays, for all provinces are iden[illegible] its eyes. But Siberia is a special territory wh[illegible]s a special approach. Hence the severity of [illegible]s of the Siberians, who are living on rich lan[illegible] almost twice as bad off as their counterparts [illegible]opean Russia, to the policy of the parent state,

The Russian Government's economic policy was subjected to stiff criticism at the congress. For example, a

resolution with extremely strong expressions was made up on the agrarian question: "This deliberate policy dooms the country to hunger...." One could have expected demands for the resignation of the government, but sociologists of the Center for Social Research, Technology, and Innovation of Krasnoyarskiy University, which polled 176 participants of the Siberian Congress, explained that the majority support the economic reforms. But these reforms, in the opinion of this majority, do not consider the interests of Siberia and should be substantially revised.

However, Aman Tuleyev, Chairman of the Kemerovo Oblast Soviet, appealed from the rostrum:

"People will not understand if the congress approves the government's economic policy."

The former rival of Yeltsin in the presidential elections, who stood with his oblast soviet in open opposition to the President and the Russian Government, spoke in general about many sound things. And he evoked applause. From his fervent speech, however, it was clear that he was in essence inveighing against the primitive wage-leveling of "developed socialism." It is noteworthy that the Kemerovo Oblast Soviet, which was disturbed by the possible backwardness of its chairman, distributed throughout the land on the eve of the congress "seductive letters," which were intended for the "leaders" of the mass movement in defense of Siberia.

All Subjects Are Equal. The Siberian Congress supported the Federal Treaty that had been initialed, making some corrections in it, and proposes that it be included in the new Constitution, leaving the text of all its articles unchanged. The resolution about the draft of the Constitution proposed that the Sixth Congress of Peoples' Deputies of Russia examine it in a first reading, publish it for discussion, and, in a month convene an extraordinary congress for final adoption of the Basic Law. In so doing, the new Constitution should provide, in the opinion of the Siberian Congress, equal rights for all subjects of the Federation.

In the resolution about the status of the soviets of people's deputies as representative organs within the power system, one can see trends that are aimed at reducing the influence of executive power. It is not accidental that there were no heads of administrations of Siberia's territories at the congress—a symptom of the confrontation that is developing between legislative and executive power.

Although the basic Russian reform cabinet was criticized at the congress, it was the President who caught it—not just as the head of the government.

"Such nonsense is possible only with us," said V. Novikov, presiding chairman at the congress, "unless the President, having sworn on the Constitution to observe the laws unfailingly, issues orders that contradict it."

And although Vladimir Shumeyko, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, and Yuriy Moskvich, representative of the President in Krasnoyarskiy Kray and member of the Constitutional Commission of the Parliament, who were present at the congress, assured the delegates that the draft of the Constitution excludes the right of the President to interrupt the activity of the soviets, the congress put to a vote the demand to deprive the President of Russia of additional powers. And in concert with Aman Tuleyev's presentation, it demanded abolition of the institution of representatives of the President at local levels "as unnecessary and even harmful" (A. Tuleyev's expression).

Incidentally, Yuriy Moskvich declined to be a candidate for delegate to the congress but accepted the organizing committee's invitation to participate in it. In his speeches at the congress he said that Russia cannot be developed without decentralization of authority and a transfer of considerable power to the territories. But, in his opinion, there was no necessity to assemble the Siberian Congress, for the rights of the regions have been secured in the draft of the new Constitution. Therefore, the Siberian Congress, which was convened at a time when the rightists were preparing for revenge on the Sixth Congress of the People's Deputies of Russia, can complicate still more the situation in the country.

The Autonomists Seek Their Place. V. Slobodchikov, chairman of the Kyzyl (the capital of Tuva) city ispolkom, explained at a press conference that it was dread of being "linked up with the separatists" that prompted nonattendance at the Congress of delegates from Siberia's nationality republics. Sakha (Yakutia), Buryatia, Khakasia, and Tuva came only as observers. However, the question, it would seem, is it not so much about the fear of separatism as the fact that the republics are jealous and often react suspiciously to putting their rights on the same level as the rights of oblasts and krays (what are they then, republics?), and, similarly, at the forthcoming Russian Congress they will express themselves decisively against appropriate articles of the new Constitution.

The autonomous okrugs are quite disturbed by the fact that the draft of the new Constitution "does not find a place" for them. A. Novoseltsev, member of the Krasnoyarskiy delegation and chairman of the Evenkiyskiy Okrug Soviet, spoke with great resentment about this at the congress. Similarly, the autonomous okrugs are striving toward statehood, in defiance of the world trend: with regional autonomy and national culture and with legislative rights to the ownership of natural resources.

And So, Who Needs the Siberian Republic? So far only the Independence Party of Siberia, which has few members and whose cochairman is Boris Perov, deputy of the Tomsk Oblast Soviet. It announced at a final press conference that 15 delegates of the congress had signed up for it.

In some other speeches revivified ideas of Siberian provincialism were sounded, in the subjunctive mood. Rostislav Gorchakov, the delegate from Igarka and deputy of the Krasnoyarskiy Kray Soviet, said that if he Russian Government does not take account of the decisions of the Siberian Congress, then it will be necessary to be separated: "We will separate not from Russia but from its Government." Aman Tuleyev did not hesitate to continue: "His policy pushes for separation and engenders talk that no one needs a Siberian Republic." Oleg Kushelevskiy, deputy of the Tomsk Oblast Soviet, remarked: "Siberia is a strong fist that can robustly influence the center's position."

This here, however, is the essence: The Siberian Congress is viewed by its organizers as a method for "civilized" pressure on Moscow. This is what at first extremely alarmed the object of the pressure and caused a call to the chairman himself of the organizing committee, who felt compelled to rebuke the press for creating a "separatist myth." He declared that he had not acted without the participation of presidential structures, but the prosecutor's office of Krasnoyarskiy Kray, which had warned the organizing committee about some disparities between drafts of the Congress's resolution and legislative enactments, "performed a certain task."

Vyacheslav Novikov (well known by the fact that he had already tried last year, after having secured the support of the kray soviet, to establish a Yenisey Republic, true, as he now states, for the purpose of "scaring" the unamenable center) said at a press conference that "if the government does not listen to the voice of Siberians, we will meet again and we will think about what we must do further...."

The Congress has reserved the right to appeal to Siberia's populace if "we are not listened to."

"The Siberian Agreement." Vyacheslav Novikov decisively denied assertions that backstage of the Siberian Congress stands the party's former Nomenklatura, establishing residence in the structures of the Siberian Agreement, an interregional association, and dreaming of returning Siberia to its patrimony and even of "living under socialism." The association, within the framework of which the congress was held and which is charged with realizing certain of its decisions, was created in November 1990 in order to revise efforts for the survival of Siberia's regions during conversion to the market and to implement major regional programs, basically through its own sources. It is another matter in which the association's activity is still poorly effective and for which it was subjected to criticism at the congress.

Although, as is well known, it was not the Nenetsi but party bureaucrats who announced the Yamalo-Nenets Republic, that "epoch" has now passed and, apparently, it is not worthwhile to seek out the power-loving political designs of the former Siberian Nomenklatura. Its majority has quickly turned down the "socialist choice" and is flowing smoothly into various economic, commercial, and exchange structures. And in a new capacity, having joined the entrepreneur stratum that is being formed rapidly, it is striving toward a new and tempting prospect. This is what slipped into certain speeches at the congress.

And other speeches, the agrarians' for example, caused some of the journalists to define the congress's color as "rosy." To which V. Novikov remarked that the whole spectrum of opinion and various points of view were represented at the congress, since the delegates expressed different political convictions. But their genuine concern about the vital interests of Siberians and the fate of Siberia united them.

From Congress to Congress? The Siberian Congress charged its delegate, A. Dobzhinskiy, Russian Parliament deputy from Irkutsk, with bringing its decisions to the attention of the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies of Russia. Whether he will succeed in creating a Siberian lobby in Parliament, the necessity for which was mentioned at the congress, is still a question. But the congress has decided to form a standing organizing committee in order to prepare for a second congress of people's deputies of Siberia, which will assemble "as necessity dictates." About which the kray and oblast soviets should make decisions. It is here that the intention to state what business is to be taken seriously is examined. There is a clear striving to find legitimacy for the Siberian Congress, which, you see, can be transformed when the opportunity presents itself into a "Siberian Parliament." Thus, the confrontation of Siberia and Moscow nevertheless has been brought out privately. Whether it will develop depends upon the position of the Center, its sober understanding of the situation, and its consideration of the realities.

For the time being the Siberian opposition remains an opposition. It is clear that it is worthwhile to the Russian leadership to give the territories the rights demanded, and here they will be absorbed in concrete work, without thinking about any "separatism." Another matter is that a rational balance of the interests of the Federation and of its subjects is necessary. The main thing right now is whether Moscow will listen to the voice of the Siberian Congress.

Poll Results on Socioeconomic, Political Development

924C1121B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Valentin Nemirovskiy, doctor of sociological sciences and scientific chief of the Center for SITI, and Sergey Peshkov, candidate of philosophical sciences and director of the Center for SITI: "They Criticize It but They Support It"]

[Text] The Center for Social Research, Technology, and Innovation (SITI) of Krasnoyarsk State University conducted a survey of participants of the Congress of

People's Deputies of Siberia. One hundred seventy-six of those surveyed offered to be experts on problems of social, economic, and political development of Siberian regions.

It has been explained that adherents of various hues of the political spectrum were represented among those surveyed, although opponents of the Russian Government and Parliament predominate considerably. The survey indicated that three-fourths of the experts support the reforms conducted by Boris Yeltsin's government. At the same time, only 14 percent of them consider that the reforms being made consider Siberia's interests fully. In the opinion of 48 percent, they are considered only partially, 38 percent say there are not considered at all. Not accidentally, 86 percent of those surveyed evaluate positively the activity of the association Siberian Agreement, although many simultaneously note specific deficiencies in its work.

Most of the Congress's participants are already acquainted with the draft of the nev Russian Constitution. However, only a fourth consider .t acceptable as a whole. The rest are still undecided or (six percent) reject it completely.

The survey's results refute the widely held opinion about the alleged "separatist" nature of the Congress. In the opinion of 73 percent of the experts, Siberia's regions must be economically self-sufficient, and the others demand both economic and political rights. However, this does not mean a separation of Siberia from Russia. It is a question of decentralizing state administration.

In particular, in answering the question about the attributes of self- sufficiency, 90 percent of those surveyed declared that they did not agree with the need for a Siberian Constitution, 95 percent consider that a national guard is not needed. There is no need to create a customs frontier (87 percent) or the Siberians' own flag, coat of arms, and anthem (88). But 37 percent think that customs duty should be levied on the passage of freight on the Transsiberian Trunk Line and of cargo on the Northern Sea Route.

In speaking about the paths to solving the nationality problem, eight of ten experts believe that it is not mandatory to divide territory on the basis of nationality. It is more important to realize the right of each citizen, regardless of his nationality affiliation. As we see, the participants of the congress basically support the principle of priority of the rights of man above the rights of nationality. Taking into account the fact that Siberian autonomists were not represented at the Congress, this indicates a realistic approach of the Russian-speaking deputies to the solution of nationality problems.

For a description of the social and political situation in Siberia, the experts were asked to answer the question: "To whom, in your opinion, does power belong in your region?" The majority consider that power locally belongs to the chief of administration (69 percent) and to the directors of enterprises and organizations (67 percent). The group of power structures second in influence are considered to be the smart operators of the shadow economy (56 percent), organs of local authority (46 percent), the camouflaged Nomenklatura (47 percent), and the soviets of people's deputies (40 percent). In level of realization of the power of authority, the experts evaluated as practically equal the President's local representatives (seven percent) and the new political controllers (eight percent). Many remarked on a situation of anarchy: authority in the region belongs to no one, 56 percent of those surveyed thought.

Finally, the results of the survey did not confirm the opinion of certain of the mass media about the Nomenklatura nature of the Congress. Its delegates represent fairly widely the various population groups. All the more so that today's dialog was not about former social membership nor even the political predilections of a deputy, but his competence and his striving to solve constructively the most severe problems that face the Siberian regions and to work together with the Russian Government and other CIS members.

Report on Demography of Northern Regions Viewed

924C1238A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by O. Zakharova: "On the Demographic Situation in the Northern Regions"]

[Text] **(According to data from the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociology, Center on Social Demography—Professor L. L. Rybakovskiy, director).**

The population of the Russian Federation has increased by 13.4 percent in the last 20 years, while the population growth in the North due to migration has comprised over 30 percent. At the same time, there are some regions, primarily in the Far North, which have experienced a four to six-time increase in population during this same period: The Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug and the Yamalo-Nenetsk Republic, which in the 70's-80's experienced a migration boom associated with the development of oil deposits in Tyumen. In these regions, the migration growth exceeded the natural growth by about three to five times. As a result of migration expansion, the relative share of the native minor peoples of the North has sharply declined—from 14.7 percent in 1970 to 4.4 percent in 1989.

There is a large relative share of Russians in the population of the former autonomous republics of the North. Thus, in Komi and Yakutiya it comprises from 50 to 70 percent, while in the national oblasts and okrugs of the North it comprises an average of 65 percent. The lowest indicator in Yakutiya in this respect is the result of a super-high concentration of Russian population in the cities, and its almost complete absence in rural areas. All of the listed regions are no less Russian than most of the oblasts in Central Russia.

On the whole, the population of the North is significantly younger than the entire Russian population. The North differs significantly from Russia also in its portion of able-bodied population, which here reaches 65-67 percent (for Russia as a whole it was 56.9 percent in 1989). Moreover, it is greatest specifically in those places where the living conditions are the most difficult: In Chukotka, Taymir and in the north of Tyumen Oblast. The specifics of the age structure are reflected in the level of natural growth. Due to the predominance of persons of young and middle age in the population, the natural growth is approximately 30-40 percent greater than the all-Russian indicators, and in individual years even more than 50 percent greater.

As of 1990, a negative migration growth in population numbers has been observed. One of the reasons for the observed phenomenon is the exodus from the Russian North of representatives of a number of nationalities—Ukrainians, Azerbaijanis, and others. This evidently testifies to the beginning of a new stage of evolution of the ethnic structure of these regions.

As compared with the regional, the ethnic differences in the birth and mortality rates in the North are great. Unlike the mortality rate, the situation in regard to the birth rate and reproduction of the population on the whole in the North is distinguished from the Russian probably in a more favorable direction. Russians in the northern regions, as well as everywhere, are characterized by the lowest birth rate. The general birth rate coefficient for Russians does not exceed 18-19 babies born per 1,000 persons of the population, and are close to the Komi (around 19). For the Yakut this indicator is 29.4, for the Buryat—26.5, for the Evenki—23.9, and for the Chukchi—28.9. The highest birth rate indicators have been recorded for the Nenets (37.5) the Eveny (35.6) and the Khanty (34.7). In various years, the average birth rate computed for all the northern regions has exceeded the Russian birth rate by from 5 to 10 percent. There are even greater differences for the individual territories. For example, Yakutiya and Buryatiya are part of the group of Russian regions characterized by the highest birth rate indicators (2.5-2.8 infants on the average per woman, with an average indicator of 1.8-2.0 for Russia). Irkutsk, Chita, and Amur Oblasts are closely adjoined to them

One of the most significant differences in the birth rate conditions in the northern regions as compared with Russia is the high level of births to couples out of wedlock (approximately 30-40 percent higher than in Russia). The highest level of births to couples out of wedlock, surpassing the Russian level by 70 percent, is recorded in Buryatiya, as well as in Irkutsk and Chita Oblasts, where the relative share of Buryats is high.

The mortality rate coefficient also significantly surpasses the mortality rate of Russians. This excess reaches a minimum of two to four times, and in individual regions (Chukot SAR, Taymyr Autonomous Okrug) the gap between these figures is six-fold.

All the northern territories, with the exception of Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Tyumen Oblasts, have lower levels of life expectancy than in Russia, for men as well as for women. Despite some improvement in the situation which occurred in the 80's the Far East continues to remain in the most difficult situation. Here the discrepancy with the all-Russian indicators is the greatest. Kamchatka Oblast is particularly apparent, where the difference in life expectancy for men reaches four years, and for women—three to three-and-a-half years.

German Question of Emigration, Ethnic Self-Preservation Explored

924C1231A Moscow FEDERATSIYA in Russian No 16, 8 Apr 92 p 6

[Article by Vladimir Petrov, ITAR-TASS correspondent, special for "F": "Who Is Playing the German Card?" First paragraph, introductory, is in bold italics in the original.]

[Text] ***At the 2nd Congress of Germans of the Former USSR held in Moscow this past March, around 750 delegates were to discuss, as a point of fact, whether our Germans will remain here after having received statehood and thereby the opportunity for their national self-preservation, or whether they will begin a systematic exodus to Germany.***

As a result of intense discussions, having declared that the strategic goal of the German National Movement is "to preserve the ethnic and physical preservation of the people," the congress—through G. Grout, chairman of the Inter-State Council for Rehabilitation of Germans of the Former USSR (MGS)—presented three objectives for the German movement in Russia: Struggle for rehabilitation, emigration, and care for Germans in areas where they live in close proximity to each other.

But one of the objectives, emigration, was announced as having a high priority and, for this reason, the congress included it among its resolutions, demanding that "the governments of Germany, Russia, and other countries of the CIS urgently approve a program for an organized resettlement to Germany for all Russian Germans who desire to do so within a time limit of not over three to five years."

A hidden struggle, taking the form of giving the Germans different kinds of favorable terms, developed among Kirgiziya, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia, where most of the Germans now live.

The leadership of Kirgiziya, on the one hand facing a personnel shortage in the face of the future increase in German emigration, and on the other, having an apparent great need for German capital, this past January established two German national-cultural regions that have broad powers to decide on economic and social questions. The Kirgiz leadership also announced the establishment of a fund for German cultural development, a German-Kirgiz bank, German national schools

and nurseries, as well as the granting of permission for dual citizenship—FRG and Kirgiziya.

According to the latest census, taken in 1989, Kirgiziya had a population of 101,309 Germans, of whom only a part were resettled during the war and the rest had ancestors who had come here during the last century. Today, according to the German ADN agency, some 70,000 Germans remain in Kirgiziya.

It should be noted that the trend for the German-speaking population to leave the republic is growing stronger with each passing day.

Kazakhstan was rather late in beginning to take urgent steps with regard to the "German question." This was evidently due to the fact that nationality relations in the republic were quite stable during the Soviet period, and the republic had a German theater, a German television program, and a nationality newspaper, as well as around 300 schools whose curriculum was in German. Nevertheless, emigration is also increasing here.

After he apparently realized that urgent measures have to be taken, N. Nazarbayev sent a telegram to the congress in which he expressed his "deep understanding of and empathy with" German problems and promised that in the near future he would discuss with German representatives the conditions under which they would agree not to leave the republic.

Ukraine's position in this question deserves a separate treatment. It is the only country that was honored with compliments at the congress (even the government of Germany was blamed for an "incorrect" understanding of priorities in the CIS German movement and for opposing landslide emigration). A positive assessment was given to an invitation to Russian Germans to come to Ukraine, but simultaneously the resolutions of the congress noted that this factor should not be looked at as an alternative to German autonomy on the Volga.

Ukraine is a factor which went practically unnoticed earlier in resolutions on the German problem (some 50,000 Germans live in Ukraine today, compared to a pre-war German population of around 435,000). The logic of conducting an independent policy as a counterweight to Russia, as well as the necessity of having effective initiatives that promise considerable gain without requiring any particular expenditures prior to L. Kravchuk's visit to the FRG, added important corrective steps to the existing situation.

Back in January of this year, the president of Ukraine said in a SPIEGEL interview—and later signed a document to that effect—that former Soviet Germans will be given the opportunity to resettle on the best land in those places where they lived until 1941, that is, in the Nikolayevskiy, Odessa, Khersonskiy, and Zaporozhskiy Oblasts and in Crimea. A special Ukrainian-German fund was established to aid resettlement, to which Kiev contributed 500 million rubles.

Kiev's move can probably be called a "no loss" move: Bonn is happy and is promising financial support. G. Grout predicts that 100-300 thousand people will want to resettle, which will allow these fertile areas which are short of manpower, to be farmed better, thus saving Ukraine tens of billions of rubles. In addition, the congress resolved to support "the efforts of the Ukrainian government to conclude bilateral treaties with other states of the CIS on questions of compensation for the property left behind by those who were resettled...." This probably means that the Ukrainian initiative will have to be paid for out of the pockets of the other CIS members.

Yet, resettlement to Ukraine does not promise to be as simple and smooth as it appears on paper. In a situation of economic crisis, given a choice between Ukraine and Germany, the most likely choice will be the latter.

We should note that the congress made an unprecedented sharp and categorical criticism of the Russian leadership's position through a resolution stating that "as a result of the Russian leadership's refusal to restore rights that had been violated, ... the hopes of the people for a national future on Russian territory have been totally crushed." Decisively refuted were "measures which ran counter to the best interests of the people on the so-called stage-by-stage restoration of the republic in the Volga area and which were approved despite the expressed will of the German people...."

The delegates approved a proposal to resettle Russian Germans in East Germany where subunits of the State Force Abroad (ZGV) are still stationed and to transfer tens of thousands of flats and cottages from people leaving the former USSR to military personnel who are being withdrawn from the FRG. Germany and Russia oppose this. In the event, however, that the Russian leadership refuses to agree to this proposal, the Inter-State Council (MGS) "must develop and present measures that show Russian responsibility for losses inflicted on the nation of Russian Germans."

In all this, totally ignored was the fact that of all the centrifugal forces which are tearing Russia apart, the one to restore the German republic against the growing opposition of the local population is sheer suicide. To be honest, with all the Russian inconsistencies in the "German question," one cannot ignore the view of both Russia and Germany that the establishment of two German nationality regions in the Volga area would be only the first step in restoring historical justice.

Russia was the first, as long ago as last year, to establish national districts, first in the Altai and later, in the Omsk Oblast. Already this year around 14,000 Germans from Central Asia resettled to the Altai. Three thousand more families from those same regions want to resettle now in the Altai. Concurrently, the emigration flow from Russia is also increasing.

The only way out of this situation would be through well studied measures by Russia, which could provide a historical perspective to the Germans and give them

specific deadlines for a stage-by-stage restoration of their statehood on the Volga. The congress that just ended simply confirmed that no other solutions would be accepted today by the German majority, but would lead to mass emigration controlled only by the limits of what the FRG can do. Attempts to play the "German card" within the CIS framework are not productive.

Economic Reporting From Chita Oblast

Regional Food Prices Noted

924C1234A Chita-tsentr ZABAYKALSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 10 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by V. Mikhailov: "The Gruel Is Not Spoiled With Butter"]

[Text] Judging from all appearances, the Transbaykal residents will for a long period of time be unable to "blaspheme" their gruel—"spoil" it with butter. There is a critical shortage of groats. And the price for butter, which has taken off like a rocket, shows no intention of coming back to earth.

Recently, the newspaper IZVESTIYA began publishing reviews by the Russian Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] on the minimum and maximum prices in cities. Thus, with the average price for cream butter throughout the republic being slightly more than 86 rubles, the highest price in Chita is 249 rubles and 49 kopecks. And one can only envy the residents of Nakhodka and Magadan, who pay approximately 25 and 32 rubles respectively for a kilogram.

Moreover, Chita is distinguished by a high price for fresh white-head cabbage—15 rubles and 79 kopecks for a kilogram. We are surpassed only by Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka and Magadan, where this vegetable is worth three gold coins.

Alas, there is still no mention of Chita on the lists of minimum and maximum prices for beef, sausage, eggs, potatoes and apples. We can only hope that our trade will correct this misunderstanding and that the city will be ranked among the leaders in this regard.

Bread Supply 'Crisis' Discussed

924C1234B Chita-tsentr ZABAYKALSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 10 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by A. Seleznev: "Bread. Price. Last Limit"]

[Text] By 27 February, our newspaper had already issued a report on the critical situation in which enterprises of the "Chitakhlebprom" [Chita Bread Industry] found themselves. The branch was practically on the brink of paralysis. It was only as a result of selflessness and an understanding by the bakery groups of their obligation to the Transbaykal people that bread was still being made available for sale to the population at more or less moderate prices.

Recently, the general director, A. Uglov, gathered together all of the association's enterprise leaders from Chita and the oblast's rayons, in order to discuss the situation that had developed and to outline the path to be followed for eliminating the crisis situation.

From the speeches made by those in attendance, it became clear that the financial noose had already been tightened and that it was no longer possible to remove it independently. The discussion of economic matters soon took on a political twist. The bread enterprise directors clearly recognize the responsibility entrusted to them, since the vitality of the branch is directly linked to the most important question at the present time—the price for bread. The theory is basic in nature: if at the present time the price of the most important food product is raised, in the interest of ensuring profitability, then a social upheaval is simply inevitable. Given the present price for raw materials, the cost for a loaf of bread may jump not to 10 but rather to 20-30 rubles. And it is not known if this will be the last limit. Thus for the impoverished layers of the population, this could be a sentence to a half-starved existence. Even if fixed prices are maintained for our black bread, we still will not be able to manage without a budgetary subsidy.

It bears mentioning that nobody from the oblast administration was in attendance at this meeting, which touched upon the vital interests of all of the oblast's residents. And thus the participants addressed an appeal to the oblast leaders in which the true situation with regard to the availability of bread for the population was expressed and measures were proposed for stabilizing it.

In particular, we have in mind here the creation of a coordination council headed by B. Ivanov that would include the leaders of those state and commercial structures that are associated with the deliveries of bread products.

It was also stated in the appeal that if the mentioned problems are not resolved before 15 March, the baking industry enterprises, having become bankrupt, would halt production operations in conformity with the law of the Russian Federation entitled: "Enterprises and Entrepreneurial Activity." And this was not an idle threat. Actually, the bread products association had already sent an official telegram to "Chitakhlebprom" stating that no longer can flour be shipped to the association's enterprises in the absence of advance payment.

Yeltsin Representative: Economic Reform Moving 'Slowly'

924C1234C Chita-tsentr ZABAYKALSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 11 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by V. Andreyev: "Detailed Discussion"]

[Text] A detailed and important discussion was held on Monday in the Editorial Office of ZABAYKALSKIY RABOCHIY with a representative of the president of Russia, S. Samoylov. The discussion took place during a

meeting with a group of journalists from the oblast's largest newspaper. Workers representing other mass media organizations also participated in this meeting.

The president's representative discussed in detail his operational methods and gave his opinion regarding the course of the economic reform in the oblast, which S. Samoylov believes is "encountering difficulties" and is still not enjoying any special success. The guest of the Editorial Office noted in particular that the land reform is slipping badly. Other aspects of the changes taking place, especially those which are argumentative, were touched upon during the discussion.

Samoylov evaluated the extremely difficult political situation confronting the country on the eve of the regular Congress of People's Deputies of Russia.

Agricultural Production in Decline

924C1234D Chita-tsentr ZABAYKALSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 11 Mar 92 p 1

[Interview with M. Kalashnikov, head of the Petrovsk-Zabaykalskiy Rayon Administration, by correspondent R. Oleynik: "But Sowing Is Necessary"]

[Text] The situation in our country is becoming more alarming. At the present time, we are concerned not only with how we live today, but also with what awaits us tomorrow. Will there be a famine, since the kolkhozes and sovkhozes are being reorganized, and do the new formations make any sense?

Our correspondent, R. Oleynik, held a discussion on this subject with M. Kalashnikov, head of the Petrovsk-Zabaykalskiy Rayon Administration.

[Oleynik] Mikhail Ivanovich, what is the situation at the present time in agriculture throughout the rayon? Generally speaking, are the city-dwellers aware, based upon the high prices for agricultural products, that the situation there is not very good?

[Kalashnikov] Yes, I am unable to offer any comforting thoughts. Production is declining and the sales of milk, meat and wool have fallen off. How could there by any increase if over the past five years the number of cattle has decreased from 15,000 to 12,000, the number of hogs and sheep has declined by almost twofold and there are considerably fewer cows. Some farms have generally eliminated sheep breeding and yet those who retained it, for example the Sibir Kolkhoz, are realizing greater profit at the present time.

Unfortunately, no success is being realized in halting the decline in the production of agricultural products, since there has been a sharp drop in the availability of electric power and other resources. Moreover, the prices for these resources have skyrocketed. Although wages in agriculture have increased, they nevertheless are still miserly compared to that being paid to miners, metallurgists and lumberjacks—amounting to an average of 400-600 rubles—at the Russian pension level.

[Oleynik] At the present time, there are essentially no kolkhozes or sovkhozes in the rayon. How are they now being referred to?

[Kalashnikov] Reporting and election meetings were held on all of the farms. A typical feature of these meetings—the people do not wish to work alone and thus they favor collective forms of labor organization. Thus, five cooperatives for the production of milk, meat and wool and also a construction and a commercial cooperative were created at the Unginskiy Kolkhoz. A land and property share was given to each kolkhoz member and all signed a declaration attesting to their joining the cooperative and naturally they brought their shares with them.

Five subunits were organized at the Peski Sovkhoz. At the Sibir Kolkhoz, during a reporting and election meeting, the decision was made to work as in the past, but with the kolkhoz being converted into a joint-stock company. The Pobeda Kolkhoz is now a people's enterprise. Even more complicated is the situation at the Tarbagatayskiy Sovkhoz, which became bankrupt after failing to pay off a loan. The central branch decided to leave the sovkhoz and open up its own account, while other decidedly weaker branches have still not stated their position.

In short, reason triumphed—the people do not wish to scamper about and so we will see just how they are doing in their new associations and cooperatives.

[Oleynik] This disbandment has been followed by numerous meetings, so much so that spring sowing has been almost forgotten. Do you not have some fears in this regard?

[Kalashnikov] Certainly, the sowing work will be carried out under more complicated conditions than was the case in past years, since the situation with regard to obtaining fuel and fertilizer will be more difficult. However, I believe that our machine operators must maintain their sense of responsibility, since indeed you reap what you sow. The grain crops will be sown at the same level as that for last year, that is, on 12,500 hectares. All of the opportunities are available for satisfying fully the city's requirements for potatoes and vegetables. Roughly 1,200 tonnes of fertilizer have already been delivered to the farms, with additional reserves available at the agrochemical storehouses. True, fertilizer is very expensive. One quintal of carbamide costs almost 650 rubles. Fuel is becoming more expensive and at the present time we are accumulating it for use during the sowing operations. The situation is good at those farms which have containers for storing it. As always, the situation with regard to spare parts is difficult. True, we are engaging in bartering with the tractor plants and we have acquired some items from them. It is my belief that peasant ingenuity will also aid the machine operators in extricating themselves from a difficult situation.

Eighty percent of our seed is certified and we are carrying out an exchange with other rayons. Eighty-six percent of

the tractor pool has been prepared for the sowing campaign and yet the situation in connection with the restoration of tractor-drawn equipment is somewhat more complicated.

[Oleynik] Mikhail Ivanovich, the city-dwellers are quite disturbed over the high price for milk—13 rubles per liter and they feel that they are being fleeced by the farms. What is the problem here?

[Kalashnikov] The farms are selling it for 7 rubles and 20 kopecks and it is after this that various mark-ups take place. In order to eliminate the latter, direct contacts must be sought and the work carried out without middlemen. Thus the Sibir Kolkhoz planned to sell its milk directly at a metallurgical plant. A discussion is underway regarding the creation by the metallurgical plant of a joint enterprise with the Peski Sovkhoz. We support this initiative. We already have positive experience in the creation of an SP [sovmestnoye predpriyatiye; joint enterprise], consisting of a meat combine and the Petrovskiy Sovkhoz. If the city applies itself with understanding to the needs of the rural areas, everyone will profit and we will overcome the crisis more rapidly.

Murmansk Oblast Soviet Reviews Economic Situation

924C1210A Murmansk POLYARNAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by V. Sidorin, under rubric: "Session of the Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies": "Don't Let the Steam Get to the Whistle"]

[Text] Yesterday a special session of the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies considered the question "The Socioeconomic Situation in Murmansk Oblast." As everyone knows, the oblast admininstration and the oblast soviet of trade unions came forth with the initiative to conduct a session with this agenda. We might recall the factors that necessitated the conducting of the session.

Recently, especially this year, there has been in the oblast a clearly discernible tendency toward an economic slump and a lowering of the population's standard of living. The volume of industrial production in 1992, as compared with the corresponding period last year, dropped by more than 12 percent. Many enterprises in industry, construction, agriculture, and transportation have proven to be on the brink of bankruptcy. The sharp decrease in the budgetary appropriations to the enterprises in the military-industrial complex led to a considerable reduction in the number of personnel, and transformed those enterprises into centers of social tension.

The lack of guaranteed shipments of food products and the difficulties in establishing direct ties with producers of agricultural output in the CIS states have completely devastated the consumer market. The commodity reserves have dropped below the critical level as stated in the standards.

The government's rigid economic policy, against a background of free prices for most of the consumer commodities and services, has put the oblast's entire budgetary sphere into a critical position. Repeated appeals by the oblast leadership to the Supreme Council, the government of the Russian Federation, and the President of Russia have been ignored.

Before this session I asked several deputies the same question: "What do you expect from the session?" The opinions expressed by V. S. Belousov and V. F. Khakimov practically coincided: we do not expect any specific decisions, since at this moment neither the oblast nor the center are ready for them. It is not precluded that there might be deputies with an opposing opinion. But V. V. Lunevich, deputy chairman of the oblast country, was justifiably concerned at having the session proceed along constructive lines, since certain movements have expressed complete opposition to convoking it.

Then Ye. B. Komarov, the head of the oblast administration, gave his report, followed by the first statements. But the sense of vagueness—which prompted this discussion—apparently still prevailed in many people. Judge for yourself. It is one thing to "beat out" the latest decree from the government of Russia (because it was precisely a draft of this decree that the administration presented—"Expanding the Rights of the Administration of Murmansk Oblast in Resolving Urgent Socioeconomic Problems"). But it is a completely different thing to attempt in a well-argumented way to defend the Northerners from the "raging" market, with a consideration of the peculiarities of the economic (raw-materials) and geographic situation of the region, and to sharpen the attention once again on whether the North of Russia is needed.

In the break between the individual meetings of the session, one of the deputies, in a conversation in the lobby, expressed it this way: "We don't want the steam to get to the whistle." I could not refrain from opening up my notes and showing the deputy where I had written the very same phrase. Incidentally, the discussion is not yet over.

In the course of the further debate, the participants of which included not only the deputies, but also representatives of trade unions and political parties, various opinions were also expressed with regard to both the socioeconomic situation and the proposed resolutions. Incidentally, the session participants had three drafts of the resolution for this question. But where did the session end?

There is no sense, or even any possibility, of paraphrasing the contents of the document that was adopted. But these are a few of the principles stated in it. Taking into consideration the ineffectiveness of the repeated attempts by the oblast administration to get the government to implement B. N. Yeltsin's 28 May order, the proposal is made to the government of the Russian Federation to adopt by 25 March 1992 the decree

governing the expansion of the rights of the administration of Murmansk Oblast, which guarantees a regulated and controllable process of changing over the oblast's national economy to market relations. It is recommended to the oblast administration and to the small soviet of the oblast soviet to modify, within a two-month period, the package of documents concerning the special economic status of Murmansk Oblast. Yu. A. Yevdokimov, chairman of the oblast soviet, is given the responsibility of acting as the initiator of the convoking of the RSFSR people's deputies within the framework of the Association of the Northwest Region (11 territories) for elaborating a common position for considering, at the 6th Session of the People's Deputies of the Russian Federation, the question linked with the problems of developing the northern rayons of Russia under conditions of the changeover to market relations.

As we can see, it does not contain those categorical notes that were previously heard emanating from individual deputies—the need to prepare for a regional strike, etc. That is, the deputy conference smoothed out the sharp angles. But what did the voters, including the readers of POLYARNAYA PRAVDA, receive from the special session, or, rather, from its first stage (its second state will be held at the end of this month)? For the time being, the latest in a series of decisions. Is this sufficient to assure that, under the very difficult market conditions, our life will be better? Of course not. Is there any hope of improvement? There would seem to be: everyone realizes that it's easy to talk about making an improvement, but it's another matter to actually do it. And what if we are actually talking about doing something, that is, if we are talking about life itself? Alas, there is also no enthusiasm. Wouldn't it be nice if every decision that we make, and particularly every law, actually went into effect.

Low Sanitary Standards in Moscow Pose 'Catastrophic' Threat

924C1204A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Apr 92 p 4

[Interview with Dr. V. Vinogradova by Igor Mosin: "Will the SES Carry Out a 'Disinfection' of the Moscow Government?"; date and place not given]

[Text] **If urgent measures are not taken to regulate trade in the capital, epidemic diseases may break out.**

"It is simply impossible to tolerate such a situation any longer," says V. Vinogradova, deputy chief physician at the Moscow Center of Gossanepidnadzor [State Sanitary-Epidemiological Inspectorate]. "If you want to call a spade a spade, the sanitary-epidemiological situation in the capital is on the brink of disaster. Judge for yourself. In February alone, the level of gastro-intestinal ailments has doubled. The number of people suffering from dysentery has increased by a factor of 2.5. The growth rate of salmonella sufferers is steadily increasing. In the first three months of this year alone, 40 cases of botulism were recorded. The chief cause of these ailments is homemade foodstuffs, and canned mushrooms in particular. Their sale is, in general, banned. But who pays any attention to the rules these days?

"Not long ago our service [Sanitary-Epidemiological Service; SES] conducted a raid on places where large quantities of foods were being peddled. The situation was terrible. We took for analysis meat, milk, lard, and home-canned products. Consider this: 50 percent of these foods were unsuitable for use in any form.

"But the greatest danger for us still lies ahead. Warm days are coming. Highly-perishable foods—milk, pastry and meat products—will quickly become unfit. But you see, it's quite clear that the merchants will try to get them off their hands by fair means or foul."

[Mosin] But Vera Sergeevna, that is exactly why your service exists, in order to prevent such scandals. Forgive me, but which way are you looking?

[Vinogradova] Moscow is turning into one big unsanitary second-hand goods market, with the complete tolerance of the capital authorities—Popov and Luzhkov. We have been appealing to the Moscow authorities to put things in order from the very first day of the government decree on free trade. But they have completely ignored our appeals. Moreover, Moscow Mayor Gavrill Popov has signed an instruction on the elimination of our preventive inspections. As a result, in recent times 46 places have been put into operation without our permission. Not in one single civilized country in the world, which our city fathers love to say, is there such lawlessness and arbitrariness.

Here is a recent example. The Busilovskiy Fast-Frozen Foods Combine has been in operation since January of this year. They are producing frozen ground meat for children, which is going to the schools. Our service has not approved this combine, and we have no control over the preparation of the ground meat. Gossanepidnadzor has banned its sale in the schools.

[Mosin] It just doesn't sink in. It seems to me that your service and the city authorities must ensure purity in the city; otherwise there will be big problems.

[Vinogradova] Yes, unfortunately that is so. And Muscovites will suffer from these problems. You may have noted that not long ago the Moscow government expressed a lack of confidence in the city's chief sanitary officer, Dr. N. Shestopalov—our leader. Luzhkov accused our entire service of being rife with corruption.

What is the root cause of such opposition? Previously our service was subordinate to the city authorities. But presently, we are directly subordinate to republic authorities. Therefore, the city authorities are unhappy that we are forcing them to observe all the norms.

[Mosin] Well all the same, what is to be done?

[Vinogradova] Our suggestions have lain for a long time at the Moscow government, and at the government of Russia as well: to forbid peddler trade in highly-perishable products, to allot special places for trade and forbid peddler trade in certain kinds of foodstuffs, and so on. The power structure now has the ball in its court.

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Kravchuk View of CIS Supported

92UN1126A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian 1 Apr 92 p 3

[Comments by Anatoliy Fedorov: "With the CIS and Without It"]

[Text] It is perfectly natural that the Kiev meeting of heads of the CIS members is at the center of the attention of the world press. It seems normal also that the further fate of the Commonwealth is being linked with the positions of Ukraine and Russia. More precisely, with the relationship of these two states. True, the Russian press frequently terms the position of the Ukrainian side unconstructive. It is obviously referring to the desire for the building of its own armed forces, adherence precisely to the current borders, noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, and the pursuit of an equal economic policy.

We would not call Ukraine's actions entirely without fault (if there are indeed such in interstate relations) but an endeavor to talk with anyone as an equal can only be welcomed. In addition, L. Kravchuk has emphasized that that same Russia operates in its own interests and in accordance with the situation. Yeltsin's team should not, therefore, be accused of some ill-intentioned steps. But Ukraine also has the right to an independent line based on the requirements of its people and appropriate to the circumstances.

Everyone agrees that the CIS has made practically no progress in its development from the Belovezhskaya to the Kiev meeting. The reasons are seen to lie in the nonfulfillment of the accords. But, in our opinion, this is the effect rather than the cause. And the origins of the instability are more deeply hidden.

The majority of joint decisions may be termed statements of intent, which define the wishes of the participants in the Commonwealth. They do not contain precise mechanisms of realization, guarantees, or liability for violation of the agreements. The political nature of the very existence of the CIS is not based on an economic platform as yet. The attempts of Ukraine, on the other hand, and other participants to switch from word to deed are coming up against the ambiguous position of Russia.

This is determined by the fact that the Russian Federation on the one hand supports the strengthening and continued development of the CIS and, on the other, (consciously or unconsciously, manifestly or secretly) is attempting to reserve for itself the rights of the former center.

A historical understanding of the irreversibility of the processes of the creation of sovereign states does not come easily. This is perceived particularly upon implementation of the uncoordinated liberalization of prices, a new jump in which is scheduled for 1 April. It is not hard to see what this threatens.

In addition, having proclaimed itself the successor of the former USSR, Russia has individually appropriated a substantial portion of assets not only in the center of the former Union but overseas as well. All attempts to discuss this problem as equals are encountering a thick wall of reluctance to recognize each country's right both to the debts and to the assets.

It may upon close study be concluded that Russia is attempting to solve its problems at the expense of the other members of the CIS to some extent. The mechanism of such calculations is understandable: strongly tied to the economic potential of the Russian Federation, the Central Asian states, for example, have simply been forced for the time being to follow Russia. But this cannot continue indefinitely.

For this reason Ukraine's actions seem better thought out, more balanced and realistic and geared to the future. L. Kravchuk, it seems, was the first to understand that the CIS cannot be a self-sufficient formation and that it is essential to truly operate at the international level. The president of Ukraine does not wish his state to be dependent on any ill-considered political decisions or some people's personal ambitions. At the same time L. Kravchuk believes that the other Commonwealth partners have the right to act similarly also.

Thus the definition of the CIS as a "dream" is as of the present the most accurate. And although at the Kiev meeting practically all its participants expressed a desire to embody the dream in reality, this prospect appears quite problematical.

At the same time all ties to the former republics of the USSR will not, most likely, be severed immediately, this would be both painful and dangerous. The president of Ukraine will evidently have, therefore, to seek a path between a civilized lengthy divorce and a really well-conceived independent policy for the good of the people of Ukraine.

Russia Faulted in CIS Stalemate

92UN1126B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 31 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Butkevich, PRAVDA UKRAINY political observer: "What Is the CIS?"]

[Text] An old anecdote talks about the torments of political-educational work among new recruits. The commander had assembled the men and had begun to elicit from them what was meant by the motherland. Ivanov did not know, Petrov did not know, Sidorov did not know... Yegorov was better prepared and replied: "The motherland is my mother." The commander was delighted that so "complex" a task was finally accomplished and, guided by the elementary principles of pedagogical science, decided to repeat the question in

order for the men to assimilate Yegorov's correct answer. The poor teacher did not know that he and the soldiers had a different logic of thought. And to the next question: "Denisov, what is the motherland?" the latter replied: "The motherland is Yegorov's mother."

During the Kiev meeting of heads of state of the CIS one sharp-witted journalist decided to repeat the said experiment with the presidents of the CIS republics. He asked all of them the one question: "What is the CIS?" The responses of many were at the "I don't know" level. L. Kravchuk replied: "It is a dream." More "moderate" answers followed. N. Nazarbayev: "The Commonwealth is not simply a dream but a necessity." R. Nabiyev: "We need to ensure that the Commonwealth changes from a dream into reality" and so on and so forth.

Why was it so difficult for the heads of state to define what the CIS is? The answer, I believe, may be found if we analyze the goals being pursued by each at the time of formation of the CIS. They were all endeavoring to have done with the center, of which everyone had long since had enough. But everyone saw the new formation in his own way. B.N. Yeltsin, for example, wanted to replace the center with a new hierarchical formation under the aegis of Russia. L.M. Kravchuk saw the CIS as an interstate formation of sovereign, independent republics, that is, an international organization.

Given such opposite positions, a mutually acceptable result cannot be found, just as a hungry wolf cannot be reconciled with a sheep. Compromises among the latter would be contrary to the laws of nature. From the very start of the formation of the CIS neither B.N. Yeltsin nor L.M. Kravchuk had a chance of igniting therein even a spark of life.

Yeltsin naively believed that it was sufficient to eliminate the all-Union bodies, and the republics would rest content. But this was tantamount to hoping to cure an ulcer merely by cutting through its rotten apex.

The intention of creating an interstate formation of equal, independent, sovereign republics was an impracticable dream. International organizations are created where interstate relations have become so complex and interwoven that an auxiliary organization for their regulation is essential. The intrastate legal system of administration, which functions mainly on the principle of subordination, and the international system, whose main principle is coordination, must not be confused here.

Intrastate hierarchical relations controlled from a single Union center in fact existed between the republics. The elimination of the center meant the elimination of the organs of administration, not the particular features of the relations. Thus the result was the formation of the CIS, which was to function on the principle of the coordination of relations, and the relations themselves are geared to subordination. It is not surprising that the CIS has found itself in the role of chance visitor observing how the old structures are disintegrating.

If the CIS was set the tasks of regulating relations between republics, it visited us too soon. In order that the republics might create a real interstate organization it is essential to establish between them equal, close, and stable economic, political, and other relations. Today such relations are merely at the startup stage. This is why even the agreements which have already been concluded are not being fulfilled. There are no relations—the rule of law even does not operate. There is a bilateral treaty between Russia and Ukraine, say, but no result. An international treaty can regulate merely equal relations, but Russia does not wish to accede to this. As a result the treaty provisions have become, at best, hollow intentions. No bilateral agreements are operating, practically, because they have not been provided with a realization mechanism.

Hoping that all may be resolved in circumvention of the stage of the startup of bilateral relations (for which it was that the CIS was created) is the equivalent of building communism in circumvention of capitalism. The first to grasp this, apparently, was Russia, which quickly began to establish bilateral relations with Kazakhstan, Byelarus, and other republics. But these are the relations of diktat, pressure, and conditions. Until Ukraine wakes up and offers its own equal relations, the seat could prove taken. It is understandable that Russia, having inherited everything from the USSR, the administrative command system included, can influence the other republics more effectively. But the idea of equality and independence, to which Ukraine adheres, is more attractive, after all. And the main thing here is not to sleep but to act decisively and purposefully.

Two opposite trends will, evidently, continue to be manifested. Russia will hardly renounce its imperial plans to bring back the "errant" republics under its jurisdiction. We must in this direction be prepared for an economic boycott, attempts to bring down the financial and banking system, and a customs war, and wholly unconcealed interference in internal affairs also.

Ukraine's sole solution is to seek economic independence consists of the accelerated creation of a national economic system and an industry, agriculture, infrastructure, and so forth independent of Russia [sentence as published]. The republic is not alone in this movement. Other members of the former USSR have found themselves in the same situation. Developing bilateral, equal, mutually profitable relations with them, Ukraine will be able to resist the intrigues of its big neighbor. And time will tell. If the republics are able to develop their bilateral relations in such a way that a multilateral agreement becomes necessary, the conditions for a real commonwealth could have matured also, perhaps. It is entirely possible that by this time Russia as well, having seen the futility of its hegemonist plans, would associate itself with the republics on the terms observed upon entry into a civilized community.

But meanwhile the CIS is an Endeavor To Impose Hegemony by the Northern Unpredictable Giant.

Kravchuk Acts Called Unconstitutional

92UN1147A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 3 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Sokol, PRAVDA UKRAINY parliamentary observer: "The President's Answer: Constitutional Scandal Brewing in Parliament"]

[Text] The situation looked bright a week ago. President Kravchuk's unconstitutional actions were discussed, wryly, in the lobbies of parliament. But a couple of days ago the subject was brought out in the open, at a news conference. And now there is an official hearing and, what is worse, it is by the parliamentary Commission on Questions of Legislation and Legality, with the participation of other commissions. Also in attendance, naturally, was a representative of the president's legal service.

The legislators gathered together all the documents of the president of Ukraine which he had published during his first two days and which, in their opinion, exceed the presidential authority and contradict the Constitution. The list turned out to be surprisingly long and from time to time it was troubling. Understandably, it is not easy to create one's own statehood. But how many "flaws" have to be repeated, and are they always inevitable?

Most frequently the members of parliament turned to the State Duma created by the president. The Duma was at the center of the disputes. In the documents published by the president it was described as a social organ and the creation of such a structure is within the rights of the president. The deputies—and a large number of them—describe it as an organ of state power (it was created by the Supreme Soviet and only by it). The arguments: Those working here are not public officials but people working for a wage, and a good one at that. The leader of the president's legal service showed that the Duma is a consultative organ, an organ for strategic developments, as a result of which it is not governmental or managerial. Members of parliament do not agree with that and point out that the president's documents include the Duma in the system of state executive power, and it is headed by the president and his deputy is the prime minister...

Both sides, if one may call them that, were represented by lawyers, and their discussion, understandably, was about details and fine points. But they are not of the essence. Legal flaws and "slips" can be eliminated. What is much more serious is seeing the deputies in opposition to the Cabinet of Ministers. That such a threat is real was shown by the recent news conference of Deputy Prime Minister V. Lanovoy. Criticizing the fundamentals of the national economic policy of Ukraine which were considered by the Supreme Soviet and one of the president's ukases, Vladimir Lanovoy repeatedly noted: These questions were not discussed in the government—they are the work of the Duma. Here how can one fail to heed the warning that the "supplementary" Cabinet of Ministers, led by the president, could bring anarchy into the system of executive power!

The deputies also focused on the following: Of the four leaders of Duma boards, three are people's deputies of Ukraine, and two head up other parliamentary commissions at the same time. The conclusion: The combination of legislative and executive power is unconstitutional. The reply—"The Constitution does not prohibit a people's deputy from being a state adviser"—seemed unconvincing. The law requires that even the president's representative relinquish his deputy authority, that is, even at the local level. There is no need to speak of the state level.

A. Kotsyuba, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Commission on Questions of Legislation and Legality, presented this idea: If the State Duma counteracts the Cabinet of Ministers, it is actually the same thing as the recent Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, which did not require or recommend but actually was the legislator. The analogy is questionable. But such a pointed wording of the issue shows how important it is to clearly define the framework of the authority of the Duma and not to allow it to be transformed into a state organ.

The parliamentary commission scrupulously, sometimes captiously analyzed the changes made by the president in the structure of the government and his ukases on new ministries. Doubts were expressed about the expediency of combining the Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties and the Ministry of Trade, and individual undertakings were also questioned. The ethical side of the matter was even touched upon with respect to personnel changes. But the main complaint was that he exceeded his authority and violated constitutional norms.

It seems that the main grounds for this was the lack of correspondence between the changes in the Constitution related to the presidency and the decree of the Supreme Soviet which recommended that the president make changes in the structure of government. At times points were stretched in order to make accusations. Along with these, however, there was also substantiated criticism.

The president's ukase on the appointment of the new justice minister is indicative of this. According to the constitution, this minister—unlike the others—is approved by the Supreme Soviet. The president, however, remembered this after the ukase had already been published. Then he rescinded the ill-fated ukase and addressed the parliament after the fact, but these actions do not change the essence of what transpired. The more so since, in an analogous situation, he exceeded his authority in appointing the minister of foreign economic ties and trade.

The people's deputies had run up against the willfulness of the president before when, in spite of the constitutional requirements, by an ukase he combined the ministries of public and higher education and appointed the minister of the newly formed organ. There was no official discussion of this within the walls of the Supreme Soviet. Parliament never adopted a resolution regarding

this—it did not reach the point of damaging relations. But now they are feeling much more exacting.

During the course of the meeting of the Commission on Questions of Legislation and Legality it was reported that the president had allowed deviations from the constitutional norms concerning questions of taxation, when forming the banking structure, and when he granted special rights to Sevastopol. Complaints were lodged against him about the establishment of different wages in the arbitration organs and the people's courts and in the legal services of the president and the Supreme Soviet. One cannot agree with everything that was said in the Commission; certain deputies were too zealous in their accusations. But the problem that was raised is extremely important for the rule-of-law state that is being constructed.

Our past life has left us a legacy that is no better. Our attachments, our habits must be broken. Previously everything was unquestioningly blamed on the higher-ups, but now unfettered democracy is shaking everybody up. The deputies allow themselves to be disrespectful to the president; they keep him waiting for an hour or more (where else is such a thing seen!) in parliament—they do not give him the floor because they are "warming up" at the microphone. The president, losing his composure, shouts to the Supreme Soviet: "I did not come here to answer questions!" And yet we are just beginning to create statehood and there is a great deal we do not know. We will not achieve our goal by throwing stones at one another, not to mention tombstones.

The economy and the growing social tension require exceptional actions. The president cannot drag his feet. What he was accused of was not deliberate but the result of haste and his colossal work load. But the Constitution is the Constitution, and the demand for it to be observed is strict everywhere. The members of parliament cannot be reproached for this. But a great deal depends on the parliament as well and on the aptness of its decisions. And it is simply incomprehensible why it is holding up and not publishing the already adopted law on changes in the Constitution, which would untie the hands of the president.

The results of the discussion in the Commission still have to be considered by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Two paths are possible after this: Either the problems will be resolved by the president or the parliament will dot the "i." Everything depends on the president's answer.

Khmara Interviewed on Political Beliefs

92UN1147B Kiev VECHERNIY KIYEV in Russian 2 Apr 92 p 2

[Interview with Stepan Khmara, people's deputy of Ukraine, by Svetlana Sinyakova, editor of the political department; place and date not given: "The Putsch Has Been Quelled. The Putsch Continues"]

[Text] **The events in the political arena of Ukraine sometimes remind one of a performance in which the main director brings out onto the stage first one group of actors, then another, each of which plays his role, which the spectators do not know about ahead of time. But there are also exceptions. Among them, in particular, is Ukraine People's Deputy Stepan Khmara.**

[Sinyakova] Stepan Ilich, at one time you wrote a draft resolution on banning the activity of the Communist Party in Ukraine. This was almost a month before the August putsch. Now you have delved into Armenian problems and even developed a real military doctrine. Is this not because previously the empire was held together by the CPSU, which had its own armed detachments—the KGB—and now an analogous role must be played by the common armed forces, whose legal status was determined at the Kiev meeting of the heads of the CIS countries?

[Khmara] I am very much disturbed by the fact that with the disappearance of the Center and the proclamation of Russia as the successor to the USSR, it automatically became the leader of the CIS and is imposing its view of the future on Ukraine. This is known to everyone who reads the newspapers or the reports from Ostankino, where they sing praises to Russian greatness and the thousand-year state stretching from the White Sea to the Black Sea. And politicians have additional information as well. Thus at an expanded meeting of the Supreme Soviet Commission on Questions of Defense and Security—where on the eve of the Kiev meeting representatives of several other commissions of the Supreme Soviet, leaders of the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, SB [expansion not given], commanders of districts and armies, and representatives of the military-industrial complex had gathered—I suggested not giving any consideration to the package of documents pertaining to troops and arms. Since they contradict the interests of Ukraine. And another proposal was that our delegation resolutely raise as question number one at the meeting the division of the property of the former USSR. And that we not participate in any other discussions until this question was resolved.

We can and must divide up the assets and liabilities, the gold and diamond supply, credits and debts, and so forth. But this certainly does not mean that we can and should divide up, say, the Black Sea Fleet. This fleet in general is not a subject of negotiations with other states because it is the property of Ukraine. All the ships were assigned to Ukrainian ports as of 1 December and all military property should be declared the property of Ukraine. The "zero option" is the fair resolution to the Ukrainian-Russian conflict.

[Sinyakova] Did you receive support?

[Khmara] From certain military people—yes. Just one agreement on the status of the strategic forces of the CIS signed in Minsk at the third meeting did damage to the creation of a Ukrainian army capable of defending

Ukraine. Strategic forces cast doubt on our very independence. For when you choose a partner for yourself you must think about with whom and against whom you are uniting. Yes, the Union has collapsed. But only de jure. De facto it has existed and does exist. The imperial structures have not been fully dismantled, particularly the army of the former USSR. And the Kiev meeting showed that this army is able to dictate its policy to the CIS.

[Sinyakova] Do you recall the euphoria after the failure of the August putsch in Moscow? It seemed that democracy had triumphed completely, once and for all. The Supreme Soviet of Ukraine adopted an Act of Independence. It created the Gaysin commission to investigate official crimes during the putsch in Ukraine. The president of the Supreme Soviet declared the activity of the Communist Party of Ukraine to be illegal—as far as I know, only one member of the presidium voted against this resolution—Kotsyuba. But subsequent events showed that this was only a smoke screen behind which the cause of the putschists—the nomenklatura elite—was living and winning.

[Khmara] I look on this somewhat differently. The revenge of the Communist Party forces, the "silent conspiracy," began long before the August events—as early as the autumn of 1990. They took the real power in Ukraine securely into their own hands. Through all the state structures, above all the Cabinet of Ministers of Vitold Fokin. And therefore the banning of the Communist Party of Ukraine for its criminal activity did not lead to a situation where charges were filed against its leaders. Moreover, a considerable number of people's deputies who headed up management structures of the Communist Party of Ukraine are still in the Supreme Soviet. And this is why cadre problems are not being resolved along the vertical. Which, in turn, makes it impossible to make structural changes or conduct the political and economic reform and the reform of the legal system. Not a single criminal case was brought against those members of the nomenklatura who frankly and openly backed the supporters of the State Committee for the State of Emergency. And this is the main reason why we cannot get past go.

Let me give this example. The conclusions of the Gaysin commission concerning the Ministry of Internal Affairs caused mistrust of the entire collegium of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. But the strange thing—or perhaps it was not so strange—is that the internal affairs minister, Comrade Vasilishin, received a token of gratitude from the president: the high rank of colonel general. The same thing happened with other highly placed bureaucrats in the militia—the greatest reactionaries were promoted in rank and position.

[Sinyakova] Well, a state of emergency was not introduced in Ukraine and the wait-and-see position turned out to be safe in all respects. Although I have no doubt that if the situation in Moscow had changed, we would have seen the true faces of many people who are now going out of their way to distance themselves from the State Committee for the State of Emergency. But here is what bothers me. We are painfully familiar with the faces of those who actively fought the democratic "yellow and blue" process from the "blue" screen. Unlike certain other officials, they were unable to "recant," destroy, or conceal their public statements in defense of reaction. But Okhmakevich's Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] became Okhmakevich's Television and Radio Company, and such odious journalists as, for example, Pasak, were promoted. During the times of the Communist Party of Ukraine Pasak, for example, could not rise above the position of editor in chief no matter how hard he tried, and now—he is in the director's chair. And this, in my view, is a very eloquent fact which shows that democracy has not triumphed in Ukraine but, on the contrary, has suffered a defeat.

[Khmara] Why just democracy? What about Ukraine? The tendency you spoke of with reference to the Radio and Television Company exists in all structures. The government and the prime minister are personally conducting a clearly anti-Ukrainian policy, reshuffling the old nomenklatura. The bureaucrats are merely moving from one chair to another, but they always remain in power. The Communist Party mafia is feeling normal. And the president relies on it when dealing with the so-called democrats. I think that if the president continues to use such tactics in the future it will be necessary to raise the question of impeachment. Until the deputies' television sets blow up.

[Sinyakova] A transparent reference. But it seems to me that the majority of the deputy corps can boldly use both their television sets and their private cars. There are still too many people among us who were not tempted by various kinds of services, bonuses, titles, and other nice "trivia" for which one must pay with concessions to the bearers of the gifts. I am not surprised that certain deputies, who up to this point have gone places by foot as their ordinary constituents do, are now enjoying the fast ride in their own cars. Man is weak. Nor am I surprised by those who refused to buy a car since they never traveled on public transportation anyway. I am much more surprised by the information that you, Stepan Ilich, have never even bought a pair of socks through "deputy trade." What helps you to resist the many temptations?

[Khmara] I do not want to speak of others. Probably not every person is capable of passing the test of glory and power. But for me it is easy. Since I have only one temptation—freedom and independence and belief in God. But the deputies are human beings and they need the same things as everybody else does. It is another matter that we have not only failed to raise the standard of living of the people but we also failed to prevent its decline. Whether this is the personal fault of the deputy or not, against a background of poverty, I do not think anyone has the moral right to improve his own living conditions. Only a great readiness for sacrifice can save us from catastrophe. Under present conditions personal

comfort and the struggle for freedom are incompatible. We must live in the extreme, uncomfortable conditions in which our people are living.

[Sinyakova] Does it not seem to you that the defeat of the democrats in the Supreme Soviet, and not only there, began when they stuck their heads into the "lion's mouth"? I have in mind their participation in the structures of the totalitarian regime which gradually imposed on them their rules of the game and their customs, and, finally, broke them apart? There is no opposition in the parliament.

[Khmara] I anticipated this situation back when they were electing commission chairmen. I registered a protest. I called this shameful trade. I even wanted to resign from Narodnaya Rada.

[Sinyakova] They say there is no such thing as a prophet in his own homeland... You, incidentally, "prophesied" both the situation that developed during the presidential elections and the results of these elections. Your colleagues did not listen to you in this case. Were they incapable of predicting this, or did they not want to?

[Khmara] Probably both. In order to anticipate, one must have not only intuition but also experience in life and politics. Some do not have enough of the former, some of the latter. And we still frequently confuse politics with politicking. People say and write that politics is an immoral and dirty business. I think that politics is one of the most complex and the most difficult arts, which requires a colossal amount of work, a lot of time, and, of course, a flair for it, as is the case with any art. Therefore it is not politics which is dirty, but dirty people compromise and sully it. I am convinced that it is moral politics and only moral politics that can be good politics. Immoral politics, regardless of the finery in which it may be arrayed, always produces a bad result. Perhaps not immediately, but inevitably. And if the person who has devoted himself to politics makes gaining power his primary task, this is also dangerous and will frequently lead to negative consequences. Power is not the goal. I consider power to be a large and heavy cross to bear, which because of circumstances and by the will of God has been placed on the shoulders of mankind. And only when man accepts power as a heavy cross will his labor produce a good result.

[Sinyakova] Before the Third Rukh Congress Vyacheslav Chornovil's competitors reproached him for "lusting for power." I recall that at the Second Congress of the Republic Party Vyacheslav Maksimovich, while he was not a member of the Ukraine Republican Party, was given the floor as your personal opponent. Certain people hoped that you would take advantage of this forum of the Rukh Congress in order, as they say, to give them what was coming to them. But that did not happen.

[Khmara] And it could not happen. I am never guided by a feeling of revenge. And I would not want anybody to be able to interpret my speech as a settling of old scores. Moreover, I anticipated these dirty events and deliberately avoided participating in them.

I could not support either of the parties. The first—because it is absurd to assert that we have an independent state and all we have to do is unquestioningly support the president and his team. There must be a healthy opposition in any normal society. Then the authorities work better as well.

But I could not speak out for Chornovil either if I considered all his activity and not individual episodes taken out of context, if I recalled his inconsistent steps and mistakes.

[Sinyakova] You and an uncompromising person. Perhaps it is not worthwhile to bring certain things up for general discussion.

[Khmara] No. If we want progress tomorrow, we must talk today, prepare sociopolitical thought, be designers of society's behavior, and not be pulled around by events. We must influence events now and not analyze them later. It is easy to be wise with hindsight, to see mistakes and missed opportunities. But to prove unorthodox ideas is a thankless task. It is difficult to accept them.

My fate is to gather stones from various sides. And I have a sense of the drama and even the tragedy of my personality. But I do not intend to change anything. It is easier for me. I have never fought for power and I do not intend to fight for it. If during the elections to the Supreme Soviet certain of my friends had warned me: You are sounding too radical, these ideas frighten people—I would have responded that my main goal is not to obtain a mandate at any price and, thank God, I can communicate with people and work for the formation of sociopolitical thought. I explained to the voters that for me being a deputy was volunteering for a prison camp. And if they sanction that prison camp, I have no doubts about what awaits me in this Supreme Soviet: work, more work, and a great deal of unpleasantness... And that is what happened...

[Sinyakova] According to sociological data, the present Supreme Soviet enjoys among Kievans at least the same popularity as the Cabinet of Ministers does. That is, it is very doubtful. Very few voters intend to vote for their deputies a second time. But also the reputation of the parties—from the Socialist Party of Ukraine to the Greens—does not show that any of them will win with its slate in the elections to parliament. There is a critical shortage of politicians with high moral authority. And if there is something in the "second echelon"—nobody knows about it.

[Khmara] There is. It is in the people. I believe in the wisdom of the people. We have many talented, capable, decent people who are unknown, who do not have a particular image. We must look for them and help them. Unfortunately, a great deal depends on the management structures of our young parties which became ill as soon

as they were born. We must remember the kind of society they sprung from. For the existing system is a satanic system which, in spite of all its shortcomings in the economic, political, and other spheres, has achieved a great deal in order to carry out the devil's design. It has encroached on the holy of holies of the Creator—the human creator. It has set the goal of destroying man as a personality. And it has accomplished a great deal along this path. And this is the most terrible crime of this system. It is not only the result of the state policy of the communist regime but it also ensues from Marxist philosophy and ideology, which I equate with the philosophy of Satan. The cross section of society we are faced with is the result of destructive work. But the process of renewal has begun and it will continue, although with terrible suffering. If we analyze reality, we could possibly make it through the catastrophe. It is terrifying to speak about it, but there is justification for remembering this terrible danger.

But if we switch over to practical politics, I am very much afraid of elections on a multiparty basis. Under our conditions this would be a catastrophe in political life. Voices are already being heard: Each party will fight for power. We have seen what came of this in the presidential elections.

Instead of selecting the best, each party will try to put its own people in, even if they are no good. Destructive opposition will begin. We in Ukraine have not reached the point where we should have either a president or multiparty elections. It would be better if we would be satisfied with improving the existing law on elections and conduct them according to the territorial principle, without rejecting the right to nominate candidates in labor collectives where they know people better. We must select the best, irrespective of their party affiliation or whether they belong to a party at all. With the exception of members of the Socialist Party of Ukraine, that is the nomenklatura communist party. In general this party should be refused registration, including its present leader, Aleksandr Moroz, the former chairman of the notorious Group-239—charges should be brought against them for criminally impeding reforms in all spheres. Now they are feeling very calm, and they are even offended when people call things by their real names.

[Sinyakova] Once at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet I heard a question which never was answered: "What are we building?" The Russian press is convincing its readers that Ukraine is continuing to build socialism. Obviously, the barracks type. But what is your opinion?

[Khmara] Seriously, we are not building anything. The process of decay is simply continuing. The old Communist Party mafia retains the power in its hands, including at the government level. The president does not want to change the cadre policy either; he relies on the corrupt nomenklatura. And this policy of the president is leading Ukraine toward social destabilization, as a result of which there could be an explosion, a loss of independence, the collapse of society, and we would have to start all over again from the beginning. The foundation of the state must be laid quickly and with resolute actions. Then it will be possible to build and improve this state. But we have not done this. And with the cadres on whom the president is relying, Ukraine is doomed and the president himself is doomed.

I would like for God to send an insight to the president so that he will finally come to his senses. Unfortunately, the new appointments—the governor generals—speak for themselves. This is a reliance on reactionary forces. For the president has not repented of his sinful activity as a Communist Party activist. And without repentance he will probably never succeed. If he had done this the people would have forgiven him. And he would have cast off his chains. But Kravchuk is being cunning, and this could have fatal results. I, of course, would not want that...

Moroz Outlines Political Position

92UN1145A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian 2 Apr 92 p 6

[Article by Aleksandr Moroz, people's deputy of Ukraine and chairman of the Political Council of the Socialist Party of Ukraine: "Point of Reference—Labor Collectives"]

[Text] I shall try to assess the general situation. Obviously, we are in a stage of practical implementation of the turn toward a capitalist economy. This turn is being carried out in all spheres: political—through the elimination of the soviets as the representative organs of the popular will and their replacement with a vertical, authoritarian structure; economic—through the intention to transfer the capital accumulated by many generations to the hands of long-concealed newly rich; social—through the placement of the concerns related to social protection of the population on the shoulders of the people themselves; and spiritual—through the distortion of history and a search for new ideals under the guise of the rebirth of national self consciousness.

This turn has several peculiarities. One of them is that we did not actually have real socialism. I think we will have another chance to give a precise definition of the structure we had until recently and which had to be changed. But is this the right way?

Another peculiarity is that the turn is being made through the efforts of the people who supported the previous structure. Manifested here is not only the paradoxical nature of the situation but also evidence of the crisis of public morality and its distortion, which is shown in the behavior of many people, in their readiness for apostasy.

Note that the tension of the political confrontation today is noticeable not so much in essence and not so much among opponents as in form, the desire to prove one's

suitability for the new cause, and the fear of being suspected of conservatism. People are squabbling among themselves for the right to be called progressive. The effect of the "can of worms" is being manifested on both sides of the recent barricades. People have already forgotten about the barricades. Their main concern is to bite before they are bitten and thus to get ahead, gain strength, and fortify their positions. One must admit that it is a disgraceful picture. The cunningness of the preceding ideology has produced a poisonous harvest.

But it seems that the most typical sign of the period might be considered to be the fact that the political forces that oppose us have found ready allies among the present bureaucrats at all levels, businessmen, recent party secretaries, and deputies, as it were, the elite of society. This is probably because the elite are afraid of losing their "niche" in the hierarchy of duties, their place at the trough. And even if they do end up losing it, they want to hang on to it as long as possible.

The replacement of the authority structures will soon cast an even brighter light on each individual. We must be vigilant; after all, we ourselves are not to blame for the world we live in and we will be the ones who have to remake this society.

As you know, the president's first roundtable meeting was held recently. It showed that we have many parties but they are not very different. To say that the roundtable will be a catalyst for the consolidation of society is premature, although we would work to assign it that role. But even if it were a screen for the authorities, we would still sit down at it. For it is still a channel of information.

The roundtable, the Rukh meeting, and the president's practical actions show that he is indeed counting on Rukh, hoping to find support for himself there and to use its influence for his contemplated reforms. There is probably no need to turn to an analysis of the motives for this position. There will be plenty of time for that, although in and of itself it is not so important.

What is important is something that is possibly very rare if not unique in world history: A state leader has come to power relying on the majority of the population, on the influence of a political party he has banned, in spite of the clearly expressed opposition of the minority of the population, and, having come to power, he has joined forces with his opponents. It would be understandable if this were an attempt to unite society. But his thesis that Rukh is capable of doing this is erroneous. Ultimately, it will come to pass that with his power he will express the will and realize the intentions of the minority against the majority of the population. This policy is not likely to hold much promise for the president and it is not likely to be useful to the state or the people.

The lack of promise of this position was also confirmed by the Rukh meeting. Yes, it is indeed an influential political force. But it is so heterogeneous, so ready for a split (also along the lines of eliteness) that it is risky to rely on it. And the main thing is that Rukh was created for functions "against"—not "for." It prepared itself to destroy. And it is only in this direction that it has unity. It is not capable of building: either programs, or immediate plans, or ideas, or cadres. Thus the combination of real power and a political force oriented toward destruction will probably not lead to success. I would like for the president to come to this conclusion himself as quickly as possible.

Rukh is being radicalized. For this reason it is losing its unity as well. Those who consider themselves to be thinking constructively are trying to distance themselves from the radicals. The proof of this is the actual self-liquidation of Narodnaya Rada [People's Council] in the republic parliament and the creation of the New Ukraine association.

Time will tell whether this association has a future. But it interests us because it is the first attempt at independent action on the part of those who say they are capable of building a political structure. Everything we have observed previously was the realization of a substantiated plan that was developed and comprehensively financed mainly from abroad. This plan was directed toward the destruction of that which existed. The plan was fulfilled ahead of schedule. After that it became clear that there was no plan. Chornovil's "What next?" actually applies to the fate of Rukh, but this does not make a bit of difference to the state.

What was said previously contains an answer to this question: Why are we ("we"—as a community) always losing to Rukh? In the first place, we have not been losing. It exhausted its potential even before the August events, but it received a "gift" in the form of the State Committee for the State of Emergency from the hands of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, who motivated the people to choose independence. But now Rukh, which went into hiding during September-November in order not to "frighten" the population before the referendum, is trying to include these results among its assets, to take credit for the unity of Ukraine, the fact that the changes were made without bloodshed, and so forth. Although the specific actions of Rukh leaders and supporters after 1 December were actually opposed to the interests of Ukraine. In order to confirm this conclusion it is sufficient to analyze the actions concerning the army and navy, the introduction of the symbols, Khmara's trip to the Crimea, and so forth.

In the second place, Rukh (and all those associated with it) were operating according to the aforementioned plan. But to oppose a plan effectively takes another plan, even if it is imperfect. And they had none.

But now the positions are equalizing... there are no plans, especially in the sphere of economic reform. And here is where an advantageous situation for us is developing, if we do not drag our feet. For the economy is our sphere. It is a condition of social protection and social justice to rely on our slogans and goals. These are our social base and our cadres. Not to take advantage of this would be a

sin, an inadmissible mistake. The more so since the economy is a field for the struggle of ideas, plans, and practical steps that do not require any extremely cumbersome organizational support. Propose, persuade—and agitate for your results.

Therefore the most important requirement for us socialists is to work in the labor collectives. We must explain and help in the organization of the protection of the interests of the labor collectives, and through them—the entire population.

Above all this has to do with the participation of the collectives in the privatization of their enterprises. We must help them to draw up applications for privatization and anticipate the influence of representatives of the collectives in the commissions which will control the course of destatization. We must not allow, under the guise of deceptively charitable certification, large-scale "con artists" who are protected by the bureaucratic apparatus to make fools both of millions of people and of collectives who have created their production and national wealth through their labor.

Those who naively want to get rich, who hope thus to cancel the state debt to the people, should recall once again the true fact that the state has never lost in games of chance. This is why there is a need for a different direction of the law as a whole in order to find a niche for protection of the rights of the labor collective. If this happens and production operates efficiently—there will be something with which to strengthen the budget, to form social funds, and to fill the market with goods.

The situation is the same for the peasants who are alarmed about the reserve land fund. We must explain to them that the land cannot be taken away from the collective farms. That the part that today is being permanently used by the farms will remain with them. Moreover, 85 percent is being turned over to collective ownership.

That is the way it is written. But there are chinks in the Code where all kinds of speculation can slip through. Profit seekers close to power are already peering through them to grab up the best plots of land: the closest, the best, irrigated ones, the ones for which there will be a great demand in the future. For themselves, for their relatives, and for bribes...

While granting city dwellers the possibility of preserving their well-being and creating conditions for farming, we must not allow squandering of the land or neglect of it. We must remember that the problem of the countryside is the state's problem.

The forms of management and the forms of ownership are important. But the state's attitude toward the peasantry is of decisive importance. If it is such as it is in France (we shall use a rejoinder from a parliamentary discussion) then the land will be released and all forms will fully show their merit.

The "well-wishers" from among the former communists, having moved to different parties, are fighting the socialists hand and fist, looking for enemies of Ukraine among them. Understandably, they want to regain their equilibrium this way, to find justification for their extremism. But the advantage of the situation lies in the fact that our position is based on the vital interests of the majority of the population. And so those who are fighting against us are revealing their true intentions. They are defending the interests of three-five percent of the population who intend to line their pockets through privatization, the collapse of the kolkhozes, the elimination of the state from the regulation of the economy, and, hence, the wildfire development of monopolies, deficits everywhere, and catastrophic inflation. Consequently, they are fighting against the people!

Having taken over the mass media with the help of the leadership of the republic and oblasts (using parasitic means), our rivals, by defaming us, are doing a good deed: They are showing that they are afraid of us. They are afraid because the socialists are actually the only organization capable of telling the truth about what is happening around us. We can be proud of this mission, but we must also be guided by the need to carry it out.

At the Rukh meeting and at the roundtable there were many discussions about the opposition to the president and the ratio of priorities of human and state rights. In the mouths of I. Drach, M. Goryn, and M. Porovskiy... these subjects sounded different while still uniting them against the socialists' position. There is nothing surprising about the increased interest in these subjects. That is always the way it happens: When an idea is exhausted it is replaced by demagogy. They speak loudly so that people will not guess that they are not saying anything. For we have never absolutized the rights of the citizen of Ukraine, detaching them from the interests of the state. Conversely, while giving priority to these rights, we consider it necessary for all state creative steps to specify guarantees of human rights. What differences of opinion are there here?

Therefore for the nth time we suggest adopting, in addition to the Constitution, a Declaration of the Rights of the Citizen of Ukraine. So that the Constitution itself, the new laws and their embodiment, would have before them a specific point of reference—the concrete person.

There would not seem to be any objections to this position. But, as we can see, not everybody likes it. After all, how else can one explain the role of the state, which is deliberately preparing for mass unemployment, whose organs are ignoring the parliament's demand for finding jobs for the people whose activity has been terminated illegally? How does one explain the pandering to fascist youngsters in the "Ukrainian Piemonte" and the capital? How can one fail to see their planned preparation: trained, hired, outfitted? And as for the opposition... For some reason the president is not interested in this subject. I think it was premature. In any case, it has not affected socialists yet.

Understandably, today things are probably more difficult for the president than for anyone else. His first 100 days have been marked by efforts to create a state and to reinforce his power. That is probably the way it should be. But as he proceeds further it becomes clear that his "team" does not have enough sensible politicians who would contain interstate conflicts within the framework of the CIS. For too much time has been lost. For the president is surrounded by advisers who are guilty of just that. And disaster is at hand. Our nearest neighbor's house is already burning down. The only way to put out the fire is together. We are not doing that—we are left looking disaster in the face.

Nor are there enough economists capable of giving him suggestions and supporting his integrated effective program for economic reform.

One must admit that, while we share with our opponents identical initial positions for defending our approaches to reforming the economy, we lag behind in activity in other spheres of social life. Since we cannot hope for support from the "pluralistically minded" mass media, we have to count mainly on the living word. There is a need for it.

A mass attack has been waged on the formation (reformation) of the people's world view. Surprisingly, it is as though many journalists and cultural workers do not notice the fatal nature and the severe consequences of this attack.

Attempts to change history, to simply rehabilitate members of the UPA [Ukrainian Insurgent Army], the elimination of museums and monuments, and the renaming of streets became more than just a typical phenomenon. Behind it one can see the watchful eye of the coordinator. Are the people silent? Let us stir them up again.

They are stirring us up. A "reexposition" of the Patriotic War Museum in Kiev is being prepared.

Eyewitnesses testify that there is not enough room in it for General Batutin or for many of the battles of the worst war on our territory. But the museum was created as a tribute to the memory of the victory of the people and the army, whose soldiers did not ask one another about nationality.

Can such a thing really be erased from consciousness? Did the hand of the bureaucrat who approved this plan for "reexposition" really not flinch?

It is probably no accident that the attack on the structure of the Znaniye organization is being waged so actively and attempts are being made to replace it with the politicized Prosvitoyu. The church is being politicized and blood is already been spilled through the skillfully planned religious feuds. All this is being done in the name of the "historical truth." There is no doubt that the time has come to engage actively in the political battle for the establishment in the public consciousness of truthful information about the history of Ukraine.

We stand behind the unity of the independent states and their useful interaction as neighbors. This is what is lacking most of all today. Our difficulties, the decline of production, unemployment, and the general disorder arise from breaking contacts, mainly economic ties. They must be restored. Anyone who does not understand this and stands in the way of arranging them is an enemy of Ukraine, its statehood, and its long-suffering people.

Organization Criticizes Rukh Policies

92P50109A Kiev VECHIRNIY KYYIV in Ukrainian 6 Apr 92 p 1

[Unsigned article entitled: "'Viche' explains"]

[Text] A new organization has been formed in Kiev—the "Viche" union [taken from the name of the municipal consultative body during the time of Kievan Rus], among the goals of which is the formation of a high political culture among Kievans. It is interesting that the first document sent to the editorial board of VECHIRNIY KYYIV was addressed to the "initiators of the creation of Rukh," the authors of the declaration read by people's deputy I. Drach at the Third Congress of Rukh. In the opinion of the members of "Viche", Ukraine is going through a period of "peaceful" revolution, the major feature of which is the striving to transfer power from the administrative-command system to the benefit of the individual and community. However, on 24 August the "interception of the revolution" took place. The reactionary section of parliament fufilled the program of the democratic forces, bankrupted them, and safely took the initative into its own hands, preserving the power of the administrative-command system. This happened because of the tactical miscalulations of those same democrats, who first of all substituted the struggle for a mere change of the attributes of power for the struggle to transfer power to the individual and community. Secondly, the democrats believed in the possibility of democratic reformulations in the absence of a civil society. However, stated "Viche", the overwhelming majority of the "initiators of the creation of Rukh" up to now have not drawn constructive conclusions: "their newest conception of Rukh as a state-forming organization again does not answer to the conditions of adequacy, for in the independent state an individual can still be doomed to a state of slavery."

Here the "conditions of adequacy" for the present state of society are formulated. This especially concerns authority—as the allocation of national wealth, reinforced by rule-of-law norms. Rule by the people will come about only when each person owns more than half of his own work and the community more than half of the national wealth. The administrative-command system will not give this up voluntarily. It is necessary to take it away. Rukh could become an initiator, after having chosen the tactic in the "peaceful" revolution of building a civil society under the slogan: "To the individual—the right of property as the result of his own labor."

The members of "Viche" consider the idea of Rukh as a state-forming organization doomed. The initiative in the Supreme Council belongs to other forces, and the people, held in bondage by the economy, are not capable of supporting it to a sufficient degree.

Perhaps things are really clearer from the sidelines? In any case, it is useful for politicians to know about such a point of view of our life and its prospects.

Direction of Change Said To Depend on 'Silent Majority'

92UN1111A Kiev VECHERNIY KIYEV in Russian 24 Mar 92 p 2

[Interview with Vladimir Polokhalo, docent of Kiev University imeni T.G. Shevchenko, historian, and political scientist, by Svetlana Sinyakova, VECHERNIY KIYEV political department editor; place and date not given: "Will We with a Mighty Hand Throw Off the Fatal Yoke Forever?]

[Text] **No matter how many times you say "halvah," the mouth will not get sweeter. No matter how many times you repeat "independent, autonomous, and democratic," there will be no magic. Our independence is still slipping out of our hands. Why? Perhaps an answer to this question will help resolve the problem?**

We think that our correspondent's interview with Vladimir Polokhalo, docent of Kiev University imeni T.G. Shevchenko, historian, and political scientist, will make it possible, as the saying goes, to shed some light on the current scene.

[Sinyakova] Vladimir Ivanovich, at one time you participated in the creation of the Democratic Platform in the Communist Party of Ukraine, which was different from the Democratic Platform of the CPSU, first and foremost in the approach to national policy. After the 28th Congress, to which you were a delegate, you left the Communist Party—incidentally, long before its final collapse. Was the obstinacy of the party leadership in the area of preserving "the indivisible Union" one of the reasons?

[Polokhalo] You can say that. As N. Berdyayev noted at one time, and I share his view, every nation strives to form its own state, to fortify and strengthen it. Not to consider this "healthy instinct of a nation" is sinful and stupid at the very least. The collapse of recent empires of the 20th century—the USSR and Yugoslavia—prompts the conclusion that a nation is able to realize its potential fully only when it acquires its own statehood.

[Sinyakova] But, as is known, the road from intentions to reality is not a short one. We are just beginning the construction of a state. Moreover, right from the very first steps the seriously disturbing thing is, will it be democratic?

[Polokhalo] It is better to wait a little for an answer. Despite the fact that more than a hundred states of the modern world have already recognized Ukraine, it is still at the crossroads.

[Sinyakova] The fabled heroic warriors had a choice of "three roads." But what about us?

[Polokhalo] If Ukraine is considered independent in the area of choice, but the CIS is still fraught with federalization—that is, it is a return to a Union that is somewhat changed, but it is still a Union—we also have an opportunity to build one out of three, a state that is either authoritarian, totalitarian, or democratic. In addition, the building of a democratic one is a very complicated task, and, on the contrary, it is least likely to succeed. In any case, two decades seem to me not to be such a big loss of time in a transition period from a totalitarian society of the Soviet kind, which in the main is still preserved in Ukraine, to a democratic society.

[Sinyakova] Twenty years is a whole lifetime. I recall that Khrushchev promised to build communism in such a period. And this was inspiring. But, then, democratic and capitalist construction over the very same period, alas, does not arouse any enthusiasm.

[Polokhalo] Yes, it is paradoxical, but it is a fact. That is the way we have all been brought up. Therefore, the road will be a long one; after all, a totalitarian society not only exterminated our civic values and civic mentality but also caused an unprecedented distortion of moral reference points, and formed the ethic of the so-called "Soviet man." The border between good and evil, between criminality and decency, was erased. Take note: Everyone here suspects everything. Ask any man in the street what he thinks of one or another policy, and you will hear: "I do not know him personally, but I think that he has his finger in the pie."

But what is most frightening is that the strata of the national intelligentsia among the people who do "intellectual work" is too thin. There is too much of a deficit of brilliant persons who have sufficiently high moral prestige to not only arouse but also satisfy the spiritual, including natural-cultural, interest.

[Sinyakova] Speaking at a conference organized by "New Ukraine," you said that the political passivity of our society has reached that level, when even the fact itself of the disappearance of any kind of a party from the political arena in Ukraine, or, for example, such a prominent organization as Rukh, will hardly be even noticed by a majority. Is this not an exaggeration?

[Polokhalo] Unfortunately, science is not inclined to exaggerate. It only states the real state of things. The present political and sociopolitical organizations in Ukraine only partly represent the interests of specific strata. Our multiparty system is deformed. Several parties orient themselves immediately on one and the same social segment that is just beginning to form—the so-called middle class. However, in fact, this orientation is

occurring in words, but in reality, not one of the existing political organizations at present has any real popular influence, a fact which also was demonstrated convincingly in the presidential elections.

It is not complicated to understand why this occurs, if you consider that all of the political parties emerged and developed not at a social but at a sociocultural level, and, in addition, the rules of behavior, tactics, values of orientation, expectations, etc., were determined not by the creation but by the destruction of the imperial totalitarian state. Lumpenization and marginalization, and the inability to express social interests and self-identification in contemporary Ukrainian society, is the objective reason that holds back the formation of a developed system of political pluralism.

It is necessary for politicians who orient themselves on creativity and on democratic reform to rely not on one or another political party, but on a broad nonparty movement or bloc of this movement with political parties. The new leadership of Rukh in the person of Vyacheslav Chornovil, in my opinion, more accurately analyzes the sociopolitical situation in the country. One would only want him to have more supporters both in and outside the Rukh [People's Movement of Ukraine] apparatus.

But in the future the spectrum of political forces in Ukraine, I think, will differ not so much according to the classic principle of "left, right, and center" as much as according to another, new triad: national-democratic, national-conservative, and liberal-democratic.

[Sinyakova] Well, but since political parties exist in an embryonic stage, it remains for society, according to your very expression, to be a "unique gruel?"

[Polokhalo] Alas, there is no other way. At least for the time being. We received a monstrous legacy of a social experiment implemented by the CPSU in the former USSR, including in Ukraine. This is a breakdown in all social relations and the ruination of daily social life, at a time when the majority has not yet awakened and has not formed its real, specific social interests and social status. For the present, they are only perceived by the privileged ruling strata, the former party-state-economic nomenklatura and all of those who surround it. But this is not more than two percent of the population. The failure of the putsch and the ban on, but more accurately the self-ban of the Communist Party of Ukraine, did not lead to the loss of its authoritative positions. This is also indicated by the fact that in the past six months the corrupt Ukrainian nomenklatura has retained all of the key posts and has successfully—exploiting the absence of a serious political opposition—impeded progressive reform.

Under conditions when a middle class—the bearer of economic and sociopolitical stability—has not yet been formed and when Ukrainian society constitutes a "silent majority," the question of a democratic future in Ukraine will be decided depending on whose side this majority takes in the final analysis: the pragmatic market-reformers, or the populist-demagogues, the supporters of the ideals of freedom and democracy, or the supporters of a "firm hand." In 1917 it was the political attitude of precisely these segments that tilted the scales at the decisive moment to the advantage of the Bolshevik dictatorship.

It is obvious to me that the politicians in authority today are also not capable of guaranteeing society against social upheaval.

[Sinyakova] From the standpoint of common sense, the leading strata cannot be interested in a spontaneous social upheaval. Why is it opposing reform?

[Polokhalo] To answer this question we must recall how this ruling strata was formed. Back in the 1970's a process of changes in value orientations took shape—"going bourgeois"—among a substantial part of the state apparatus. It held on with a death grip to its semi-secret privileges that were inaccessible to the majority—comfortable apartments, rest, trips abroad, special support, special medicine... At the same time, an interlocking of the nomenklatura and the trade-economic elite began to take place. In the years of so-called perestroyka the higher and middle echelon of the nomenklatura uncontrollably used its authority and its positions for enrichment. In the last half-year it consolidated for itself the lion's share of state property de jure, which it controlled a long time ago de facto.

Take note: It was no accident that Stanislav Gurenko, first secretary of the former Communist Party of Ukraine Central Committee, is now calling from the pages of the press on his former colleagues and like-thinkers, who not too long ago were ardently antimarket, to get accustomed to the market. Indeed, he himself is not ashamed to use "both experience and knowledge" in this walk of life.

But it is understandable that they are not hurrying. Our "nouveaux riches," a bourgeoisie which in origin is the nomenklatura, is afraid to participate in market competition "on common grounds." It got so accustomed to a game in which eventually all chances were on its side. I think that it will try to delay the inevitable end for at least two-three more years. But in the meantime we have to overcome their "experience and knowledge," which resemble "wild bourgeois activity" and "undeveloped capitalism" more than a civilized market with "a human face."

[Sinyakova] In such a case, what would you wish for those of our politicians who are striving not in words but in deeds for the general welfare?

[Polokhalo] To those who have retained their moral prestige in the eyes of their voters and did not pursue the path of opportunism, not to lose optimism. What voice the still passive "silent majority" will speak out with depends on them. Today, perhaps even more than in the times "before independence," it is important that the

people see: None of us, politicians all the more so, have the right to free ourselves from the work of daily choices between good and evil, decency and meanness, and truth and falsehood.

Youth Polled on Political Parties

92UN1157A Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 2 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by Oleksandr Vyshnyak and Volodymyr Oliynyk: "Seven Percent for... Communism"]

[Text] Such was the surprising conclusion reached by the organizers of a republican poll of youth, the purpose of which was to determine the level of approval given by young people to existing political parties in Ukraine and their programs.

At the end of last year an interim creative collective from the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute on Youth Issues conducted a poll of young respondents in all the districts of Kiev and in several oblasts (Lviv, Rivne, Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, as well as Crimea). A total of nearly one and a half thousand persons were polled. The first surprise was that seven percent of those polled believe in the communist idea, while only half the young respondents favors the former Communist Party's opposition. The democratic parties received the highest rating. The tables below, reflecting the results of the study, make everything clear.

REPRESENTATIVES OF PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS FOR WHOM UKRAINIAN YOUTH WOULD VOTE IN AN ELECTION

Political Organizations	Portion of Youth in %
1. Popular Movement of Ukraine [Rukh]	15.9
2. Green World Ecological Association	8.8
3. Communist Party of Ukraine	4.0
4. Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth	3.8
5. Green Party of Ukraine	3.6
6. Party of Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine	3.4
7. Union of Ukrainian Students (SUS)	2.8
8. Democratic Party of Ukraine	2.0
9. People's Party of Ukraine	1.7
10. Ukrainian Republican Party	1.3
11. Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party	1.2
12. Liberal Democratic Party of Ukraine	1.1
13. Peasant-Democratic Party	0.9
14. Ukrainian People's-Democratic Party	0.9
15. Ukrainian National Party	0.8
16. Social Democratic Party	0.4
17. United Social Democratic Party	0.3
18. Independent candidate	16.0
19. Depending on the candidate and not on his party affiliation	28.3

POPULARITY RATING OF POLITICAL PARTIES, MOVEMENTS, AND YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS

Political Organizations	Don't know	Support actively	Support in general	Indifferent to	Do not support	Condemn	Rating
1. Green World Ecological Association	32.3	14.8	27.3	17.1	5.9	2.6	—0.06
2. Popular Movement of Ukraine [Rukh]	17.8	12.3	21.3	20.4	16.7	11.4	—0.05
3. Union of Ukrainian Students (SUS)	39.6	10.7	14.7	21.5	8.9	4.6	—0.11
4. Green Party of Ukraine (PZU)	44.8	7.0	14.9	20.8	9.1	3.4	—0.14

POPULARITY RATING OF POLITICAL PARTIES, MOVEMENTS, AND YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS (Continued)

Political Organizations	Don't know	Support actively	Support in general	Indifferent to	Do not support	Condemn	Rating
5. Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth (SNUM)	38.1	8.4	14.4	21.1	11.8	6.3	—0.16
6. Party of Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine (PDVU)	45.4	5.4	14.5	23.1	8.0	3.6	—0.19
7. Democratic Party of Ukraine (DemPU)	44.4	3.4	11.6	25.4	11.7	3.5	—0.23
8. Ukrainain Christian Democratic Party (UKhDP)	50.2	4.0	9.0	13.3	10.4	3.3	—0.24
9. Ukrainian Republican Party (URP)	37.8	2.9	11.4	25.4	14.8	7.6	—0.25
10. Ukrainian People's Democratic Party (UNDP)	47.8	2.3	10.4	24.7	11.7	3.1	—0.26
11. People's Party of Ukraine (NPU)	45.2	3.0	10.0	25.0	12.3	4.6	—0.26
12. Union of Youth Organizations of Ukraine [SMOU] (Lenin Young Komsomol League of Ukraine—MDS [expansion not given])	37.9	4.9	11.2	21.2	15 2	9.7	—0.26
13. Peasant-Democratic Party of Ukraine	52.3	3.2	8.0	23.2	10.1	3.3	—0.27
14. Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (SDPU)	54.2	1.5	5.5	23.9	10.6	4.3	—0.31
15. United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (OSDPU)	57.1	2.1	5.0	22.2	10.3	3.4	—0.32
16. Liberal Democratic Party of Ukraine (LDPU)	54.9	1.9	5.1	23.4	11.0	3.8	—0.32
17. Ukrainian National Party (UNP)	52.7	2.4	5.2	23.3	11.3	5.2	—0.32
18. Former Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU)	23.7	2.3	8.1	23.4	23.6	19.0	—0.37

Reportedly Little Faith in Parties, Government

92UN1113A Kiev VECHIRNIY KYYIV in Ukrainian 20 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Svitlana Synyakova under the "Political Crossroads" rubric: "The People Are Silent. And That Means a Storm Is Brewing"]

[Text] **A three-day republic scientific-practical conference on the topic "Toward a New Ukraine Through Reforms," sponsored by the Nova Ukrayina public-political association, was recently held in Kiev. It is interesting that politicians, holding the mandates of deputies, were joined in organizing the conference by businessmen, among them the Epsilon Center for Humanities Research, the Ukrainian League of Enterprise Owners With Foreign Investment of Capital, the Kiev Yednannya Trade Union of Employees of Cooperatives and Other Forms of Free Enterprise, and others. It was the businessmen who provided the funds that made it possible for theoreticians in the fields of politics, economics, science, and education to exchange views at the podium and in the lobby of the conference hall.**

As we know, businessmen do not throw away money. What, then, did they stand to gain? The following observations by **A. KOVAL**, head of the Epsilon Center for Humanities Research, provide a partial explanation:

"For instance, we are introducing a free market. But we do not stop to consider the possibility that our society may subconsciously reject this innovation. Yet we should keep in mind that just as you cannot take the words out of a song, so you cannot erase from our history more than seventy years of an unprecedented attempt to build socialism. The psychology of several generations of the peoples of the former Union carries on it the imprint of those years. This should be taken into account.

"Or this. We Ukrainians are East Slavs. What is acceptable in the West may be out of place in the East. Therefore, it is quite possible that very specific pills are needed to treat the Ukrainian economy. Moreover, what requires treatment is not just the economy, but the whole social organism. As a result, this is a matter not only for economists, lawyers, businessmen, and politicians, but also for sociologists, culturalists, psychologists, and even historians.

"It is not difficult to understand people who have gone out on their own, as it were. If the reforms fail, they will be the first to suffer. The brief history of NEP [New Economic Plan] does not allow other conclusions. But that is not the only thing that NEP teaches us. The end of NEP quite logically led to 1937 and other such years. Do we have the strength to break out of this vicious circle?"

I thought the most interesting discussion from the standpoint of the above question was presented in the joint paper by **Professor V. Butkevych, Professor V. Volovych, and Docent V. Polokhal.** Allow me to cite some of their observations:

"The success and prospects of implementing reforms in Ukraine as it moves from authoritarianism to a normal, dynamic, and stable civil society now depend directly on whether or not the existing political parties and movements will be able to ensure mass social support for these reforms.... There is, however, evidence of growing political apathy, caused by objective conditions, among a significant portion of the population. Random polls show that more than 50 percent of the population does not trust any of the institutions of government, any political party, or any public-political organization. This is also confirmed by the results of the elections of people's deputies in one of the districts of Kiev that took place, or, more precisely, failed to take place two weeks ago. Less than 40 percent of those eligible to vote took part in the elections. And, as we know, for the past several years Kiev has served as a barometer of social attitudes in the sociopolitical life of the republic...

"Briefly put, today's Ukrainian society represents an indifferent 'silent majority' in both social and political respects. This majority has not yet defined itself and does not in fact know what it wants. However, this condition cannot endure and has an end result. If the advocates of the ideals of democracy and freedom fail to shape the social will of this majority through political means, it may rapidly fall prey to populist demagogues and the advocates of totalitarianism as life grows increasingly more difficult."

Such is the prognosis of political scientists. And it is confirmed by specialists in the law:

"As far as providing a legal foundation for socioeconomic reforms is concerned, it appears at first glance that a great deal has been done. For two years, the Supreme Soviet has more or less actively been trying to fill this vacuum. Nor is there a sense that the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 'owes' us anything in this respect. However, such activity in itself does not prove that there exists a thought-out state legal policy. If anything, it serves as an indicator of unconsidered, spontaneous, pseudoreformist activity....

"When the president proposed to set aside the laws passed by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine and declare a state of economic emergency, he in effect admitted that the work done by the Supreme Soviet over the last two years had not been headed in the right direction. Small wonder that more and more frequently we now hear statements to the effect that the Cabinet of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet have only been working the 100 days that have passed since the referendum on independence. As if to say that we had a different Cabinet or a different Supreme Soviet prior to this. The attempt to separate oneself from oneself in the temporal dimension inevitably leads to self-liquidation rather than to rebirth....

"Although there has been much talk about a rule-of-law state, we have not yet begun to create it. The old administrative command system—the antithesis of a rule-of-law state—is still wholly in place.

"It is not surprising, therefore, that almost everything in the republic (except for slogans, appeals, and speeches by political leaders) remains the same as before. As before, we have a Supreme Soviet (whose election was a far cry from a democratic process) instead of a permanently acting parliament. We have changed the name of the Council of Ministers to the Cabinet of Ministers, leaving it with the same powers, the same people, and the right to make irresponsible, unprofessional, and incompetent decisions. We have created a new position and extended to its holder the functions of a puppet. We have not created a judicial power, thereby confirming that we regard the rule-of-law state as a speculative concept. We have not established the separation of powers, and, as a result, have not succeeded in fixing the limits of authority between the highest organs of the government and the administrative branch. We have not set up a constitutional court....

"We could easily continue listing what we have *not* done, but do we really need to do so? We can put it much more simply: The only thing we have done during the two years that this Supreme Soviet has been in office is to proclaim the Declaration of Sovereignty and the Act of Independence. And that is all....

"Society cannot exist in a state of expectation and stagnation for long. If we continue to do nothing to fundamentally strengthen the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, it is safe to assume even at this stage that we will lose both our sovereign (so far in slogans) state and our independent (so far in declarations) Ukraine."

All comments are superfluous. Just as it is pointless to blame the scholars for understanding the situation but saying and doing nothing about it. This is a job for the Supreme Soviet. But it appears that those who currently make up this body still fail to realize that they have already completed their role as "the driving force of progress." All reserves have been used up. All that is left to do is to leave the stage with dignity. Otherwise a new "seaman Zhelyeznyak" will appear and force everyone to dance to the same old tune.

Sevastopol Mayor Opposes Crimea Independence

92UN1111B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 26 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Olga Pronina, PRAVDA UKRAINY correspondent in the Republic of Crimea: "The Third 'Assault' on Sevastopol? Ivan Yermakov Gives an Explanation to PRAVDA UKRAINY"]

[Text] **The fighters for the independence of Crimea, it seems, are attempting to organize a scandal. They say that the Crimea produces every fourth stewing pan in the CIS—consequently, it is possible to live without Ukraine. Sevastopol's special status was fixed back in Catherine's time...**

This time the scandal is being organized around the ukase of President L.M. Kravchuk "Concerning Organs of State Executive Authority of the City of Sevastopol," or rather, around the alleged "extreme negative reaction" to it by the inhabitants of the hero-city.

Now, when the Crimea is on the threshold of a referendum, which could take it out of the structure of Ukraine, the leaders of the RDK [Crimean Republic Movement] are trying to suggest to Crimeans that this ukase will virtually take Sevastopol out of the Republic of Crimea and render the conduct of a referendum on its territory senseless and the inhabitants without rights. The scanty picketing of angered citizens at the Sevastopol City Soviet, which was shown the other day on Ostankino and Crimean television, apparently, was supposed to convince television viewers of the CIS that tension in the struggle for the independence of the Crimea, at least in Sevastopol, continues to grow.

But what, in fact, is occurring in the hero-city. We asked I.F. Yermakov, its mayor, to help us understand this. He has the floor:

"It was not long ago that guests of the Crimea left our peninsula with regret: It was better here with products, and we were not being whipped by the waves of political extremism of various polarities. The manifestations of national discord were profoundly foreign to Crimeans. But, gradually, the 'epidemic' of the illness of the young democracy even reached us. Imperceptibly we became accustomed to rallies, picketing, strikes, and other actions of civil disobedience.

"Today, as never before, you understand that the slow pace of conducting political and economic reforms, both in Ukraine and in the Crimea, does not at all promote stability in the sociopolitical situation. And although the recent series of meetings of delegations of Crimea and Sevastopol with the leadership of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine showed that there is an understanding of the problem of our region in Kiev, knowing the enormous inertia of the state machine it is difficult to hope for a quick implementation of what was planned. But it is now extremely necessary to the Crimea, where the increase in political tension is reaching the limit.

"It is entirely possible to understand the people who are trying independently to find a solution to the very difficult situation that is developing. A certain group of inhabitants of Crimea and Sevastopol associate this step with the holding of a general Crimean referendum. The more than 40,000 signatures collected in our city compel us to treat the idea of such a large-scale action rather seriously. It is all the more vexing when, instead of thoughtful analysis of the developing situation and arrangement of political forces, the mass media are engaged in affixing labels, manipulating public opinion, and stirring up political passions. For example, in a review of 14 March 'Forever under the yellow and blue?' the independent newspaper KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA makes an attempt to represent Sevastopol as a kind of prodigal son of Crimean democracy. Numerous readers are deliberately misled regarding the status of Sevastopol, the impending referendum on its territory, and the mood of its inhabitants. As for the status of Sevastopol as a city of republic significance, to Crimeans this comes as no surprise. This status, considering the strategic significance of Sevastopol, was in fact confirmed from Catherine's time, and it remains unchanged to this day.

"The question of its subordination was submitted to a general city referendum in Sevastopol in 1991, and 93.8 percent of the voters voted for a special status for the city. Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of Crimea ratified the special status of the city in a declaration on the sovereignty of Crimea and the draft of its constitution. The recent ukase of the president, which raised such a clamor among RDK supporters, only defined concretely the application of pertinent articles of the Constitution of Ukraine and gave an interpretation of the structures of subordination to executive authority, but it in no way changed the essence of things, as the supporters of independence are trying to persuade Crimeans.

"Why this question, which the citizens of Sevastopol always treated calmly, is now exaggerated specifically during the period of the campaign to collect signatures to demand a referendum is understandable, I think. Whether senseless or not, the holding of a referendum in Sevastopol has to be determined by Sevastopol's residents. It is another matter that it is possible to dispute the proposed wording on independence for the Republic of Crimea in a union with other states. Such a word combination can lead to a deeper political labyrinth in the event of a referendum. I am also troubled by the fact that until now the official structures of the republic have not defined their attitude to a referendum. As if the collection of signatures, RDK rallies, pamphlets and the like were being disregarded. I repeatedly tried to submit this question for examination at the session of the Supreme Soviet of Crimea, but I did not get the support of the deputies.

"The holding of a referendum is a matter of the will of the people, their reason, and wisdom. But before deciding on such a serious step it is necessary to weigh carefully the pro's and con's. After all, the agitation now for the full independence of Crimea is only working at

the level of emotion. Is it really possible to take seriously the argument in leaflets I saw saying that since the Crimea produces every fourth stewing pan in the Soviet Union, it is also possible to live without Ukraine. No one in the Crimea has conducted a deep economic analysis or calculated what the Crimea is outside Ukraine. How and where raw materials will be obtained for industry, what kind of water will there be to drink, and whose energy systems will be used.

As for the yellow-and-blue banner over the buildings of the local soviets of Sevastopol, let us look at things soberly: Although the Crimea is a republic today, it is a part of Ukraine, and we are all obliged to adhere to its laws, if we want to live in a rule-of-law state.

Conflict Possible if Tatar Rights Denial Continues

92UN1141A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian 3 Apr 92

[Article by Boris Sidorenko: "A Time of Uraza, or How the Crimean Tatars Have Tried and Failed To Find Their Way Out of a Labyrinth Almost Half a Century Long"]

[Text] **Forty years ago I happened to serve my military duty in the Crimea. At that time we used to go out onto the boundless steppes between Feodosiya and Kerch for training. This place, covered with wretched grass, even in May burned under a blazing sun and did not present a happy picture. Yet the numerous gray snakes and varicolored lizards felt right at home in this hundred-kilometer space. What desolate territory!**

Once when we were rushing into the latest "attack" we were suddenly ordered to lie down, and I sank down happily. As I was catching my breath I noticed that I was not lying on the ground exactly but on a round spongy rock, eroded by time, wind, and occasional rain, with a hole in the middle. It did not take a specialist to realize it was an ordinary millstone once used to grind grain into flour. I concluded that people must have lived there once—probably Tatars who might have grown cereals locally. Now it was a bare desert!

Our commanders did not tell us about Tatars in Crimea at the time. But we were reminded of them by the curious place names, so strange to the Slavic ear—Karasu-Bazar, Ak-Monay, Chanda, Ayu-Dag—and by the faint echoes of the frightful punishment meted out against a whole people, who had been deported from their native lands and scattered afar....

Dividing and Ruling

For several years now the Tatars have been coming back to their homeland en masse. But it turns out no one is happy to see them. Their return is generating numerous problems, the knot grows more tangled, and all because no one wants to recognize the Tatars as natives of the Crimea with all the consequences ensuing therefrom. It is necessary to act, to go to the authorities and beg and demand that their rights be recognized at long last, so that land may be allotted or sold to them and they can get help finding housing and jobs. Enough humiliation! This was the origin of the plan called "Action Kiev-92." A large group of Crimean Tatars came to the capital city of Ukraine in search of truth, justice, and protection and recognition of their rights. What came out of this plan will be discussed below.

I met with the group of Crimean Tatars in the park by the Supreme Soviet building, next to the Vatunin Monument, and recorded their stories, which were bitter, but with a ray of hope.

Eredzhep Khayredinov, chairman of the Auditing Commission of the Crimean Tatar National Movement, told me:

"We have come here to get the Ukrainian parliament to recognize the Crimean Tatar nation's right to self-determination, and also to recognize our representative organ the Majlis, which was formed at the Kurultay, the Crimean Tatars' National Congress."

"But would it not have been more logical to secure recognition first from the Supreme Soviet of the Crimean Republic?" I asked.

"We thought so, too. But immediately after the Kurultay the Supreme Soviet of the Crimean Republic met and did not recognize our national Kurultay movement or the Majlis."

"You want to know why?" said Elviz Gafarov, who does various jobs on Prigorodnyy Sovkhoz in Simferopol Rayon. "Because they do not want to. And they are doing everything they can so that others will refuse to recognize not just us but Ukraine as well. There is a civic organization down there, the RDK (Republican Movement of Crimea), which is in favor of separating the Crimea from Ukraine. They are waging massive propaganda. They claim that the Ukrainians are going to wipe out the Russians. They are serious about it. And people believe them. And they are collecting signatures for an independent Crimea."

So no one is thinking up anything new in politics. In the same old way they are going by the principle Divide and Conquer. They are dividing, subdividing, waging false propaganda, and in this way ruling....

"We are convinced," Reserve Colonel Refat Kurtiyev adds, "that the present membership of the Crimean Supreme Soviet is against the Tatars. They will not even get in contact with the Majlis. So we are hoping that the parliamentarians of Ukraine will try to convince the Crimean Supreme Soviet that it is wrong to treat natives this way."

Eredzhep spoke up once more:

"In order to create the impression that the Crimean Tatars are taking part in the work of the Supreme Soviet of the Crimean Republic, yesterday's partycrats are

using the same old repulsive methods: They are selecting certain of our kinsmen who are convenient to them and placing them in state positions. For instance, they formed a culture-mongering society and from there they pushed into the Crimean Supreme Soviet someone like Iskander Memetov, whom the Majlis did not approve for the role. Our ill-wishers are resorting to slick maneuvers like that, claiming that we refused to take part in parliament. But what is there left for us to do if they never take account of our opinions? We do not want anybody to use us as silent stooges. Take a look at the mechanism by which our political opponents in the Crimean Supreme Soviet are operating. Let us say some parliamentary commission has a meeting to discuss an issue affecting us Tatars. In order to maintain the appearance of an objective discussion, they invite one of our spineless kinsmen, who just sits there and listens. Then they hand down some preplanned verdict and tell the public that the resolution of the issue was participated in by representatives of the Crimean Tatar people. Yet we do have our own fully responsible people, chosen by members of our own nation. Anyone who wants them should ask the Majlis, and such representatives will be immediately made available."

Bulldozing the Mosque

"Your attitude towards the Crimean Supreme Soviet is understandable," I agreed. "But what is the attitude of the so-called Russian-speaking population' toward you? How are they treating the new repatriates?"

"Parliament ignores us, and the populace, brainwashed by civic organizations such as the RDK, is very wary of us...."

The conversation was joined by Shefina Khalikova, a nurse who came from Uzbekistan as a delegate of the Crimean Tatar people to "Action Kiev-92."

"It is not just the civic organizations that are spreading all kinds of fairy tales about us. Recently I arrived in the Crimea with hopes of settling there. We looked at homes which people wanted to sell. But as soon as the owners found out that we were Crimean Tatars, they said, Go on home, we will not sell you our house.' We wondered what the matter was. Thank God we found one good soul—a Ukrainian woman, by the way—who invited us into her home and gave us this answer: Before you arrived, special representatives of the village soviet and the militia went around the village and warned people not to let these Crimean Tatars anywhere near their homes.' The village is called Trudovoye, in Sakskiy Rayon."

After such total propaganda, in which Soviet authorities were involved, things really got unbearable for the Crimean Tatars. But the Crimean authorities are not confining themselves to anti-Tatar propaganda. They are also operating with bulldozers. Here is what we were told about this by Shevkhi Seidametov, a vehicle driver by profession, who until recently worked as a gardener in the village of Cheremisovtsy, Belogorskiy Rayon:

"The native people are returning, and meanwhile the privatization and sale of the land is in full swing. But not to the Crimean Tatars, you will notice. And in Sara-Su, the local inhabitants were sent out to our self-built settlement."

Elviz Gafarov added:

"On 2 August 1991, before the start of GKChPism, [State Committee for the State of Emergency] bulldozers razed the homes and mosque we had built in the village of Molodezhnoye in our rayon. But as soon as the bulldozers disappeared, the Tatars began to build again in hopes that no one would touch them this time. But when the 19th came around—the day of action by the GKChPists, they razed all the structures again. I do not think that this would have taken place except by Bagrov's instructions...."

Evidently, I concluded, souls akin to the GKChPists had decided that their time had come. But I asked about something else, namely something I had heard before in the halls of the editorial offices.

"You say that they are destroying your homes, but you do not say that elsewhere in the Crimea, practically in Yalta, two nine-story buildings are being built for you. But the Crimean Tatars are refusing them, because, being village-dwellers, they do not like cities and high-rises. Are these rumors true or not?"

"It's a lie." Khayredinov answered. "No one has built housing like that for us, although representatives of the Crimean Tatar intelligentsia would not refuse it. There are professors and doctors of science among us.... It is true that in Yevpatoriya they began to build something for us, and in Simferopol 25 apartments are to be offered to Crimean Tatars in one building. In addition, plans call for constructing three buildings in accordance with a state program. And there is some construction going on in the villages and settlements, but it is all insignificant compared to the flood of repatriates. There are 180,000 Crimean Tatars living in Crimea now, and about 20,000 are wandering around without residence permits. According to the population settlement scheme, Crimea is supposed to be taking in about 20,000 Tatars per year, but if they are settled at this rate, the repatriation process will never be finished, because the annual natural growth of our people outside the Crimea will exceed that number."

"It looks like your situation is critical in the Crimea. Do you see any way out?"

"We came to the capital city of Ukraine in search of a way out of the labyrinth of continuing problems," said Khayredinov. "We were hoping to find understanding in parliament, hoping to be recognized, because after all, we recognize Ukraine, unlike certain other political forces in Crimea. We decided to attract the deputies' attention to ourselves, and to do this we had to put up our tents as close as possible to the entrance to the Supreme Soviet. So that the members of parliament, as they went to

meetings, could see that we are here, that we are appealing to the public to help us solve our urgent problems. But what happened after our peaceful initiative? When I came up to the place where our boys were trying to put up the tents, we were surrounded by militia and troops armed with gas canisters and clubs. They closed the circle and began to beat everybody indiscriminately and released the gas. Since then, Ava Bikirov has been in the hospital with a broken collar bone, and Dilyara Refatova has a broken rib. These women are pensioners, and in addition one of them is an invalid. Were they really dangerous to anybody? Why this inhuman treatment of people who are seeking their rights in Ukraine's capital city? The only thing that sustains us is that most Kievans treat us well and try to help us if they can...."

This was corroborated by a Kievan woman, pensioner Neonila Volkotrub, who had stood there and listened in on our conversation:

"On that day, the 19th of March, I came here and saw the whole terrible thing. The senior Tatar went into the Supreme Soviet and then returned to Vatunin Monument, where a rally and then a public prayer were held. They hardly had time to get on their feet when they were attacked; the crowd was split up into parts and penetrated to the center. People were beaten for no reason. No reason at all.... It is shameful for us Kievans and for our whole people that we cannot solve the problems of the Tatars through reason rather than resorting to clubs...."

The Ukrainian woman speaks the truth. It was not our people who deported the Tatars from Crimea; we ourselves were deported sometimes. But if we are to be considered an independent state, we must now restore justice by getting rid of the consequences of the evil actions of the masters of the communist empire. Instead of their lawful rights, however, what have the best representatives of the Crimean Tatars received? What they have received from the "democratizers," in fact, are blows across their shoulders and backs....

Is Crimea Creeping Towards Karabakh?

A frightful injustice has been going on for almost half a century, and no one has had the courage to put a stop to it. Even our parliament.

Let us attempt to predict what might happen to all of us from the Crimean Tatars' impasse. If no solution is found to the problems, the conflict in Crimea might get even worse, and this circumstance can result in an irreversible situation in which antidemocratic separatist forces will try to tear Crimea away from Ukraine and "bury" the Crimean Tatar question for decades. Naturally, this will not bring any good either to Ukraine or to Crimea, nor to the Crimean Tatars. The tighter the bowstring is pulled, the deeper the arrow will strike.

The Crimean Tatar people have now entered the time of fasting known as Uraza. For a full month, Moslems cannot take food or even water from sunup to sundown.

"Our people—even those who are picketing—are observing the Uraza," Shefika Khalikova said proudly.

And I thought, the Crimean Tatars have been observing Uraza for almost half a century, starting with that fateful spring day when all of the members of that nation were deported to faraway lands.

"What might all this indefiniteness lead to?" I asked the Crimean Tatars who had gathered around me. Eredzhep Khayredinov answered:

"We will try to make use of nonviolence. We have plenty of opportunities for peaceful struggle. If the Ukrainian parliament does not recognize our demands, our organization will be forced to appeal to the world community for help for this unhappy nation, which was expelled from its homeland and has never had its rights restored. And we will hope that if Ukraine is not able to restore the rights of its lawful children, then someone appointed by the United Nations will do so."

Shevkhi Seydametov added:

"All of this indefiniteness with respect to our situation could very easily result in a Crimean Karabakh. And it will not be our fault."

To be sure, it is entirely possible, although not to be desired. If the Tatars' hopes for a peaceful solution to the problem fade, a Crimean Karabakh looms. And it would not necessarily be the Crimean Tatars who started it. All it would take is a spark.

We are happy today about breaking away from the empire. But have we really broken away? It seems to me that the empire is still on the backs of many of us, and sometimes in our hearts and heads. At this point, I should like to appeal to our parliamentarians as follows:

Our esteemed gentlemen and comrades! It is still not too late; give back to the Crimean Tatars that which was taken away from them by tsars past and present. By doing so you will open the gates and release this persecuted, hounded, freedom-loving people from the tangled labyrinth of artificially created obstacles to a normal life. At long last, the nearly half-century fasting of Uraza must come to an end.

Majlis Chairman on Crimean Tatar Concerns

92UN1141B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 2 Apr 92 p 2

[Interview with Refat Chubarov, deputy chairman of the Majlis of the Crimean Tatar People, by correspondent Olga Pronina; place and date not given: "We Have No Other Land"]

[Text] **In the heat of today's passions over the future of Crimea, fighters for Crimean independence have somehow forgotten that there is also another native people living on Crimean territory—the Crimean Tatars. But it would not be amiss to find out what the people who have returned from exile think about the future fate of their historical homeland, and what they want the fundamental law of the Crimean Republic—the constitution—to look like. Moreover, what is the likelihood of unforeseen consequences in connection with attempts to play the "Crimean card" against their will?**

These are the questions I put to Refat Chubarov, deputy chairman of the Majlis of the Crimean Tatar People. Here is what he said:

The opinion of the Crimean Tatars is set forth in the Declaration of National Sovereignty that was adopted at the Kurultay (congress) in June of last year, in which we state clearly that we are going to restore statehood in our historical homeland. We are not against seeing Crimean autonomy reinstated within an independent Ukraine; what we are against is having this done on a territorial basis. Our people can preserve itself and prosper as an ethos only in Crimea; we have no other land. This is why we want to have state guarantees of our national self-determination within an independent Ukraine.

Today's problems in Crimea took shape, with all their conflicts and insolubility, in late 1990, when the Crimean Tatars opposed holding the referendum, because not all the families of the deported had returned to their homeland yet. To decide the fate of Crimea and all its native peoples by a mere raising of the hand by a majority of Crimeans, it seemed to us, was not right. We warned at the time that the 20 January referendum would be a first step toward destabilization of the situation in Crimea. Unfortunately, that is what happened.

Practically from the moment of deportation of the Crimean Tatars, the local authorities changed, yet the policy remained what it had been. All those years, an artificial stereotype of the Crimean Tatars as enemies was formed. Our return coincided with perestroyka, which to a large extent shook entrenched structures. The old party regime, which was still quite firmly entrenched in its armchairs, began to detect the winds of change. It was not able to undertake to deal with [illegible]'s social problems and thereby win the people's trust, because of its conservatism and inertia. Then the tried-and-true bolshevik method of setting people against people came into play. It was necessary to show an enemy that was preventing a normal life. And the Tatars filled the bill just fine. When elections to the Supreme Soviet and the local soviets were being held, Crimeans were so intimidated by the threat of "Tatarization" that not a single deputy was elected from among the Crimean Tatars to serve in the oblast soviet at the time.

The task is broader now: to nullify the actions of the emerging democratic forces of Crimea which are striving to build a society which can satisfy everyone living on the peninsula, and to make their own rule even stronger—up to and including the creation of an independent republic. At that time, artificially created political parties and movements sprang up all over the place, and, incidentally, the leaders of many of them got quite a lot of support from party structures along with substantial material infusion. They began to play on the nationalistic feelings of Russians living in Crimea. One can trace the ultimate interests of each of the groups in terms of their position. Until democratic processes got started in Ukraine and the country declared its independence, its policies suited many people fine. I do not have any particular names in mind. It is just a whole segment of the nomenklatura, which fairly easily moved from party to parliamentary and governmental armchairs. Given the resulting situation, they chose the only possible variant for themselves: to fight for the complete independence of Crimea, thus guaranteeing them personal prosperity and immunity. I am going into these details so that you will understand that in the final analysis the whole struggle for the interests of Crimea are rooted firmly in the struggle for the interests of the ruling authorities and their nomenklatura, counting on the support of the Russian-speaking population.

And events are unfolding in such a manner that it is simply hard to find the most convenient moment. And so they are trying to bring to the point of conflict the issue of whether Crimea belongs to Ukraine or Russia. But if, God forbid, it should be brought to the point of absurdity, two unresolvable problems will arise: Ukraine will have a hard time implementing its Declaration of Sovereignty, and it will place the Crimean Tatars in a drastic situation with respect to their struggle for self-determination. To broach the issue of to whom Crimea belongs today is to doom ourselves to a situation in which we will not be able to solve any of its problems. The issue of affiliation is splitting Crimeans into irreconcilable groups.

Under these circumstances, only a thoughtful and considered approach to the drafting of the constitution could somehow reconcile Crimeans In the draft of the constitution which the Majlis worked out, we have tried to embody guarantees of our interests in state structures. Up to now, however, the Crimean Supreme Soviet has acted as if the Majlis did not exist. So far it has not been recognized de jure. In addition, the Supreme Soviet has given it an extremely negative appraisal. Not until 27 January of this year did the Supreme Soviet come to us with the proposal to hold a joint meeting of deputies and Majlis representatives. All the same, as he opened it Supreme Soviet Chairman Nikolay Bagrov let slip that there were a few representatives of the Crimean Tatars present who had proposed an alternative draft. The discussion was lengthy and not easy, but I have to say, with satisfaction, that a number of deputies understand very well that unless the Crimean Tatars' problems are

solved, unless there are guarantees of their representation in the organs of government, it will be impossible to solve the problems of Crimea and place its society on a sound footing.

But when they tried to sum it up, the majority still insisted that the Supreme Soviet proclaim autonomy on the territorial principle, and there is no possibility of compromise.

Given the complex situation, in our opinion, it is necessary to stop the adoption of the constitution, because the Majlis and the Supreme Soviet have failed to reach a consensus. And it is hardly likely they can do so given such positions. The question of deciding the fate of this deported nation will have to be taken up by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and examined in parliament, if, of course, Ukraine seriously intends to build a democratic society. We can see no other civilized way to solve our problem.

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Illegal Use of U.S. Dollars Affecting Economy

92UN1119B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 7 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Georgiy Dolzhenko, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA staff correspondent: "The Dnieper Is Wonderful in Quiet Weather. And the Dollar—Always"]

[Text] Kiev—**Hard Currency Rush in Ukraine—in Pictures and in Specialists' Opinions**

Have you noticed this peculiarity? Life around us is increasingly often tuned to stock exchange summaries. The exchange rates of monetary units continuously rock our well-being; the relationship between the ruble and hard currency determines the price of goods in the stores and the purchasing capacity of the people. And this relationship is as changeable as the wind in May. Only a month ago the dollar bought 230 rubles [R]; now it gets R100 in Kiev, and even less in Russia—R60-70. Such upswings and falls of monetary exchange rates are generally a normal phenomenon in the market environment. What is not normal is the fact that some of our overly smart compatriots check their life's course exclusively against the reference points of the hard currency rates.

Hard currency is flowing into Ukraine through a multitude of streams, but only 20 to 30 million hard currency rubles annually land in the treasury accounts. Last August, the state had to appeal to enterprises for help in providing hard currency to purchase grain, but the latter turned out to be no richer than church rats. The crux of the problem is that the hard currency streams, skillfully directed around the state treasury, settle in the pockets of wheelers-dealers.

One can count on his fingers the number of those wishing to earn a million in hard currency rubles through honest labor. At a Bessarabia market, you may be offered a kilogram of meat for a couple of dollars. In the Borispol airport, taxi drivers unerringly identify the owners of "greenbacks" and lure them to their chariots. Some manage to rent apartments for currency. Some sell them, having first privatized them or bought out their square meters for rubles, and then unload them through a broker for dollars.

The wild privatization of housing in Kiev is gaining speed. Especially active are citizens leaving permanently for foreign countries. And really, why not take a nice round sum with them? Lately, 5,000 lucky ones became owners of apartments in the capital city. Of them, about 100 are foreigners, 200 representatives of Transcaucasian nations, and the rest—our "business" people.

You may become a serious contender for the title of millionaire if you obtain in accordance with proper procedures a license for exchanging hard currency for rubles, or establish with God's help some quiet association for the same purpose. No room in an exchange association—do not despair. Set up an unremarkable brokerage office in any sphere of business: computers, equipment, or, in the worst case scenario, horns and hooves. Find a trusting client, sign a delivery contract with a mandatory prepayment, and promise to deliver to him at the agreed-upon time (the later the better) the desired goods on a gold platter. You put the money to work right away, and several months later, with apologies, refund to the client his prepayment, by now seriously chipped up by inflation.

There are other ways to put together a fortune in dollars. This is what V. Urchukin, president of the Ukrintur [Ukraine Foreign Tours] company, related to me. Hotels of the former USSR State Committee for Foreign Tourism are almost entirely divided between mafiosi groups. The same groups have created almost 800 small enterprises, which by letters of permission place foreigners in hotels for rubles, while appropriating the lion's share of hard currency, leaving the state treasury high and dry. Moreover, some hotels—such as, for instance, Lybid in Kiev—have been turned into centers of crime and prostitution. "I have tried to fight it," says V. Urchukin. "But in the end of December I was accosted near my home and beaten up; they used knuckle dusters and nerve-paralyzing gas. The mafia let me know who is the real master of the situation."

Leaving the scum aside, because of the confusion, chaos, and ineffectiveness of the laws, these methods of obtaining hard currency may be considered legitimate. In the worst case—semilegitimate, not bringing on their heels harsh articles of the Criminal Code. There also are, however, those willing to risk freedom by trying their luck in the sphere of the forbidden. The most harmless of those are commercial trips abroad. One trip, for instance, to Poland brings $200-$250 or more. Despite the price liberalization, everything goes there. Especially considering that there are no more problems with passports. Only novices go through the motion of getting an invitation—usually, a fictitious one. They are too much

trouble, plus the permission is only given for one trip. Business trips are another matter.

"Members of cooperatives are especially experienced in such trips," says V. Shepel, chief of the Visa and Registration Department [OVIR] administration of the republic's MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. Cooperatives are established for this purpose. One or two persons go, but register another ten strangers to go with them. In the end of last year, local authorities closed the border control point at Shegini for those traveling on private business, but there was still a line of about 1,200 cars—almost all company cars.

As is known, demand creates supply, and shortage looks for loopholes. OVIR and customs officials cannot always resist the temptation to "assist" someone for a certain remuneration. Last year, criminal proceedings for abuse of official position was initiated against three OVIR employees, about 20 people were removed from their job, and there was a major case in the Kiev and Zaporozhye customs.

We have taken a detour, though, from the main topic—the study of criminal ways of enrichment for those who want to be the masters of life tomorrow. A hard currency prostitute can hardly count on a cloudless future, since she is selling her health, and there are only illnesses ahead for her. It is another matter for souteneurs, international traders in "live goods." According to Ukraine MVD General G. Sheludko, chief of the Interregional Administration for Combating Organized Crime, our lost sheep are eagerly purchased abroad.

The mafiosi structures have stretched their hands into other profitable endeavors as well—for instance, cars. The militia is currently looking for 6,000 stolen passenger cars. The theft is done on a large scale, with one group stealing, another "welds-over" the numbers on chassis and engines, and the third ships the merchandise "over the hill." There is also a reverse flow of the same kind of goods. The most widely used corridors are between Poland, Hungary, and Ukraine. According to Interpol, half of the cars stolen in Italy and Germany end up in Poland, and then some of them end up here. But this is rough work that involves risk. Hard currency "casters" are another matter. This requires a quick hand and extensive knowledge of psychology.

You come to an Intourist cashier's window, select a dealer who wants to exchange rubles into hard currency, and strike an acquaintance with him: I just came back from a business trip abroad, you say, or international competition, and I do not know how to turn dollars into rubles—at a market rate, of course. Naturally, he gets excited, and you bring him "home." You bring him to the door, and leave him for a moment "to see that there are no visitors." Then you reappear and say that there are indeed unexpected guests in the house, then offer to conduct the exchange right there, on the spot. The client agrees, and you give him a wad of real dollars to count. Then you take it back and ask him to count his money. Then you take it, while handing him a "doll" he had seemingly just counted. At this moment, your accomplice posing as a dvornik or a militia man appears and asks what exactly you are doing. You and the client, naturally, take off in different directions. The trick is accomplished.

This is, of course, just a schematic outline. Everything is much more complicated, but there are other, simpler ways to operate. On the whole, however, listing them is a waste of time. All of them spring from life, from your and my discomfort. For instance, foreigners living in Kiev and other cities, are permitted to exchange Ukraine coupons at a 1:10 rate. At the same time, the dollar already brings R250. So it turns out that the state itself gives a hand to our "shadow economy dealers." And they will do their best, have no doubt.

The whole point is that one dollar is not worth 250, or even 100, of our rubles—"wooden" as they may be. It has been raised to such heights and is being propped there artificially only for speculative purposes.

According to the same V. Urchukin—he holds a doctorate in economic science, used to be deputy chairman of the Ukraine Council of Ministers, and knows the problem inside out—as early as 1990 it was proposed to the then all-Union government headed by N. Ryzhkov to purchase hard currency from entrepreneurs at the rate of R22 per dollar, and permit them to use the remaining 60 percent of the hard currency at R24 per dollar. This would have increased the incentives for the producers to earn hard currency, would have replenished the treasury, but most importantly, the market rate of the dollar would not have exceeded R30. In 1991, however, the following order was established: 40 percent of hard currency earnings were expropriated automatically; of the remaining 60 percent, the enterprises could keep 12, while 4.8 percent went into a local budget and 43.2 to all-Union ministries. In this situation, where would the desire to earn hard currency come from?

We had a chance to see for ourselves that there are more than enough problems with hard currency. They have sprouted shoots, which produced profusely blooming racketeering, machinations, and other social ills. Instead of trying to cure those, however, we should treat the roots that feed the ills.

Vice Prime Minister Lanovyy on Economic Independence

92UN1119A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian 7 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Ukraine Vice Prime Minister Vladimir Lanovyy: "Economic Policy and the Policy of Reforms"]

[Text] Can Ukraine today travel the road of transforming the economic system on the principles of free market economy, regulated by the sovereign Ukrainian state? Yes, it can.

The strategy of this road was set by the current president of Ukraine about two years ago, and the author of these notes was charged with participating in its development. Is there another way?

No, there is not.

The freedom of producers of goods is realized through their realization of the rules dictated to them by the market. The market structure is dynamic to the extent it follows from the self-development of the economy, on the one hand, and on the other, to the extent it is permitted by the state.

By maintaining control over the state of the market, the state, to a greater or lesser degree, restrains structural economic shifts.

Today, the former state—the Soviet Union—has disintegrated.

A multitude of new, politically independent states have emerged. The latter, however, have not yet mastered the entire arsenal of the means of regulating their national economies. All with the exception of one—Russia. The latter not only completely manages the economy within its state borders, but also controls the economic processes in the aggregate of states—former parts of the USSR. In this situation, Russia could not fail to make use the advantages of its dominating position; the regulating state impulses are directed at economic exploitation of the countries dependent on it, to its own advantage.

The whole world is familiar with the methods of foreign economic expansion in the environment of formal independence of the states—it is the method of financial pressure exerted upon them. This method is used as a given by Russia in respect to other states. In addition, Russia has appropriated the right of singlehandedly managing the common money supply.

When the CIS was being formed, the Russian Federation did not offer to jointly regulate the issuance and allocation between the states of the money printed by enterprises it nationalized. The Central Bank of Russia, without consulting with others, releases new installments of credit resources, which go into possession of exclusively Russia's organizations (budget, banks, and enterprises). It is using unilaterally the bank deposits and other loan capital of all states, previously centralized by the USSR Gosbank [State Bank].

As a result of these actions alone, the largest of the CIS states turns to its advantage the correlation between the physical volumes of exported and imported goods, although the value-based balance of foreign trade, for example, between Ukraine and Russia, will show the opposite picture: Ukraine and other states caught in financial and money nets, will show as debtors. They will also be compelled to partially make up for internal and external debts that belong to Russia, which has purchased imported goods with respective means. Using the jointly created gold and hard currency reserves, the Russian state already ensures a higher solvency of the ruble on its territory.

Having created the necessary financial-valuable preconditions, Russia will soon start presenting for the debt obligations of other states for their negative balance in the export-import turnover.

Can Ukraine in these circumstances independently regulate the correlation between goods and money on its territory, stimulate foreign trade activities, stabilize prices, introduce anti-inflation levers, strive for financial stability of enterprises, and maintain the people's standard of living? Can it stimulate structural shifts and the growth of national wealth, an increased inflow of investments, goods, and technologies? No, and no.

There is only one solution: to consistently implement the course towards economic independence expressed by destiny-setting acts of the Ukraine Supreme Soviet in 1990 and 1991, and by "foundations of national economic policy" formulated by the president of our state.

The reasonableness of these approaches has been reaffirmed in personal conversations and discussions with, and expert evaluations by, major politicians and businessmen from the United States, England, Italy, and Germany, by the scientists from Harvard, New York, and Central European universities, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and others. And now we must make a decisive step towards establishing a sovereign economy—through independent money emission, independent credit system, our own budget and borrowing policy, our own control over movement of prices, ensuring the balance between the goods and means of payment, and the customs and hard currency regulation.

What will be the new economic function of the Ukrainian state? It will steadily free the market from its administrative guardianship. In particular, it will be expressed in the following: First, the list of products sold outside state orders, allocations, and other centralized distribution channels will be greatly increased. At the same time, wherever there is competition, the state will not interfere in price formation. Second, budget transfusions into the economy will be considerably reduced, and at the same time direct and indirect taxes will be reduced. The state will loosen the control over the creation and liquidation of enterprises and the sales of property and securities. The national bank will stop issuing directives in what volume and at what price the banks should buy credit resources. Third, the list of goods being reviewed [as published] for export will be minimized, and the number of degrees of freedom in hard currency operations increased. The Ukrainian state will master the methods of indirect influence. Primary among them will be: stimulation with the help of preferential credits, taxes, subsidies, and investment structural restructuring and introduction of new technologies; regulation of the money mass and activities of the banks;

exerting influence on monopolists through taxes; differentiated customs-duty and hard currency stimulation of exports; and encouragement of entrepreneurship and trade.

In addition, our state is the only one that will be able to ensure the economic protection on its territory for both those who produce and those who consume. For this purpose, the state, through economic and financial means, will strive for stability of both the domestic and the external rate of the national monetary unit. At the same time, Ukraine will be adjusting its external rate in respect to currencies with falling value and thus protect domestic prices from exports from respective countries. Using special methods, it will ensure the equivalency of the external hard currency and commodity exchange. Our own border and customs control will relieve us from the disorganized export of national currency and material resources out of the state, while skillful structural regulation of exports and imports will bring about the positive balance of payments for the republic.

Metro's Podolsk-Voskresensk Line Viewed

924A0930A Kiev VECHERNIY KIYEV in Russian 25 Mar 92 p 3

[Interview with A. Volynskiy, director of Kiev Subway Design Institute by correspondent P. Motlyakh; place and date not given: "The Birth of the Podolsk-Voskresensk Line"]

[Text] **For a number of years passions have been flaring around the project for construction of the fourth line of the Kiev metro, the Podolsk-Voskresensk Line. From the very name of this line itself it is evident that it must traverse the oldest district of the city—Podol. This is what sparked the strife: There are still fresh memories of the complications that developed as a result of the laying of the first line through this district to Obolon.... What is the state of design work on the new line today, which variant was selected from the many proposed, and were some lessons extracted from previous experience? Our correspondent speaks with A.P. Volynskiy, director of the Kiev Metro Design [Kievmetroproyekt] Institute about that and many other matters.**

It is already clear to everyone, Anatoliy Petrovich said, that the largest Vigurovshchina-Troyeshchina housing complex in the city and its closest neighbors cannot get by without a link with the right-bank part of the city. More than 350,000 people live here (an entire oblast center!) and building is continuing.

[Motlyakh] There would also be no harm in asking someone about how the development of the city was planned: Large masses of people were housed on the left bank of the Dnieper, while their work remained on the right bank...

[Volynskiy] Yes. It is true. Beside Thermoelectric Power Station-6 and the Almaz Production Association, people have nowhere to work in the northern section of left-bank Kiev. Thank God, the completion in the near future of the left wing of the Syretsk-Pechersk Line eliminates transportation problems in the southern left-bank area—the Kharkov complex, Poznyaki and Oskorki. The establishment of a link between the northern part of the left bank and the rest of the city, however, remains undecided.

[Motlyakh] What about the Moskovskiy Bridge?

[Volynskiy] Everyone knows how well traveled it is: It handles eight bus routes and three trolley-bus routes. Bus loads during peak hours amount to seven to eight persons per square meter. And what takes place mornings and evenings at Petrovka Station?

Today more than 60,000 transportation units cross the Moskovskiy Bridge per day. In ten years this load will double and significantly exceed the handling capacity of the bridge. No other type of transport, except for the metro, is capable of resolving problems of linkage between the left and right banks.

[Motlyakh] But a portion of the load will be assumed by the proposed construction of the high-speed streetcar line along the Dnieper—from Vigurovshchina-Troyeschina to the Kharkov complex with transfer to two metro lines: Svyatoshchino-Brovarsk and Syretsk-Pechersk lines.

[Volynskiy] That is exactly it—a portion. The time it takes to get to the right bank will prove to be too long. The handling capacity of the high-speed streetcar does not exceed 45 percent that of the metro. No matter how you slice it the only solution is one more metro line across the Dnieper.

[Motlyakh] How is it to be brought through Podol, then across Trukhanov Island and Rybalskiy Peninsula and the two rivers—Dniester and Desenka, to say nothing of the Raduzhnoye Lake?

[Volynskiy] The following variant appeared to be the most rational at first glance: From the elevated part of the city the metro line exits to Verkhniy and Nizhniy Val streets near Frolovsk Church and along that street reaches a bridge which must be constructed in the harbor area. A transfer center was planned at Kontraktovaya Ploshchad Station.

[Motlyakh] The public rallied specifically against this variant. There was an extensive discussion in our newspaper as well....

[Volynskiy] That is the problem. If the metro is again built through Podol at a shallow depth then the losses will be nonrecoverable: At a depth of one to two meters here each cubic meter of earth is literally "stuffed" with priceless relics of our history. No one will forgive us for their loss.

There were numerous variants of the metro route through Podol—underground, above ground, on trestles

above Verkhniy and Nizhniy Val streets. Also surface routes in a trench along the street with overpasses at all intersections.

They were all faulty for a key reason—irreplaceable losses to the cultural layer of the most ancient part of the city, violation of the historical entity of Podol or disfigurement of its architectural facade by the concrete monster—the trestle. The inevitable increase in vehicular traffic in ancient Podol, the pollution, the noise—that, after all, also will not help the "well being" of the most ancient structures and architectural monuments.

[Motlyakh] But there were also some roundabout variants?

[Volynskiy] All of the previous roundabout variants provided little relief. It was either necessary to demolish many dwellings and industrial facilities because of the narrow streets, or the "trestle solution" appeared again in an arc from Nizhnyaya Yurkovskaya to the harbor. There would be less demolition, but a trestle in Podol, even outside the historical zone, would not be tolerated by the public. The excessively sharp, small-radius curves would have sharply diminished the speed of blue expresses.

[Motlyakh] Why not build deep tunnels below Podol and under the Dniester?

[Volynskiy] Of course, this would be the best variant. But under our conditions this is impossible. Water saturated sands are on the bottom of Dnieper to a depth of up to 35 meters. Freezing of the ground here does not help. Therefore the building of tunnels here has to be done with caisson chambers under high pressure. Work by a person under such high pressure is prohibited.

Automatic caisson panels for building of tunnels are available at present only in certain foreign countries. The purchase of such equipment and technology would require at least $40 million. We do not have such funds today. Furthermore an underwater tunnel of such a length under our hydrogeological conditions would produce considerable difficulties in operation.

Here is another thought. No matter how you twist and turn at present it is impossible to get by without another vehicular crossing over the Dnieper, even with another metro line. Therefore it was decided to build this bridge in combination with the metro. We will also "save" $40 million.

Work on the technical and economic substantiation of the last variant of the Podolsk-Voskresensk Line has practically been completed at our institute. The draft was prepared by a group of specialists under the guidance of Chief Project Engineer A.V. Kazadayev.

[Motlyakh] What are the main characteristics of the new metro line?

The length of the entire route with 16 stations is 26 kilometers. The metro stations Zhulyany, Aeroport, Sevastopolskaya Ploshchad, Vozdukhoflotskiy Prospekt, and Vokzalnaya-2 will be built in the left wing between the settlement of Zhulyany and Kiev-Passazhirskiy Station.

Further on the route will cross the Ploshchad Pobedy with a station in the vicinity of the circus, the Lukyanovskiy Rynok, the housing complex on Tatarka and will emerge in Podol. After crossing the harbor, Dnieper, and Desenka via the bridge this line will bisect Rusanovskiye Sady and will terminate at the junction of two complexes—Voskresenka and Vigurovshchina-Troyeshchina in the vicinity of the intersection of two prospects, Vatutin and Mayakovskiy, Raduzhnaya Street and Perov Boulevard. Designs of the stations were worked out sufficiently well.

[Motlyakh] What will they be like? Let us take a ride on this metro line....

[Volynskiy] Construction will be carried out, as usual, in segments. It is planned to complete the segment from Vokzalnaya to the end Voskresenskaya Station in nine years. Seven of these years will be spent on the first segment from Troyeshchina to Lukyanovskaya Station, and two years from there to Vokzalnaya Station.

Such a roundabout variant will cost eight to 10 percent more than the initial ones, since the route is lengthened by 1.3 kilometers. But what we will gain and save for this eight to 10 percent!..

Demolition is comparatively limited: two dormitories of the Lenkuznitsa plant on Naberezhno-Lugovaya and the Kiev Rechnoy School, as well as several warehouses and coal storage units of the river port, and Woodworking Combine-3 of Stroydetal. That is about all, except for the moving of a few small dacha houses.

[Motlyakh] So, off we go—from Vokzalnaya-2 Station....

[Volynskiy] It will be built on the east side of the railway station and linked with the pedestrian crossing below the tracks. Transfer to the working station from one platform to the other will be possible via four escalators.

The underground Ploshchad Pobedy Station lobby is on the west side of the circus at the intersection of Prospekt Pobedy and Vorovskoy and Volodarskiy streets.

The Dukyanovskaya Station is located at the intersection of Artema and Kosiora streets. The underground lobby is incorporated in the underground passageways. This will also be the transfer point to the station of the same name as the Syretsk-Pechersk Line on which it is being constructed.

The deep-lying metro ends in the vicinity of Tatarskaya Station located at the center of the new housing complex.

Podolskaya Station is located on Naberezhno-Lugovaya Street and partly on the territory of Woodworking Combine-3. This will also be the transfer point to Taras Shevchenko Station which originally was not planned as

a transfer point and will therefore have to be redesigned. This will be accomplished without halting the movement of trains on the Krasnoarmeysk-Kurenevsk Line.

The section between Podolskaya and Sudostroitelnaya stations involves transition from underground to aboveground tracks on trestles and a bridge—over the territory of the freight-handling port, the harbor, and Rybalsk Peninsula. The bridge will be located between the Lenkuznitsa Plant and the old suspension bridge.

This bridge crossing will be linked with Frunze Street via Naberezhno-Lugovaya and Zavodskaya streets, which will allow vehicular traffic to detour around the historical part of Podol. A full bypass around Podol will be created after completion of a superhighway on Zavodskaya Street through Tatarka District in the future.

There are two stations after Podolskaya Station—the aboveground Sudostroitelnaya and Trukhanov Ostrov stations. The first one will be located on a trestle. One of its exits will lead to an escalator to the surface lobby on Elektrikov Street near the Lenkuznitsa plant.

The second station, Trukhanov Ostrov, will also be on a trestle in the northern part of the rest zone. Two of its lobbies were designed below the station itself on alluvial soil. People will go up and down on escalators.

Passing Trukhanov Ostrov we come to another bridge and trestle over Desenka and Rusanovskiye Sady. In some sections the metro will pass through shallow tunnels constructed in alluvial soil. In about the same way as across the Opechen Lake to Obolon.

Raduzhnaya Station is located in Rusanovskiye Sady near the Kiev-Petrovka—Kiev-Dneprovsk Railway Line. Its lobbies will contain transfer points to the electric trains and the high-speed Vigurovshchina-Troyeshchina—Kharkov Complex Streetcar Line.

The last segment is also embedded at a shallow depth. The route will cross Raduzhnoye Lake over an alluvial dam. Voskresenskaya—the end station, is of the ordinary type. Two lobbies and exits leading to underground pedestrian walkways below Raduzhnaya Street and Vatunin Prospekt.

At present preparations are under way at our institute for the further designing of a metro directly through the Vigurovshchina-Troyeshchina complex.

[Motlyakh] Thank you, Anatoliy Pavlovich, for an informative conversation.

BYELARUS

Prime Minister's Negative Remarks on CIS Future Noted

92UN1190A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 16, 15 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Anatoliy Kozlovich, correspondent: "The Belovezha 'Foresters' Could Have Been Taken by the 'Scrufs of Their Necks': That's What Byelarus's Prime Minister Thinks"]

[Text] **Byelarus's extremely unprofessional, uninformative, and uninteresting television suddenly produced a sensation on its late-evening program entitled "Capital."**

Dmitriy Filimonov, this program's leading journalist, reported certain details of a meeting between Vyacheslav Kebich, the Republic of Byelarus's prime minister, and the military. An amateur dictaphone attested over the airwaves how little confidence Byelarus's prime minister has in the CIS. He considers the Belovezha Forest meeting between Yeltsin, Kravchuk, and Shushkevich to be illegal and its decisions—unconstitutional. Kebich told the military with a hint of flattery that all he would have needed was a single one of our companies of assault troops to take this company of "foresters" by the "scrufs of their necks." (By the way, he himself was also in the Belovezha Forest at that time). Naturally, the prime minister took the military further into his confidence by telling them that nothing sensible or worthwhile would come of this CIS and that we must seek salvation beyond its borders—something which Byelarus is already engaged in doing very actively and successfully.

MOLDOVA

Dniester Region Politics Censured

92UN1154A Kiev VECHERNIY KIYEV in Russian 31 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Irina Lukomskaya: "'Russia's Combat Outpost': The Dniester Region through the Eyes of an Eyewitness"—usage of Moldavia, Moldova as published]

[Text] **The political card of the Moldavian Dniester region is eagerly being placed in the same pack with the Karabakh and Yugoslav cards, and the inevitability of interethnic conflict in disintegrating states is thereby affirmed. This point of view remains predominant in the central media, and it is rather "promising" as an instructive example for others who do not think too highly of the idea of various commonwealths of states—"See, that is the way it will be here."**

So, what is happening in the Dniester region? The officially recognized version is common knowledge—that the interethnic conflict is caused by the non-Moldavian population's fear that Moldova will be joined to Romania. Another version remains unheard, one that does not have a spokesman in today's mass media. It is expressed by B.M. Shcherba, leader of the civic movement "Dignity"—a movement that opposes the idea of statehood for the Dniester region:

[Shcherba] In order to understand just what the Dniester Republic is, it is necessary to listen to Tiraspol radio, to read Tiraspol newspapers, and to observe the innovations of the leadership of this republic.

The beloved heroes on Tiraspol radio are Makashov, Zhirinovskiy, and Nevzorov. In one of the broadcasts a message from Nevzorov was transmitted to the citizens of the Dniester region: "Stand firm, brothers." And somewhat earlier, a revelation of the same author: "In the Baltics it was necessary to take not the television center but the parliament." The "combat outpost of Russia"—this is what one of them nicknamed the Dniester region.

Undoubtedly, there are other interesting leading characters as well.

On 19 August the leadership of the Dniester region welcomed the telegram of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of the Emergency]. The composition of its leadership has almost been unchanged since that time.

President Smirnov declared at one of the meetings: "Some hurried to toss away their party cards. I always have my party card on me."

In a television interview Colonel Kitsak, commander in chief, called Gorbachev a "turncoat," saying: "All honest-minded people want everything to be like it was before the 1980's."

Cossacks from the Don appeared in Tiraspol in the fall. They were settled in the "Friendship," the best hotel in the city, and they paid 60 rubles [R] each per day. They immediately began to get the Dniester region Cossacks together. At present, the Cossacks receive R1,750 a month, not counting their food. They are actually mercenaries—who are charged by the command to be armed and ready. But these are people who like to drink. Imagine: Drunk, and not just one, and with weapons.

According to an ukase of President Smirnov the Cossacks will be in charge of the customs service. According to his ukase, they have been raised to the rank of officials. If you look in another document, it indicates there that citizens of the Dniester Republic are obligated to fulfill the instructions of officials.

Exasperation with the Cossacks compelled the people to unite. On the side of the newcomers from the "public" were the united council of labor collectives and the women's strike committee headed by Galina Andreyeva.

The first cherishes the idea of "new Russia"—from Tiraspol to Rostov. True, not long ago it was wide of the mark: In its message to the UN committee for the protection of human rights it called the Dniester region "age-old Russian lands." Having "lost" sight of the fact

that this is absolutely ignorant from an historical point of view—these always were diffuse Ukrainian-Moldavian territories.

But the women's strike committee (incidentally, what this name expresses is not clear) was celebrated at first because, sitting on the railroad tracks, it blocked the movement of trains at a time when it simply was necessary to export tomatoes—the whole crop was lost. But after that it spent R31,000 on a new year's evening party for the Cossacks. The slightly tight Cossacks had a row with a patrol, after which they were taken to the police; however, G. Andreyeva made a "resolute demand," and those who were at fault were released.

It is entirely possible that the women's strike committee learned to resolve questions in such a "resolute" way from the leadership of the republic, which in the very same style began transferring everything to its jurisdiction after the referendum. Among the first—symptomatically—are the police and the procuracy. How?

An armed man came to the police and said: Sign. One of my acquaintances complained: "I recently filed a report against him... The procuracy held out the longest of all, but it also yielded under the threat of unemployment. For greater cogency, before reporting to those "who fall under the jurisdiction," they were informed: Those who do not transfer will be declared outside the law. But—what law? The old ones are not in effect, and there are no new ones. Anarchy.

However, on what, other than force, is this "phantom-republic" based. On what?

The trump card is intimidation with the Romanian threat. That is, with the fact that the present leadership of Moldova, it is said, intends to join the republic to Romania. It is understandable that the non-Moldavian population gives a hostile reception to such a prospect. The threat is deliberately exaggerated, which arouses opposition to it, and on this basis people gather under their own flags.

But the whole problem is that the idea of joining Romania is very unpopular among the population—it is professed only by the leadership of the People's Front. As for President Snegur, he declared: "We did not pull our head out from under Moscow in order to place it under Bucharest." His program, which is oriented on independence, passed verification during the presidential elections of 8 December last year. An overwhelming majority of parliament supports it, including representatives of the People's Front.

But the Tiraspol leaders represent the matter in such a way that those who do not agree with them are nationalists who are fighting to join Romania. This is understandable. I am also among the nationalists, a teacher of Russian literature, who is half Ukrainian. The label sticks so firmly that even people who have known me for many years, after reading about me in the newspapers or hearing about me on the radio, ask if I really am for unification with Romania.

The second strong column supporting the building of Dniester statehood is fear. "Who is not with us is against us." It is impossible to assemble legally. Imagine, our coordination council meets, and a militia man appears immediately—all of us in the settlement have known each other for a long time, this is what is unpleasant—and he says that he is ordered to report who was here, and to disperse them. My telephone is monitored shamelessly (I know a fellow who is assigned to record my conversations on a tape recorder—he, lifting the receiver, breathes heavily and noisily). My movements are continuously followed.

On one occasion the school director assembled us, and, blushing, proposed that we sign a document, sent from above, with the words: "We, the undersigned, fully approve," and so forth in this spirit. It was very funny, but the administration signed it, nonetheless. The very same day it was announced on the radio: "One female employee in the rayon finance department did not sign such a document, and she now thinks: Sign it anyway or start to look for a new place of work, and a place to live at the same time."

The administration of three vocational schools located on the territory of Tiraspolskiy Rayon decided to stand firm. Then an order of the president came out about disbanding these schools. The official reason—the Dniester region does not need builders(!). Of course, the ukase was canceled after a certain time.

As for the educational policy of the politicians, starting next year a new subject will be introduced in the schools (the old one is not yet forgotten well enough)—basic military training. The left bank has no plans to switch the Moldavian language to the Latin script, as is done in Chisinau, but to soften the impression from its actions it is thinking of conducting a referendum on this score. Thus, a deliberate blow will be inflicted on the Moldavian language, which in the future will lead to the disappearance of its users in this region.

Chisinau's training programs, which are more advanced and modern, also are not recognized. The weight of the argument in favor of the Dniester region: Either do it the way we do, or we will stop financing you.

Tiraspol already has its own university. Ten professors will teach in it, and a doctor of juridical sciences has been appointed rector. It is true that all of them were dismissed from other VUZ's [higher educational institutions] that specialized in Marxism-Leninism. Practicing physicians will be invited to lecture at the medical faculty. The university is not yet a legal entity—this means that its diplomas will be invalid.

One detail: The new educational institution is being financed from the Russian fund. The fund actually has the right to finance various projects on the territory of

other states, but with the concurrence of those states. Nobody asked Moldova. But, of course, if the Russian fund has already recognized the statehood of the Dniester region...

As for the money, the residents of the left bank are very interested in where it is coming from. For example, my mother's pension is R800. Wages are correspondingly high also: They are increased for everyone on the first request: Where does such money come from—after all, the Dniester region is not trading with anyone yet. The official version: They opened their own bank. This is not very believable. Many suspect that it is the very same party millions that were lost.

Also puzzling is the appearance of weapons—everyone knows that the 14th Army, which is deployed on inflammable territory, is really observing neutrality, and that the arms are not from its stores. The Cossacks also admit this, verifying that they buy arms on the market; however, they refuse to demonstrate this very interesting process.

Now a so-called conciliation commission is working here. But, however paradoxical this may be, it is not interested in settling the conflict. After all, if the situation normalizes, the fog will be lifted, and the current figures will have to leave, and the people will not forgive them.

...Incidentally, virtually not one street has been renamed in recent years. One Japanese journalist was perplexed at first—the ideological changes, judging by the flags, slogans, and names, have not affected this part of the former USSR at all. But suddenly, moving along October 25th Street and seeing the building of the rayon executive committee in front of him and armed guards at the entrance, he laughed suddenly: "But this is the big museum of Bolshevism! Do not get rid of it. Show it to the tourists—and you will have a lot of money."

From the sidelines, all of this really looks comical. But I have to live there, and I get a little sick from this thought.[end Shcherba]

Last week Ostankino TV reported that half a squadron of Siberian Cossacks was heading for the Dniester region, and, it is said, if they choose to they will assemble still more. On what kind of a basis are citizens who are not even from an adjacent state interfering in the internal affairs of Moldova? It is very simple: The Cossacks have this kind of order—a local leader reported in a local television interview that if "they are beating our own," Cossacks come immediately from everywhere to help. Never mind the laws, never mind noninterference, especially if the country of which you are a citizen keeps quiet.

And Russia is persistently quiet, as if following its own tradition that was worked out over the course of recent years—January of last year in Lithuania, the December events in Tbilisi, and at times the indiscreet expression of words in support of the Russian-speaking population of the Crimea, but also the secret February instructions of R. Khasbulatov to the directors of Moscow hotels "not to give accommodations to persons of Chechen nationality" (IZVESTIYA wrote about this). Official Russia, as was recognized during the Kiev meeting of heads of state of the CIS, never forgets its national interests, even if it is difficult to reconcile them with the concept of justice with respect to other states.

Ukraine, echoing the character of its president, was silent for a long time. Immediately after the actual recognition of the coup d'etat in Georgia it still did not decide to express itself with respect to the Dniester region. As if it forgot that actions were taking place on its borders.

However, the Dniester region thought about itself: The war was threatening to spill over into Odessa Oblast. In the end the president decided to publish an ukase on strengthening security on the border with Moldova. Later, a recommendation followed to the oblast executive committee to establish a commission for the reception of refugees. Afterwards came the ban on the transit of armed formations through Ukraine heading in the direction of Moldova. And even though after the last one a bus with Krasnodar numbers had already been seized, and its passengers were disarmed and sent back to where they came from, many are inclined to see first and foremost a political aspect in this step of the Ukrainian president (including Chisinau and Bucharest). In the end, Ukraine, albeit indirectly, recognized the fact of interference of representatives of Russia in the internal Moldovan conflict. In addition, it actually announced that it does not intend to take even an indirect part in all of this.

It is worth repeating that an important political announcement was made indirectly, on the sly, as if not to frighten or offend anyone. Meanwhile, not only the Cossacks did not catch it but even citizens of Ukraine. And that is why recruiters are coming to Kiev, bringing an official invitation to our lads to do battle, on a form with a double-headed eagle. Having no view on the events other than the "Russian view," some are going.

Thus, perhaps this really may not be a case when silence is golden?

Pro-Rutskoy Position on Dniester Events

92UN1156A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 Apr 92 p 4

[Article by S. Karkhanin: "Gunshots and Applause"]

[Text] Misfortune brings people together, and inhabitants of Dubossary, a frontline city, are listening to the radio broadcasts from the congress of Russian deputies all together—in the city soviet executive committee building. The day when the decree adopted on the Dniester region was broadcast, thousands of people greeted it with applause.

Chisinau continues, meanwhile, the tactics of threats. President of Moldova M. Snegur has unequivocally made it understood that he intends "restoring order" on

the left bank at all costs. The People's Front is organizing protest meetings against the position of the Russian authorities, and one such resolution addressed to President B. Yeltsin was sent by students of Chisinau Secondary School No. 6.

The declaration of the foreign ministers of Moldova, Russia, Romania, and Ukraine, which deals with the problems of the Dniester region, is being discussed extensively. Many residents of the left bank have noticed that general phrases are predominant in this document and that it was discussed in the absence of representatives of the Dniester Republic. As far, however, as the clause concerning "withdrawal from the conflict zone of foreign citizens participating in it" is concerned, the idea—sending the Don Cossacks home—is hardly practicable. Yu. Grigoryev, chief of staff of the Cossack association in Dubossary, said in this connection: "We have but one law—the decision of the group and the ataman. If, however, we receive from Moscow a 'decree' requiring us to leave our brothers and primordially Russian land in the lurch, we will respond in the spirit of the letter of the Zaporozhye Cossacks to the Turkish sultan."

Hundreds of telegrams are being sent to the command and officers of the 14th Army, whose position is just about the main factor of stability on the boundary between the antagonists. One such telegram was sent by the Officers Union: "The furious, pro-Romanian leaders of Moldova have resolved to wipe out the freedom-loving people of the Dniester region, who are drawn toward Russia, and forcibly drag them together with all of Moldova into Romania," the telegram says. "We will not allow officers and their families and other citizens to become hostages and victims of the criminal actions of some and the no less criminal inaction of others."

The inhabitants of the left bank confirm that the speech at the Congress of Russian Vice President A. Rutskoy was completely truthful and that the abrupt tone is explained by the outrages of the terrorists who have been sent from the right bank and who are raging in the Dniester region. Having visited the left bank, A. Rutskoy could see for himself on whose side the truth lies and who is defending a just cause. The list of those martyred by the Moldavian [as published] police has been supplemented by the name of one further peaceful inhabitant—Sergey Velichko. Having raped his wife, the patrol subjected Sergey himself to sadistic torture.

D. Postovan, prosecutor of Moldova, sent SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA a letter, incidentally, whose import amounts to the fact that "the paper is reflecting events unobjectively" and that the true culprits of the tragedy on the Dniester are the "separatists," whom the "resistance movement" is combating. The prosecutor preferred to gloss over the fact that the fighters of this "movement" are, for the most part, former criminals clothed in police uniform and armed with Romanian and Belgian assault rifles and that they are "resisting" by terrorizing, in the main, the peaceful inhabitants of Dniester villages....

Meanwhile the gunfire over the Dniester is unabating. Relying on the Cosnita and Kochiyerskiy beachheads captured on the left bank, armed detachments of Moldova are once again regrouping, preparing for a broad-based invasion of the Dniester region. Subunits of a Moldavian [as published] army are being formed in Chisinau, armored equipment for them has been taken from the arsenals of the CIS forces, and a callup of reservists has begun, and papers are being received, what is more, by Russians and Ukrainians living in Moldova, as a rule. Special terrorist groups have torched three eight-apartment houses in the village of Korzhevo near Dubossary, the majority of residents of these houses being Russians. Random firing is clattering out in Bendery, as before.

Cossack Influence in Dniester Region Noted

92UN1181A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian 1-7 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Sergey Ivanov: "Cossacks in the Dniester Region—Who, Wherefrom, and Why"]

[Text] The appearance of Cossacks in the armed order of battle of the guards of the Dniester Moldavian [as published] Republic (PMR) gave the conflict an additional sharpness, and, along with this, it introduced a bit of romanticism.

It is not being reported exactly how many Don and Kuban Cossacks arrived. A figure was cited for me in the Chancellery of the prime minister of Moldova: According to the status in the first 10 days of March, the number that arrived on the left bank of the Dniester and, moreover, armed people, was on the order of 10,000.... Cossacks, or hired professional soldiers who assumed their appearance? was the question raised by Prime Minister V. Muravschi. Even if they are Cossacks, what are they doing on the territory of independent Moldova?

I decided it was better to see for myself one time. And so, I am in the Tiraspol House of Soviets—the government of the PMR is located here now. One of the rooms is used as Cossack headquarters. A sentry, armed with a wooden club, is posted at the door to maintain orderly routine (the guard at the building itself is far more imposing). My documents are examined critically (like nowhere else) by a man in a tall Astrakhan hat and a field Afghan jacket with colonel's epaulets, and, afterwards, Aleksandr Vasilyevich Kucher, ataman of the Black Sea Cossack troops, introduces himself.

The conversation is constantly interrupted. A long silent telephone livens up, and operational summaries pour in from the field one after another. Duty officer responsibilities are performed by veteran-activists of the Cossack movement under the command of Hero of the Soviet Union I. Pashchenko. The veterans do not restrain their

emotions: "The generals are betraying us and selling us!" This is in regard to the "neutrality" of the 14th Army. "And also these chiefs of yours in Moscow...." The strength of the expressions eases somewhat with the arrival of women; they brought provisions assembled by the local residents for the Cossacks.

Sturdy mustachioed Cossack muzhiks come by. Those who are dressed in field clothes sign in their firearms—they returned from patrol in the area of Dubossary. Others in Cossack clothes and regalia gloomily started to smoke—these returned from a funeral in one of the villages.... They enter into an energetic male conversation of an operational nature with chief Kucher; not for a stranger's ears! The women and the correspondent have to withdraw....

We continue our conversation in the empty meeting hall. My interlocutor is B. Belokopytov, deputy of the city soviet and a lieutenant colonel in the reserve. He was "recruited into the Cossacks recently," and he was chosen to be the commander of a Cossack camp of the Tiraspol circle. In the words of Boris Petrovich, practically any of the local residents who desire to can "fill out a questionnaire," and the ataman soviet will decide further.

The recently started process of Cossack revival did not leave out the Dniester region either. The tasks of the movement—re-creation of the age-old Cossack spirit, from which come an inalienable patriotism and an exemplary attitude to the performance of military duty.... The Black Sea Cossack troops are one of some dozen and a half that exist, and it includes Cossacks of the Dniester region and Bendery (Tiraspolskiy, Dubossarskiy, Slobodzeyskiy, and other districts). Naturally, these structures are set up in rayons in which Cossacks have been living for a long time.

It was proposed to invite experts on Cossacks from the shores of the Don to restore Cossack traditions. But plans had to be changed: The events began, and two Cossack platoons were formed urgently from locals under the command of their own atamans. There are a few.

About those who came "to the war." These, by the way, are not only Cossacks. Ordinary volunteers are coming, alone and in groups. Recently, a detachment of Gagauz came, setting an example of mutual assistance: In 1990, people from the Dniester region helped them defend Gagauziya from the incursions of "volunteers" on the side of Chisinau. Nonetheless, the government of the PMR found it more expedient to do business with help along the Cossack line, which is the most organized: The people carried documents, certifying as to authority and qualifications. These can be trusted with weapons and sent to the "front lines...." As they told me, order has been brought in this matter! And, incidentally, the decision on rendering such support was made by the leading organs of the Russian Cossack movement last fall, when it became clear that events were approaching...

There was one more competent interlocutor—Valeriy Litskay, the official representative of the Dniester region administration. Thus, administration on the military question is oriented on subunits of professionals—everyone sees what tragic consequences the "people's war" led to in the well-known Karabakh. The presence of Cossacks instills confidence in the guards. On its part, at the beginning of the year, the Supreme Soviet of the PMR passed a law on the Cossacks, stipulating their special status—this does not even exist on the Don.

Where is the Cossack force employed? On the most dangerous sector of the left bank—close to the Dubossary bridge. Also dangerous are zones at other bridges, and that is why they have already mined them and even tried to blow them up. The Dniester River is swift, and the shores are not accessible—this is what gives the bridges a special significance, and in this case, unfortunately, not only economic. There are also other circumstances: The rayon of Dubossary is the "slender waist," a narrow place approximately in the middle of a long and not wide left bank zone, and the Moldavian people (who make up more than 60 percent of the population in Moldova, and about 40 percent in the Dniester region) is concentrated mainly right in the villages hereabouts. There is no need to prove how important it is to Chisinau to establish control specifically over this zone, but for Tiraspol, accordingly, not to allow this. The interests of the parties came into opposition here. This is why agreements on a cease-fire are achieved here with such difficulty and are violated with such ease. And so Cossacks and other armed people will perish, and, as it happens, unarmed people also.... I suppose: The Cossacks appeared here, because they were moved by a sincere effort to defend the Russian people. They are by no means "blue helmets," either in their status or, what is more, in their manner of behavior, and from the standpoint of the so-called "grand policy," their future stay and activity with weapons in hand will hardly resolve the problem that has arisen. It is more likely that they will aggravate it... But inasmuch as the problem exists, then its resolution is the prerogative of official representatives who are given the political responsibility and diplomatic capabilities.

Let it be so. But no clear answer has been given to too many important questions. But, after all, it would seem that there are politicians for this!... "Snegur's team" proceeds from the concept of "an independent Moldova in internationally recognized borders," but the opposition and powerful People's Front, as if nothing were wrong, is leading the matter to a "Romanian merger." These are two big differences, as they say in the vicinity and in Odessa. But what will you say the position of Chisinau should be? Well, they decided in the Dniester region that, under the cover of the first, preparations are being made for the second. Now imagine the attitude of these people toward a possible reward of fate—while not moving from the spot, to end up suddenly in the position of a "second-rate foreigner," dumb and not wanted.

Politics of Left, Right Bank War Analyzed

92UN1202A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 11, 15 Mar 92 p 9

[Article by Aleksandr Kakotkin: "Moldova: for Each Republic Its Own Karabakh?"—usage of Moldova, Moldavia as published]

[Text] **The majority of indications of the "Karabakhization" of the conflict in the Dniester region are already in evidence. It has its own Khankendi-Stepanakert, that is, Dubossary, which Chisinau officialdom has renamed Dubesar, and its own Shusha in the form of the neighboring village of Kochiyery, where the main forces of Chisinau's supporters on the Left Bank have settled. There are sufficient weapons and armored equipment on both sides. The mutual hatred, stoked by hardened propaganda, has reached a critical point. There is a fundamental difference also, it is true: The conflict between Chisinau and Tiraspol is more of a political than interethnic nature.**

Left Bank

Thirty-nine percent Moldavians, 26 percent Ukrainians, and 24 percent Russians live on the left bank of the Dniester. Chisinau, which believed that in an era of militant nationalism the Dniester Moldavian Republic [PMR] would fall apart of its own accord, manifestly underestimated the Tiraspol politicians. The leaders of the PMR, technocrats and shop floor workers in the main, have operated amazingly methodically and resourcefully. For a start they underpinned independence with a substantial economic base. Wages on the left bank are higher than on the right, and there are far more allowances for the needy strata of the population. Last year the PMR, having spent approximately 400 million rubles [R] on social needs (given a population of 750,000), armed a sizable army and transferred R180 million to Chisinau, contrived to put together a budget showing a R140 million profit. Thanks to a well-considered tax policy, the decline in production this year on the left bank has constituted only four percent, on the right bank, 25 percent.

The leaders of the Dniester region have introduced three official languages, created a three-faction chamber of nationalities with each faction's right of veto, and given careful thought to personnel policy. And have achieved an improbable result: The vast majority of left-bank Moldavians support Tiraspol. And they constitute one-third of those who have fallen in the conflicts with Tiraspol.

The PMR armed forces includes the "Dniester" battalion, approximately 600 men strong, a 1,500-man guard with about 30 armed vehicles and approximately 1,500 militia officers equipped with automatic weapons. There are also several hundred armed defense squad volunteers and Don Cossacks, and a detachment of volunteers recently arrived from allied Gagauzia. There are in the reserve as yet unarmed fighters of territorial-rescue detachments (approximately 3,000 persons).

Tiraspol's political demands began with a free economic zone and, in proportion to the blood shed, grew to subject of a federation which Moldova proper, Gagauzia, and the PMR would join as equals. The PMR does not intend breaking away from Moldova: It has thought about this and concluded that this would be economically disadvantageous. Separation is possible in the event of Moldova reuniting with Romania.

Right Bank

The nationalist intoxication which accompanied Chisinau's actions has manifestly subsided of late. Parliament even attempted to democratize the Language Act, falling just 10 votes short. And had the deputies from the left bank been in attendance at the session, the outcome of the voting would have been quite different. On 6 March President Snegur offered the left bank a free economic zone. But, alas, the train had, apparently, already left.... The mutual mistrust has gone too far. The left bank is sure that Moldova is on the point of running to Romania, and the right bank maintains that, should the separatists be given free rein, they would immediately affiliate with Ukraine. Both Prime Minister Valeriu Muravschi and Supreme Soviet Chairman Aleksandru Mosanu told me that all the provocations and conflicts are being organized by Tiraspol in order to impede the process of Moldova's entry into the world community. Indeed, it is Tiraspol which is benefiting from the conflicts, in the main: The population is coming together, the authority of the leadership is strengthening and in the eyes of the world community Moldova appears to be a little empire. But the last two clashes occurred on the eve of Moldova's entry into the CIS and the United Nations, which the PMR did not oppose. And in Moldova there is the People's Front, which is oriented toward reunification with Romania and which is disadvantageous to both. But both leaders rejected the suspicions leveled at the People's Front of Moldova out of hand. They saw nothing odd in the coincidence of the fighting in the Dniester region and the departures from Moldova of the president. In their opinion, the president is fully in control of the situation in the republic, and the People's Front of Moldova is too weak to prevent him. But Valeriu Muravschi said that the tension is beneficial to "certain forces," which could operate via the hands of the People's Front.

The prime minister and the speaker of parliament declared that they conceive of the future of the PMR as a separate region with free economic zone status. Aleksandru Mosanu was quite candid: "Were we to arrange a federation, it is us who the next day would be swept away here." But who precisely would be doing the sweeping, he did not specify. And to my question concerning the possibility of an understanding somehow being reached with the leaders of the PMR Valeriu Muravschi replied: "It is possible. But not with these people."

Everyone suspects everyone else of everything. Mosanu declared that for him Russia's interference in the conflict was obvious and he hinted that it was beneficial to Ukraine. Muravschi discerned powerful imperial forces behind the Dniester region. And Oazu Nantoy, director of the Policy Analysis Service, accused the bitterest enemies—the People's Front of Moldova and the PMR—of a secret alliance: "Mircea Druc could pay Smirnov's wages, and the latter, Druc's." True, everyone declared that he would solve Moldova's conflict exclusively by peaceful means and with the enlistment of forces of the world community, possibly.

What Will Happen?

I fear that there will be great bloodshed. Whereas it took Karabakh years to switch from individual exchanges of fire to fighting with the participation of armored vehicles, in Moldova such "progress" has been made in just four months. It is still not a fact that the enemies will succeed in getting out of the confrontation easily. I have already spoken about the left bank, and there remain on the right bank approximately 3,000 police officers and Special Militia Department forces and approximately 20 armored combat vehicles. Several hundred supporters of Chisinau are on the left bank, holding on to the "Kochiyery beachhead."

Both banks are accommodating themselves to the military units for, as the events in Kochiyery showed, the 14th Army, torn to pieces, has been incapable of protecting itself even. Cossacks have appeared on the left bank, consequently, Romanian volunteers should be expected on the right bank. Given this accumulation of nonprofessional fighters, one chance shot, a deliberate provocation even more, and events could slip completely out of control. A carnage in which the adversaries are without a moment's hesitation using against one another modern weapons captured from the army is beginning. And Moldova has the highest density of population of all the republics of the CIS. There will be many casualties, quite futile, moreover, for the foes lack the strength to gain a victory over one another, but there is, one other hand, a great surplus of hatred. Whereas at this time the armies are being kept apart, we will not have long to wait for the next twist to the spiral: the Reunification Committee is together with the People's Front of Moldova planning to hold all-Romania parliamentary elections in May. I told the leaders on both banks this and was struck by their Olympian composure. Almost everyone responded roughly thus: "Regrettable, of course, but what can you do!"

KAZAKHSTAN

Problems of Kazakh Self-Sufficiency Reviewed

92US0379A Alma-Ata YEGEMENDI QAZAQSTAN in Kazakh 17 Dec 91 p 2

[Article by Nurtore Zhusip: "Who Is Going to Receive, and Who to Provide?"]

[Text] **The republic parliament has reviewed questions concerned with the current budget system, and the 1992 Republic of Kazakhstan budget, and has specific sources for survival. Hitherto Kazakhstan has been a raw materials' zone. As a result, raw materials produced have been sold cheaply, and we have paid dear for products manufactured from them. If we do not achieve radical change, that is to say, if we ourselves do not produce all the kinds of products needed by the people's economy and by the people, then no matter how well we structure things, there is no way for us to mend the "holes" in the budget.**

"It is difficult for Kazakhstan to live on its own. It cannot get very far with raw materials alone. This being the case, how can it be a part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (whether it is a renewed union or not, or a "Slavic" union, it makes no difference)? However, other than that, where will its strength come from?" This prevailing viewpoint is heard every other day.

"Kazakhstan has endowed no one. Has it become rich by providing a little grain? Its production is weak, and it has repeatedly received subsidies from the center. You are crazy." Kolbin in his time said this sort of thing. One-sided pronouncements of this kind are being heard again now that the former union republics have achieved their sovereignty. Who is to receive, and who is to provide? This is a question we do not wish to pose. Republic President Nursultan Abishuly Nazarbayev once said: "There is no need for there to be a connected giving and taking of one from the other. If there is, we will easily fall into unending bickering. Also, what need is there to exhaust tendencies of our nation complex in its economic relations." In saying this we realize that he was summoning us to difficult work. In touching upon such momentous words, we should not notice the one-sided ideas. However, things are turning out more and more differently as events progress.

We have no interest in raising these issues. This should be stated openly. It has been Russian publications that have screamed out loud about "who will give what to whom, and whom will receive what," and which have published information about whom is producing what, and whom is providing what. "Most of the republics which have achieved sovereignty have declared their independence. They now would consolidate political independence through economic independence. Looking at the statements of the republics, all are critical of the center since, it would seem, they give too much and get too little in return, but is this really the way things are?" So they say, and the Russians have begun not to take into consideration what the sovereign republics produce and provide. It is like doing a good job in fleecing a docile camel. The joke is on Kazakhstan.

According to statistics, some 6.5 billion rubles worth of consumer goods were brought into Kazakhstan from other regions and from foreign countries in 1990. However, the region itself supplies 1.2 billion rubles worth of goods (not including grain and other raw materials). The difference between exports and imports is considerable: it is nearly 5.4 billion rubles. Within this, the figure for consumer goods brought in from other regions is 3.5 billion rubles.

More specifically, we import fish and fish products, and canned fruits and vegetables, vegetable oil, margarine and sugar from outside. Our primary supplier of fish and fish products is Russia. Vegetable oil comes in from Russia, Uzbekistan and Moldova. Among consumer goods, almost 50 percent of non-food consumer goods seem to be brought in from outside. Among these consumer goods, televisions, home refrigerators and freezers, sewing machines, motorcycles and motor scooters, pianos and grand pianos, photographic equipment and home equipment and appliances, in addition to other varieties, are brought in from outside. Kazakhstan gets motorcycles, motor scooters, televisions, pianos, and grand pianos from Russia, the Ukraine and Byelarus. Among those providing refrigerators and freezers is Russia. It turns out that light vehicles and conveniences are primarily supplied by Russia and the Ukraine, and that sewing machines are supplied only by Russia.

At the same time, it turns out that Russia in 1990 supplied Kazakhstan with 63 percent of its rolled iron, 89 percent of its construction glass and 98 percent of its calcium soda.

The by-stander might think that these figures have nothing to do with daily life in Kazakhstan. However, if we bear in mind that all of these figures have been chosen with only one aim to mind, namely to show that Russia is "the people's benefactor in everything," then everything becomes clear. Here we are "forgetting" to reveal certain important facts given below.

First of all, the fact that the former USSR economy was centralized and administered according to a general administrative-governmental system has been intentionally forgotten. Second, the fact that the economies of republics like Kazakhstan have been purposely directed at the production primarily of raw materials has not been taken into account. Third, the kinds of prices (to be sure very low) at which the raw materials have been sold, and the prices (very dear) at which they have been resold, have been forgotten maliciously.

In any case, much like the proverb: "if a kettle has a handle, the cook his opportunity," one can hush up the real state of affairs as much as one wishes. At present there is no need to dispute about who gives to whom, and who supplies what. About this there is, to be sure, the

document prepared for the purvey of the republic president by Novosibir scientists and experts. We would like to recall that it was stated that the problem would not be resolved in favor of Kazakhstan. We think it necessary that the public of the republic become aware of the details of the question, and that the people become informed about them.

The essence of the question under discussion here is not who gives to whom, and who takes from whom. The question is a matter of resistance to feelings of superiority, of feelings that "we are superior to you," through specific acts. Whatever the quantities of raw materials produced by Kazakhstan, it remains poverty stricken. "If the mouth eats there is blood, and if it does not eat there is blood." Just as the proverb suggests, we must be free of the view that someone is bad, that Kazakhstan is bad. However, to achieve this....

To achieve this, Kazakhstan must provide everything itself, must produce everything itself. Kazakhstan must produce and manufacture everything, from shoes to automobiles, from matches to aircraft, from suits and trousers to combines. Only through this will we consolidate economic independence.

Kazakhstan can survive on its own. Thanks to God, Kazakhstan provides its grain freely to all republics, including grain-rich Russia, Uzbekistan, Moldova, Qyrghyzstan, its groats to Russia, the Ukraine, Byelarus, Uzbekistan and Qyrghyzstan. Some 41 percent of Kazakh coal is delivered without complaint to areas outside the republic, and what fine coal it is!

We are obligated to say that Russia provides us with most combines to collect the grain, trolley-buses, electric trains and road construction equipment. We must now produce all of this ourselves.

However, it is not true that Kazakhstan imports only and provides nothing itself. During a nine-month period, Kazakhstan exported 10.5 million rubles' worth of products. Among these products, products worth 9.5 billion went as exports to other republics, and 1 billion rubles' worth went as exports to foreign countries. Russia takes some 60 percent of our raw materials and products.

There are not a few industrial products produced by Kazakhstan and exported abroad. For example, during the nine-month period we delivered 155,000 tires intended for automobiles and agricultural equipment, 19.2 million square meters of ceiling covering materials, 145.5 million standard slate units, and 333,000 tons of mineral fertilizers.

If we had not provided the required tires, would the automobiles and tractors have been able to run? If we had not delivered similar required raw materials, would the promised products reach us?

In conclusion, what we are saying is this: Whether there is a union or not, whether we are divided, or not divided, is not the issue. The issue is our producing our own products, and our strengthening our own budget. In this connection, we think that the republic president should draw up a program for things to be done immediately, and assign specific tasks. If we are to be hungry, let us be hungry. However, this will only last for a time. During this time we need a specific program saying we will do this and that, and good edicts. Without such a program and edicts, the reforms that have been begun will show no swift return. For example, in only a short time the spring planting season will begin. We are standing around complaining about lack of tractors on the one hand, and lack of propellers on the other. We know that Kazakhstan alone, without anyone's help, must produce everything needed, starting, above all, with equipment and devices intended for all enterprises involved in carrying out the coming year's planting. We know that we must ourselves make a very good beginning in this effort.

TAJIKISTAN

Confusion Over Rumored Presence of Kazakhstan Troops Explained

92US0413A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 16, 15 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Samoylenko, correspondent: "Nabiyev's Opposition Teaches Nazarbayev: How a Kazakh 'Landing' Was Made in Dushanbe"]

[Text] **A political meeting is a political meeting, and—as a rule—it is impossible to ascertain how information finds its way into the crowd. But it does find its way, and how! On 7 April Tajikistan shuddered. Internal troops of the Republic of Kazakhstan had arrived in Dushanbe!**

According to information received in Alma-Ata from the Tajikistan Ministry of Internal Affairs, this "false rumor" was launched at a political meeting in Dushanbe by Yusupov, the chairman of the Democratic Party. Naturally, the meeting was filled with indignation, and the leaders of the opposition shot off a telegram to N. Nazarbayev demanding an explanation, the immediate withdrawal of his soldiers, and stating that this was interference in the internal affairs of an independent state. This "false rumor" could have been shot down without delay, as soon as it flew over the square in Dushanbe where the meeting was being held. But—strange as it may seem—Tajikistan's leaders did not react at all to Yusupov's sensational statement. Why not? Could it be that they hoped that this version would thoroughly intimidate the opposition leaders and would result in the complete dispersal of the stubborn meeting?

The inscrutability of Tajikistan's official authorities and the wrathful haste of the Democrats heated up the square in Dushanbe and Kazakhstan's public pretty well. And it was not until the "false rumor" flew into the major newspapers that V. Gordeyev, the commander of Kazakhstan's internal troops, issued a statement to the following effect: This was a provocation; all troop units of

the Republic of Kazakhstan were within their proper areas of deployment; and there had been no orders by N. Nazarbayev to "render aid to Tajikistan's authorities."

The political meeting in Dushanbe greeted the announcement by the opposition leaders concerning their telegram to N. Nazarbayev with a feeling of profound satisfaction. All that remains to be said is that the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan received no dispatches of any kind from Dushanbe....

TURKMENISTAN

Security Chief on New Functions

92US0409B Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 24 Mar 92 p 2

[Interview with Major General A. Ovedzhov, chairman, Turkmenistan Committee for National Security, by journalists; place and date not given: "State Security: New Tasks"]

[Text] **As already reported, a press conference for journalists was held in the Turkmenistan Committee for National Security. Major General A. Ovedzhov, the committee's chairman, gave detailed replies to questions put to him by representatives of the mass media.**

[Journalists] Two basic directions or trends—intelligence and counterintelligence—have taken shape and become specific in the work of the present-day Turkmenistan Committee for National Security. But, of course, they also existed previously. Just what has changed in their functions?

[Ovedzhov] Previously all our subdivisions and units, including intelligence and counterintelligence, were subordinate to the central apparatus of the USSR KGB. This central authority made all the decisions on their own and merely assigned us the task of carrying them out. Moreover, the interests of our republic were not taken into account as a rule. Nowadays the situation is different. Having found our independence, we have subordinated the activity of these services to developing Turkmenistan's foreign economic ties. We have keyed our efforts on obtaining corroborating information with regard to possible subversive acts. Intelligence now serves to discover smuggling and hard-currency operations crossing our state border. We are alarmed, for example, by the smuggling of drugs, which are penetrating into Turkmenistan from the territory of neighboring states. Turkmenistan is rich in natural resources and raw materials which have attracted the attention not only of our neighbors, but also of other powers. All this must be taken into consideration. In short, it's high time that we stopped relying on someone else and took care of our own security ourselves.

[Journalists] Has the work of the KNB [Committee for National Security] become more complicated in connection with the fact that Turkmenistan's borders with its neighboring states have become open in many respects?

[Ovedzhov] Our government itself has proceeded to expand contacts. Generations of Turkmens have dreamed of communicating and visiting with their relatives who live on the other side of the border. In order to furnish people with such opportunities, we have opened up points where the passage across the state border has been simplified. This is a good cause and a necessary one, but the policy of open borders does not mean a policy of open doors. We must not forget that a border can also be used for other purposes—those which are unacceptable for our society. We will continue to welcome the development of economic ties just so long as they are not harmful to our state's interests.

[Journalists] Will the Border Troops Administration be included within the KNB?

[Ovedzhov] It's hard to say. This matter will be resolved at the level of the Turkmenistan government. But I can assure you that—just as before—we will be working in close contact with the border troops.

[Journalists] Is mutual cooperation being proposed by the Turkmenistan Committee for National Security with the Commonwealth states and with the corresponding special services of foreign neighboring countries?

[Ovedzhov] Our mutual relations with the Commonwealth states will most likely be built on a foundation of an agreement or treaty. And as to cooperation with our foreign neighbors, practical life itself will compel us to set up and fine-tune contacts for the joint struggle against international terrorism and the illegal drug business.

[Journalists] In connection with the disintegration of the USSR, the Turkmenistan Committee for National Security will hardly send its own staff members to study in the other republics. But personnel training is a necessary condition. Wherein do you see the solution to this problem?

[Ovedzhov] Indeed, with the elimination of the USSR KGB, we have found ourselves in an extremely difficult position, inasmuch as we do not have our own training center. Serious personnel changes have occurred within the KNB; most of our staff members are young persons, and they need training. As of now, we see the following three directions which can be taken here: instruction and training within the committee itself, drawing upon experienced officials and veterans of the state security organs; concluding agreements with those CIS countries where our staff members used to be trained in a centralized manner; and creating our own school here in Turkmenistan. Let's see which variant will be the most acceptable.

[Journalists] A division for combatting organized crime has been set up within the committee's structure. But

there is also just such a unit within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. How will your mutual relations be structured and arranged?

[Ovedzhov] We will operate in close contact, supplementing each other's efforts. Our common task is to fight against the recently sharply increasing criminal gangs, to reveal deeply conspiratorial criminal formations, and to expose corrupted elements. We have a single, common cause—to safeguard the new and peaceful labor of our inhabitants, to protect and defend the interests of a sovereign Turkmenistan. We will never be divided by any sort of quest for glory. There is work to be done.

[Journalists] In its previous form the KGB was quite a "silent," i.e., "uncommunicative," organization. Secrecy, secrecy, and more secrecy. It was extremely rare that information regarding the activities of the state security organs ever appeared in the press. Can we count on a more open and public explanation of the activities being carried out by Turkmenistan's KNB?

[Ovedzhov] The requirement and need for secrecy is not a mere whim or caprice. The most dangerous thing in our work is a leak of information. Data which has not been verified or which has been distorted by a journalist, a confidential conversation "not for publication" but which, nevertheless, is splashed all over the pages of the press can be detrimental to the interests of our state. However, we are in favor of cooperation with the press. For this purpose, the KNB has an operating public relations group. Furthermore, journalists who wish to write about the KGB's past, about the most interesting operations carried out by the staff members of the state security organs, can obtain access to our archives.

Transcribed by V. Zarembo

Relations With Mexico Established

92US0409A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 31 Mar 92 p 1

[Report: "Turkmenistan Has Established Diplomatic Relations with Mexico"]

[Text] Ashkhabad, 30 Mar (Turkmen PRESS)—Turkmenistan has established diplomatic relations with the United Mexican States. The appropriate protocol document was signed on 27 March by N. K. Nurklychev, the Turkmenistan government's permanent representative in Moscow, and by Carlos Tello, Mexico's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Russian Federation.

The document declares that the establishment of diplomatic relations is in the interests of both states and will facilitate the development of cooperation between Turkmenistan and the United Mexican States in the political, economic, commercial, scientific, and cultural fields.

The Mexican government has entrusted the task of representing the interests of the United Mexican States in Turkmenistan to the Mexican Embassy in Russia and its ambassador, Carlos Tello.

UZBEKISTAN

Resolution on Measures To Control Oil Spill, Protect Population

925D0326A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 19 Mar 92 p 1

[Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Urgent Measures for the Localization of the Oil Spill at the Mingbulak Deposit in Namangan Oblast, Social Protection for the Population, and Efficient Utilization of Natural Resources in This Region]

[Text] The Cabinet of Ministers resolves:

1. For a prompt solution of all problems connected with the installation of equipment for the oil spill at the Mingbulak Deposit, its efficient utilization, and the population's protection to establish a republican headquarters.

To agree with the top-priority measures implemented by ministries and departments jointly with local bodies of management for the localization of the oil spill at the Mingbulak Deposit in Namangan Oblast.

2. To appoint the Uzbekneft Production Association as the client for the construction of a complex of facilities at the Mingbulak Deposit.

The republic's banks must finance the facilities on preferential terms. Payment should be made according to the estimates for actually performed jobs. 3. The Uzbekneft Production Association must work out planning estimates within a 10-day period and the general contractor—the Ministry of Construction of the Republic of Uzbekistan—before 1 May 1992 must ensure the construction of a 15-km long oil pipeline with an oil-loading rack at the Turakurgan Station.

The Administration of the Central Asian Railroad before 20 April 1992 must plan and build railroad tracks to the oil-loading rack and reconstruct the Turakurgan Railroad Station for the purpose of ensuring a simultaneous loading of the rolling stock.

On 26 March 1992 the Sredazneftegazstroy Production, Construction, and Installation Association must begin laying the oil pipeline and complete work before 25 April.

The Bridge Building Trust No 7 must ensure the construction of piers across the Syrdarya River before 20 April.

4. Uzkontrakttorg must provide facilities connected with the localization of the oil spill at the Mingbulak Deposit and the utility systems under construction with all the necessary material and technical resources, bought-in

components, and equipment. Within a 1-week period it must ensure the delivery of 15 km of metal pipes to the Sredazneftegazstroy Production, Construction, and Installation Association for the construction of the oil pipeline.

5. In 1992-1993 the State Committee on Geology of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Uzbekneft Production Association must complete the first stage in geological surveying at the Mingbulak Deposit, determine commercial and hypothetical oil reserves in the region, and—jointly with the Committee for Forecasting the Prospects for the Development of Uzbekistan and the Fergananefteorgsintez Production Association—submit to the Cabinet of Ministers proposals on the advisability of the expansion, reconstruction, and retooling of Fergana and Altyaryk oil refining plants and the establishment of additional capacities for oil at these plants.

6. The Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Seismology, jointly with the State Committee on Geology of the Republic of Uzbekistan, must immediately launch work on the study of the seismic state of the soil in regions adjacent to the Mingbulak Deposit and submit proposals within 2 months.

7. To establish that as of 1 March of the current year a 30-percent salary increase is introduced for all workers, employees, engineering and technical personnel, and managers of ministries, departments, enterprises, and organizations performing jobs at the Mingbulak Deposit for the period of elimination of the oil spill.

8. To recommend to the State Committee on Geology of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Uzbekneft Production Association, and the Sredazgazprom Production Association:

—as of 1 April 1992 to increase up to twofold the wage rates and salaries of workers, employees, and engineering and technical personnel directly engaged in well drilling and in oil, gas, and water production, as well as in the elimination of the flows occurring in the process;

—to ensure the indicated increase in wage rates and salaries at enterprises and organizations within their jurisdiction and, at the same time, to preserve existing ratios in rate and salary scales within personnel categories; to increase wages within the cost-accounting income of enterprises and organizations.

The Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Uzbekistan, when necessary, must submit to the Cabinet of Ministers proposals for a differentiated reduction of up to 12 percent in the rates of income tax on the indicated enterprises and organizations.

9. The Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Uzbekistan and Uzgosstrakh [the Uzbek Main Administration of State Insurance]: according to the submitted calculations of the Uzbekneft Production Association must compensate for the incurred expenditures connected with the oil spill at the Mingbulak Deposit;

—within a 3-day period must ensure the rendering of one-time assistance in terms of 500 rubles per family residing in the zone of the oil spill;

—within a 15-day period, jointly with local bodies of state management, must determine the damage done to the population and to farms and ensure appropriate compensation for them.

10. To take into consideration that Uzbekistan's Trade-Union Federation Council allocates from its funds 200 rubles to every family residing in the zone of the oil spill.

11. The Ministry of Health of the Republic of Uzbekistan must ensure medical examination and preventive treatment for persons engaged in restoration work and for the population in adjacent regions and establish effective control over the region's sanitary and epidemiological situation.

When the maximum permissible concentrations of harmful emissions are exceeded and a threat to the health of the population in adjacent regions arises, the khokim [governor] of Namangan Oblast, jointly with the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Uzbekistan, must solve the problem of the boundaries of residential tracts and periods of the population's temporary resettlement.

12. The State Committee for the Protection of Nature of the Republic of Uzbekistan, jointly with appropriate ministries, departments, and bodies, within a 3-day period must work out measures ensuring ecological cleanliness of regions, water basins, and land adjacent to Mingbulak and realize them.

13. The Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Comrade Giniyatullin) and the State Committee for Water Resources Construction (Comrade Baymirov) with the forces of their planning organizations must determine the volumes of work, including excavation work, on conveyance to the wellhead connected with the prevention of pollution of the Syrdarya River and other water arteries and carry it out within a 10-day period.

14. The Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Uzbekistan and Uzbekbrlyash, jointly with local bodies of management, must provide workers at facilities with hot food and day-to-day goods and increase the norm of sale of detergents, necessities, and building materials to the population in adjacent regions.

15. The Committee for Forecasting the Prospects for the Development of Uzbekistan and the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Uzbekistan must allocate the necessary capital investments for the production of the envisaged volumes of construction and restoration work.

16. The Uzbek State Bank, the Uzbek Industrial Construction Bank, and the Uzbek Agro-Industrial Bank must allocate the necessary credits to enterprises and

organizations carrying out the construction of facilities connected with oil production, transportation, and refining and elimination of the consequences of oil spills.

17. The Uzbekneft Production Association and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Republic of Uzbekistan within a 1-month period must elaborate and submit proposals for drawing foreign firms and specialists into the activation of work on the exploration and development of oil fields.

Within a 1-month period the general economic complex must solve the problem of currency financing for surveying and the development of the Mingbulak Deposit according to the calculations submitted by the Uzbekneft Production Association.

18. The State Committee for the Supply of Petroleum Products of the Republic of Uzbekistan must ensure a regular delivery of fuels, lubricants, and production materials for operating machinery.

19. Khokimy [governors] of Namangan, Andizhan, and Fergana oblasts must form commissions for a prompt solution of problems connected with social protection for the population residing in the zone of the oil spill and adjacent regions.

20. Within the shortest period the Sredazgazprom Production Association must draw specialists, machinery, and the necessary material resources into construction, installation, and restoration work.

21. The Ministry of Power and Electrification, the Ministry of Communication, the Administration of the Central Asian Railroad, the Ministry of Housing and Municipal Facilities, and the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Uzbekistan must ensure the development of engineering utility systems in the zone of construction of facilities connected with oil production, transportation, and refining, as well as in settlements of adjacent regions.

22. The Ministry of Motor Transport, the Ministry of Highways, the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Administration of the Central Asian Railroad, the National "Uzbekiston khavo yullari" Airline, Glavtashkentstroy [Main Administration for Housing and Civil Engineering Construction in the City of Tashkent], and other ministries and departments within a 3-day period must place at the disposal of the Uzbekneft Production Association the maximum number of oil product tankers for the purpose of substantially increasing the volumes of oil transportation from the Mingbulak Deposit. They must ensure a regular transportation of material and technical resources and personnel at superintendents' request.

23. The Ministry of Highways of the Republic of Uzbekistan must ensure the construction, reconstruction, and improvement of highways, bridges, and crossings in the region of the Mingbulak Deposit and the adjacent territory.

24. Goskomtekhnadzor [the State Committee for Supervision of Safe Working Practices in Industry] (Comrade Akhmedbayev) and managers of the republic's ministries and departments must increase the responsibility of managers of enterprises and organizations for the fulfillment of the developed measures to ensure work safety during the elimination of the flow.

25. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan must ensure fire safety in the zone of the oil spill, road traffic safety, and preservation of public order in adjacent regions.

26. The State Committee on the Press of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the National Information Agency, and the State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company of Uzbekistan, with the enlistment of local mass information media, must organize a press center for effective coverage of the course of work at the Mingbulak Deposit.

[Signed] I. Karimov, chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers

ARMENIA

Nuclear Power Station Fate Examined

924A0948A Yerevan EPOKHA in Russian No 11, 12 Mar 92 p 5

[Article by Em. Mkrtchyan: "The Nuclear Power Station Takes Its Revenge on the Politicians. The Politicians Take Their Revenge on the Nuclear Power Station. The Nation Suffers"]

[Text] As long ago as 10 January this year by decision of the government a commission was set up to study the condition of the Armenian nuclear power station [AES]. It included department and section chiefs who one way or another were involved directly or indirectly in this truly painful problem. State minister of the Republic of Armenia Vigen Chitechyan was appointed chairman of this commission, and state minister Grigor Areshyan as his deputy, and the members included Andrey Amatuni, director of the Physics Institute, Ara Babloyan, minister of public health, Stepan Badalyan, chief of the emergency situation department, Karine Daniyelyan, minister of ecology, Ashot Safaryan, minister for industry, and Sepukh Tashyan, minister of power, and others.

Having done its work, the commission reached definite conclusions that it was decided to share at a press conference that took place recently in the meeting hall of the Republic of Armenia Supreme Soviet.

The right to speak first was assumed by Grigor Areshyan, who in the recent past was one of the best archaeologists in the republic and has now taken on the enormous burden of chief state ideologist. He explained the reasons why it was necessary for the government one way or another to take another look at the AES. They were clear as day. The very viability of the nation was being placed in question. The profound energy crisis is paralyzing the republic's entire economic life and placing a large question mark over the future. On the other hand, as he said, if certain work is not done today at the AES, regardless of whether or not it will be started up, it will become a very dangerous object, and in another year or two may become a tragedy.

"It is essential to take note of two important circumstances," G. Areshyan said, moving into the field of political analysis and ideological support for the AES problem. Since he is not so sophisticated in this important state field he allowed himself to say a few things that resulted in him being forced throughout the meeting to fend off attacks from our colleagues representing the opposition press. Namely: He accused of irresponsibility certain political forces that are today speaking out and saying that the "alleged" shutdown of the AES took place out of political considerations, and that the forces that did this were trying to destabilize the political situation in the republic.

He was convinced that the debates about the closure of the AES had nothing to do with the process of the replacement of the authorities or with the advent of a new leadership. "In this ill-considered step the guilty are first and foremost the former first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, Suren Arutyunyan, and the former communist leaders of the republic." We will not argue with Mr. Areshyan, particularly since the dispute is pointless. What is done is done, and how and why it was done we leave to the consciences of those who did it.

As far as the specific matter is concerned—whether or not to shut down our AES—this was not discussed at the press conference. No one spoke "in favor" or "against." However, the talk did move in certain directions, and it was clear that the commission had also been set up finally to convince the republic of the need to open it. We should be aware that the world prices for energy sources are growing and that in 10 or 15 years will have grown so significantly that we will not be able to get by without the peaceful atom, Grigor Areshyan stated. But he forgot to mention that in 10 or 15 years, if the AES is soon opened, it will be time to shut it down again. What should be done? Build a new one; this was the conviction of the minister of power, Sepukh Tashyan

In his speech the commission chairman, Vigen Chitechyan, noted three important circumstances that have forced us to return to the question of the fate of the AES. First, the nuclear power station should be brought on line in 14 to 18 months. And we will have a power source rated at 400 megawatts of electric power. This, of course, will not cover all the republic's needs but it will provide us with an existence without crisis. Second, he was personally convinced that the decision on the AES should have been made long ago (it is difficult to disagree with this), because if we delay, when we move to start it up we shall encounter even greater technical, financial, and social difficulties and "next winter will not be the best" (?). Third, operation of the AES is one way or another connected with a certain risk. This circumstance should not be ignored. And therefore if it is decided to start up the station for a second time, preparations must be made for it in the most careful manner.

The commission concluded that it is necessary to bring in experts from abroad to work on the AES. On the order of 300 to 400 people should present their conclusions on the suitability of the station for startup, and study the condition of the equipment, the engineering networks, the metal, and the seismic status. And if all the necessary steps are taken, it will be possible not only to reach design level for safety at the AES but also exceed it. But in any event it will not meet today's safety requirements.

According to preliminary economic calculations, using the AES the republic will be able to obtain relatively inexpensive electric power. However, the costs for the second startup will total about 1.2 billion rubles [R]. It is obvious that we will be unable to manage without outside help. Otherwise, Vigen Chitechyan noted, the republic will each year be forced to acquire energy

sources costing R24 billion, or $610 million at world prices, which we are moving toward today, to provide for its energy complex.

At the press conference there was great interest in the problems of utilizing radioactive waste, and in the seismic stability of the station. The answers provided were quite vague. In the first case V. Chitechyan limited himself merely to a statement to the effect that it must be taken outside the republic, but he did not go into any detail, presumably so as to avoid giving the press a pretext for raising a "rumpus" before the time. Geologist Ashot Karapetyan talked about seismic safety. He was not inclined to regard as final the conclusions of several commissions that had visited the AES and returned with a verdict of 8.5 to 9 on the scale.

The question of guarantees evoked a number of unclear answers. And this is understandable. A French delegation that recently visited the AES has stated that no European government would permit such a station because it cannot be brought up to the safety standard. "Well, that is their opinion," Chitechyan remarked. "We are taking it into consideration." And let me add that they are naive people, these Frenchmen, we should have the worries they do.

It seems to us, however, that the most important problem connected with the second startup of the AES is who exactly will assume the responsibility for saying "yes." The government along with the parliament, or the people through a referendum? Grigor Areshyan was personally convinced that with the approval of the government the question should be resolved by the parliament.

And what, may one ask, about last year's decision by that same parliament, according to which the AES can be opened only with the agreement of the people? Will they risk it?

Revival of Republic Communist Party Viewed

92US0405A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Apr 92 p 3

[Article: "Communists for Independence of People's Karabakh: Second Birth of the Armenian Communist Party"]

[Text] The Armenian Ministry of Justice officially registered the 23d sociopolitical organization. It is the revived Communist Party of Armenia.

In August 1991, after the failure of the coup, its leaders, who already had an independent status and were disassociated to a significant degree (at least in words) from the CPSU, announced its self-dissolution. It was concurrently announced that a new Democratic Party with a social-democratic orientation was to be formed out of its "fragments." And so it happened, though far from all communists consented to such mimicry. Convinced communists headed by the venerable secretary of the Yerevan City Committee, Sergey Badalyan, firmly resolved to fight for the revival of their party under its former name, with its former charter and program.

Their half-year fight has now been graced with success. The Ministry of Justice was unable to find grounds for rejecting registration of the organization, which deleted the principles of the class struggle from its program long ago, and which calls itself a national party, despite the fact that it proclaims itself to be the successor of the better traditions of the Communist Party of Armenia.

As is required, the Communist Party Central Committee published an appeal to all laborers of the republic in which it explained the goals and objectives of Armenian communists to its potential allies. We find that its fundamental principles include fighting for a strong, flourishing, independent Armenia. The Communist Party will guide itself chiefly by the interests of national unity. The communists favor the fastest possible recognition of the independence of the Republic of Nagornyy Karabakh, and they ask the government to use all means to ensure dependable defense of Armenia. They also favor a strong military, political, economic and cultural union with Russia, and in the area of foreign policy they are prepared to defend the idea of recognizing genocide of the Armenians in 1915 by Turkey. The social program of the CPA includes an appeal to restore the zone of the 1988 earthquake as quickly as possible, to heed the interests of refugees, and to "surmount the errors made in the process of privatization." The communists proclaim themselves to be proponents of all forms of ownership.

The Central Committee hopes to restore its authority among the masses in short time. It is believed however that the Communist Party would hardly be able to assume a prominent place on Armenia's political scene in the immediate future, although its leader Sergey Badalyan asserts that the Communist Party will soon have a membership of tens of thousands, while there are also hundreds of thousands who instinctively lean toward the communist ideal.

Nonetheless the left flank of sociopolitical life is already firmly occupied by socialists represented by Dashnaks, social-democrats represented by the Gnch Party, and that same Democratic Party, which has recently been activating its efforts among the intelligentsia. Judging from everything, the reborn communists understand this quite well. Sergey Badalyan asserts that the Communist Party is prepared for close cooperation with all traditional enemies—the "Dashnaktsutyun" Party, as well as with all other opposition forces. If the left-wing parties are able to achieve tactical unity, their united front will be capable of successfully competing with the Armenian National Movement. But the question is this: Will Dashnaks agree to an alliance with those who persecuted them yesterday?

Poll on Armenian Emigration to U.S.

92US0389A Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA in Russian 12 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Gevork Pogosyan, director of the Sociological Research Center of the Armenian Academy of Sciences, under the rubric "Sociological Survey": "Let's Go to America!"]

[Text] The city which ranks second in the world with respect to size of Armenian population—Los Angeles—is threatening to become the first. As we know, quite recently the United States raised its migration quota with respect to the former USSR from 20 to 300 thousand per year. In the order of first priority they will be accepting citizens of those countries with which diplomatic relations have been established. And so, something on the order of 20-30 thousand people will get the opportunity annually to leave Armenia for permanent residence there, perhaps even more. There has never been any shortage of people desiring to leave the republic for the United States. Even if a ticket there at today's prices costs an entire fortune.

Our survey among Yerevan residents was conducted a couple of weeks prior to the decision by the U.S. Government to increase migration quotas. The survey results may therefore be perceived as preliminary and somewhat modest.

As always, the survey was conducted among representatives of all social segments of the capital's population. Of 1,200 individuals responding to the question on the survey sheet—"If you had the opportunity, would you leave for permanent residence in the United States or some other country?"—28.9 percent responded "YES"; 44.3 percent—"NO." Seventeen percent stated they were still thinking about it, and 9.7 percent replied that they were unable to answer. The younger generation (ages 18-30) is the most favorably disposed towards leaving, which fact is apparent from the table.

If you had the opportunity, would you leave for permanent residence in the United States or some other country?

	YES	Still Thinking	NO	Unable to Respond
Total	28.9	17	44.3	9.7
Men	28.5	18.5	40.7	12.3
Women	29.2	15.9	47.1	7.7
Ages 18-30	36.2	13.6	40.1	10.4
Ages 30-45	19.6	21.2	47.2	10.9
Ages 45-60	20.1	9.1	47.9	22.9
Age 60 and over	26.3	14.6	45.8	3.3
With High School Education	30.4	15.3	45.9	8.4
With Higher Education	24.5	16.7	48.2	10.6
Workers	28.2	14.9	46.4	10.5
Office workers	23.4	12.8	54.6	9.2
Intelligentsia	22.9	19.7	45.7	11.7
Students	29.8	11.8	50.6	7.9
Pensioners	34.6	13.1	38.3	4.6
Unemployed and Housewives	35	15.5	44.3	5.1
Members of Cooperatives and Business People	22.6	25.2	40	12.2
With Families	25.3	16.9	48.4	9.4
Without Families	33.1	14.9	44.5	7.5

People of middle and older age (30-60) are not very inclined to leave (47 percent unambiguously responded "NO"). Those having the greatest difficulty responding were middle-aged people (22.9 percent); those having the least difficulty, strange as it may seem, were the elderly (3.3 percent). The hypothetical desire to leave was expressed most of all by the young and by the old—pensioners and the unemployed. Whereas the former may still consider that they have the opportunity to realize their intentions, for the latter (the elderly) this is more a theoretical possibility. Although it should be stated that those who actually leave for permanent residence in the United States include quite a great number of elderly. Moreover, the elderly there are paid a good healthy pension.

It is also interesting that members of cooperatives and business people, as well as office workers and the intelligentsia, do not manifest any particular desire to leave. This is very important since the "brain drain" and outflow of culture, the departure of business and enterprising people, will cause irreparable damage to the republic. If overall deterioration of the social situation continues, which is more than likely, sentiment favoring

emigration will grow. In this case it is precisely that social base which comprises the single necessary element capable of supporting revival of the national economy, of developing national culture and science, which will "vanish" abroad. According to the most modest calculations, the number of people throughout the republic desiring to leave may amount to about 500,000. And a still greater number of people desire to leave for temporary, seasonal jobs. Consequently, the main able-bodied portion of the population, energetic and enterprising, will be seeking ways to travel abroad.

It is already impossible to suspend departures or prohibit them altogether. The Stalinist iron curtain has long been abandoned. The country is transitioning towards an open economy and "open door" policy in order to integrate itself smoothly into the civilized world community. Consequently, we cannot be thinking about how to hold people back or prevent them from going abroad, but rather about how to regulate this flow, how to use it to the advantage of the nation. To date not only does our republic lack a national program or state approach to this question, neither is there any organization, committee, or institution which would be engaged more or less professionally in the issue. It has been left to drift along its own course, as they say. There are countries, in fact, in which emigrants and so-called "gastarbeiters" [guest workers] account for a significant item of the national income.

Pannational Movement Chairman on Leadership, Role

92US0389B Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA in Russian 13 Mar 92 p 2

[Interview with Ter Iusik Lazaryan, deputy of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet and chairman of the Armenian Pannational Movement, by Zara Nazaryan; place and date not given: "AOD: On the Eve of the Congress"]

[Text] As has already been reported, Ter Iusik Lazaryan, deputy of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet, was recently elected chairman of the Armenian Pannational Movement (AOD).

[Nazaryan] How do your new responsibilities as head of the Armenian Pannational Movement go along with your professional activity, and what will you be accomplishing in the near future?

[Lazaryan] For two years now I have been combining work in the church with work in the Armenian Pannational Movement. Today, of course, things have become far more complicated. There is not a single day of rest. The AOD Congress will begin 20 March in the SKK [not further identified] and will continue three days, we expect. The Fourth Congress must examine questions involving the program, the statutes of the Armenian Pannational Movement, and the Artsakh issue. Documents will be approved on external and internal policy and a new board elected.

[Nazaryan] Does it not trouble the AOD that more and more of its members are going over to state structures?

[Lazaryan] There are two problems here—on the one hand, we understand that with the transfer of many AOD representatives to state structures, the movement itself becomes weakened. On the other hand, not being in contact with state structures would prevent us from working the way we aspire. The movement has sufficient potential so as to continue "placing" cadres. After all, the most important thing is the interests of the state, and the goal of AOD has never been simply its own consolidation.

[Nazaryan] What was the reason for transformation of the parliamentary faction "Anrapetutyun" into the AOD faction?

[Lazaryan] If you recall, elections to the parliament were conducted not so much according to the party principle as according to the principle of majority. We therefore believed that factions in the Supreme Soviet would also be formed more in accordance with the principle of one or another general goal than in accordance with party affiliation. It is precisely for this reason that the "Anrapetutyun" faction was created, which included, in addition to AOD members, representatives of various parties and a few former communists. But as parliamentary work progressed, party factions began to emerge: Dashnaktsutyun, Ramkavar Azatakan, and others. Naturally the question arose—if many people have formed the impression that AOD has a majority in parliament, then there must be a clarification as to who constitutes its membership. This is one of the main reasons the "Anrapetutyun" faction was dissolved and another emerged—the faction of the Armenian Pannational Movement. On the other hand, AOD should have been represented in the parliament precisely in the form of a discrete party faction, capable of discussing and voting for these or those issues and then presenting its decisions to the Supreme Soviet.

[Nazaryan] Does this mean that AOD is becoming a party? And when may this take place?

[Lazaryan] The question as to whether or not AOD will become a party is not being specially raised. If it happens, it will have been dictated by vital necessity, and not by abstract discussion. In the meantime, AOD remains a movement, in any case until such time as state structures are put in order and it becomes clear what type of party Armenia needs. I repeat—the main goal of the movement is the establishment of a powerful independent state.

Pannational Movement Member on Popularity, NKAO

92US0397A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Apr 92 p 3

[Interview with David Shakhnazaryan by Liana Minasyan; place and date not given: "They Negotiate

Only With the Strong, says David Shakhnazaryan, a Member of the Governing Body of the Armenian Pannational Movement and a Possible Candidate For the Post of Chairman"]

[Text]

[Minasyan] After coming to power, the movement began to noticeably lose its popularity. That is natural, is it not?

[Shakhnazaryan] Before coming to power we were prepared for ideological struggle and not prepared for economic reforms. There are objective reasons for this—Armenia continues to be a part of the economic expanse of the CIS. Armenia does not have the economic protection that all the other states of the Commonwealth have; therefore, it cannot conduct an absolutely independent policy and is forced to coordinate its reforms with the processes taking place in other countries. Thus, the economic breakdown, as distinguished from the ideological, was not to be very difficult—perhaps it was even impossible. There is yet another reason—the cadre. We have our own group, which is making its own recommendations to the political leadership of the movement. Last year we were the initiators of land privatization, and right now we have presented to the government a proposal on privatization of production. And the government cannot but take our proposals into consideration—if only because the Armenian Pannational Movement [AOD] has a majority of its representatives in the parliament; not to mention other methods of influence.

[Minasyan] Do the positions of the AOD and the Armenian authorities on the Karabakh question wholly coincide?

[Shakhnazaryan] They do. The Karabakh situation arose because the rights of the people to self-determination were trampled. The beginning of the movement in Karabakh was constitutional, but Azerbaijan responded to it with force, owing to which armed actions began.

Conflict in any event should be resolved by peaceful negotiations between Nagorn0-Karabakh and Azerbaijan. Even now, intermediaries would like to conciliate Azerbaijan and Armenia. But this is at root an unacceptable approach, since Armenia is not a party to the conflict and has no territorial pretensions whatsoever against Azerbaijan.

All the intermediaries are fighting to expand their own influence in the region: Iran and Turkey are quite obviously competing with one another. And that is precisely why Turkey's Western allies wish to present the Iranian peace mission in a poor light, to a certain extent. In Yerevan, however, Iranian mediation is given preference, since Turkey was unable to maintain complete neutrality.

The AOD has always declared the well-known thesis that there are no permanent enemies and friends; there are only national interests. The movement has assumed a weighty mission—to reorient the policy of Armenia toward reality. However, the continuation of military actions could undermine these efforts. Therefore our chief goal is not to allow the conflict to grow.

The Commonwealth has no mechanism for pacifying such conflicts. In the best case, with time the CIS will turn into something like the European Community. But even if it only ensures the bloodless disintegration of the empire, that suits us fine too.

[Minasyan] And do the policies conducted by the Armenian authorities and the NKR [Nagorno-Karabakh Republic] coincide?

[Shakhnazaryan] The NKR is independent in its policy, and as far as our approaches to various questions are concerned, they could hardly coincide all the time, nor should they. Sometimes it turns out that way. However, the foreign policy of Nagorno-Karabakh should become more active, and we are prepared to agree in advance to any treaty which it concludes with Azerbaijan. Armenia must recognize the independence of the NKR, but only at the time when such recognition is to its advantage.

[Minasyan] Do you associate the increased international attention to Karabakh with the fact that the military situation there has changed since January?

[Shakhnazaryan] Only by demonstrating its defensive capability was Karabakh able to force the international community to take up this problem. That and only that. They negotiate only with the strong.

[Minasyan] What do you think of Yeltsin's decision to transfer troops in the Transcaucasus to Russian jurisdiction?

[Shakhnazaryan] After the Union disappeared, Russia, whether it wanted to or not, assumed certain obligations of the former Center, that is, the empire. That decision was one of the manifestations of such an attitude. Those troops which begin to move across the territory of Armenia without the consent of its government will be nationalized.

AZERBAIJAN

Causes of Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Examined

92US0335A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Mar 92 pp 4-5

[Article by Sergey Lezov: "In and Around Nagorno-Karabakh. An Experiment in Interpretation of Mythical Thinking"]

[Text] **Sergey Vladimirovich Lezov is a historian and associate of the Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the author of a number of works on the history of modern Christian theology in the West. For several years he has edited the section devoted to Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh in the law enforcement weekly EKSPRESS-KHRONIKA (Moscow) and worked on the bulletin VESTI IZVESTIYA SSSR (Munich), and at the present time he is the Moscow representative of the journal STRANA I MIR (Munich). This article, which presents a view of the problems of Karabakh and its "environs," is the result of four months of work of the independent researcher. The editors do not completely share this view but consider it necessary to familiarize their readers with it.**

There are no bad peoples... (from the newspapers)

Every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way (A great writer of the Russian land)

At the beginning of March 1992 I was talking with some pilots at the Yerevan airport, Erebuni. It is a dirty, cold building. We were sitting in the office of the person in charge of shipments to Karabakh. There were no departures on that day—"helicopters cannot fly in this weather." And in general "there are more journalists than are needed in Karabakh: We see our boys in NOVOSTI every day. They are soldiers, not movie stars. What do you journalists want? Only one thing is important to you—to sell your tapes for as much as you can." (One pilot said all this, the rest of them yawned approvingly.)

I wanted somehow to separate myself from the "incorrect" journalists: "I do not even have a camera with me, I am not a reporter, my work is to write and analyze the situation."

This reply followed: "You mean you do not understand what is going on? You do not know that one people is fighting for freedom and the other will not let them be free?"

I was reminded of that simple formula. In fact, when you are outside the intellectual establishment there is nothing to stop you from telling the truth: Nobody will condemn you for taking an unbalanced approach to this complex problem.

I think the wording used by the person with whom I was speaking is the truth, but it reduces the problem to the "right of the peoples to self-determination"—which theoretically is everywhere recognized and "secured" but in practice, unfortunately, it depends completely on the specific alignment of political forces and interests.

Yet can one describe what is happening on the purely historical plane, without reference to legal definitions and moral assessments.

Let us look at a map of the Caucasus and the threshold to Asia. Let us note on it the regions of dense Armenian population at the beginning of the 1910's. Not having their own statehood, the Armenians lived in communities in the Russian or Ottoman empires on the expanses from the Asia Minor coastline of the Mediterranean Sea (Kilikiya) to Tiflis and the Northern Caucasus, from Baku to the Black Sea. The Armenian population in Turkey reached more than 2.5 million, the majority living in the six Asia Minor vilajets. (It is important to note that today, 80 years later, the population of the Republic of Armenia is approximately the same.) "Up until World War I a large share of the Armenians (about 4 million) lived densely on the territory of the historical Armenia: About 1.5 million of them were in the Russian empire and the rest in Turkey" ("Peoples of the World. A Historical-Ethnographic Reference," Moscow, 1988, p. 69). Historical Armenia is usually understood to mean the space bounded by Lake Sevan (in the east), Lake Van (in the southeast), and Lake Urmia (in Yugoslavia).

With this kind of descriptive-demographic approach, the history of the Armenians in the 20th century extended over the decades like a national catastrophe which threatens to end up in the complete destruction of this people.

Indeed, let us recall the following facts.

As a result of the genocide of the Armenians in the Ottoman empire, Western Armenia (the eastern part of modern Turkey) practically lost its indigenous population: During 1915-1916 from 1.5 to 2 million Armenians were deprived of their civil rights, deported, and, finally, destroyed "on the sly" during the world war. It will be easy for the reader to see in the subsequent events the model of the physical destruction of entire social groups, which was then to be applied repeatedly in our century. That is how the communists destroyed the exploiting classes, and the National Socialists—the Jews.

Here are the results: There are only about 100,000 Armenians in Turkey now and they live mainly in Istanbul and other large cities. The majority of them are strongly assimilated and deny—in keeping with the official Turkish version of history—the genocide of 1915 and emphasize their loyalty to Turkey. And throughout the world the overall number of Armenians has increased only insignificantly during the eight decades since the genocide: The consequences of this event are being felt to this day.

The catastrophe in the Ottoman empire was followed by a slaughter of Armenians in Nakhichevan, Baku, and Shusha (1918-1921). At the end of 1920 the independent Armenian republic, which lasted for less than three years, fell under attacks from the Turkish and Russian armies. The Armenian territories were divided up between Kemalist Turkey and communist Russia. The Moscow Treaty signed on 16 March 1921 confirmed Turkey's right to the Kara area and certain other Western Armenian territories seized by Russia during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and incorporated by it in keeping with the Berlin Treaty of 1878. (Russia

relinquished these territories for the first time in the Brest-Litovsk treaty.) According to that same Moscow Treaty, the Nakhichevan area, which is a part of the nucleus of the historical Armenian territories, was turned over to the protectorate of Azerbaijan. This treaty became the legal basis for the formation of the Nakhichevan ASSR as a part of Azerbaijan. The well-known decree on the inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh in Soviet Azerbaijan with the rights of an autonomous entity, adopted by the Caucasian bureau of the RKP(B) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] on 5 July 1921 was also conditioned by attempts on the part of the Bolsheviks to find a common language with Turkey, which then, as today, was aspiring to be the protector of the Azeris.

In Nakhichevan we see the same result as in Western Armenia: In 1917 Armenians composed about 40 percent of the population, in 1926 their numbers had decreased almost five-fold, and by the beginning of the eighties there were only two Armenian villages left in this Armenian autonomous entity of Azerbaijan, that is, the Armenian community of Nakhichevan no longer exists. Only the Armenian name of the area is left, as is the case with Asia Minor.

During the 50 years preceding the current Karabakh crisis, the proportion of the Armenian population in the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] and regions of Azerbaijan adjacent to the oblast (Shaumyanovsk, Dashkesan, Khanlar, Shamkhor) has continually decreased. According to numerous pieces of evidence, verbal and literary, the Armenian and Azeri communities in Karabakh under Soviet power lived in a condition of "frozen war"—mutual hostility, from time to time breaking into bloodletting.

By questioning specialists in ethnography and Georgian Armenians (there were about a half million of them by 1988) I learned that the existence of the Armenian community in Georgia was ultimately threatened. This subject is not discussed much because, out of political considerations, one does not speak about it too loudly. Here there has also been deep animosity which broke through to the surface as the Georgian national liberation movement rose. Armenian cultural institutions were closed down and Armenians were assigned the status of "guests" who were faced with a choice: assimilation or emigration. Under Zviad Gamsakhurdia this attitude toward the Armenian minority actually became state policy. Georgian Armenians are leaving for the Northern Caucasus and Russia, and there are also many of them among the candidates for emigration to the United States.

Alas, during the course of the conflict "in and around Nagorno-Karabakh" hundreds of thousands of Armenians were driven out of Baku, Kirovabad (Gyandzhi), and also Khanlar, Shamkhor, Dashkesan, and other rural regions of Azerbaijan. There is no need to speak in detail here about the Sumgait carnage, the Kirovabad pogroms in November 1988, or the Baku pogroms in January 1990: Everyone interested in this will remember well the events which resulted in the fact that there are no Armenians left in Azerbaijan.

I repeat: We are speaking not about a moral assessment but about a description of the historical process which, it seems, is proceeding with the irreversibility of a geological shift. It is terrible to say it, but even the earthquake of 7 December 1988, which destroyed half of Armenia, is not out of place in this picture.

And against this background the Karabakh movement might be understood as a final spasm of an ethnic group trying to cling to life, to break this tendency, and not to allow it in the future. For understandable reasons the concepts I have used evoke unpleasant associations, but this is precisely about a struggle for living space. For anyone who is familiar with Yerevan, which has grown monstrously over the past two or three decades, anyone who has had occasion to travel through Armenia, knows that this tiny mountain country which suffers from all the diseases of the Third World is not in a condition to feed its own population, not to mention accept hundreds of thousands of refugees.

Thus the "Karabakh problem" amounts to the instinctual desire of a people to survive, to cling to its last chance. This is the instinct for self-preservation which is "beyond good and evil," which lies outside morality, as does the very national principle understood in the biological-ethnic sense.

The threat of persecution and destruction is a constant of Armenian history which is most clearly expressed in the 20th century but which appeared much earlier. This is what contributed to the final completion of the model for the interpretation of history which might be called the **Armenian myth.**

Dozens of definitions of the concept of myth have been developed in the humanities. I will use their common element: Myth is the nonscientific knowledge that makes it possible for an individual included in a particular community to interpret his life. Myth does not have the significance of truth, that is, it cannot be true or false, it cannot be proved or disproved. A myth prescribes the norms and values for an individual, his main characteristic—his effectiveness. If a myth is unable to give meaning to the lives of the members of the society it becomes ineffective, loses its social function, and disintegrates. In this case it is replaced by another myth. So the myth contains—in its undismantled form—religious, philosophical, legal, and moral components. For example, in the Russian society that has now been formed, the myth of social justice is being replaced by the myth of human rights and a free market.

A key symbol of the Armenian myth is the state of being civilized. Behind this word-figure stands the idea of the Armenians as an ancient people with a 3,000-year history, the legacy of a truly ancient culture, and the spread of its civilizing influence to other peoples. The concept of being civilized, which distinctly singles the Armenians

out from other peoples, is functionally similar to the concept of people being selected by a single God, which is at the center of attention in the Jewish myth.

A second most important element of the Armenian myth is the idea of the Armenians as a Christian people, an outpost of the Christian world in the East.

Linked to these two elements of the myth is a third—the self-perception of the Armenians as an eternal defenseless victim in the hands of uncivilized adherents to different creeds and as a people betrayed by the West in the name of incorrectly understood political interests. The Armenian people is doomed to suffering in innocence like Christ himself. Armenian history includes a kind of lesson which the Christian world does not want to learn.

It was these ideas that made it possible for the Azeri writer Anar to speak of the "Armenian masochism," about a cult of suffering that inheres in Armenians.

This myth was given final form in Soviet Armenia during the past 25 years, where it is now more effective than it is in the Armenian Diaspora. In the sixties Soviet Armenians gained the right to observe the day in memory of the victims of the genocide—24 April—and since that time an extensive genocide literature has appeared in Armenia. The image of the actions unrecognized and undiscussed by the world had a decisive influence on the Armenian cultural consciousness: Along with the cult of suffering there is arising a cult of the hero-fedayeen, the fighter against the Turks.

It is easy to note that all elements of the myth contribute to the isolation of the Armenians, for it consistently sets this people against its "neighbors," that is, the Turkish and other Muslim peoples. (This reminds me of my friends from Stepanakert who instead of "Azeris" or "Turks" always say descriptively: "our neighbors.") In essence, the myth forms the identity of the Armenians as "anti-Turk." Obviously, this isolationist myth is alien to the modern West: The liberal world view that prevails in Western Europe and the United States is based on secularism and universalism. In other words, the Armenian myth does not submit to an adequate translation into the language of the human rights myth.

As for the "Moscow friends of the Armenian people," they, unfortunately, have frequently engaged in actualization and rephrasing of the Armenian myth over the past four years. Here one must clarify what is really on the minds of the people to whom the fate of Armenia is important and not the Slavophiles from among the "so-called democrats" who at one time took advantage of the Armenian theme and the gullibility of the Armenian people as a springboard for their careers. I am convinced that these latter understand the meaning of their own treachery. I hope they sometimes feel ashamed.

According to my observations, the "Moscow friends" frequently achieved an effect with the help of a forbidden device: Appealing to the Armenian audience, they took advantage of the deeply entrenched anti-Turkish and anti-Islamic feelings of the Armenians, that is, they degraded to propaganda the national and religious hostility in another country, referring to Armenians as "our little brothers" with whom they could and had to speak precisely in a racist language. The "Moscow friends" are strengthening those very elements of the Armenian myth that isolate the Armenians from the neighboring peoples and give them an "anti-Turkish" identity.

People could object that I am exaggerating the influence of political myths on the development of the conflict. But here is another observation: The Armenian leaders and the mass media, as a rule, suppress the information that contradicts the myth. In my view, one of the decisive events that finally turned the conflict into a battle to the end, that is, to the physical destruction or expulsion of one of the ethnic groups, was the deportation of the Azeris from Armenia in November 1988. According to my information, more than 100,000 Azeri Christians were driven out (mainly from the Gugarskiy, Gorisskiy, and Stepanavanskiy Rayons of Armenia) in a couple of days and dozens were killed. The leaders of the Karabakh movement of Armenia at the time (now many of them are state leaders) have not announced publicly that the Armenians are guided by the caveman principle of blood revenge and collective liability which is typical of "uncivilized" peoples. What happened was not the subject of public discussion and interpretation. It was not perceived as the national disgrace of the Armenians. Instead of this, people were vaguely given to understand that the Armenian Azerbaijanis were to blame for everything themselves because they were disloyal. Nobody in Armenia would dare to undertake demythologization.

As the Azeri society awakened, a "countermyth" about the insidious Armenians and the naively credulous Azeris was formed here (out of already prepared blocks) and became a public factor. It is typical that instead of demythologization the mass consciousness is offered a battle of myths. And in Azerbaijan confidence is increasing in the idea that the Russian and Western public would not refrain from dual standards: The Christian world will be on the side of the civilized people in any case, displaying its inherent Eurocentric racism. The lack of sensitivity of the Western consciousness to the sufferings of the Palestinian people is there for all to see. For in the modern Western consciousness the role of sufferers has been permanently assigned to the Jews (incidentally, the bearers of the Armenian myth also experience jealousy toward them, and until the Western intellectual community finally becomes tired of the subject of the guilt of the Christians before the Jews for the Holocaust the Christian conscience is not likely to burden itself with new concerns of that kind. "Bolivar cannot carry two.")

As for the "Moscow friends" of the Armenians, in the face of such events as the exile of the Azeris from Armenia, they were either proved to be bloodthirsty fans of their team or displayed a helpless confusion or even disenchantment with the civilized Armenians: "How is such a thing possible?" All this was especially clearly manifested after the publication of the reports on the mass murders of the Azeri population during the storming of the village of Khodzhaly at the end of February 1992.

And the attempts at an "objective approach" in the central and (later) Russian press could not be called objective either: Since the autumn of 1988 they have been printing both the Armenian and the Azeri versions of the events in adjacent columns. But the "inability to find and tell the truth" (V.L. Pasternak) cannot be made up for with this kind of objectivity.

Here we are entering on a narrow path. For it is obvious that to be a "fan" is immoral and to adopt (expressed in obscure form) the principle of collective responsibility is impossible. But even the liberal dogma to the effect that there are "no bad peoples" (that is, on average "all peoples are the same") does not contribute to an understanding of the situation and sometimes causes direct harm to the cause.

What I find it important to express is very close to the words of the French Catholic writer George Bernanos written in November 1943 in a dispute with an American journalist: "Dear Thompsom considers it unfair to attribute to all German people the responsibility for the crimes committed by the fascists. And I consider it just as unfair to exclude the fascists from the German people, thus not accounting for the circumstances that mitigate their guilt, that is, the inherited nature of the environment and cultural and moral traditions. Yes, there were maniacs and sadists among the Germans... But there is one category of Germans, the largest, who, although they are neither maniacs nor sadists, nonetheless look on cruelty and violence differently from the way we do."

Recently an American friend accused me of racism for the words: "In Russian culture human life is not included among the basic values." He probably responded to these words in approximately the same way as I would assess the standard accusations against the "Georgians" heard somewhere in a waiting line in Moscow ("Their entire nation is like that," and so forth). But: We know that various peoples look on cruelty and violence in different ways, just as various peoples take different attitudes toward human life.

In the fall of 1990 I spent a week in the home of a friend of mine in Askeran. Several times a day he took me in his Zhiguli from Askeran to Stepanakert and back. The direct road runs through Khodzhaly, and one time stones were thrown at an Armenian vehicle traveling in front of us. On the days after that the Armenian drivers preferred the roundabout road, which was harder to drive on. Regarding this I heard: "If we had burned down a couple of houses in Khodzhaly in the spring of 1988 the Azeris would have left of their own accord."

Here it is appropriate to recall that the first campaign of the pogrom mob from Agdam to Askeran was on 22 February 1988, two days after the special session of the NKAO Congress of People's Deputies which petitioned to the Supreme Soviets of the two republics to have the NKAO transferred from the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian SSR. This campaign was the first attempt at violence by the Azeris since the beginning of the Karabakh movement and at the same time it was the first publicly significant reaction of the Azeris to the decision of the Karabakh Oblast Soviet. On the way, the mob beat Armenians and destroyed buildings. The people participating in the pogrom were stopped by police bullets on the outskirts of Askeran—where four years later, at the beginning of March 1992, Azeri armed personnel carriers forcing their way through to Askeran were stopped.

The second reaction of the Azeri society to the aspiration of the Karabakh residents to freedom was the Sumgait pogrom of 27-29 February 1988.

Looking at all these various episodes together, I shall try to make two arguments.

First, the attitudes toward violence in the Azeri and Armenian political cultures are indeed different. It is difficult for me to imagine that a neutral historian could find arguments to refute such an assertion. A pogrom and mass slaughter—this is precisely the response which could naturally have been expected in February 1988. It is precisely these expectations that followed from all the experience of the coexistence of the Armenians and the Turks during critical moments of history. The threat of slaughter (the so-called "Azeri factor") indeed has been a political argument from the very beginning of the conflict.

In the second place, level of political morality set by "Sumgait" is convincing everywhere in our country—and not just in Transcaucasia. (This has not been a common assertion among authors analyzing the dynamics of the mass violence in the age of the disintegration of the USSR.) The Armenians also successfully mastered the argument of violence: Nobody will protect you, therefore kill the opponent and take over his position unless you want to remain a vulnerable victim. Such is today's conclusion from the appeal "Sumgait must not be repeated," and it is precisely in this sense that I understood the wish of many of my acquaintances in Askeran about the missed opportunity to drive the Azeris out of Khodzhaly. Were it not for the stubborn armed resistance of the Armenians, there would have been a "final solution" to the Karabakh question long ago through the destruction of the Armenians.

Unfortunately, attempts to resolve disputes by "civilized" means, that is, through mutual concessions and compromises, have had almost no success, partly because of the helplessness and incompetence of the central authorities, but that is not all. The possibility of

a compromise was noted at the time when Arkadiy Volskiy was governing in Karabakh (the summer of 1988 through November of 1989), first as a representative of the Communist Party Central Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet and then as the head of the special government committee responsible to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. But what he tried to do and had already done was destroyed by the joint efforts of Azerbaijan and Armenia. In both republics forces that were not ready for compromise were in charge of the situation.

Incidentally, this is not surprising: Even in Europe the new world order, which is based on the exclusion of force as a major political factor, is only beginning to assert itself. The disintegration of Yugoslavia also raised questions about the fate of ethnic minorities (for example, the Serbs in Croatia). Europe united could not stop a civil war, carnage, and expulsion of the population there.

Or here is another kind of example. As soon as Vaclav Havel became president of Czechoslovakia, in one speech he tried almost to problematize the postwar universal deportation of Germans from Sudetenland. He was not talking about the legal justification for this event (he had no advances toward Germany in mind): Havel just doubted the moral magnitude and beauty of this act. His speech evoked a stormy negative reaction which clearly showed that many Czechs subscribe to the principle of collective responsibility.

The understanding of the situation proposed here leads to the following prognosis. In solving the Karabakh problem, apparently, this is the only alternative: The Armenian community of Karabakh will be destroyed (possibly, with a military defeat, the remainder will be saved by fleeing) or Karabakh will gain actual independence (whatever it may be called). As for the plans for "real autonomy" within Azerbaijan, they are apparently hopeless if Azerbaijan has any control at all over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Now events are developing in such a way that the probability of the first outcome is much greater. Obviously, with the present state of affairs, the fact that Azerbaijan's military potential is many times greater will be seen, and aid to Karabakh from Armenia is insignificant. The "air bridge" is unreliable; it can be destroyed very quickly. The rural population of Karabakh is eating up their last supplies and they are already close to a real blockade famine. Trying to reinforce their positions, the Karabakh residents are almost sure to storm Shusha and this will bring the end closer.

The first large military defeat of the Karabakh residents will mean universal slaughter of the population. If they break through the Karabakh front, the Armenian Government, even if it is left in complete isolation, will come to the aid of Karabakh, and Armenian armed formations will try to cut an infantry "corridor" to Nagorno-Karabakh through the region of Lachin. In the words of the high Armenian officials, there will be no possibility of doing anything else in such a situation. A failure to take resolute measures would mean a loss of power.

One must keep in mind that there are tensions and contradictions between the authorities of the Republic of Armenia and the leadership proclaimed on 2 September 1991 of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). Leaders of the national liberation movement of Armenians in Karabakh have never depended on Yerevan and it is quite wrong to think of them as "henchmen" of the Armenian political forces. With the passage of time and the loss of illusions the influence of the Armenian authorities on the people of Karabakh will quickly decrease. From my experience, having traveled to Karabakh and been in constant communication with the people of Karabakh, I have received the impression that they are aspiring not so much to merge with Armenia as to get out from under the control of Baku: They consider actual independence form Azerbaijan to be a prerequisite for maintaining their community. In February 1988 "mnatsum" (unification with Armenia) was considered to be the only constitutional possibility of getting out from under Azerbaijan's thumb. Incidentally, all participants in the February events, including the oblast party-soviet elite, understood quite well that through their actions they were burning their bridges once and for all: There will never be a pardon. Therefore the February resolution of the session of the oblast soviet and the decree with the same spirit of the plenum of the Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan should be considered acts of great courage.

And when the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 28 November 1989 abolished the special government committee of the NKAO and again placed Karabakh completely at the disposal of Azerbaijan authorities, leaders of Armenia and the NKAO took a desperate step in order to influence the Center somehow: On 1 December 1989 in Yerevan a joint session of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia and the National Council of the NKAO proclaimed the creation of a unified Armenian republic, which includes Nagorno-Karabakh. This decision had no consequences but the new, postcommunist authorities in Armenia prefer not to take responsibility for it. Yet at one time it was the Armenian Pannational Movement (AOD), which came to power in 1990, that developed a draft of the decision and assigned its implementation to the old Supreme Soviet. Moreover, the AOD appeared and achieved its first successes precisely with "Karabakh" slogans, which it scuttled as it came closer to power. (Perhaps the reader will remember the since the spring of 1988 the AOD leadership has been known as the "Karabakh committee.") This inconsistency generates distrust of Yerevan among the Karabakh Armenians. And vice versa: The stubbornness of the people of Karabakh and their desire to survive on their own land is likely to hamper the new leadership of the Republic of Armenia in establishing good relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. One must understand that in

Armenia it is not so much the government as the opposition, mainly the Dashnaktsutyui part, that handles aid to Karabakh.

The attempt to open up the "Lanchin corridor" would mean war along the entire front between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The outcome of this war would depend on the position of the neighboring states and therefore cannot be predicted. One thing is clear: Unlike Azerbaijan, Armenia now has no real allies and therefore this is no longer a matter of Karabakh alone but of the existence or nonexistence of Armenians in the Transcaucasus. On the horizon is the threat of another genocide.

The logical possibility of avoiding such a development is the recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic by the international community. But today, apparently, nobody is prepared to make such a decision.

Ex-President on Nagorno-Karabakh, Presidential Elections

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[Interview with Ayaz Mutalibov, former president of Azerbaijan, conducted by Dana Mazalova; place and date not given: "'I Am a Humanist. At Heart,' the Ex-President of Azerbaijan Says of Himself"]

[Text] **Czechoslovak journalist Dana Mazalova has been studying problems of the Transcaucasus for 10 years now. Ayaz Mutalibov granted her alone an exclusive interview a month after his resignation. She, in turn, offered it to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA.**

[Mazalova] How do you feel?

[Mutalibov] Now, normal, although at first, after the session, I was told that I was in bad shape.

[Mazalova] What was the reason for your resignation?

[Mutalibov] My resignation was involuntary—I had had no thought of resigning but, realizing that everything had been properly stage-managed and that the right had joined forces with the left against the president, I decided to avoid a confrontation. Although I had legitimate opportunities for this (and the world would have supported me because I was the constitutional president elected in a national ballot).

It seems to me that Azerbaijan's image was thereby damaged, although we have shown that we differ sharply in this respect from Georgia. Yes, in the presidential entourage there was, as in any "royal court," a multitude of intrigues. But it was my job, having shown the legitimacy of power, to have brought Azerbaijan into the international community. Sentiment in the West is not in favor of what happened. There is now no recognized personality in Azerbaijan, whereas in the past six months, as a result of my modest international efforts, there was shaped a political image which, at the risk of this sounding immodest, was noticed. But now people come up to me and ask: With whom should we be dealing here? But I do not know now what anyone has in mind. I had a clearly arranged program, but what is theirs? But my opponents consider this factor immaterial for some reason or other. They played on it in order to put me in a difficult position.

I understood the geopolitical situation in which Azerbaijan finds itself today, I knew its place in the former Union, and I knew the problems of the CIS. I advocated the constructive and consistent realization of independence, which does not come all at once, instantaneously. As a politician and an economist, I always believed that if one forged ahead regardless and failed to take account of life's realities, both democracy and the degree of independence which we had achieved could have caved in. Unfortunately, the Azerbaijan People's Front has set another task. They believed that participation in the Commonwealth was totally unnecessary for us, as was participation in the joint command of the armed forces also. This was a serious mistake, which enabled certain forces to avail themselves of this position of Azerbaijan's and aggravate the situation. We are not Ukraine—not yet, in any event—and we should not be compared with it. Let us compare ourselves with Georgia, with Moldova. Had I not gone to Alma-Ata (where, incidentally, no one was expecting me), the process of Azerbaijan's recognition would have dragged on, and there would have happened with us the same as has happened in neighboring Georgia.

I attempted to balance the interests of right and left, and now the communist regime is coming to be replaced by an Azerbaijan People's Front regime. It is a regime. It is not democracy.

I did not recognize this word—front—from the very outset. Front against whom? This was an invention of Gorbachev or his ideologues. In terms of its extremism, form, and structure it is a communist, Bolshevik movement. They have support cells, functionaries—they have invented nothing new other than the name. The Azerbaijan People's Front has become a most veritable supernationalist movement.

On the day of the session I made an analysis of the mistakes we had made on account of the domestic political power struggle. I proposed a compromise—a coalition government in accordance with the prevailing status quo in Azerbaijan. Having enacted a law on parties and having created equal conditions for political struggle, we would have formed a new parliament, having dissolved the old one. And the party which obtained a majority in it would have formed a government of popular trust.

[Mazalova] Why did they not agree to this?

[Mutalibov] I do not know. I assume they were afraid of not obtaining a majority among the people. It was for this reason that they opted for a revolutionary version similar to the Romanian one: they came to power by

having removed the president, seized the key positions, and oppressed members of the opposition.

[Mazalova] Would the Georgian version have been possible here had it not been for Karabakh?

[Mutalibov] No. Nor would it there had it not been for Ossetia. This is a detonator causing tension in society and moral depression, which has to have some kind of outlet. Dogs are set on the victim.... But who is the victim? Power, the president.

[Mazalova] But, on the other hand, the war is distracting attention from the domestic political situation.

[Mutalibov] I was in these two years one of the few people who sincerely did not want a war, which neither we nor the Armenians need. I said: We are taking the path of independent development, we need to be involving ourselves with the economy. What are we doing?! Public money is being thrown to the wind, we are bleeding ourselves white and could reach a point where we have become indigent once again. And then some third party will come and say: "I will save you."

[Mazalova] Some observers believe that, following your resignation, the Karabakh conflict will be used in the domestic political struggle in Azerbaijan and that it cannot be stopped.

[Mutalibov] These fears are not inappropriate. The Azerbaijan People's Front accused us of being unable to solve the Karabakh problem. They must now give the people assurances that they can do so. There are two ways: either more decisive actions (inasmuch as I was accused of indecisiveness) or compromise.

[Mazalova] Via the CIS?

[Mutalibov] Yes. But they reject the CIS. They reject compromise. They are opposed to the restoration of the autonomous oblast within the previous borders. There then remains just one way—waging war until a victorious outcome. But I said continually: the world will not allow this because the Karabakh problem has already gone far beyond the confines of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Having assumed the commitments, we have joined the United Nations and the CSCE. Armenia also.

Let us assume that the opposition adopts a decision to restore the status quo. It would then be repudiating itself and would have to explain to the people why it prevented Mutalibov from doing this. They have painted themselves into a corner, where nothing is left but to buzz around [shmalyat]. Let us assume that they mobilize all our forces. This could grow into a big war, and it is not known who would win, although no one any longer wishes to fight here.

If we are victorious in Nagorno-Karabakh, we will acquire a new Karabakh in Nakhichevan. When I went there in 1990, I told the people of Nakhichevan: My brothers, do not listen to what is being said in Baku. Baku is a long way away from Armenia, but you are next door, you should have a different policy.

[Mazalova] The Karabakh conflict has now reached the bloody stage where it is very difficult to stop it. How might it develop, in your opinion, if the interests of third parties: Turkey, Iran, Russia, are considered?

[Mutalibov] Everyone is now trying to get in on this conflict and display initiative, proceeding from his own ambitions. Turkey and Iran are competing in terms of the degree of influence on Azerbaijan. Russia, on the other hand, has not, unfortunately, disavowed the line which prevailed under Gorbachev. And I believed that, upon coming to power, the democrats in Russia would use all their influence to put an end to the conflict, not farm it out to the belligerents.

But what might happen now? Our people are hoping that Turkey might help in some way. But, proceeding from its own political purposes, it will not become mixed up in the conflict on account of Azerbaijan. This is not part of its plans. Nor is Turkey on its own, it is part of a bloc system. There is a general policy there, and there are economic strings to which it must adhere. I warned that the development of the Karabakh conflict would cause popular unrest against the country's leaders in Turkey itself. This has, unfortunately, been the case—disturbances in Ankara, Istanbul, they are shouting for resignations there also. Demirel has declared that he has to take heed of the opinion of the people, who are demanding intervention. What does this mean at the end of the 20th century?

This is not the way we should be acting. We were making progress on the path toward independence and had joined the United Nations. The next stage was a sound economic program and privatization. The rest would come. Domestic problems were the second question. But this concept of mine was unremunerative because it was correct and was understood by the people's masses. Where, then, was the excuse for a power struggle? They needed all or nothing.

[Mazalova] What do you think about a Yugoslav version of a solution of the national conflict—republics acquiring independence in defiance of the principle of the inviolability of borders—in respect of Nagornyy Karabakh?

[Mutalibov] This is a delayed-action bomb, which will be going off constantly. It is a violation of the generally accepted rules, and the party which considers itself injured would never forgive anyone this. And the resulting tension could be used by any forces.

The Karabakh model could be applied in any region. The first international use of the Karabakh experience was in Kosovo. This model is now being developed in Crimea, which both Russia and Ukraine consider their primordial territory.

[Mazalova] Did you and Ter-Petrosyan have any appreciation of one another's attributes?

[Mutalibov] He perceived my refinement. And I understood and perceived his refinement, his political essence. Many people thought that we made no contact. Yes, we did. But I always endeavored to define the point of contact of interests from which we could go further. I was continually proposing that we regulate the situation and ensure peace together, without third parties—we would then both go down in the history of our peoples.

[Mazalova] What might the world community do for peace in Karabakh? Commissions, observers are coming....

[Mutalibov] International commissions should restore the status quo, bringing the situation to the starting point. Currently, according to a decision of our parliament, the autonomy does not exist. They, in turn, have formed the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, with which we cannot, naturally, agree—this means secession from Azerbaijan. For compromise to be achieved Armenia must officially announce that it considers annulled all decisions on the annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh, regardless of their legal basis. And our parliament should reverse the anticonstitutional—there is no new constitution as yet—decision on the dissolution of the autonomy and restore it within its former boundaries. After which, negotiations would be conducted by the communities of Nagorno-Karabakh—Armenian and Azerbaijani.

[Mazalova] Now, when there is no Union, what do you think of the role which is being performed in the Karabakh conflict by the CIS forces? On the one hand there is talk of an endeavor to halt the conflict. But, on the other, how, for example, were the Azerbaijanis able to "conquer" a Transcaucasus Military District supply terminal in Agdam which was intended for the contingency of war and which had a control system about which only the generals knew?

[Mutalibov] I did not even know that the supply terminal had been taken and plundered. But how were the Armenians able to steal 150 flamethrowers? Disintegration is, you know, disintegration. Tacit consent.... I always called this an outrage. When it was demanded that I create national armed forces, I realized that desire and possibility are entirely different things. We have no legal sources for acquiring weapons. Back in October I officially raised the following matter with Shaposhnikov and Gorbachev: We wish to form our own armed forces of a maximum of 20,000 men. In allocating weapons legally for a national self-defense force we would be forestalling the possibility of their spontaneous seizure from the Soviet Army, as happened in Armenia in 1990. I said: If you are worried about Armenia's reaction, give them the same quantity. The following principle operates in world practice—either two states sign a neutrality treaty or there is military parity between them. But we do not have parity, consequently, you yourselves are pushing us into the plunder of Army units. I foresaw this.

On the one hand there was a tremendous desire to preserve the Army in all the republics, on the other, the anti-Army mood following the proclamation of independence. Since we have independence, we should, consequently, have an independent army also. We would always have negotiated its status and given thought to jurisdiction and dual subordination according the head of state rights in the event of aggression. This was not done either.

[Mazalova] Do you not think that you made a mistake in not signing in Minsk the agreement on the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS?

[Mutalibov] I do. I, as president, should have availed myself of this right.

[Mazalova] What do you think about the events in Khodzhaly, after which you resigned? Corpses of Khodzhaly inhabitants were found not far from Agdam. Some people had initially shot them in the legs so that they could not get far. Then procured an ax. My colleagues photographed them on 29 February. At the time of new photographs on 2 March these same corpses had been scalped. A strange kind of game....

[Mutalibov] As the Khodzhaly people who escaped say, all this was organized in order that there be a pretext for my resignation. Some force was operating to discredit the president. I do not believe that the Armenians, who are very precise and knowledgeable about such situations, could have permitted the Azerbaijanis to have obtained documents exposing them as having perpetrated fascist actions. It may be assumed that some people had an interest in subsequently showing these closeups at the Supreme Soviet session and focusing everything on myself.

If I state that the Azerbaijani opposition was to blame for this, it could be said that I am slandering them. But the overall background of the arguments is such that the corridor by which people could leave had, for all that, been abandoned by the Armenians. Why would they be shooting in that case? The more so on territory close to Agdam, where by that time there were sufficient forces for moving out and helping people. Or simply arranging for the peaceful inhabitants to leave. This was continually the practice.

I was being told all the time that the Khodzhaly people would hold on and that they needed help with weapons, people, and food. I gave instructions for this to be done by helicopter. But the pilots, it was explained to me, refused to fly there inasmuch as they lacked the special instruments enabling them to evade the Stingers. This went on for almost a whole week. Deployed near at hand, however, was the Agdam grouping, which was required to continually monitor the development of events. As soon as the equipment had ringed Khodzhaly, the populace was to be evacuated. Even earlier I had given the same instructions in respect of Shusha: to leave the men, but to bring out the women and children. These are also the laws of war: they have to be saved. My conduct was

objective and unequivocal: I gave these instructions, but why they were not carried out in Khodzhaly I do not know.

I spoke on several occasions, incidentally, in this period with Mkrtchyan, chairman of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Supreme Soviet: "You have killed thousands of people, give us an opportunity to bring out their bodies." But he replied that there should be no corpses, that they had our people, whom they were feeding, although there was a shortage of food, and whom they were prepared to release in exchange for their hostages.

[Mazalova] When were you notified of these deaths?

[Mutalibov] The day after it was reported that there were only a few bodies in Khodzhaly. The information came from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

[Mazalova] Who was responsible for this information?

[Mutalibov] The minister himself. A press service had by that time been created in the Defense Ministry also. Following the helicopter business, we agreed that no one would give unverified information.

[Mazalova] Do you consider Prime Minister Gasan Gasanov responsible also?

[Mutalibov] The head of the government is, of course, responsible for everything, although he refuses to have anything to do with this, saying that he is not involved in such matters. But the government is the government.

[Mazalova] Might you join the new presidential elections scheduled for 7 July?

[Mutalibov] I want to be left in peace. I do not want all the failures to be put down to me and to be made a scapegoat, as is customary with us. If they do not keep their promise made at the session to guarantee the president immunity and a normal life, I will have to become involved in the political struggle and assemble my people.

[Mazalova] If the Azerbaijan People's Front were to lose their confidence, and the people asked you to return, would you?

[Mutalibov] If the people asked, I would. I am a decisive person, but in sacrificing myself I tried to show that power is not the main thing. I am at the height of my powers and have quite a good grasp of politics. I am a normal, communicable, approachable person. I am a humanist at heart and do not thirst for blood and vengeance. Such a person is needed today also.

[Mazalova] Has this resignation been of any benefit to you?

[Mutalibov] First, this disagreeable fact has not changed my human nature. Were I to become a leader once again, I should be considerably tougher and bear in mind that individual representatives of society are not the whole people.

[Mazalova] Thank you.

Preparations for Presidential Elections Viewed

92US0378A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Aydyn Mekhtiyev: "Could Geydar Aliyev Become President?: A Session of the People's Front Majlis Has Been Held"]

[Text] A session of the People's Front Majlis set aside the adoption of a resolution expressing the attitude of this leading political force in the republic toward the coming presidential elections. The opinions of members of the majlis on this question were divided. Specifically, the writer Vagif Samedoglu believes that it is essential to boycott the elections. In his opinion, representatives of the former communist nomenklatura who head the executive locally will endeavor to do everything to falsify the election results. In this case the possible defeat of the Azerbaijan People's Front would seriously damage the authority of this organization. Abbas Abdulla, chief editor of the journal ULDUZ, on the contrary, called on the members of the majlis to adopt a decision in favor of the Azerbaijan People's Front's participation in the presidential election campaign. "I see no realistic force capable of opposing the People's Front at the elections," Abdulla declared. Following lengthy discussion, the members of the Front Majlis agreed that it is essential to ascertain the attitude of the population of the republic toward the idea of presidential elections as quickly as possible, after which to convene a meeting of the majlis for the adoption of the final decision on this matter.

According to the Election Act, the election campaign is to begin three months prior to the elections. But little more than two months remain until 7 June—election day—and the Central Electoral Commission has yet to be formed. And there are no visible outward preparations for a struggle for the office of head of state. Forecasting their possible outcome is difficult. There are many popular politicians in the republic, but naming a clear leader is hard. The independent Sociological Research Center of the republic recently made public data of an opinion poll, according to which the greatest confidence of the electorate is enjoyed by present Defense Minister Rakhim Gaziyev and also Geydar Aliyev, chairman of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic Supreme Majlis. In the event of his being nominated for the office of president, Abulfas Elchi-bey, leader of the People's Front, could expect to be successful also.

Geydar Aliyev has found himself in a difficult position. The special session of the Supreme Soviet, which completed its business last week, rescinded the amendment to clause 2 of Article 112 of the Constitution of Azerbaijan depriving Geydar Aliyev of the right to be a member of the presidium of the republic parliament. But according to a clause of the Election Act, a candidate must not be over 65 years of age. Geydar Aliyev, who

will be celebrating his 70th birthday in two years, could not be a part of the election struggle unless this clause of the law were to be revised in the next few days.

Presidential Registration Procedures Begin

92US0398A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Aydyn Mekhtiev: "Cadre Changes Continue: Registration of Candidates for President Has Been Permitted Since Yesterday"]

[Text] Three days after the resignation of Prime Minister Gasanov, yet another state figure of Azerbaijan was relieved of his post "by his own wishes" by decree of acting President Yagub Mamedov. Leaving his post is 66-year-old State Secretary of Azerbaijan Mitat Abasov. Whereas local observers associated the 4 April decree of Yagub Mamedov on relieving Prime Minister Gasan Gasanov from his post with the circumstance that the latter might become a serious rival of the acting president in the forthcoming election campaign, the resignation of Mitat Abasov was interpreted as a "purge" of the cadres at the leadership of the republic, who were chosen by former President Mutalibov. As is well known, Mitat Abasov, vice president of the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences, was appointed state secretary of the republic after his predecessor in that post, Tofik Ismailov, perished as a result of a helicopter accident in Karabakh on 20 November of last year.

Taking into consideration the fact that the structure of presidential authority in Azerbaijan does not provide for the post of vice president, one may draw the conclusion that Yagub Mamedov looks upon the figure of state secretary as one of the key positions.

In spite of the fact that in accordance with the law on elections, registration of candidates to the post of president begins on 7 April, not a single political figure in the republic has yet been officially put forward. This is explained not only by the fact that the candidates have not yet managed to gather the 20,000 signatures required for registration. The reason for the temporizing position of the candidates lies in the fact that the leadership of the republic and the People's Front have not yet reached agreement on the question of the conditions for conducting the presidential campaign. The People's Front hopes to enlist the support of the voters for holding a proposed broad-scale campaign with the goal of securing the agreement of the heads of administrative power in the localities to changes in the membership of local electoral commissions, and including members of the NFA [Azerbaijan People's Front] on a parity basis. Apparently it was not by accident that on 6 April Yagub Mamedov held an expanded session with the participation of the heads of the rayon administrations, at which special attention was devoted to the tactic of local organs of power in the period of the forthcoming election battle with the opposition.

Incidentally, there is no unity in the opposing camp on the question of participating in the presidential campaign. For example, the movement "For Democratic Reforms in Azerbaijan and in Defense of Human Rights" recently issued an appeal in which it called upon political forces to refuse to take part in the presidential election. The document points out that "holding elections for the president of Azerbaijan should be preceded by the adoption of a new Constitution, holding parliamentary elections ahead of schedule, and the establishment of a Constitutional Court." The appeal goes on to say that "in accordance with international legal norms, in a state in which part of its territory has been engulfed by war and is in fact occupied, holding elections for president is not considered possible." Lala Gadzhieva, leader of the movement, who has just returned from a trip to a number of regions in Karabakh, told a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent that "holding elections is also impossible because to this day the status of the more than 350,000 Azerbaijan refugees from Karabakh has not yet been determined." "If even our people are forced to take part in these traitorous elections," Gadzhieva continued, "then I, knowing full well the apportionment of political forces, along with the lack of a base and presidential structures, am deeply convinced that this experiment will last no longer than six months."

Possible Presidential Candidates Viewed

92US0417A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Aydyn Mekhtiyev: "There Are the First Presidential Aspirants; Age Has Gotten in the Way of Geydar Aliyev"]

[Text] By a majority of votes, the session of the APF [Azerbaijan People's Front] mejlic which has been concluded in Baku has accepted the decision to nominate as the presidential candidate of this party, which is an influential political force in the republic, the APF chairman—a 54-year old candidate in philological sciences, Abulfaz Elchi-bey. The mejlic session ratified the lists of initiative groups for gathering signatures in support of Elchi-bey submitted by local sections of the front.

On that same day, the nomination of one other candidate for president was announced. The leader of the National Independence Party, which is not part of the APF, Etibar Mamedov, who a week ago had celebrated his 37th birthday, was nominated at the conference of the labor collective of the Baku Oil Processing Plant.

Thus, the opposition forces have decided to participate in the elections, and this is associated with the fact that the republic's leadership has fulfilled the main demand of the People's Front: By decision of the National Council, the powers and authorities of the Central Electoral Commission have been rescinded. This commission consisted mainly of former communists, and its chairman, Ali Kerimov, was relieved of his duties. The

Azerbaijan parliament formulated a new Central Electoral Commission, which includes representatives of the opposition.

Of the current republic leadership, Supreme Soviet Chairman Yagub Mamedov can realistically aspire to the office of president. However, having become carried away with cadre reorganization in the upper echelons of power, he is in no hurry to include himelf in the electoral struggle.

One of the most popular politicians of Azerbaijan, Geydar Aliyev, will evidently not be able to participate in the campaign. The age limit specified for presidential candidates has taken the leader of the Nakhichevan autonomy out of the struggle. Nevertheless, on 9 April the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic Supreme Medjlis, in which Aliyev's influence is absolute, did not take seriously the demands of a number of deputies to boycott the presidential elections. By decision of the Nakhichevan parliament, the electors of this autonomy will participate in the elections for president of Azerbaijan.

Nevertheless, in the past days the topic of the upcoming electoral battles has not been the main one. Republic residents observed with alarm the acute complication of relations between the Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense and the commanders of the CIS 4th Army stationed in the republic. As a result of a clash between soldiers and officers of the national army and paratroopers of the 4th Army on 8 April, two Azerbaijanis died, two more were seriously wounded, and 1 Azerbaijani servicemen were taken away to an unknown destination. The conflict occured after a group of Azerbaijani officers and soldiers was sent to the storehouses of the CIS united armed forces to the village of Uch-Tape (17 kilometers from Baku) for the purpose of stopping fuel and lubricant materials from being taken out of there. However, after several hours, a group of about 25 paratroopers came to the storehouses. The Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense issued a statement accusing Lt. Col. Zolotov, who headed the paratroop operation, of giving the order to fire on the unarmed Azerbaijani military servicemen.

Age Factor in Possible Aliyev Candidacy for President

92US0388A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 14, Apr 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Is Geydar Looming Up Ahead?]

[Text] Reports have appeared recently regarding the possible return to power in Azerbaijan of Geydar Aliyev, former first secretary of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party.

It is noted here that Aliyev will mark his 70th birthday in two years. And this observation is not made by accident—elections for president of Azerbaijan are scheduled for 7 June of this year. According to the Azerbaijan Constitution, however, the president must be an individual younger than 65. Although 68 is a good way away from 65, Aliyev expects that with help from his adherents he will be able to eliminate this point of inconvenience to him, which was adopted, incidentally, exclusively "for his sake."

In actuality, things are even more complicated still. It turns out Aliyev will celebrate his 70th in just one month. Although Aliyev himself cites documents with 10 May 1923 as his date of birth (but says—1924), he was in fact born in 1922. This was established several years ago by the party control committee of the CPSU Central Committee, whose representatives found an application in Nakhichevan archives which he filled out upon entering the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League]. Aliyev simply forgot about this application. As far as other documents citing his year of birth are concerned, he personally destroyed these prior to departing for work in Moscow at the beginning of the 1940's. Why it was necessary for him to do this remains a riddle. Is it possible he could predict back then that he would be running for president in 1992?

Presidential Adviser, Deputy Premier on Kiev Meeting

92US0417B Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 31 Mar 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with S. Gadzhiyev, state presidential adviser on state-legal policy, and A. Azizbekov, deputy prime minister of the republic of Azerbaijan and chairman of the Azerbaijan Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply], conducted by E. Abaskuliyeva: "Proceeding From National Interests"]

[Text] **We have already reported on the meeting of the heads of the CIS member states held in Kiev on 20 March of this year, and have also published the documents adopted at this meeting. Yet among the questions included on the agenda of the Kiev meeting were also those on which the representatives of Azerbaijan had their own specific opinion, as a result of which a number of documents were not signed by them. What documents were these, and what is our position on each of them? We asked two meeting participants—S. Gadzhiyev, state presidential adviser on state-legal policy, and A. Azizbekov, deputy prime minister of the Azerbaijan Republic and Gossnab chairman—to answer these questions.**

[Correspondent] Sabir Muallim, how would you explain the fact that an entire packet of proposals associated with problems of armaments was not signed by you?

[Gadzhiyev] I believe that the answer to this question does not require lengthy explanation primarily because the proposed documents concerned questions of the CIS unified armed forces which we, as you know, did not enter along with the Ukraine and Moldova. We repeatedly stated that we consider it necessary to create our own army, and rejected participation in the CIS unified armed forces. And thus, it is natural that we did not place our signatures under that which does not relate to us.

[Correspondent] Ayduy Muallim, questions of economics are of particular importance for us today because, it seems, it is no accident that our readers are interested in the problems which were discussed at the Kiev meeting.

[Azizbekova] Two important economic questions were discussed at the meeting of the Council of Heads of CIS Member States: the agreement on legal succession in regard to contract agreements, all property, state archives, debts and statutes of the former USSR, and the agreement on the division of assets and liabilities of the former USSR State Bank between the central banks of the CIS member states. Russia was opposed to the adoption of these agreements, and the discussion was concluded with the signing of standard protocols on the creation of commissions.

However, the heads of the governments concentrated their attention on extremely important problems associated with the draft of the agreement in the sphere of price formation. On 14 February in Minsk we posed the question of the need to agree that the price policy be conducted in a coordinated manner, i.e., in order to determine the balance from each of the republics, it is necessary to decide what the dollar is equal to in rubles. This would serve as protection for the Azerbaijan market. Then we know conditionally in world prices what corresponds to what in our mutual accounting with other CIS states. Let us say, for example, Azerbaijan imports $6.4 billion worth of goods and exports $6.2 billion.

But then this question turned out to be open, and already in Kiev Russia announced that it is releasing prices, including also on power sources. Naturally, those states which have no power sources, including also the Ukraine, were against this. The argument flared up primarily between others, but since the interests contradict each other, once again the documents were not signed, but only a protocol on creation of a commission.

We are in favor of having the pricing policy conducted in a coordinated manner, and that is specifically how we are building our relations with other states—the former USSR republics. Here too some contradictions arise. Let us say, for example, the Ukraine sells butter not according to the relation of the dollar and the ruble, on which we had agreed, but at a more expensive rate, because everyone needs butter, and buys diesel fuel here cheaper because others have it too, and the prices on it have dropped.

Due to lack of coordination of prices in the CIS, the prices on fuel and cotton have dropped on the world market. After all, now each one of the CIS members enters the market independently, and as a result the prices are dropping to our common detriment.

Non-acceptance of each other's interests leads to nonfulfillment of the decisions adopted at CIS meetings and to a deterioration of the economic position. The question of coordinating agencies for CIS railroads was also discussed at this meeting. Everyone signed this document except us. What are we talking about here? That the work of the Ministry of Railways must be coordinated, which, as proposed by Russia, is what the coordinating council will do. The documents ratified here are important for everyone.

We had our own variant. Naturally, we also favor coordination of railroad activity. But since we are an independent state, it is principally incorrect to have some council over us, which would obligate us to act in one way or another. We proposed that this council not ratify, but rather coordinate joint actions, which go into effect on the territory of one state or another only after its ratification by the republic's parliament or leadership. The Ukraine supported us. However, the document proposed by Russia is effective only until December of 1992.

The heads of state also reviewed one other question in Kiev—the agreement on organization of economic relations and the principles for resolving economic disputes. The discussion centered around the creation of a CIS economic court—a court of arbitration. I was opposed to this. Why? Let me explain. Each republic has its own court of arbitration, where enterprises of states bound by agreement relations may turn. If such an economic dispute is not resolved, they may turn also to a third-party court, which they may select by agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant.

This document was prepared at the meeting in Moscow back on 13 March, at which Azerbaijan was absent in connection with its participation in the work of its own extraordinary session. Therefore, we did not place our signatures under this agreement in Kiev. Others agreed with us, and the document was put off for further study.

As for the other documents which we supposedly did not sign, there is some inaccuracy here: the agreement on principles of customs duty policy, on the coordination of bank activity, on the inter-state commission on import of food products, on the guarantee of rights to citizens of CIS member states in the sphere of pension provision, and the agreement on standardization were discussed on 13 March in Moscow. As I have already stated, we were not present at that meeting. These documents are currently being studied.

ESTONIA

Government Reviews First Month in Office

92UN1188A Tallinn THE BALTIC INDEPENDENT in English 20-26 Mar 92 p 2

[Text] The need for quick monetary and ownership reforms was stressed by the Estonian Prime Minister Tiit Vähi in an article in the government daily paper RAHVA HAAL on March 12 summing up the first month in office of the new government.

Mr Vähi said that the government would make every effort to carry out the monetary reform at the earliest opportunity, at the same time making sure that "the people would not be disappointed" by it. However, he did not elaborate on the details.

Two of the most urgent domestic policy tasks of the government cited by the Prime Minister were the need to strengthen legislation and fight corruption. As a move in the right direction, Mr Vähi mentioned the doubling of the salaries of tax and customs officials and the tightening of their work standards.

The freeing of prices is seen by Mr Vähi as an inevitable step in the transition to a market economy. As one of its first acts, the government raised the minimum wage from 400 to 1,000 roubles (from $3 to $12). Salary increases would continue so that by the end of the year the minimum wage would be US $100, the Prime Minister predicted.

Mr Vähi emphasised the inevitability of the recent sharp increases in rent and the cost of water, electricity, heating and gas, which were caused by the increase in the price of fuel imported from Russia. In cases where such expenses made up more than a quarter of a family's income then the state would cover the rest, he promised.

With regard to foreign trade, the prime minister pointed to the need to overcome dependence on trade with Russia. Western investments in Estonia should be encouraged through creating new investment incentives and lessening the red tape, he said.

Among the incentives for foreign investors, Mr Vähi mentioned the possibility of selling land to foreigners, which is prohibited under present legislation. "The sale of small plots of land to foreigners does not endanger Estonia in the least," Mr Vähi said. "On the contrary, this could earn us the hard currency we desperately need to tide us over the next winter when we will have to buy all our fuel at world-market prices." In order to cope with this, Estonia needs "tens of millions of dollars worth of foreign investment," the prime minister explained.

According to Mr Vähi, the state revenue for the first half of 1992 is planned at US $20 million, compared to the $3 million earned in 1991.

The Prime Minister stressed the need for Estonia to also start acting as an independent state in the sphere of the economy, which he interprets as selling Estonian resources as expensively as possible. As an example, Mr Vähi cited the government decision to raise twelve-fold the cost of Estonian electricity being sold to Latvia. The effectiveness of this policy has, however, been questioned in some quarters. Latvian officials have already said they are looking for cheaper energy suppliers.

Banking Problems With Moscow Continue

92UN1188B Tallinn THE BALTIC INDEPENDENT in English 20-26 Mar 92 p 3

[Article by Kaja Kell]

[Text] In a relatively new development for Estonia the holders of individual savings accounts and companies making bank deposits have started to comprehend that a high inflation rate is not the only factor to make you lose your savings. Banks can make mistakes and go bankrupt—here and now. And political controversies can make hard-earned currency resources virtually unavailable.

The savings bank organization of the former Soviet Union was a typically centralized structure with Moscow calling the shots. The deposits accumulated in central accounts in Moscow and interest was handed out from there as well.

A number of years savings having accumulated in Moscow, the deposits belonging to individual account holders from Estonia now amount to more than 2 billion roubles.

"One mustn't think that Moscow is unaware or unable to understand what is going on in Estonia. As soon as the campaign aimed at persuading individual account holders to withdraw their accounts from the All-Soviet Savings Bank system was launched, Moscow reacted by threatening to freeze deposited savings," said President of the Bank of Estonia Siim Kallas.

At the end of last year Mrs [as printed] Kallas and the Chairman of the Managing Board of the Soviet Central Bank Viktor Gerashtchenko signed a document, declaring that the money deposited in individual savings accounts belongs to the people of the Republic of Estonia. All the technicalities concerning the handing over of the deposits should have been resolved by special negotiations. These negotiations have not yet taken place.

The economic situation in the rouble zone being what it is, Moscow is applying every possible kind of pressure to compel the former republics to assume a responsibility for the internal debts of the old Soviet Union. Four billion roubles is the estimated amount that Moscow would like Estonia to contribute: Estonia, on the other hand, has never agreed to the whole idea.

"We are facing some very difficult negotiations. Dividing the liability for the debts of the former Soviet Union has become a matter of controversy—both openly and behind the scenes," said Mr Kallas.

One of the moves in this game of moves and countermoves was the freezing of the hard currency accounts of the former Soviet republics in the Moscow Vneshekonombank. The Bank of Estonia has recently been criticised by local politicians for failing to transfer the hard currency deposited in its Moscow correspondent account to its Western accounts in time. The Bank of Estonia maintains that the critics are not aware of all the facts.

Mr Kallas said that his bank has been transferring the hard currency from its Moscow account all the time. At the beginning of December 1991 there was only about US$1 million in Estonia's Vneshekonombank account. By now the accumulation of money from various hard-currency transactions has increased from that amount up to an estimated US $14.5 million. "We do not have the exact numbers at our disposal because the inadequate accounting system of the Moscow bank makes it impossible for them to give their clients up-to-date figures," said Mr Kallas.

Officials stress that it was impossible for many businesses to use an alternative banking system. "Soviet export organisations had only one banking system available to them. And in some cases the companies couldn't even stop using the services of their agents because they had signed long-term contracts," said Mr Kallas. According to Estonian officials, the only real solution for companies with hard currency resources locked in Vneshekonombank accounts is to find a way to use their hard currency for transactions on the internal Russian market, which is still possible under the Moscow banking system.

"The Bank of Estonia is going to guarantee all the individual savings deposited in Estonia's state-owned Savings Banks," Mr Kallas said. That covers most of the savings accounts in Estonia, but there are still numerous accounts in various commercial banks which don't have a state guarantee.

Last week an Estonian weekly paper published an article about the Savings Bank losing 30 million roubles in an unfortunate credit operation. A local commercial bank had found a way to turn the unpredicted rise of the rouble's exchange rate against the dollar to its advantage, by declaring that it was unable to repay its principal and would have to hand over the security in the form of a previously fixed amount of US dollars. There is no legal mechanism to compel this bank to pay back the roubles.

The state will bear the burden of this oversight, but it is well known among the business community (and admitted by the president of the Bank of Estonia) that the Savings Bank has not been the only one to bear losses whilst learning to operate in the new market conditions and within a framework of inadequate legislation.

Mr Kallas said that a new credit information and credit risk assessment system for banks would soon come into operation, but until now every depositor has had to look after himself. If the economy is experiencing difficulties then the banks are experiencing them as well. All the well-known technical excuses for long delays in fulfilling clients' requests for transferring funds can only be a cover-up for lack of funds, the President argued.

"We shall probably need something like the US federal deposit insurance system in the long run, but a special reserve fund for insuring small savings deposited in commercial banks will soon come into being," Siim Kallas said.

LITHUANIA

Government Stops Salaries for Budget Officials, Deputies

92UN1161A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 9 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by correspondent V. Zarovskiy: "Government Vouchers, Granddaughters of Kerensky Provisional Government Bank Notes"]

[Text] Vilnius—The unexpected is always alarming. Why the heck did first the Prime Minister of Lithuania G. Vagnorius and then the Chairman of the Supreme Council V. Landsbergis sign the appropriate documents and deprive workers of all budgetary organizations, as well as the deputies, of their salaries? To bring about order? Ha! Who is it that is causing problems right now? It seems the Communists are gone, as well as the underground and Russia, just as everyone around, is a friendly country.

Just recently increases in wages, pensions, and grants in the republic were taking place almost every month. Outstanding students got a stipend of a 1,000 [currency not specified], pensioners, more than 1,000, workers (almost all) 3,000-4,000 and higher. Plus free government vouchers.

The government keeps extending their life, now until May. In the current Lithuanian salary they have little meaning. The maximum that may be purchased with them is two-and-a-half kilograms of pork. This means only one thing: The Lithuanian Government does not have cash (rubles) in order to buy back its "progeny" from the population. Moreover there is no "wooden" money to pay salaries and pensions. The enterprises are without cash. The service of Z. Vaisvila, the deputy prime minister of Lithuania and also chief of state security, finally abandoned the search for KGB agents and a Marxist underground and caught a group of the Lithuanian-Estonian mafia. Unfortunately, however, that was too late: They managed to conspire with Lithuanian savings bank workers and steal 80 million rubles in cash from accounts in Lithuania

Perhaps I am exaggerating, and even here, in Lithuania, I will be accused of rumor mongering, but experts are almost unanimously stating that the decision regarding nonpayment of salaries to officials and deputies means only one thing—the early introduction of our own currency.

Membership of Parliamentary Factions Listed

92UN1115C Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian 10 Mar 92 p 3

[Unattributed report: "What Kind of Parliamentary Factions Do We Have?"]

[Text] Factions, a normal phenomenon in the civilized world, began to form themselves in the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania only in the summer of 1990. The first one of them was the Sajudis Center faction, announcing itself on 21 June 1990. The last (or is it really the last?) Sajudis Accord faction was formed quite recently. At present, there are 9 factions in the Supreme Council to which 111 deputies belong, 29 deputies do not belong to any faction. Most factions were registered by the Supreme Council Presidium on 8 May 1991, when the permanent statutes of the Supreme Council came into force.

The LDDP [Democratic Labor Party of Lithuania] faction was established on 25 September 1990 as the faction of the Left; 10 deputies, members of the LDDP, belong to it. The faction of the Left had more members, including the deceased deputy Valerijonas Sadreika. The Moderate faction was created in March 1991 as the Seventh faction.

The Tautininkai [Nationalist] faction, established in January 1991, has split into two: the Reorganized Tautininkai, which includes most of the members of the Lithuanian Tautininkai alliance, and the National Progress faction. The latter (and, in part, the former) have attracted many members of the Sajudis joint faction.

The Sajudis Joint faction, formed in December 1990, was, for a long time, the largest one (36) members; with the secession of the "progressives" and with the formation of the Sajudis Accord faction, it shrank to 15 deputies. It includes deputies who are leaders of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and several members of the Independence party, its chairman excluded.

The Sajudis Moderate Radical and the Free Democrat factions, established in September 1990, disintegrated six months later: the "radicals" dispersed to various factions and many of the "democrats" went over to the Liberal faction, which was formed in April 1991. Its members are mostly active in the Lithuanian Liberal Union.

Various changes are taking place at this time in the largest, the Sajudis Center, faction, which has 20 members: some joined the faction, and others (more numerous), left it, mostly for the Moderate faction. The Center faction is based on the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania, the first one to receive international recognition, which returned to the Socialist International in 1990.

Only one faction has remained unchanged, the Polish faction, which consists of 8 deputies, mostly members of Lithuania's Polish Union. This faction required a special Supreme Council resolution for its establishment. According to the statutes, a faction must have no less than a 1/15th portion of all the deputies.

To which factions do other well-known members of Lithuania's political parties belong? Currently the Democrats belong to the Sajudis Accord faction. The greens, at present, are scattered throughout various factions. The Moderate faction deputies are still gathered together in the Citizen's Charter Club. The deputies who are active in the Future Forum of Lithuania have neither an organized separate faction nor have they established their own club.

And, finally, about those who do not belong to any faction: they are deputies of various political persuasions, among them, three ministers.

We apologize in advance to our esteemed deputies, if we listed their affiliation incorrectly.

LDDP Faction (formerly the faction of the Left - 10 deputies)
Vladimiras Beriozovas
Algirdas Brazauskas - (faction leader) - LDDP chairman
Bronislovas Genzelis (Ld)
Ceslovas Jursenas
Jokubas Minkevicius
Petras Papovas
Algirdas Razauskas
Kestutis Rimkus,
Benediktas Rupeika
Mindaugas Stakvilevicius

Polish Faction (8 deputies)
Stanislavas Akanovicius
Zbignevas Balcevicius
Leonas Jankelevicius
Risardas Macejkianecas - (faction leader)
Ceslavas Okincicas
Stanislavas Piesko
Valentina Suboc
Edvardas Tomasevicius

Liberal Faction (10 deputies)
Kestutis Glaveckas (Ld)
Algirdas Kumza (Ld)
Vytautas Kvietkauskas
Arvydas Lescinskas (C)

Bronislovas Lubys
Donatas Morkunas
Virginijus Pikturna (Ld)
Jonas Tamulis (C)
Rimvydas Valatka (C)
Eduardas Vilkas (Ld) -
(faction leader)

Moderate Faction (formerly the Seventh Faction - 16 deputies)
Vilius Baldisis (C) -
chairman of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania
Juozas Dringelis (Nr) -
deputy speaker of the Supreme Council
Eugenijus Gentvilas (Nr) -
speaker of the Supreme Council
Eimantas Grakauskas (C)
Valdimiras Jarmolenka
Virgilijus Kacinskas (C) -
(faction leader)
Stasys Kropas (C) -
chairman of the Supreme Council Local Governments Commission
Bronislovas Kuzmickas -
deputy chairman of the Supreme Council
Nijole Ozelyte-Vaitiekuniene (C, Li)
Vytautas Paliunas (S)
Kazimieras Saja (S)
Saulius Saltenis
Albertas Simenas (C) -
minister of economics
Jonas Simenas (C) -
chairman of the Supreme Council Environmental Protection Commission
Birute Valionyte (S)
Emanuelis Zingeris

Reorganized Tautininkai Faction (10 deputies)
Irena Andrukaitiene (S)
Klemas Inta (T) -
deputy speaker of the Supreme Council
Jonas Liaucius (S)
Jonas Macys (Nr, T)
Leonas Milcius (T)
Rasa Rastauskiene (T)
Algimantas Sejunas (T)
Mecislovas Treinys (T), -
(faction leader) - chairman of the Supreme Council Agriculture Commission
Algimantas Ulba (Ld, C)
Povilas Varanauskas (T)

Sajudis Center Faction (20 deputies)
Vytenis Andriukaitis
Leonas Apsega
Mykolas Arlauskas
Egidijus Bickauskas -
member of the Supreme Council Presidium
Miglute Gerdaityte
Gediminas Ilgunas -
chairman of the Supreme Council Education, Science and Culture Commission
Albinas Januska
Jurgis Jurgelis -
chairman of the Supreme Council Citizens' Rights and Nationality Affairs Commission
Stasys Kasauskas
Ceslovas Kudaba
Nikolajus Medvedevas -
chairman of the Supreme Council Mandate and Ethics Commission
Romualdas Ozolas -
chairman of the Supreme Council Presidium State Commission for Problems of Eastern Lithuania
Eugenijus Petrovas -
member of the Supreme Council Presidium
Vytautas Pleckaitis (Nr)
Jonas Prapiestis -
chairman of the Supreme Council Legal System Commission
Gintaras Ramonas
Audrius Rudys -
chairman of the Supreme Council Budget Commission
Aloyzas Sakalas
(faction leader) - member of the Supreme Council Presidium, chairman of the LSDP
Petras Vaitiekunas
Alfonsas Zalys (Nr)

Sajudis Joint Faction (15 deputies)
Julius Beinortas
Ruta Gajauskaite
Balys Gajauskas -
chairman of the Supreme Council Commission for Investigation of KGB Activities
Romualda Hofertiene
Gintautas Iesmantas
Juozas Karvelis
Stasys Malkevcius -
(faction leader)
Vytautas Puplauskas
Antanas Racas
Narcizas Rasimavicius
Alfonsas Svarinskas
Zita Slicyte
Praciskus Tupikas
Gediminas Vagnorius -
prime minister of the Republic of Lithuania
Zigmas Vaisvila -
deputy prime minister of the Republic of Lithuania

Sajudis Accord Faction (11 deputies)
Povilas Aksomaitis (S)
Nijole Ambrazaityte (S)
Rimantas Astrauskas (S)
Petras Giniotas (S)
Egid Jarasiunas (S) -
(faction leader)

Zenonas Juknevicius (S) -
first deputy minister of Justice
Alber Miskinis (S) -
chairman of the Supreme Council Defense and Internal Affairs Commission, chairman of the Democratic Party of Lithuania
Liudvikas Simutis (S)
Gediminas Serksnys (S)
Kazimieras Uoka -
state controller of the Republic of Lithuania

Nation's Progress Faction (11 deputies)
Aleksandras Ambrazevicius (T) -
member of the Supreme Council Presidium
Audrius Butkevicius -
minister of National Defense
Arunas Degutis (S, T)
Kestutis Grinius (T)
Egidijus Klumbys (S) -
first deputy minister of Transport
Vytautas Kolesnikovas (Nr, T)
Birute Nedzinskiene (S)
Algimantas Norvilas (S)
Rolandas Paulauskas (T)
Vidmantas Povilionis (S) -
chairman of the Supreme Council Foreign Affairs Commission
Aurimas Taurantas (S) -
chairman of the Supreme Council State Restoration and Constitution Commission

Deputies not belonging to any faction (29 deputies)
Aleksandras Abisala -
minister without portfolio
Laima Andrikiene (S)
Kazimieras Antanavicius (C) -
chairman of the Supreme Council Economic Commission
Virgilijus Cepaitis -
chairman of the Independence Party
Medardas Cobotas -
chairman of the Supreme Council Health Care and Social Affairs Commission
Algirdas Endriukaitis -
deputy secretary of the Supreme Council
Romas Gudaitis (C) -
member of Supreme Council Presidium
Vidmante Jasukaityte (Ld)
Antanas Karoblis (S)
Valdemaras Katkus -
first deputy minister of Foreign Affairs
Vytautas Landsbergis -
chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, honorary chairman of Lithuanian Sajudis
Kestutis Lapinskas (C) -
chairman of the Supreme Council Temporary Commission for the Preparation of the Draft Constitution
Mecys Laurinkus -
member of Supreme Council Presidium
Kazimieras Motieka (ATP) -
deputy chairman of the Supreme Council, chairman of the Citizenship and Amnesty Commission
Justas Paleckis (K)
Jonas Pangonis (Ld, K)
Algirdas Patackas
Sergejus Pirozkovas
Petras Poskus
Kazimiera Prunskiene
Saulius Razma
Romualdas Rudzys (K)
Liudvikas Sabutis -
secretary of the Supreme Council
Algirdas Saudargas -
minister of foreign affairs
Ceslo Stankevicius -
deputy chairman of the Supreme Council
Rimvydas Survila -
minister of agriculture
Lionginas Sepetys
Vladas Terleckas
Vidmantas Ziemelis (T)

Notes:

Abbreviations: AT—The Supreme Council, ATP—Supreme Council Presidium, C—Sajudis Center faction, K—LDDP faction (formerly, the Left faction), Ld—the former Free Democrat faction, LDDP—Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party, LDP—Lithuanian Democratic Party, Li - Liberal faction, LSDP—Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, Nr—the former Moderate Radical faction, S—Sajudis joint faction, T—the former Taufininkai faction.

* * *

The names in bold print belong to the nine suspended Supreme Council deputies (no right to vote, etc.).

* * *

This report was prepared by the editors, using data published in TIESA and LIETUVOS AIDAS, the publication "Who's Who in Lithuania—92," and in consultation with some Supreme Council deputies.

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4 May 1992

contracted deliveries of products for industrial processing. Delivery contracts for these were the beginning of the year were fulfilled by 77.5 percent.

The amount of potatoes put in storage by 1 January 1992 for sale in the winter and spring was below last year's figure by 3,800 tonnes (or 8.1 percent).

The dwindling food supply in state and cooperative trade resulted in the continuous rise of kolkhoz market prices.

Commodity turnover on the kolkhoz market in 1991 amounted to R191.1 million and was 2.2 times as high as the 1990 figure. Furthermore, the increase was the result of increased output as well as rising prices.

Domestic sales decreased by almost half.

The supply of tobacco products was 2.1 times as great as in 1990, but tobacco sales were halted periodically.

The shortage of lumber and construction materials grew even more acute in the past year. In 1991 the trade network received from 17.21 percent less soft roofing and insulation materials, rolled ferrous metal products, roofing slate, and cement and from 30.59 percent less hardware and commercial timber.

The network of cooperatives (commercial stores) of Turkmenistan grew. The commercial prices of a broad variety of foodstuff items were 4.5 times as high as state prices on the average and were within the reach of only a limited segment of the buying public.

The number of enterprises with broad independence for foreign transactions were to a better position than the rest of the population with regard to their supply of scarce products and goods. Direct natural exchange was practiced widely, and it frequently transcended the boundaries of a single territory. The imposition of restrictions in private entrepreneurship regulations on the premium of goods crossing their borders have increased the flow of the unregulated territorial migration of money and goods.

The sales volume of services for the population amounted to R[illegible] million, which was below the 1990 figure (in comparable prices) by [illegible].8 percent.

Personal services, which represent 40 percent of all paid services, decreased by 28 percent (in comparable prices) over the year.

The reduced volume of personal services was due to some extent to the rise of clients because of the high costs of some services, combined with the virtual absence of improvement in their quality, as well as to the extremely unsatisfactory supply of spare parts, crude resources, materials, and components and the consequent impossibility of connecting the necessary services.

Crime

Mounting social tension had a tremendous effect on the crime rate.

In the past year 19,500 crimes were reported in Turkmenistan, or 3.5 percent more than last year. One out of every 10,000 was a serious crime. The crime rate rose by 30.4 percent in Tashauz, 8.6 percent in Mary Oblast and 11 percent in Krasnovodsk Oblast.

The number of thefts of state property increased by 24.5 percent, cases of the embezzlement of state and public property increased by six percent during the year, and reported cases of theft and embezzlement numbered 2,391 and 634 respectively.

The rate of juvenile crime is still high. Juveniles committed 1,461 crimes (10.9 percent) during the year. The number of crimes committed by individuals under the influence of alcohol is rising and numbered 1,806 (8.5 percent). The number of group crimes exceeded 1,800 (13.2 percent), and crimes by repeat offenders numbered 3,400 (10.8 percent). Cases of robberies rose by 19.6 percent, vandalism rose 30.5 percent, bribery rose 32.6 percent, illegal drug transactions rose 81.7 percent, and violations of trade rules increased 1.9-fold. More than 6,500 reported crimes remained unsolved and 1,100 criminals remained at large.

The 2,900 reported accidents on highways and streets killed 366 people and injured 1,178.

There were 2,351 fires in 1991 resulting in the death of 58 people, including 20 children. Damage caused by fires exceeded 1 million rubles. More than 77.3 percent of the fires were caused by the improper use of malfunctioning of electrical appliances, 23.7 percent were the result of careless burning, and 15.4 percent were caused by children playing with fire. In comparison with last year the number of fires decreased by 117 (or 4.9 percent), but losses increased by R131,000 (18.6 percent) and the number of deaths increased by 13 (28.9 percent).

State of the Environment

According to the data of the Turkmenistan State Committee for Hydrometeorology, the concentration of at least one harmful substance in the air was five or more times in excess of the norm on average daily in 1991. Concentrations of substances dangerous to human health 10 times in excess of the norm were recorded most frequently in Ashkhabad (carbon monoxide—66 times) and Bezmein (solvent particles—7 times).

The level of surface water pollution did not change appreciably during the year. A high content of phenols, petroleum products, and pesticides was recorded, however, in the Atrek-Gorgan, Murgab, and Tedzhen rivers, the Karakum Canal, and the Sarykamish and Akhchakhan reservoirs.

In 1991 agencies of the Turkmenistan State Committee for Environmental Protection recorded three cases in which pollutants were dumped into bodies of water causing damage estimated at R[illegible]. Administrative proceedings were instituted against the officials and citizens for violations of environmental laws, and they

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ing words of the statement of Archbishop Mark.

In some other speeches revivified ideas of
provincialism were sounded, in the subjunct
Rostislav Gorchakov, the delegate from Ip
deputy of the Krasnoyarskiy Kray Soviet, said
Russian Government does not take account o
sions of the Siberian Congress, then it will be
to be separated: "We will separate not from I
from its Government." Aman Tuleyev did no
to continue: "His policy pushes for separ
engenders talk that no one needs a Siberian I
Oleg Kushelevskiy, deputy of the Tomsk Obla
remarked: "Siberia is a strong fist that can
influence the center's position."

This here, however, is the essence: The Sibe
gress is viewed by its organizers as a method
lized" pressure on Moscow. This is wha
extremely alarmed the object of the pressure a
a call to the chairman himself of the organi
mittee, who felt compelled to rebuke the
creating a "separatist myth." He declared that
acted without the participation of presiden
tures, but the prosecutor's office of Krasnoyar
which had warned the organizing committee al
disparities between drafts of the Congress's
and legislative enactments, "performed a cert

Vyacheslav Novikov (well known by the fact th
already tried last year, after having secured th
of the kray soviet, to establish a Yenisey Repu
as he now states, for the purpose of "sca
unamenable center) said at a press conferenc
the government does not listen to the voice of
we will meet again and we will think about wha
do further...."

The Congress has reserved the right to appeal to
populace if "we are not listened to."

"The Siberian Agreement." Vyacheslav Novi
sively denied assertions that backstage of the
Congress stands the party's former Nomenklatu
lishing residence in the structures of the Siber
ment, an interregional association, and dre
returning Siberia to its patrimony and even
under socialism." The association, within the f
of which the congress was held and which is cha
realizing certain of its decisions, was cr
November 1990 in order to revise efforts for th
of Siberia's regions during conversion to the m
to implement major regional programs,
through its own sources. It is another matter in
association's activity is still poorly effective
which it was subjected to criticism at the cong

Although, as is well known, it was not the N
party bureaucrats who announced the Yama
Republic, that "epoch" has now passed and, a
it is not worthwhile to seek out the power-lovin
designs of the former Siberian Nomenkla
majority has quickly turned down the "sociali

People's Deputies of Siberia. One hundred seventy-six of those surveyed offered to be experts on problems of social, economic, and political development of Siberian regions.

It has been explained that adherents of various hues of the political spectrum were represented among those surveyed, although opponents of the Russian Government and Parliament predominate considerably. The survey indicated that three-fourths of the experts support the reforms conducted by Boris Yeltsin's government. At the same time, only 14 percent of them consider that the reforms being made consider Siberia's interests fully. In the opinion of 48 percent, they are considered only partially, 38 percent say there are not considered at all. Not accidentally, 86 percent of those surveyed evaluate positively the activity of the association Siberian Agreement, although many simultaneously note specific deficiencies in its work.

Most of the Congress's participants are already acquainted with the draft of the new Russian Constitution. However, only a fourth consider it acceptable as a whole. The rest are still undecided or (six percent) reject it completely.

The survey's results refute the widely held opinion about the alleged "separatist" nature of the Congress. In the opinion of 73 percent of the experts, Siberia's regions must be economically self-sufficient, and the others demand both economic and political rights. However, this does not mean a separation of Siberia from Russia. It is a question of decentralizing state administration.

In particular, in answering the question about the attributes of self- sufficiency, 90 percent of those surveyed declared that they did not agree with the need for a Siberian Constitution, 95 percent consider that a national guard is not needed. There is no need to create a customs frontier (87 percent) or the Siberians' own flag, coat of arms, and anthem (88). But 37 percent think that customs duty should be levied on the passage of freight on the Transsiberian Trunk Line and of cargo on the Northern Sea Route.

In speaking about the paths to solving the nationality problem, eight of ten experts believe that it is not mandatory to divide territory on the basis of nationality. It is more important to realize the right of each citizen, regardless of his nationality affiliation. As we see, the participants of the congress basically support the principle of priority of the rights of man above the rights of nationality. Taking into account the fact that Siberian autonomists were not represented at the Congress, this indicates a realistic approach of the Russian-speaking deputies to the solution of nationality problems.

For a description of the social and political situation in Siberia, the experts were asked to answer the question: "To whom, in your opinion, does power belong in your region?" The majority consider that power locally belongs to the chief of administration (69 percent) and to the directors of enterprises and organizations (67 percent). The group of power structures second in influence are considered to be the smart operators of the shadow economy (56 percent), organs of local authority (46 percent), the camouflaged Nomenklatura (47 percent), and the soviets of people's deputies (40 percent). In level of realization of the power of authority, the experts evaluated as practically equal the President's local representatives (seven percent) and the new political controllers (eight percent). Many remarked on a situation of anarchy: authority in the region belongs to no one, 56 percent of those surveyed thought.

Finally, the results of the survey did not confirm the opinion of certain of the mass media about the Nomenklatura nature of the Congress. Its delegates represent fairly widely the various population groups. All the more so that today's dialog was not about former social membership nor even the political predilections of a deputy, but his competence and his striving to solve constructively the most severe problems that face the Siberian regions and to work together with the Russian Government and other CIS members.

Report on Demography of Northern Regions Viewed

924C1238A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by O. Zakharova: "On the Demographic Situation in the Northern Regions"]

[Text] **(According to data from the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociology, Center on Social Demography—Professor L. L. Rybakovskiy, director).**

The population of the Russian Federation has increased by 13.4 percent in the last 20 years, while the population growth in the North due to migration has comprised over 30 percent. At the same time, there are some regions, primarily in the Far North, which have experienced a four to six-time increase in population during this same period. The Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug and the Yamalo-Nenetsk Republic, which in the 70's-80's experienced a migration boom associated with the development of oil deposits in Tyumen. In these regions, the migration growth exceeded the natural growth by about three to five times. As a result of migration expansion, the relative share of the native minor peoples of the North has sharply declined—from 14.7 percent in 1970 to 4.4 percent in 1989.

There is a large relative share of Russians in the population of the former autonomous republics of the North. Thus, in Komi and Yakutiya it comprises from 50 to 70 percent, while in the national oblasts and okrugs of the North it comprises an average of 65 percent. The lowest indicator in Yakutiya in this respect is the result of a super-high concentration of Russian population in the cities, and its almost complete absence in rural areas. All of the listed regions are no less Russian than most of the oblasts in Central Russia.

On the whole, the population of the North is significantly younger than the entire Russian population. The North differs significantly from Russia also in its portion of able-bodied population, which here reaches 65-67 percent (for Russia as a whole it was 56.9 percent in 1989). Moreover, it is greatest specifically in those places where the living conditions are the most difficult: In Chukotka, Taymir and in the north of Tyumen Oblast. The specifics of the age structure are reflected in the level of natural growth. Due to the predominance of persons of young and middle age in the population, the natural growth is approximately 30-40 percent greater than the all-Russian indicators, and in individual years even more than 50 percent greater.

As of 1990, a negative migration growth in population numbers has been observed. One of the reasons for the observed phenomenon is the exodus from the Russian North of representatives of a number of nationalities—Ukrainians, Azerbaijanis, and others. This evidently testifies to the beginning of a new stage of evolution of the ethnic structure of these regions.

As compared with the regional, the ethnic differences in the birth and mortality rates in the North are great. Unlike the mortality rate, the situation in regard to the birth rate and reproduction of the population on the whole in the North is distinguished from the Russian probably in a more favorable direction. Russians in the northern regions, as well as everywhere, are characterized by the lowest birth rate. The general birth rate coefficient for Russians does not exceed 18-19 babies born per 1,000 persons of the population, and are close to the Komi (around 19). For the Yakut this indicator is 29.4, for the Buryat—26.5, for the Evenki—23.9, and for the Chukchi—28.9. The highest birth rate indicators have been recorded for the Nenets (37.5) the Eveny (35.6) and the Khanty (34.7). In various years, the average birth rate computed for all the northern regions has exceeded the Russian birth rate by from 5 to 10 percent. There are even greater differences for the individual territories. For example, Yakutiya and Buryatiya are part of the group of Russian regions characterized by the highest birth rate indicators (2.5-2.8 infants on the average per woman, with an average indicator of 1.8-2.0 for Russia). Irkutsk, Chita, and Amur Oblasts are closely adjoined to them.

One of the most significant differences in the birth rate conditions in the northern regions as compared with Russia is the high level of births to couples out of wedlock (approximately 30-40 percent higher than in Russia). The highest level of births to couples out of wedlock, surpassing the Russian level by 70 percent, is recorded in Buryatiya, as well as in Irkutsk and Chita Oblasts, where the relative share of Buryats is high.

The mortality rate coefficient also significantly surpasses the mortality rate of Russians. This excess reaches a minimum of two to four times, and in individual regions (Chukot SAR, Taymyr Autonomous Okrug) the gap between these figures is six-fold.

All the northern territories, with the exception of Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Tyumen Oblasts, have lower levels of life expectancy than in Russia, for men as well as for women. Despite some improvement in the situation which occurred in the 80's the Far East continues to remain in the most difficult situation. Here the discrepancy with the all-Russian indicators is the greatest. Kamchatka Oblast is particularly apparent, where the difference in life expectancy for men reaches four years, and for women—three to three-and-a-half years.

German Question of Emigration, Ethnic Self-Preservation Explored

924C1231A Moscow FEDERATSIYA in Russian No 16, 8 Apr 92 p 6

[Article by Vladimir Petrov, ITAR-TASS correspondent, special for "F": "Who Is Playing the German Card?" First paragraph, introductory, is in bold italics in the original.]

[Text] ***At the 2nd Congress of Germans of the Former USSR held in Moscow this past March, around 750 delegates were to discuss, as a point of fact, whether our Germans will remain here after having received statehood and thereby the opportunity for their national self-preservation, or whether they will begin a systematic exodus to Germany.***

As a result of intense discussions, having declared that the strategic goal of the German National Movement is "to preserve the ethnic and physical preservation of the people," the congress—through G. Grout, chairman of the Inter-State Council for Rehabilitation of Germans of the Former USSR (MGS)—presented three objectives for the German movement in Russia: Struggle for rehabilitation, emigration, and care for Germans in areas where they live in close proximity to each other.

But one of the objectives, emigration, was announced as having a high priority and, for this reason, the congress included it among its resolutions, demanding that "the governments of Germany, Russia, and other countries of the CIS urgently approve a program for an organized resettlement to Germany for all Russian Germans who desire to do so within a time limit of not over three to five years."

A hidden struggle, taking the form of giving the Germans different kinds of favorable terms, developed among Kirgiziya, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia, where most of the Germans now live.

The leadership of Kirgiziya, on the one hand facing a personnel shortage in the face of the future increase in German emigration, and on the other, having an apparent great need for German capital, this past January established two German national-cultural regions that have broad powers to decide on economic and social questions. The Kirgiz leadership also announced the establishment of a fund for German cultural development, a German-Kirgiz bank, German national schools

and nurseries, as well as the granting of permission for dual citizenship—FRG and Kirgiziya.

According to the latest census, taken in 1989, Kirgiziya had a population of 101,309 Germans, of whom only a part were resettled during the war and the rest had ancestors who had come here during the last century. Today, according to the German ADN agency, some 70,000 Germans remain in Kirgiziya.

It should be noted that the trend for the German-speaking population to leave the republic is growing stronger with each passing day.

Kazakhstan was rather late in beginning to take urgent steps with regard to the "German question." This was evidently due to the fact that nationality relations in the republic were quite stable during the Soviet period, and the republic had a German theater, a German television program, and a nationality newspaper, as well as around 300 schools whose curriculum was in German. Nevertheless, emigration is also increasing here.

After he apparently realized that urgent measures have to be taken, N. Nazarbayev sent a telegram to the congress in which he expressed his "deep understanding of and empathy with" German problems and promised that in the near future he would discuss with German representatives the conditions under which they would agree not to leave the republic.

Ukraine's position in this question deserves a separate treatment. It is the only country that was honored with compliments at the congress (even the government of Germany was blamed for an "incorrect" understanding of priorities in the CIS German movement and for opposing landslide emigration). A positive assessment was given to an invitation to Russian Germans to come to Ukraine, but simultaneously the resolutions of the congress noted that this factor should not be looked at as an alternative to German autonomy on the Volga.

Ukraine is a factor which went practically unnoticed earlier in resolutions on the German problem (some 50,000 Germans live in Ukraine today, compared to a pre-war German population of around 435,000). The logic of conducting an independent policy as a counterweight to Russia, as well as the necessity of having effective initiatives that promise considerable gain without requiring any particular expenditures prior to L. Kravchuk's visit to the FRG, added important corrective steps to the existing situation.

Back in January of this year, the president of Ukraine said in a SPIEGEL interview—and later signed a document to that effect—that former Soviet Germans will be given the opportunity to resettle on the best land in those places where they lived until 1941, that is, in the Nikolayevskiy, Odessa, Khersonskiy, and Zaporozhskiy Oblasts and in Crimea. A special Ukrainian-German fund was established to aid resettlement, to which Kiev contributed 500 million rubles.

Kiev's move can probably be called a "no loss" move. Bonn is happy and is promising financial support. G. Grout predicts that 100-300 thousand people will want to resettle, which will allow these fertile areas which are short of manpower to be farmed better, thus saving Ukraine tens of billions of rubles. In addition, the congress resolved to support "the efforts of the Ukrainian government to conclude bilateral treaties with other states of the CIS on questions of compensation for the property left behind by those who were resettled...." This probably means that the Ukrainian initiative will have to be paid for out of the pockets of the other CIS members.

Yet, resettlement to Ukraine does not promise to be as simple and smooth as it appears on paper. In a situation of economic crisis, given a choice between Ukraine and Germany, the most likely choice will be the latter.

We should note that the congress made an unprecedented sharp and categorical criticism of the Russian leadership's position through a resolution stating that "as a result of the Russian leadership's refusal to restore rights that had been violated.... the hopes of the people for a national future on Russian territory have been totally crushed." Decisively refuted were "measures which ran counter to the best interests of the people on the so-called stage-by-stage restoration of the republic in the Volga area and which were approved despite the expressed will of the German people...."

The delegates approved a proposal to resettle Russian Germans in East Germany where subunits of the State Force Abroad (ZGV) are still stationed and to transfer tens of thousands of flats and cottages from people leaving the former USSR to military personnel who are being withdrawn from the FRG. Germany and Russia oppose this. In the event, however, that the Russian leadership refuses to agree to this proposal, the Inter-State Council (MGS) "must develop and present measures that show Russian responsibility for losses inflicted on the nation of Russian Germans."

In all this, totally ignored was the fact that of all the centrifugal forces which are tearing Russia apart, the one to restore the German republic against the growing opposition of the local population is sheer suicide. To be honest, with all the Russian inconsistencies in the "German question," one cannot ignore the view of both Russia and Germany that the establishment of two German national districts in the Volga area would be only the first step in restoring historical justice.

Russia was the first, as long ago as last year, to establish national districts, first in the Altai and later, in the Omsk Oblast. Already this year around 14,000 Germans from Central Asia resettled to the Altai. Three thousand more families from those same regions want to resettle now in the Altai. Concurrently, the emigration flow from Russia is also increasing.

The only way out of this situation would be through well studied measures by Russia, which could provide a historical perspective to the Germans and give them

specific deadlines for a stage-by-stage restoration of their statehood on the Volga. The congress that just ended simply confirmed that no other solutions would be accepted today by the German majority, but would lead to mass emigration controlled only by the limits of what the FRG can do. Attempts to play the "German card" within the CIS framework are not productive.

Economic Reporting From Chita Oblast

Regional Food Prices Noted

924C1234A Chita-tsentr ZABAYKALSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 10 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by V. Mikhaslov: "The Gruel Is Not Spoiled With Butter"]

[Text] Judging from all appearances, the Transbaykal residents will for a long period of time be unable to "blaspheme" their gruel—"spoil" it with butter. There is a critical shortage of groats. And the price for butter, which has taken off like a rocket, shows no intention of coming back to earth.

Recently, the newspaper IZVESTIYA began publishing reviews by the Russian Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] on the minimum and maximum prices in cities. Thus, with the average price for cream butter throughout the republic being slightly more than 86 rubles, the highest price in Chita is 249 rubles and 49 kopecks. And one can only envy the residents of Nakhodka and Magadan, who pay approximately 25 and 32 rubles respectively for a kilogram.

Moreover, Chita is distinguished by a high price for fresh white-head cabbage—15 rubles and 79 kopecks for a kilogram. We are surpassed only by Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka and Magadan, where this vegetable is worth three gold coins.

Alas, there is still no mention of Chita on the lists of minimum and maximum prices for beef, sausage, eggs, potatoes and apples. We can only hope that our trade will correct this misunderstanding and that the city will be ranked among the leaders in this regard.

Bread Supply 'Crisis' Discussed

924C1234B Chita-tsentr ZABAYKALSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 10 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by A. Seleznev: "Bread. Price. Last Limit"]

[Text] By 27 February, our newspaper had already issued a report on the critical situation in which enterprises of the "Chitakhlebprom" [Chita Bread Industry] found themselves. The branch was practically on the brink of paralysis. It was only as a result of selflessness and an understanding by the bakery groups of their obligation to the Transbaykal people that bread was still being made available for sale to the population at more or less moderate prices.

Recently, the general director, A. Uglov, gathered together all of the association's enterprise leaders from Chita and the oblast's rayons, in order to discuss the situation that had developed and to outline the path to be followed for eliminating the crisis situation.

From the speeches made by those in attendance, it became clear that the financial noose had already been tightened and that it was no longer possible to remove it independently. The discussion of economic matters soon took on a political twist. The bread enterprise directors clearly recognize the responsibility entrusted to them, since the vitality of the branch is directly linked to the most important question at the present time—the price for bread. The theory is basic in nature: if at the present time the price of the most important food product is raised, in the interest of ensuring profitability, then a social upheaval is simply inevitable. Given the present price for raw materials, the cost for a loaf of bread may jump not to 10 but rather to 20-30 rubles. And it is not known if this will be the last limit. Thus for the impoverished layers of the population, this could be a sentence to a half-starved existence. Even if fixed prices are maintained for our black bread, we still will not be able to manage without a budgetary subsidy.

It bears mentioning that nobody from the oblast administration was in attendance at this meeting, which touched upon the vital interests of all of the oblast's residents. And thus the participants addressed an appeal to the oblast leaders in which the true situation with regard to the availability of bread for the population was expressed and measures were proposed for stabilizing it.

In particular, we have in mind here the creation of a coordination council headed by B. Ivanov that would include the leaders of those state and commercial structures that are associated with the deliveries of bread products.

It was also stated in the appeal that if the mentioned problems are not resolved before 15 March, the baking industry enterprises, having become bankrupt, would halt production operations in conformity with the law of the Russian Federation entitled: "Enterprises and Entrepreneurial Activity." And this was not an idle threat. Actually, the bread products association had already sent an official telegram to "Chitakhlebprom" stating that no longer can flour be shipped to the association's enterprises in the absence of advance payment.

Yeltsin Representative: Economic Reform Moving 'Slowly'

924C1234C Chita-tsentr ZABAYKALSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 11 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by V. Andreyev: "Detailed Discussion"]

[Text] A detailed and important discussion was held on Monday in the Editorial Office of ZABAYKALSKIY RABOCHIY with a representative of the president of Russia, S. Samoylov. The discussion took place during a

meeting with a group of journalists from the oblast's largest newspaper. Workers representing other mass media organizations also participated in this meeting.

The president's representative discussed in detail his operational methods and gave his opinion regarding the course of the economic reform in the oblast, which S. Samoylov believes is "encountering difficulties" and is still not enjoying any special success. The guest of the Editorial Office noted in particular that the land reform is slipping badly. Other aspects of the changes taking place, especially those which are argumentative, were touched upon during the discussion.

Samoylov evaluated the extremely difficult political situation confronting the country on the eve of the regular Congress of People's Deputies of Russia.

Agricultural Production in Decline

924C1234D Chita-tsentr ZABAYKALSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 11 Mar 92 p 1

[Interview with M. Kalashnikov, head of the Petrovsk-Zabaykalskiy Rayon Administration, by correspondent R. Oleynik: "But Sowing Is Necessary"]

[Text] The situation in our country is becoming more alarming. At the present time, we are concerned not only with how we live today, but also with what awaits us tomorrow. Will there be a famine, since the kolkhozes and sovkhozes are being reorganized, and do the new formations make any sense?

Our correspondent, R. Oleynik, held a discussion on this subject with M. Kalashnikov, head of the Petrovsk-Zabaykalskiy Rayon Administration.

[Oleynik] Mikhail Ivanovich, what is the situation at the present time in agriculture throughout the rayon? Generally speaking, are the city-dwellers aware, based upon the high prices for agricultural products, that the situation there is not very good?

[Kalashnikov] Yes, I am unable to offer any comforting thoughts. Production is declining and the sales of milk, meat and wool have fallen off. How could there by any increase if over the past five years the number of cattle has decreased from 15,000 to 12,000, the number of hogs and sheep has declined by almost twofold and there are considerably fewer cows. Some farms have generally eliminated sheep breeding and yet those who retained it, for example the Sibir Kolkhoz, are realizing greater profit at the present time.

Unfortunately, no success is being realized in halting the decline in the production of agricultural products, since there has been a sharp drop in the availability of electric power and other resources. Moreover, the prices for these resources have skyrocketed. Although wages in agriculture have increased, they nevertheless are still miserly compared to that being paid to miners, metallurgists and lumberjacks—amounting to an average of 400-600 rubles—at the Russian pension level.

[Oleynik] At the present time, there are essentially no kolkhozes or sovkhozes in the rayon. How are they now being referred to?

[Kalashnikov] Reporting and election meetings were held on all of the farms. A typical feature of these meetings—the people do not wish to work alone and thus they favor collective forms of labor organization. Thus, five cooperatives for the production of milk, meat and wool and also a construction and a commercial cooperative were created at the Unginskiy Kolkhoz. A land and property share was given to each kolkhoz member and all signed a declaration attesting to their joining the cooperative and naturally they brought their shares with them.

Five subunits were organized at the Peski Sovkhoz. At the Sibir Kolkhoz, during a reporting and election meeting, the decision was made to work as in the past, but with the kolkhoz being converted into a joint-stock company. The Pobeda Kolkhoz is now a people's enterprise. Even more complicated is the situation at the Tarbagatayskiy Sovkhoz, which became bankrupt after failing to pay off a loan. The central branch decided to leave the sovkhoz and open up its own account, while other decidedly weaker branches have still not stated their position.

In short, reason triumphed—the people do not wish to scamper about and so we will see just how they are doing in their new associations and cooperatives.

[Oleynik] This disbandment has been followed by numerous meetings, so much so that spring sowing has been almost forgotten. Do you not have some fears in this regard?

[Kalashnikov] Certainly, the sowing work will be carried out under more complicated conditions than was the case in past years, since the situation with regard to obtaining fuel and fertilizer will be more difficult. However, I believe that our machine operators must maintain their sense of responsibility, since indeed you reap what you sow. The grain crops will be sown at the same level as that for last year, that is, on 12,500 hectares. All of the opportunities are available for satisfying fully the city's requirements for potatoes and vegetables. Roughly 1,200 tonnes of fertilizer have already been delivered to the farms, with additional reserves available at the agrochemical storehouses. True, fertilizer is very expensive. One quintal of carbamide costs almost 650 rubles. Fuel is becoming more expensive and at the present time we are accumulating it for use during the sowing operations. The situation is good at those farms which have containers for storing it. As always, the situation with regard to spare parts is difficult. True, we are engaging in bartering with the tractor plants and we have acquired some items from them. It is my belief that peasant ingenuity will also aid the machine operators in extricating themselves from a difficult situation.

Eighty percent of our seed is certified and we are carrying out an exchange with other rayons. Eighty-six percent of

the tractor pool has been prepared for the sowing campaign and yet the situation in connection with the restoration of tractor-drawn equipment is somewhat more complicated.

[Oleynik] Mikhail Ivanovich, the city-dwellers are quite disturbed over the high price for milk—13 rubles per liter and they feel that they are being fleeced by the farms. What is the problem here?

[Kalashnikov] The farms are selling it for 7 rubles and 20 kopecks and it is after this that various mark-ups take place. In order to eliminate the latter, direct contacts must be sought and the work carried out without middlemen. Thus the Sibir Kolkhoz planned to sell its milk directly at a metallurgical plant. A discussion is underway regarding the creation by the metallurgical plant of a joint enterprise with the Peski Sovkhoz. We support this initiative. We already have positive experience in the creation of an SP [sovmestnoye predpriyatiye; joint enterprise], consisting of a meat combine and the Petrovskiy Sovkhoz. If the city applies itself with understanding to the needs of the rural areas, everyone will profit and we will overcome the crisis more rapidly.

Murmansk Oblast Soviet Reviews Economic Situation

924C1210A Murmansk POLYARNAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by V. Sidorin, under rubric: "Session of the Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies": "Don't Let the Steam Get to the Whistle"]

[Text] Yesterday a special session of the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies considered the question "The Socioeconomic Situation in Murmansk Oblast." As everyone knows, the oblast admininstration and the oblast soviet of trade unions came forth with the initiative to conduct a session with this agenda. We might recall the factors that necessitated the conducting of the session.

Recently, especially this year, there has been in the oblast a clearly discernible tendency toward an economic slump and a lowering of the population's standard of living. The volume of industrial production in 1992, as compared with the corresponding period last year, dropped by more than 12 percent. Many enterprises in industry, construction, agriculture, and transportation have proven to be on the brink of bankruptcy. The sharp decrease in the budgetary appropriations to the enterprises in the military-industrial complex led to a considerable reduction in the number of personnel, and transformed those enterprises into centers of social tension.

The lack of guaranteed shipments of food products and the difficulties in establishing direct ties with producers of agricultural output in the CIS states have completely devastated the consumer market. The commodity reserves have dropped below the critical level as stated in the standards.

The government's rigid economic policy, against a background of free prices for most of the consumer commodities and services, has put the oblast's entire budgetary sphere into a critical position. Repeated appeals by the oblast leadership to the Supreme Council, the government of the Russian Federation, and the President of Russia have been ignored.

Before this session I asked several deputies the same question: "What do you expect from the session?" The opinions expressed by V. S. Belousov and V. F. Khakimov practically coincided: we do not expect any specific decisions, since at this moment neither the oblast nor the center are ready for them. It is not precluded that there might be deputies with an opposing opinion. But V. V. Lunevich, deputy chairman of the oblast country, was justifiably concerned at having the session proceed along constructive lines, since certain movements have expressed complete opposition to convoking it.

Then Ye. B. Komarov, the head of the oblast administration, gave his report, followed by the first statements. But the sense of vagueness—which prompted this discussion—apparently still prevailed in many people. Judge for yourself. It is one thing to "beat out" the latest decree from the government of Russia (because it was precisely a draft of this decree that the administration presented—"Expanding the Rights of the Administration of Murmansk Oblast in Resolving Urgent Socioeconomic Problems"). But it is a completely different thing to attempt in a well-argumented way to defend the Northerners from the "raging" market, with a consideration of the peculiarities of the economic (raw-materials) and geographic situation of the region, and to sharpen the attention once again on whether the North of Russia is needed.

In the break between the individual meetings of the session, one of the deputies, in a conversation in the lobby, expressed it this way: "We don't want the steam to get to the whistle." I could not refrain from opening up my notes and showing the deputy where I had written the very same phrase. Incidentally, the discussion is not yet over.

In the course of the further debate, the participants of which included not only the deputies, but also representatives of trade unions and political parties, various opinions were also expressed with regard to both the socioeconomic situation and the proposed resolutions. Incidentally, the session participants had three drafts of the resolution for this question. But where did the session end?

There is no sense, or even any possibility, of paraphrasing the contents of the document that was adopted. But these are a few of the principles stated in it. Taking into consideration the ineffectiveness of the repeated attempts by the oblast administration to get the government to implement B. N. Yeltsin's 28 May order, the proposal is made to the government of the Russian Federation to adopt by 25 March 1992 the decree

governing the expansion of the rights of the administration of Murmansk Oblast, which guarantees a regulated and controllable process of changing over the oblast's national economy to market relations. It is recommended to the oblast administration and to the small soviet of the oblast soviet to modify, within a two-month period, the package of documents concerning the special economic status of Murmansk Oblast. Yu. A. Yevdokimov, chairman of the oblast soviet, is given the responsibility of acting as the initiator of the convoking of the RSFSR people's deputies within the framework of the Association of the Northwest Region (11 territories) for elaborating a common position for considering, at the 6th Session of the People's Deputies of the Russian Federation, the question linked with the problems of developing the northern rayons of Russia under conditions of the changeover to market relations.

As we can see, it does not contain those categorical notes that were previously heard emanating from individual deputies—the need to prepare for a regional strike, etc. That is, the deputy conference smoothed out the sharp angles. But what did the voters, including the readers of POLYARNAYA PRAVDA, receive from the special session, or, rather, from its first stage (its second state will be held at the end of this month)? For the time being, the latest in a series of decisions. Is this sufficient to assure that, under the very difficult market conditions, our life will be better? Of course not. Is there any hope of improvement? There would seem to be: everyone realizes that it's easy to talk about making an improvement, but it's another matter to actually do it. And what if we are actually talking about doing something, that is, if we are talking about life itself? Alas, there is also no enthusiasm. Wouldn't it be nice if every decision that we make, and particularly every law, actually went into effect.

Low Sanitary Standards in Moscow Pose 'Catastrophic' Threat

924C1204A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Apr 92 p 4

[Interview with Dr. V. Vinogradova by Igor Mosin: "Will the SES Carry Out a 'Disinfection' of the Moscow Government?", date and place not given]

[Text] **If urgent measures are not taken to regulate trade in the capital, epidemic diseases may break out.**

"It is simply impossible to tolerate such a situation any longer," says V. Vinogradova, deputy chief physician at the Moscow Center of Gossanepidnadzor [State Sanitary-Epidemiological Inspectorate]. "If you want to call a spade a spade, the sanitary-epidemiological situation in the capital is on the brink of disaster. Judge for yourself. In February alone, the level of gastro-intestinal ailments has doubled. The number of people suffering from dysentery has increased by a factor of 2.5. The growth rate of salmonella sufferers is steadily increasing. In the first three months of this year alone, 40 cases of botulism were recorded. The chief cause of these ailments is homemade foodstuffs, and canned mushrooms in particular. Their sale is, in general, banned. But who pays any attention to the rules these days?

"Not long ago our service [Sanitary-Epidemiological Service, SES] conducted a raid on places where large quantities of foods were being peddled. The situation was terrible. We took for analysis meat, milk, lard, and home-canned products. Consider this: 50 percent of these foods were unsuitable for use in any form.

"But the greatest danger for us still lies ahead. Warm days are coming. Highly-perishable foods—milk, pastry and meat products—will quickly become unfit. But you see, it's quite clear that the merchants will try to get them off their hands by fair means or foul."

[Mosin] But Vera Sergeevna, that is exactly why your service exists, in order to prevent such scandals. Forgive me, but which way are you looking?

[Vinogradova] Moscow is turning into one big unsanitary second-hand goods market, with the complete tolerance of the capital authorities—Popov and Luzhkov. We have been appealing to the Moscow authorities to put things in order from the very first day of the government decree on free trade. But they have completely ignored our appeals. Moreover, Moscow Mayor Gavrill Popov has signed an instruction on the elimination of our preventive inspections. As a result, in recent times 46 places have been put into operation without our permission. Not in one single civilized country in the world, which our city fathers love to say, is there such lawlessness and arbitrariness.

Here is a recent example. The Busilovskiy Fast-Frozen Foods Combine has been in operation since January of this year. They are producing frozen ground meat for children, which is going to the schools. Our service has not approved this combine, and we have no control over the preparation of the ground meat. Gossanepidnadzor has banned its sale in the schools.

[Mosin] It just doesn't sink in. It seems to me that your service and the city authorities must ensure purity in the city; otherwise there will be big problems.

[Vinogradova] Yes, unfortunately that is so. And Muscovites will suffer from these problems. You may have noted that not long ago the Moscow government expressed a lack of confidence in the city's chief sanitary officer, Dr. N. Shestopalov—our leader. Luzhkov accused our entire service of being rife with corruption.

What is the root cause of such opposition? Previously our service was subordinate to the city authorities. But presently, we are directly subordinate to republic authorities. Therefore, the city authorities are unhappy that we are forcing them to observe all the norms.

[Mosin] Well all the same, what is to be done?

[Vinogradova] Our suggestions have lain for a long time at the Moscow government, and at the government of Russia as well: to forbid peddler trade in highly-perishable products, to allot special places for trade and forbid peddler trade in certain kinds of foodstuffs, and so on. The power structure now has the ball in its court.

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Kravchuk View of CIS Supported

92UN1126A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian 1 Apr 92 p 3

[Comments by Anatoliy Fedorov: "With the CIS and Without It"]

[Text] It is perfectly natural that the Kiev meeting of heads of the CIS members is at the center of the attention of the world press. It seems normal also that the further fate of the Commonwealth is being linked with the positions of Ukraine and Russia. More precisely, with the relationship of these two states. True, the Russian press frequently terms the position of the Ukrainian side unconstructive. It is obviously referring to the desire for the building of its own armed forces, adherence precisely to the current borders, noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, and the pursuit of an equal economic policy.

We would not call Ukraine's actions entirely without fault (if there are indeed such in interstate relations) but an endeavor to talk with anyone as an equal can only be welcomed. In addition, L. Kravchuk has emphasized that that same Russia operates in its own interests and in accordance with the situation. Yeltsin's team should not, therefore, be accused of some ill-intentioned steps. But Ukraine also has the right to an independent line based on the requirements of its people and appropriate to the circumstances.

Everyone agrees that the CIS has made practically no progress in its development from the Belovezhskaya to the Kiev meeting. The reasons are seen to lie in the nonfulfillment of the accords. But, in our opinion, this is the effect rather than the cause. And the origins of the instability are more deeply hidden.

The majority of joint decisions may be termed statements of intent, which define the wishes of the participants in the Commonwealth. They do not contain precise mechanisms of realization, guarantees, or liability for violation of the agreements. The political nature of the very existence of the CIS is not based on an economic platform as yet. The attempts of Ukraine, on the other hand, and other participants to switch from word to deed are coming up against the ambiguous position of Russia.

This is determined by the fact that the Russian Federation on the one hand supports the strengthening and continued development of the CIS and, on the other, (consciously or unconsciously, manifestly or secretly) is attempting to reserve for itself the rights of the former center.

A historical understanding of the irreversibility of the processes of the creation of sovereign states does not come easily. This is perceived particularly upon implementation of the uncoordinated liberalization of prices, a new jump in which is scheduled for 1 April. It is not hard to see what this threatens.

In addition, having proclaimed itself the successor of the former USSR, Russia has individually appropriated a substantial portion of assets not only in the center of the former Union but overseas as well. All attempts to discuss this problem as equals are encountering a thick wall of reluctance to recognize each country's right both to the debts and to the assets.

It may upon close study be concluded that Russia is attempting to solve its problems at the expense of the other members of the CIS to some extent. The mechanism of such calculations is understandable: strongly tied to the economic potential of the Russian Federation, the Central Asian states, for example, have simply been forced for the time being to follow Russia. But this cannot continue indefinitely.

For this reason Ukraine's actions seem better thought out, more balanced and realistic and geared to the future. L. Kravchuk, it seems, was the first to understand that the CIS cannot be a self-sufficient formation and that it is essential to truly operate at the international level. The president of Ukraine does not wish his state to be dependent on any ill-considered political decisions or some people's personal ambitions. At the same time L. Kravchuk believes that the other Commonwealth partners have the right to act similarly also.

Thus the definition of the CIS as a "dream" is as of the present the most accurate. And although at the Kiev meeting practically all its participants expressed a desire to embody the dream in reality, this prospect appears quite problematical.

At the same time all ties to the former republics of the USSR will not, most likely, be severed immediately, this would be both painful and dangerous. The president of Ukraine will evidently have, therefore, to seek a path between a civilized lengthy divorce and a really well-conceived independent policy for the good of the people of Ukraine.

Russia Faulted in CIS Stalemate

92UN1126B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 31 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Butkevich, PRAVDA UKRAINY political observer: "What Is the CIS?"]

[Text] An old anecdote talks about the torments of political-educational work among new recruits. The commander had assembled the men and had begun to elicit from them what was meant by the motherland. Ivanov did not know, Petrov did not know, Sidorov did not know... Yegorov was better prepared and replied: "The motherland is my mother." The commander was delighted that so "complex" a task was finally accomplished and, guided by the elementary principles of pedagogical science, decided to repeat the question in

order for the men to assimilate Yegorov's correct answer. The poor teacher did not know that he and the soldiers had a different logic of thought. And to the next question: "Denisov, what is the motherland?" the latter replied: "The motherland is Yegorov's mother."

During the Kiev meeting of heads of state of the CIS one sharp-witted journalist decided to repeat the said experiment with the presidents of the CIS republics. He asked all of them the one question: "What is the CIS?" The responses of many were at the "I don't know" level. L. Kravchuk replied: "It is a dream." More "moderate" answers followed. N. Nazarbayev: "The Commonwealth is not simply a dream but a necessity." R. Nabiyev: "We need to ensure that the Commonwealth changes from a dream into reality" and so on and so forth.

Why was it so difficult for the heads of state to define what the CIS is? The answer, I believe, may be found if we analyze the goals being pursued by each at the time of formation of the CIS. They were all endeavoring to have done with the center, of which everyone had long since had enough. But everyone saw the new formation in his own way. B.N. Yeltsin, for example, wanted to replace the center with a new hierarchical formation under the aegis of Russia. L.M. Kravchuk saw the CIS as an interstate formation of sovereign, independent republics, that is, an international organization.

Given such opposite positions, a mutually acceptable result cannot be found, just as a hungry wolf cannot be reconciled with a sheep. Compromises among the latter would be contrary to the laws of nature. From the very start of the formation of the CIS neither B.N. Yeltsin nor L.M. Kravchuk had a chance of igniting therein even a spark of life.

Yeltsin naively believed that it was sufficient to eliminate the all-Union bodies, and the republics would rest content. But this was tantamount to hoping to cure an ulcer merely by cutting through its rotten apex.

The intention of creating an interstate formation of equal, independent, sovereign republics was an impracticable dream. International organizations are created where interstate relations have become so complex and interwoven that an auxiliary organization for their regulation is essential. The intrastate legal system of administration, which functions mainly on the principle of subordination, and the international system, whose main principle is coordination, must not be confused here.

Intrastate hierarchical relations controlled from a single Union center in fact existed between the republics. The elimination of the center meant the elimination of the organs of administration, not the particular features of the relations. Thus the result was the formation of the CIS, which was to function on the principle of the coordination of relations, and the relations themselves are geared to subordination. It is not surprising that the CIS has found itself in the role of chance visitor observing how the old structures are disintegrating.

If the CIS was set the tasks of regulating relations between republics, it visited us too soon. In order that the republics might create a real interstate organization it is essential to establish between them equal, close, and stable economic, political, and other relations. Today such relations are merely at the startup stage. This is why even the agreements which have already been concluded are not being fulfilled. There are no relations—the rule of law even does not operate. There is a bilateral treaty between Russia and Ukraine, say, but no result. An international treaty can regulate merely equal relations, but Russia does not wish to accede to this. As a result the treaty provisions have become, at best, hollow intentions. No bilateral agreements are operating, practically, because they have not been provided with a realization mechanism.

Hoping that all may be resolved in circumvention of the stage of the startup of bilateral relations (for which it was that the CIS was created) is the equivalent of building communism in circumvention of capitalism. The first to grasp this, apparently, was Russia, which quickly began to establish bilateral relations with Kazakhstan, Byelarus, and other republics. But these are the relations of diktat, pressure, and conditions. Until Ukraine wakes up and offers its own equal relations, the seat could prove taken. It is understandable that Russia, having inherited everything from the USSR, the administrative command system included, can influence the other republics more effectively. But the idea of equality and independence, to which Ukraine adheres, is more attractive, after all. And the main thing here is not to sleep but to act decisively and purposefully.

Two opposite trends will, evidently, continue to be manifested. Russia will hardly renounce its imperial plans to bring back the "errant" republics under its jurisdiction. We must in this direction be prepared for an economic boycott, attempts to bring down the financial and banking system, and a customs war, and wholly unconcealed interference in internal affairs also.

Ukraine's sole solution is to seek economic independence consists of the accelerated creation of a national economic system and an industry, agriculture, infrastructure, and so forth independent of Russia [sentence as published]. The republic is not alone in this movement. Other members of the former USSR have found themselves in the same situation. Developing bilateral, equal, mutually profitable relations with them, Ukraine will be able to resist the intrigues of its big neighbor. And time will tell. If the republics are able to develop their bilateral relations in such a way that a multilateral agreement becomes necessary, the conditions for a real commonwealth could have matured also, perhaps. It is entirely possible that by this time Russia as well, having seen the futility of its hegemonist plans, would associate itself with the republics on the terms observed upon entry into a civilized community.

But meanwhile the CIS is an Endeavor To Impose Hegemony by the Northern Unpredictable Giant.

Kravchuk Acts Called Unconstitutional

92UN1147A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 3 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Sokol, PRAVDA UKRAINY parliamentary observer: "The President's Answer: Constitutional Scandal Brewing in Parliament"]

[Text] The situation looked bright a week ago. President Kravchuk's unconstitutional actions were discussed, wryly, in the lobbies of parliament. But a couple of days ago the subject was brought out in the open, at a news conference. And now there is an official hearing and, what is worse, it is by the parliamentary Commission on Questions of Legislation and Legality, with the participation of other commissions. Also in attendance, naturally, was a representative of the president's legal service.

The legislators gathered together all the documents of the president of Ukraine which he had published during his first two days and which, in their opinion, exceed the presidential authority and contradict the Constitution. The list turned out to be surprisingly long and from time to time it was troubling. Understandably, it is not easy to create one's own statehood. But how many "flaws" have to be repeated, and are they always inevitable?

Most frequently the members of parliament turned to the State Duma created by the president. The Duma was at the center of the disputes. In the documents published by the president it was described as a social organ and the creation of such a structure is within the rights of the president. The deputies—and a large number of them—describe it as an organ of state power (it was created by the Supreme Soviet and only by it). The arguments: Those working here are not public officials but people working for a wage, and a good one at that. The leader of the president's legal service showed that the Duma is a consultative organ, an organ for strategic developments, as a result of which it is not governmental or managerial. Members of parliament do not agree with that and point out that the president's documents include the Duma in the system of state executive power, and it is headed by the president and his deputy is the prime minister.

Both sides, if one may call them that, were represented by lawyers, and their discussion, understandably, was about details and fine points. But they are not of the essence. Legal flaws and "slips" can be eliminated. What is much more serious is seeing the deputies in opposition to the Cabinet of Ministers. That such a threat is real was shown by the recent news conference of Deputy Prime Minister V. Lanovoy. Criticizing the fundamentals of the national economic policy of Ukraine which were considered by the Supreme Soviet and one of the president's ukases, Vladimir Lanovoy repeatedly noted: These questions were not discussed in the government—they are the work of the Duma. Here how can one fail to heed the warning that the "supplementary" Cabinet of Ministers, led by the president, could bring anarchy into the system of executive power?

The deputies also focused on the following: Of the four leaders of Duma boards, three are people's deputies of Ukraine, and two head up other parliamentary commissions at the same time. The conclusion: The combination of legislative and executive power is unconstitutional. The reply—"The Constitution does not prohibit a people's deputy from being a state adviser"—seemed unconvincing. The law requires that even the president's representative relinquish his deputy authority, that is, even at the local level. There is no need to speak of the state level.

A. Kotsyuba, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Commission on Questions of Legislation and Legality, presented this idea: If the State Duma counteracts the Cabinet of Ministers, it is actually the same thing as the recent Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, which did not require or recommend but actually was the legislator. The analogy is questionable. But such a pointed wording of the issue shows how important it is to clearly define the framework of the authority of the Duma and not to allow it to be transformed into a state organ.

The parliamentary commission scrupulously, sometimes captiously analyzed the changes made by the president in the structure of the government and his ukases on new ministries. Doubts were expressed about the expediency of combining the Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties and the Ministry of Trade, and individual undertakings were also questioned. The ethical side of the matter was even touched upon with respect to personnel changes. But the main complaint was that he exceeded his authority and violated constitutional norms.

It seems that the main grounds for this was the lack of correspondence between the changes in the Constitution related to the presidency and the decree of the Supreme Soviet which recommended that the president make changes in the structure of government. At times points were stretched in order to make accusations. Along with these, however, there was also substantiated criticism.

The president's ukase on the appointment of the new justice minister is indicative of this. According to the constitution, this minister—unlike the others—is approved by the Supreme Soviet. The president, however, remembered this after the ukase had already been published. Then he rescinded the ill-fated ukase and addressed the parliament after the fact, but these actions do not change the essence of what transpired. The more so since, in an analogous situation, he exceeded his authority in appointing the minister of foreign economic ties and trade.

The people's deputies had run up against the willfulness of the president before when, in spite of the constitutional requirements, by an ukase he combined the ministries of public and higher education and appointed the minister of the newly formed organ. There was no official discussion of this within the walls of the Supreme Soviet. Parliament never adopted a resolution regarding

this—it did not reach the point of damaging relations. But now they are feeling much more exacting.

During the course of the meeting of the Commission on Questions of Legislation and Legality it was reported that the president had allowed deviations from the constitutional norms concerning questions of taxation, when forming the banking structure, and when he granted special rights to Sevastopol. Complaints were lodged against him about the establishment of different wages in the arbitration organs and the people's courts and in the legal services of the president and the Supreme Soviet. One cannot agree with everything that was said in the Commission; certain deputies were too zealous in their accusations. But the problem that was raised is extremely important for the rule-of-law state that is being constructed.

Our past life has left us a legacy that is no better. Our attachments, our habits must be broken. Previously everything was unquestioningly blamed on the higher-ups, but now unfettered democracy is shaking everybody up. The deputies allow themselves to be disrespectful to the president; they keep him waiting for an hour or more (where else is such a thing seen!) in parliament—they do not give him the floor because they are "warming up" at the microphone. The president, losing his composure, shouts to the Supreme Soviet: "I did not come here to answer questions!" And yet we are just beginning to create statehood and there is a great deal we do not know. We will not achieve our goal by throwing stones at one another, not to mention tombstones.

The economy and the growing social tension require exceptional actions. The president cannot drag his feet. What he was accused of was not deliberate but the result of haste and his colossal work load. But the Constitution is the Constitution, and the demand for it to be observed is strict everywhere. The members of parliament cannot be reproached for this. But a great deal depends on the parliament as well and on the aptness of its decisions. And it is simply incomprehensible why it is holding up and not publishing the already adopted law on changes in the Constitution, which would untie the hands of the president.

The results of the discussion in the Commission still have to be considered by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Two paths are possible after this: Either the problems will be resolved by the president or the parliament will dot the "i." Everything depends on the president's answer.

Khmara Interviewed on Political Beliefs

92UN1147B Kiev VECHERNIY KIYEV in Russian 2 Apr 92 p 2

[Interview with Stepan Khmara, people's deputy of Ukraine, by Svetlana Sinyakova, editor of the political department; place and date not given: "The Putsch Has Been Quelled. The Putsch Continues"]

[Text] **The events in the political arena of Ukraine sometimes remind one of a performance in which the main director brings out onto the stage first one group of actors, then another, each of which plays his role, which the spectators do not know about ahead of time. But there are also exceptions. Among them, in particular, is Ukraine People's Deputy Stepan Khmara.**

[Sinyakova] Stepan Ilich, at one time you wrote a draft resolution on banning the activity of the Communist Party in Ukraine. This was almost a month before the August putsch. Now you have delved into Armenian problems and even developed a real military doctrine. Is this not because previously the empire was held together by the CPSU, which had its own armed detachments—the KGB—and now an analogous role must be played by the common armed forces, whose legal status was determined at the Kiev meeting of the heads of the CIS countries?

[Khmara] I am very much disturbed by the fact that with the disappearance of the Center and the proclamation of Russia as the successor to the USSR, it automatically became the leader of the CIS and is imposing its view of the future on Ukraine. This is known to everyone who reads the newspapers or the reports from Ostankino, where they sing praises to Russian greatness and the thousand-year state stretching from the White Sea to the Black Sea. And politicians have additional information as well. Thus at an expanded meeting of the Supreme Soviet Commission on Questions of Defense and Security—where on the eve of the Kiev meeting representatives of several other commissions of the Supreme Soviet, leaders of the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, SB [expansion not given], commanders of districts and armies, and representatives of the military-industrial complex had gathered—I suggested not giving any consideration to the package of documents pertaining to troops and arms. Since they contradict the interests of Ukraine. And another proposal was that our delegation resolutely raise as question number one at the meeting the division of the property of the former USSR. And that we not participate in any other discussions until this question was resolved.

We can and must divide up the assets and liabilities, the gold and diamond supply, credits and debts, and so forth. But this certainly does not mean that we can and should divide up, say, the Black Sea Fleet. This fleet in general is not a subject of negotiations with other states because it is the property of Ukraine. All the ships were assigned to Ukrainian ports as of 1 December and all military property should be declared the property of Ukraine. The "zero option" is the fair resolution to the Ukrainian-Russian conflict.

[Sinyakova] Did you receive support?

[Khmara] From certain military people—yes. Just one agreement on the status of the strategic forces of the CIS signed in Minsk at the third meeting did damage to the creation of a Ukrainian army capable of defending

Ukraine. Strategic forces cast doubt on our very independence. For when you choose a partner for yourself you must think about with whom and against whom you are uniting. Yes, the Union has collapsed. But only de jure. De facto it has existed and does exist. The imperial structures have not been fully dismantled, particularly the army of the former USSR. And the Kiev meeting showed that this army is able to dictate its policy to the CIS.

[Sinyakova] Do you recall the euphoria after the failure of the August putsch in Moscow? It seemed that democracy had triumphed completely, once and for all. The Supreme Soviet of Ukraine adopted an Act of Independence. It created the Gaysin commission to investigate official crimes during the putsch in Ukraine. The president of the Supreme Soviet declared the activity of the Communist Party of Ukraine to be illegal—as far as I know, only one member of the presidium voted against this resolution—Kotsyuba. But subsequent events showed that this was only a smoke screen behind which the cause of the putschists—the nomenklatura elite—was living and winning.

[Khmara] I look on this somewhat differently. The revenge of the Communist Party forces, the "silent conspiracy," began long before the August events—as early as the autumn of 1990. They took the real power in Ukraine securely into their own hands. Through all the state structures, above all the Cabinet of Ministers of Vitold Fokin. And therefore the banning of the Communist Party of Ukraine for its criminal activity did not lead to a situation where charges were filed against its leaders. Moreover, a considerable number of people's deputies who headed up management structures of the Communist Party of Ukraine are still in the Supreme Soviet. And this is why cadre problems are not being resolved along the vertical. Which, in turn, makes it impossible to make structural changes or conduct the political and economic reform and the reform of the legal system. Not a single criminal case was brought against those members of the nomenklatura who frankly and openly backed the supporters of the State Committee for the State of Emergency. And this is the main reason why we cannot get past go.

Let me give this example. The conclusions of the Gaysin commission concerning the Ministry of Internal Affairs caused mistrust of the entire collegium of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. But the strange thing—or perhaps it was not so strange—is that the internal affairs minister, Comrade Vasilishin, received a token of gratitude from the president: the high rank of colonel general. The same thing happened with other highly placed bureaucrats in the militia—the greatest reactionaries were promoted in rank and position.

[Sinyakova] Well, a state of emergency was not introduced in Ukraine and the wait-and-see position turned out to be safe in all respects. Although I have no doubt that if the situation in Moscow had changed, we would have seen the true faces of many people who are now going out of their way to distance themselves from the State Committee for the State of Emergency. But here is what bothers me. We are painfully familiar with the faces of those who actively fought the democratic "yellow and blue" process from the "blue" screen. Unlike certain other officials, they were unable to "recant," destroy, or conceal their public statements in defense of reaction. But Okhmakevich's Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] became Okhmakevich's Television and Radio Company, and such odious journalists as, for example, Pasak, were promoted. During the times of the Communist Party of Ukraine Pasak, for example, could not rise above the position of editor in chief no matter how hard he tried, and now—he is in the director's chair. And this, in my view, is a very eloquent fact which shows that democracy has not triumphed in Ukraine but, on the contrary, has suffered a defeat.

[Khmara] Why just democracy? What about Ukraine? The tendency you spoke of with reference to the Radio and Television Company exists in all structures. The government and the prime minister are personally conducting a clearly anti-Ukrainian policy, reshuffling the old nomenklatura. The bureaucrats are merely moving from one chair to another, but they always remain in power. The Communist Party mafia is feeling normal. And the president relies on it when dealing with the so-called democrats. I think that if the president continues to use such tactics in the future it will be necessary to raise the question of impeachment. Until the deputies' television sets blow up.

[Sinyakova] A transparent reference. But it seems to me that the majority of the deputy corps can boldly use both their television sets and their private cars. There are still too many people among us who were not tempted by various kinds of services, bonuses, titles, and other nice "trivia" for which one must pay with concessions to the bearers of the gifts. I am not surprised that certain deputies, who up to this point have gone places by foot as their ordinary constituents do, are now enjoying the fast ride in their own cars. Man is weak. Nor am I surprised by those who refused to buy a car since they never traveled on public transportation anyway. I am much more surprised by the information that you, Stepan Ilich, have never even bought a pair of socks through "deputy trade." What helps you to resist the many temptations?

[Khmara] I do not want to speak of others. Probably not every person is capable of passing the test of glory and power. But for me it is easy. Since I have only one temptation—freedom and independence and belief in God. But the deputies are human beings and they need the same things as everybody else does. It is another matter that we have not only failed to raise the standard of living of the people but we also failed to prevent its decline. Whether this is the personal fault of the deputy or not, against a background of poverty, I do not think anyone has the moral right to improve his own living conditions. Only a great readiness for sacrifice can save us from catastrophe. Under present conditions personal

comfort and the struggle for freedom are incompatible. We must live in the extreme, uncomfortable conditions in which our people are living.

[Sinyakova] Does it not seem to you that the defeat of the democrats in the Supreme Soviet, and not only there, began when they stuck their heads into the "lion's mouth"? I have in mind their participation in the structures of the totalitarian regime which gradually imposed on them their rules of the game and their customs, and, finally, broke them apart? There is no opposition in the parliament.

[Khmara] I anticipated this situation back when they were electing commission chairmen. I registered a protest. I called this shameful trade. I even wanted to resign from Narodnaya Rada.

[Sinyakova] They say there is no such thing as a prophet in his own homeland... You, incidentally, "prophesied" both the situation that developed during the presidential elections and the results of these elections. Your colleagues did not listen to you in this case. Were they incapable of predicting this, or did they not want to?

[Khmara] Probably both. In order to anticipate, one must have not only intuition but also experience in life and politics. Some do not have enough of the former, some of the latter. And we still frequently confuse politics with politicking. People say and write that politics is an immoral and dirty business. I think that politics is one of the most complex and the most difficult arts, which requires a colossal amount of work, a lot of time, and, of course, a flair for it, as is the case with any art. Therefore it is not politics which is dirty, but dirty people compromise and sully it. I am convinced that it is moral politics and only moral politics that can be good politics. Immoral politics, regardless of the finery in which it may be arrayed, always produces a bad result. Perhaps not immediately, but inevitably. And if the person who has devoted himself to politics makes gaining power his primary task, this is also dangerous and will frequently lead to negative consequences. Power is not the goal. I consider power to be a large and heavy cross to bear, which because of circumstances and by the will of God has been placed on the shoulders of mankind. And only when man accepts power as a heavy cross will his labor produce a good result.

[Sinyakova] Before the Third Rukh Congress Vyacheslav Chornovil's competitors reproached him for "lusting for power." I recall that at the Second Congress of the Republic Party Vyacheslav Maksimovich, while he was not a member of the Ukraine Republican Party, was given the floor as your personal opponent. Certain people hoped that you would take advantage of this forum of the Rukh Congress in order, as they say, to give them what was coming to them. But that did not happen.

[Khmara] And it could not happen. I am never guided by a feeling of revenge. And I would not want anybody to be able to interpret my speech as a settling of old scores. Moreover, I anticipated these dirty events and deliberately avoided participating in them.

I could not support either of the parties. The first—because it is absurd to assert that we have an independent state and all we have to do is unquestioningly support the president and his team. There must be a healthy opposition in any normal society. Then the authorities work better as well.

But I could not speak out for Chornovil either if I considered all his activity and not individual episodes taken out of context, if I recalled his inconsistent steps and mistakes.

[Sinyakova] You and an uncompromising person. Perhaps it is not worthwhile to bring certain things up for general discussion.

[Khmara] No. If we want progress tomorrow, we must talk today, prepare sociopolitical thought, be designers of society's behavior, and not be pulled around by events. We must influence events now and not analyze them later. It is easy to be wise with hindsight, to see mistakes and missed opportunities. But to prove unorthodox ideas is a thankless task. It is difficult to accept them.

My fate is to gather stones from various sides. And I have a sense of the drama and even the tragedy of my personality. But I do not intend to change anything. It is easier for me. I have never fought for power and I do not intend to fight for it. If during the elections to the Supreme Soviet certain of my friends had warned me: You are sounding too radical, these ideas frighten people—I would have responded that my main goal is not to obtain a mandate at any price and, thank God, I can communicate with people and work for the formation of sociopolitical thought. I explained to the voters that for me being a deputy was volunteering for a prison camp. And if they sanction that prison camp, I have no doubts about what awaits me in this Supreme Soviet: work, more work, and a great deal of unpleasantness... And that is what happened...

[Sinyakova] According to sociological data, the present Supreme Soviet enjoys among Kievans at least the same popularity as the Cabinet of Ministers does. That is, it is very doubtful. Very few voters intend to vote for their deputies a second time. But also the reputation of the parties—from the Socialist Party of Ukraine to the Greens—does not show that any of them will win with its slate in the elections to parliament. There is a critical shortage of politicians with high moral authority. And if there is something in the "second echelon"—nobody knows about it.

[Khmara] There is. It is in the people. I believe in the wisdom of the people. We have many talented, capable, decent people who are unknown, who do not have a particular image. We must look for them and help them. Unfortunately, a great deal depends on the management structures of our young parties which became ill as soon

as they were born. We must remember the kind of society they sprung from. For the existing system is a satanic system which, in spite of all its shortcomings in the economic, political, and other spheres, has achieved a great deal in order to carry out the devil's design. It has encroached on the holy of holies of the Creator—the human creator. It has set the goal of destroying man as a personality. And it has accomplished a great deal along this path. And this is the most terrible crime of this system. It is not only the result of the state policy of the communist regime but it also ensues from Marxist philosophy and ideology, which I equate with the philosophy of Satan. The cross section of society we are faced with is the result of destructive work. But the process of renewal has begun and it will continue, although with terrible suffering. If we analyze reality, we could possibly make it through the catastrophe. It is terrifying to speak about it, but there is justification for remembering this terrible danger.

But if we switch over to practical politics, I am very much afraid of elections on a multiparty basis. Under our conditions this would be a catastrophe in political life. Voices are already being heard: Each party will fight for power. We have seen what came of this in the presidential elections.

Instead of selecting the best, each party will try to put its own people in, even if they are no good. Destructive opposition will begin. We in Ukraine have not reached the point where we should have either a president or multiparty elections. It would be better if we would be satisfied with improving the existing law on elections and conduct them according to the territorial principle, without rejecting the right to nominate candidates in labor collectives where they know people better. We must select the best, irrespective of their party affiliation or whether they belong to a party at all. With the exception of members of the Socialist Party of Ukraine, that is the nomenklatura communist party. In general this party should be refused registration, including its present leader, Aleksandr Moroz, the former chairman of the notorious Group-239—charges should be brought against them for criminally impeding reforms in all spheres. Now they are feeling very calm, and they are even offended when people call things by their real names.

[Sinyakova] Once at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet I heard a question which never was answered: "What are we building?" The Russian press is convincing its readers that Ukraine is continuing to build socialism. Obviously, the barracks type. But what is your opinion?

[Khmara] Seriously, we are not building anything. The process of decay is simply continuing. The old Communist Party mafia retains the power in its hands, including at the government level. The president does not want to change the cadre policy either; he relies on the corrupt nomenklatura. And this policy of the president is leading Ukraine toward social destabilization, as a result of which there could be an explosion, a loss of independence, the collapse of society, and we would have to start all over again from the beginning. The foundation of the state must be laid quickly and with resolute actions. Then it will be possible to build and improve this state. But we have not done this. And with the cadres on whom the president is relying, Ukraine is doomed and the president himself is doomed.

I would like for God to send an insight to the president so that he will finally come to his senses. Unfortunately, the new appointments—the governor generals—speak for themselves. This is a reliance on reactionary forces. For the president has not repented of his sinful activity as a Communist Party activist. And without repentance he will probably never succeed. If he had done this the people would have forgiven him. And he would have cast off his chains. But Kravchuk is being cunning, and this could have fatal results. I, of course, would not want that...

Moroz Outlines Political Position

92UN1145A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian 2 Apr 92 p 6

[Article by Aleksandr Moroz, people's deputy of Ukraine and chairman of the Political Council of the Socialist Party of Ukraine: "Point of Reference—Labor Collectives"]

[Text] I shall try to assess the general situation. Obviously, we are in a stage of practical implementation of the turn toward a capitalist economy. This turn is being carried out in all spheres: political—through the elimination of the soviets as the representative organs of the popular will and their replacement with a vertical, authoritarian structure; economic—through the intention to transfer the capital accumulated by many generations to the hands of long-concealed newly rich; social—through the placement of the concerns related to social protection of the population on the shoulders of the people themselves; and spiritual—through the distortion of history and a search for new ideals under the guise of the rebirth of national self consciousness.

This turn has several peculiarities. One of them is that we did not actually have real socialism. I think we will have another chance to give a precise definition of the structure we had until recently and which had to be changed. But is this the right way?

Another peculiarity is that the turn is being made through the efforts of the people who supported the previous structure. Manifested here is not only the paradoxical nature of the situation but also evidence of the crisis of public morality and its distortion, which is shown in the behavior of many people, in their readiness for apostasy.

Note that the tension of the political confrontation today is noticeable not so much in essence and not so much among opponents as in form, the desire to prove one's

suitability for the new cause, and the fear of being suspected of conservatism. People are squabbling among themselves for the right to be called progressive. The effect of the "can of worms" is being manifested on both sides of the recent barricades. People have already forgotten about the barricades. Their main concern is to bite before they are bitten and thus to get ahead, gain strength, and fortify their positions. One must admit that it is a disgraceful picture. The cunningness of the preceding ideology has produced a poisonous harvest.

But it seems that the most typical sign of the period might be considered to be the fact that the political forces that oppose us have found ready allies among the present bureaucrats at all levels, businessmen, recent party secretaries, and deputies, as it were, the elite of society. This is probably because the elite are afraid of losing their "niche" in the hierarchy of duties, their place at the trough. And even if they do end up losing it, they want to hang on to it as long as possible.

The replacement of the authority structures will soon cast an even brighter light on each individual. We must be vigilant; after all, we ourselves are not to blame for the world we live in and we will be the ones who have to remake this society.

As you know, the president's first roundtable meeting was held recently. It showed that we have many parties but they are not very different. To say that the roundtable will be a catalyst for the consolidation of society is premature, although we would work to assign it that role. But even if it were a screen for the authorities, we would still sit down at it. For it is still a channel of information.

The roundtable, the Rukh meeting, and the president's practical actions show that he is indeed counting on Rukh, hoping to find support for himself there and to use its influence for his contemplated reforms. There is probably no need to turn to an analysis of the motives for this position. There will be plenty of time for that, although in and of itself it is not so important.

What is important is something that is possibly very rare if not unique in world history: A state leader has come to power relying on the majority of the population, on the influence of a political party he has banned, in spite of the clearly expressed opposition of the minority of the population, and, having come to power, he has joined forces with his opponents. It would be understandable if this were an attempt to unite society. But his thesis that Rukh is capable of doing this is erroneous. Ultimately, it will come to pass that with his power he will express the will and realize the intentions of the minority against the majority of the population. This policy is not likely to hold much promise for the president and it is not likely to be useful to the state or the people.

The lack of promise of this position was also confirmed by the Rukh meeting. Yes, it is indeed an influential political force. But it is so heterogeneous, so ready for a split (also along the lines of eliteness) that it is risky to rely on it. And the main thing is that Rukh was created for functions "against"—not "for." It prepared itself to destroy. And it is only in this direction that it has unity. It is not capable of building, either programs, or immediate plans, or ideas, or cadres. Thus the combination of real power and a political force oriented toward destruction will probably not lead to success. I would like for the president to come to this conclusion himself as quickly as possible.

Rukh is being radicalized. For this reason it is losing its unity as well. Those who consider themselves to be thinking constructively are trying to distance themselves from the radicals. The proof of this is the actual self-liquidation of Narodnaya Rada [People's Council] in the republic parliament and the creation of the New Ukraine association.

Time will tell whether this association has a future. But it interests us because it is the first attempt at independent action on the part of those who say they are capable of building a political structure. Everything we have observed previously was the realization of a substantiated plan that was developed and comprehensively financed mainly from abroad. This plan was directed toward the destruction of that which existed. The plan was fulfilled ahead of schedule. After that it became clear that there was no plan. Chornovil's "What next?" actually applies to the fate of Rukh, but this does not make a bit of difference to the state.

What was said previously contains an answer to this question: Why are we ("we"—as a community) always losing to Rukh? In the first place, we have not been losing. It exhausted its potential even before the August events, but it received a "gift" in the form of the State Committee for the State of Emergency from the hands of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, who motivated the people to choose independence. But now Rukh, which went into hiding during September-November in order not to "frighten" the population before the referendum, is trying to include these results among its assets, to take credit for the unity of Ukraine, the fact that the changes were made without bloodshed, and so forth. Although the specific actions of Rukh leaders and supporters after 1 December were actually opposed to the interests of Ukraine. In order to confirm this conclusion it is sufficient to analyze the actions concerning the army and navy, the introduction of the symbols, Khmara's trip to the Crimea, and so forth.

In the second place, Rukh (and all those associated with it) were operating according to the aforementioned plan. But to oppose a plan effectively takes another plan, even if it is imperfect. And they had none.

But now the positions are equalizing... there are no plans, especially in the sphere of economic reform. And here is where an advantageous situation for us is developing, if we do not drag our feet. For the economy is our sphere. It is a condition of social protection and social justice to rely on our slogans and goals. These are our social base and our cadres. Not to take advantage of this would be a

sin, an inadmissible mistake. The more so since the economy is a field for the struggle of ideas, plans, and practical steps that do not require any extremely cumbersome organizational support. Propose, persuade—and agitate for your results.

Therefore the most important requirement for us socialists is to work in the labor collectives. We must explain and help in the organization of the protection of the interests of the labor collectives, and through them—the entire population.

Above all this has to do with the participation of the collectives in the privatization of their enterprises. We must help them to draw up applications for privatization and anticipate the influence of representatives of the collectives in the commissions which will control the course of destatization. We must not allow, under the guise of deceptively charitable certification, large-scale "con artists" who are protected by the bureaucratic apparatus to make fools both of millions of people and of collectives who have created their production and national wealth through their labor.

Those who naively want to get rich, who hope thus to cancel the state debt to the people, should recall once again the true fact that the state has never lost in games of chance. This is why there is a need for a different direction of the law as a whole in order to find a niche for protection of the rights of the labor collective. If this happens and production operates efficiently—there will be something with which to strengthen the budget, to form social funds, and to fill the market with goods.

The situation is the same for the peasants who are alarmed about the reserve land fund. We must explain to them that the land cannot be taken away from the collective farms. That the part that today is being permanently used by the farms will remain with them. Moreover, 85 percent is being turned over to collective ownership.

That is the way it is written. But there are chinks in the Code where all kinds of speculation can slip through. Profit seekers close to power are already peering through them to grab up the best plots of land: the closest, the best, irrigated ones, the ones for which there will be a great demand in the future. For themselves, for their relatives, and for bribes...

While granting city dwellers the possibility of preserving their well-being and creating conditions for farming, we must not allow squandering of the land or neglect of it. We must remember that the problem of the countryside is the state's problem.

The forms of management and the forms of ownership are important. But the state's attitude toward the peasantry is of decisive importance. If it is such as it is in France (we shall use a rejoinder from a parliamentary discussion) then the land will be released and all forms will fully show their merit.

The "well-wishers" from among the former communists, having moved to different parties, are fighting the socialists hand and fist, looking for enemies of Ukraine among them. Understandably, they want to regain their equilibrium this way, to find justification for their extremism. But the advantage of the situation lies in the fact that our position is based on the vital interests of the majority of the population. And so those who are fighting against us are revealing their true intentions. They are defending the interests of three-five percent of the population who intend to line their pockets through privatization, the collapse of the kolkhozes, the elimination of the state from the regulation of the economy, and, hence, the wildfire development of monopolies, deficits everywhere, and catastrophic inflation. Consequently, they are fighting against the people!

Having taken over the mass media with the help of the leadership of the republic and oblasts (using parasitic means), our rivals, by defaming us, are doing a good deed: They are showing that they are afraid of us. They are afraid because the socialists are actually the only organization capable of telling the truth about what is happening around us. We can be proud of this mission, but we must also be guided by the need to carry it out.

At the Rukh meeting and at the roundtable there were many discussions about the opposition to the president and the ratio of priorities of human and state rights. In the mouths of I. Drach, M. Goryn, and M. Porovskiy... these subjects sounded different while still uniting them against the socialists' position. There is nothing surprising about the increased interest in these subjects. That is always the way it happens: When an idea is exhausted it is replaced by demagogy. They speak loudly so that people will not guess that they are not saying anything. For we have never absolutized the rights of the citizen of Ukraine, detaching them from the interests of the state. Conversely, while giving priority to these rights, we consider it necessary for all state creative steps to specify guarantees of human rights. What differences of opinion are there here?

Therefore for the nth time we suggest adopting, in addition to the Constitution, a Declaration of the Rights of the Citizen of Ukraine. So that the Constitution itself, the new laws and their embodiment, would have before them a specific point of reference—the concrete person.

There would not seem to be any objections to this position. But, as we can see, not everybody likes it. After all, how else can one explain the role of the state, which is deliberately preparing for mass unemployment, whose organs are ignoring the parliament's demand for finding jobs for the people whose activity has been terminated illegally? How does one explain the pandering to fascist youngsters in the "Ukrainian Piemonte" and the capital? How can one fail to see their planned preparation: trained, hired, outfitted? And as for the opposition... For some reason the president is not interested in this subject. I think it was premature. In any case, it has not affected socialists yet.

Understandably, today things are probably more difficult for the president than for anyone else. His first 100 days have been marked by efforts to create a state and to reinforce his power. That is probably the way it should be. But as he proceeds further it becomes clear that his "team" does not have enough sensible politicians who would contain interstate conflicts within the framework of the CIS. For too much time has been lost. For the president is surrounded by advisers who are guilty of just that. And disaster is at hand. Our nearest neighbor's house is already burning down. The only way to put out the fire is together. We are not doing that—we are left looking disaster in the face.

Nor are there enough economists capable of giving him suggestions and supporting his integrated effective program for economic reform.

One must admit that, while we share with our opponents identical initial positions for defending our approaches to reforming the economy, we lag behind in activity in other spheres of social life. Since we cannot hope for support from the "pluralistically minded" mass media, we have to count mainly on the living word. There is a need for it.

A mass attack has been waged on the formation (reformation) of the people's world view. Surprisingly, it is as though many journalists and cultural workers do not notice the fatal nature and the severe consequences of this attack.

Attempts to change history, to simply rehabilitate members of the UPA [Ukrainian Insurgent Army], the elimination of museums and monuments, and the renaming of streets became more than just a typical phenomenon. Behind it one can see the watchful eye of the coordinator. Are the people silent? Let us stir them up again.

They are stirring us up. A "reexposition" of the Patriotic War Museum in Kiev is being prepared.

Eyewitnesses testify that there is not enough room in it for General Batutin or for many of the battles of the worst war on our territory. But the museum was created as a tribute to the memory of the victory of the people and the army, whose soldiers did not ask one another about nationality.

Can such a thing really be erased from consciousness? Did the hand of the bureaucrat who approved this plan for "reexposition" really not flinch?

It is probably no accident that the attack on the structure of the Znaniye organization is being waged so actively and attempts are being made to replace it with the politicized Prosvitoyu. The church is being politicized and blood is already been spilled through the skillfully planned religious feuds. All this is being done in the name of the "historical truth." There is no doubt that the time has come to engage actively in the political battle for the establishment in the public consciousness of truthful information about the history of Ukraine.

We stand behind the unity of the independent states and their useful interaction as neighbors. This is what is lacking most of all today. Our difficulties, the decline of production, unemployment, and the general disorder arise from breaking contacts, mainly economic ties. They must be restored. Anyone who does not understand this and stands in the way of arranging them is an enemy of Ukraine, its statehood, and its long-suffering people.

Organization Criticizes Rukh Policies

92P50109A Kiev VECHIRNIY KYYIV in Ukrainian 6 Apr 92 p 1

[Unsigned article entitled "'Viche' explains"]

[Text] A new organization has been formed in Kiev—the "Viche" union [taken from the name of the municipal consultative body during the time of Kievan Rus], among the goals of which is the formation of a high political culture among Kievans. It is interesting that the first document sent to the editorial board of VECHIRNIY KYYIV was addressed to the "initiators of the creation of Rukh," the authors of the declaration read by people's deputy I. Drach at the Third Congress of Rukh. In the opinion of the members of "Viche", Ukraine is going through a period of "peaceful" revolution, the major feature of which is the striving to transfer power from the administrative-command system to the benefit of the individual and community. However, on 24 August the "interception of the revolution" took place. The reactionary section of parliament fulfilled the program of the democratic forces, bankrupted them, and safely took the initative into its own hands, preserving the power of the administrative-command system. This happened because of the tactical miscalulations of those same democrats, who first of all substituted the struggle for a mere change of the attributes of power for the struggle to transfer power to the individual and community. Secondly, the democrats believed in the possibility of democratic reformulations in the absence of a civil society. However, stated "Viche", the overwhelming majority of the "initiators of the creation of Rukh" up to now have not drawn constructive conclusions. "their newest conception of Rukh as a state-forming organization again does not answer to the conditions of adequacy, for in the independent state an individual can still be doomed to a state of slavery."

Here the "conditions of adequacy" for the present state of society are formulated. This especially concerns authority—as the allocation of national wealth reinforced by rule-of-law norms. Rule by the people will come about only when each person owns more than half of his own work and the community more than half of the national wealth. The administrative-command system will not give this up voluntarily. It is necessary to take it away. Rukh could become an initiator after having chosen the tactic in the "peaceful" revolution of building a civil society under the slogan "To the individual—the right of property as the result of his own labor."

The members of "Viche" consider the idea of Rukh as a state-forming organization doomed. The initiative in the Supreme Council belongs to other forces, and the people, held in bondage by the economy, are not capable of supporting it to a sufficient degree.

Perhaps things are really clearer from the sidelines? In any case, it is useful for politicians to know about such a point of view of our life and its prospects.

Direction of Change Said To Depend on 'Silent Majority'

92UN1111A Kiev VECHERNIY KIYEV in Russian 24 Mar 92 p 2

[Interview with Vladimir Polokhalo, docent of Kiev University imeni T.G. Shevchenko, historian, and political scientist, by Svetlana Sinyakova, VECHERNIY KIYEV political department editor; place and date not given: "Will We with a Mighty Hand Throw Off the Fatal Yoke Forever?]

[Text] **No matter how many times you say "halvah," the mouth will not get sweeter. No matter how many times you repeat "independent, autonomous, and democratic," there will be no magic. Our independence is still slipping out of our hands. Why? Perhaps an answer to this question will help resolve the problem?**

We think that our correspondent's interview with Vladimir Polokhalo, docent of Kiev University imeni T.G. Shevchenko, historian, and political scientist, will make it possible, as the saying goes, to shed some light on the current scene.

[Sinyakova] Vladimir Ivanovich, at one time you participated in the creation of the Democratic Platform in the Communist Party of Ukraine, which was different from the Democratic Platform of the CPSU, first and foremost in the approach to national policy. After the 28th Congress, to which you were a delegate, you left the Communist Party—incidentally, long before its final collapse. Was the obstinacy of the party leadership in the area of preserving "the indivisible Union" one of the reasons?

[Polokhalo] You can say that. As N. Berdyayev noted at one time, and I share his view, every nation strives to form its own state, to fortify and strengthen it. Not to consider this "healthy instinct of a nation" is sinful and stupid at the very least. The collapse of recent empires of the 20th century—the USSR and Yugoslavia—prompts the conclusion that a nation is able to realize its potential fully only when it acquires its own statehood.

[Sinyakova] But, as is known, the road from intentions to reality is not a short one. We are just beginning the construction of a state. Moreover, right from the very first steps the seriously disturbing thing is, will it be democratic?

[Polokhalo] It is better to wait a little for an answer. Despite the fact that more than a hundred states of the modern world have already recognized Ukraine, it is still at the crossroads.

[Sinyakova] The fabled heroic warriors had a choice of "three roads." But what about us?

[Polokhalo] If Ukraine is considered independent in the area of choice, but the CIS is still fraught with federalization—that is, it is a return to a Union that is somewhat changed, but it is still a Union—we also have an opportunity to build one out of three, a state that is either authoritarian, totalitarian, or democratic. In addition, the building of a democratic one is a very complicated task, and, on the contrary, it is least likely to succeed. In any case, two decades seem to me not to be such a big loss of time in a transition period from a totalitarian society of the Soviet kind, which in the main is still preserved in Ukraine, to a democratic society.

[Sinyakova] Twenty years is a whole lifetime. I recall that Khrushchev promised to build communism in such a period. And this was inspiring. But, then, democratic and capitalist construction over the very same period, alas, does not arouse any enthusiasm.

[Polokhalo] Yes, it is paradoxical, but it is a fact. That is the way we have all been brought up. Therefore, the road will be a long one; after all, a totalitarian society not only exterminated our civic values and civic mentality but also caused an unprecedented distortion of moral reference points, and formed the ethic of the so-called "Soviet man." The border between good and evil, between criminality and decency, was erased. Take note: Everyone here suspects everything. Ask any man in the street what he thinks of one or another policy, and you will hear: "I do not know him personally, but I think that he has his finger in the pie."

But what is most frightening is that the strata of the national intelligentsia among the people who do "intellectual work" is too thin. There is too much of a deficit of brilliant persons who have sufficiently high moral prestige to not only arouse but also satisfy the spiritual, including natural-cultural, interest.

[Sinyakova] Speaking at a conference organized by "New Ukraine," you said that the political passivity of our society has reached that level, when even the fact itself of the disappearance of any kind of a party from the political arena in Ukraine, or, for example, such a prominent organization as Rukh, will hardly be even noticed by a majority. Is this not an exaggeration?

[Polokhalo] Unfortunately, science is not inclined to exaggerate. It only states the real state of things. The present political and sociopolitical organizations in Ukraine only partly represent the interests of specific strata. Our multiparty system is deformed. Several parties orient themselves immediately on one and the same social segment that is just beginning to form—the so-called middle class. However, in fact, this orientation is

occurring in words, but in reality, not one of the existing political organizations at present has any real popular influence, a fact which also was demonstrated convincingly in the presidential elections.

It is not complicated to understand why this occurs, if you consider that all of the political parties emerged and developed not at a social but at a sociocultural level, and, in addition, the rules of behavior, tactics, values of orientation, expectations, etc., were determined not by the creation but by the destruction of the imperial totalitarian state. Lumpenization and marginalization, and the inability to express social interests and self-identification in contemporary Ukrainian society, is the objective reason that holds back the formation of a developed system of political pluralism.

It is necessary for politicians who orient themselves on creativity and on democratic reform to rely not on one or another political party, but on a broad nonparty movement or bloc of this movement with political parties. The new leadership of Rukh in the person of Vyacheslav Chornovil, in my opinion, more accurately analyzes the sociopolitical situation in the country. One would only want him to have more supporters both in and outside the Rukh [People's Movement of Ukraine] apparatus.

But in the future the spectrum of political forces in Ukraine, I think, will differ not so much according to the classic principle of "left, right, and center" as much as according to another, new triad: national-democratic, national-conservative, and liberal-democratic.

[Sinyakova] Well, but since political parties exist in an embryonic stage, it remains for society, according to your very expression, to be a "unique gruel?"

[Polokhalo] Alas, there is no other way. At least for the time being. We received a monstrous legacy of a social experiment implemented by the CPSU in the former USSR, including in Ukraine. This is a breakdown in all social relations and the ruination of daily social life, at a time when the majority has not yet awakened and has not formed its real, specific social interests and social status. For the present, they are only perceived by the privileged ruling strata, the former party-state-economic nomenklatura and all of those who surround it. But this is not more than two percent of the population. The failure of the putsch and the ban on, but more accurately the self-ban of the Communist Party of Ukraine, did not lead to the loss of its authoritative positions. This is also indicated by the fact that in the past six months the corrupt Ukrainian nomenklatura has retained all of the key posts and has successfully—exploiting the absence of a serious political opposition—impeded progressive reform.

Under conditions when a middle class—the bearer of economic and sociopolitical stability—has not yet been formed and when Ukrainian society constitutes a "silent majority," the question of a democratic future in Ukraine will be decided depending on whose side this majority takes in the final analysis: the pragmatic market-reformers, or the populist-demagogues, the supporters of the ideals of freedom and democracy, or the supporters of a "firm hand." In 1917 it was the political attitude of precisely these segments that tilted the scales at the decisive moment to the advantage of the Bolshevik dictatorship.

It is obvious to me that the politicians in authority today are also not capable of guaranteeing society against social upheaval.

[Sinyakova] From the standpoint of common sense, the leading strata cannot be interested in a spontaneous social upheaval. Why is it opposing reform?

[Polokhalo] To answer this question we must recall how this ruling strata was formed. Back in the 1970's a process of changes in value orientations took shape—"going bourgeois"—among a substantial part of the state apparatus. It held on with a death grip to its semi-secret privileges that were inaccessible to the majority—comfortable apartments, rest, trips abroad, special support, special medicine... At the same time, an interlocking of the nomenklatura and the trade-economic elite began to take place. In the years of so-called perestroyka the higher and middle echelon of the nomenklatura uncontrollably used its authority and its positions for enrichment. In the last half-year it consolidated for itself the lion's share of state property de jure, which it controlled a long time ago de facto.

Take note: It was no accident that Stanislav Gurenko, first secretary of the former Communist Party of Ukraine Central Committee, is now calling from the pages of the press on his former colleagues and like-thinkers, who not too long ago were ardently antimarket, to get accustomed to the market. Indeed, he himself is not ashamed to use "both experience and knowledge" in this walk of life.

But it is understandable that they are not hurrying. Our "nouveaux riches," a bourgeoisie which in origin is the nomenklatura, is afraid to participate in market competition "on common grounds." It got so accustomed to a game in which eventually all chances were on its side. I think that it will try to delay the inevitable end for at least two-three more years. But in the meantime we have to overcome their "experience and knowledge," which resemble "wild bourgeois activity" and "undeveloped capitalism" more than a civilized market with "a human face."

[Sinyakova] In such a case, what would you wish for those of our politicians who are striving not in words but in deeds for the general welfare?

[Polokhalo] To those who have retained their moral prestige in the eyes of their voters and did not pursue the path of opportunism, not to lose optimism. What voice the still passive "silent majority" will speak out with depends on them. Today, perhaps even more than in the times "before independence," it is important that the

people see. None of us, politicians all the more so, have the right to free ourselves from the work of daily choices between good and evil, decency and meanness, and truth and falsehood.

Youth Polled on Political Parties

92UN1157A Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 2 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by Oleksandr Vyshnyak and Volodymyr Oliynyk: "Seven Percent for ... Communism"]

[Text] Such was the surprising conclusion reached by the organizers of a republican poll of youth, the purpose of which was to determine the level of approval given by young people to existing political parties in Ukraine and their programs.

At the end of last year an interim creative collective from the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute on Youth Issues conducted a poll of young respondents in all the districts of Kiev and in several oblasts (Lviv, Rivne, Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, as well as Crimea). A total of nearly one and a half thousand persons were polled. The first surprise was that seven percent of those polled believe in the communist idea, while only half the young respondents favors the former Communist Party's opposition. The democratic parties received the highest rating. The tables below, reflecting the results of the study, make everything clear.

REPRESENTATIVES OF PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS FOR WHOM UKRAINIAN YOUTH WOULD VOTE IN AN ELECTION

Political Organizations	Portion of Youth in %
1. Popular Movement of Ukraine (Rukh)	15.9
2. Green World Ecological Association	8.8
3. Communist Party of Ukraine	4.0
4. Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth	3.8
5. Green Party of Ukraine	3.6
6. Party of Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine	3.4
7. Union of Ukrainian Students (SUS)	2.8
8. Democratic Party of Ukraine	2.0
9. People's Party of Ukraine	1.7
10. Ukrainian Republican Party	1.3
11. Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party	1.2
12. Liberal Democratic Party of Ukraine	1.1
13. Peasant-Democratic Party	0.9
14. Ukrainian People's-Democratic Party	0.9
15. Ukrainian National Party	0.8
16. Social Democratic Party	0.4
17. United Social Democratic Party	0.3
18. Independent candidate	16.0
19. Depending on the candidate and not on his party affiliation	28.3

POPULARITY RATING OF POLITICAL PARTIES, MOVEMENTS, AND YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS

Political Organizations	Don't know	Support actively	Support in general	Indifferent to	Do not support	Condemn	Rating
1. Green World Ecological Association	32.3	14.8	27.3	17.1	5.9	2.6	—0.06
2. Popular Movement of Ukraine (Rukh)	17.8	12.3	21.3	20.4	16.7	11.4	—0.05
3. Union of Ukrainian Students (SUS)	39.6	10.7	14.7	21.5	8.9	4.6	—0.11
4. Green Party of Ukraine (PZU)	44.8	7.0	14.9	20.8	9.1	3.4	—0.14

POPULARITY RATING OF POLITICAL PARTIES, MOVEMENTS, AND YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS (Continued)

Political Organizations	Don't know	Support actively	Support in general	Indifferent to	Do not support	Condemn	Rating
5. Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth (SNUM)	38.1	8.4	14.4	21.1	11.8	6.3	—0.16
6. Party of Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine (PDVU)	45.4	5.4	14.5	23.1	8.0	3.6	—0.19
7. Democratic Party of Ukraine (DemPU)	44.4	3.4	11.6	23.4	11.7	3.5	—0.23
8. Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party (UKhDP)	50.2	4.0	9.0	13.3	10.4	3.3	—0.24
9. Ukrainian Republican Party (URP)	37.8	2.9	11.4	25.4	14.8	7.6	—0.25
10. Ukrainian People's Democratic Party (UNDP)	47.8	2.3	10.4	24.7	11.7	3.1	—0.26
11. People's Party of Ukraine (NPU)	45.2	3.0	10.0	25.0	12.3	4.6	—0.26
12. Union of Youth Organizations of Ukraine [SMOU] (Lenin Young Komsomol League of Ukraine—MDS [expansion not given])	37.9	4.9	11.2	21.2	15.2	9.7	—0.26
13. Peasant-Democratic Party of Ukraine	52.3	3.2	8.0	23.2	10.1	3.3	—0.27
14. Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (SDPU)	54.2	1.5	5.5	23.9	10.6	4.3	—0.31
15. United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (OSDPU)	57.1	2.1	5.0	22.2	10.3	3.4	—0.32
16. Liberal Democratic Party of Ukraine (LDPU)	54.9	1.9	5.1	23.4	11.0	3.8	—0.32
17. Ukrainian National Party (UNP)	52.7	2.4	5.2	23.3	11.3	5.2	—0.32
18. Former Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU)	23.7	2.3	8.1	23.4	23.6	19.0	—0.37

Reportedly Little Faith in Parties, Government

92UN1113A Kiev VECHIRNIY KYYIV in Ukrainian 20 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Svitlana Synyakova under the "Political Crossroads" rubric: "The People Are Silent. And That Means a Storm Is Brewing"]

[Text] **A three-day republic scientific-practical conference on the topic "Toward a New Ukraine Through Reforms," sponsored by the Nova Ukrayina public-political association, was recently held in Kiev. It is interesting that politicians, holding the mandates of deputies, were joined in organizing the conference by businessmen, among them the Epsilon Center for Humanities Research, the Ukrainian League of Enterprise Owners With Foreign Investment of Capital, the Kiev Yednannya Trade Union of Employees of Cooperatives and Other Forms of Free Enterprise, and others. It was the businessmen who provided the funds that made it possible for theoreticians in the fields of politics, economics, science, and education to exchange views at the podium and in the lobby of the conference hall.**

As we know, businessmen do not throw away money. What, then, did they stand to gain? The following observations by **A. KOVAL**, head of the Epsilon Center for Humanities Research, provide a partial explanation.

"For instance, we are introducing a free market. But we do not stop to consider the possibility that our society may subconsciously reject this innovation. Yet we should keep in mind that just as you cannot take the words out of a song, so you cannot erase from our history more than seventy years of an unprecedented attempt to build socialism. The psychology of several generations of the peoples of the former Union carries on it the imprint of those years. This should be taken into account.

"Or this. We Ukrainians are East Slavs. What is acceptable in the West may be out of place in the East. Therefore, it is quite possible that very specific pills are needed to treat the Ukrainian economy. Moreover, what requires treatment is not just the economy, but the whole social organism. As a result, this is a matter not only for economists, lawyers, businessmen, and politicians, but also for sociologists, culturalists, psychologists, and even historians.

"It is not difficult to understand people who have gone out on their own, as it were. If the reforms fail, they will be the first to suffer. The brief history of NEP [New Economic Plan] does not allow other conclusions. But that is not the only thing that NEP teaches us. The end of NEP quite logically led to 1937 and other such years. Do we have the strength to break out of this vicious circle?"

I thought the most interesting discussion from the standpoint of the above question was presented in the joint paper by **Professor V. Butkevych, Professor V. Volovych, and Docent V. Polokhal.** Allow me to cite some of their observations:

"The success and prospects of implementing reforms in Ukraine as it moves from authoritarianism to a normal, dynamic, and stable civil society now depend directly on whether or not the existing political parties and movements will be able to ensure mass social support for these reforms.... There is, however, evidence of growing political apathy, caused by objective conditions, among a significant portion of the population. Random polls show that more than 50 percent of the population does not trust any of the institutions of government, any political party, or any public-political organization. This is also confirmed by the results of the elections of people's deputies in one of the districts of Kiev that took place, or, more precisely, failed to take place two weeks ago. Less than 40 percent of those eligible to vote took part in the elections. And, as we know, for the past several years Kiev has served as a barometer of social attitudes in the sociopolitical life of the republic.

"Briefly put, today's Ukrainian society represents an indifferent 'silent majority' in both social and political respects. This majority has not yet defined itself and does not in fact know what it wants. However, this condition cannot endure and has an end result. If the advocates of the ideals of democracy and freedom fail to shape the social will of this majority through political means, it may rapidly fall prey to populist demagogues and the advocates of totalitarianism as life grows increasingly more difficult."

Such is the prognosis of political scientists. And it is confirmed by specialists in the law:

"As far as providing a legal foundation for socioeconomic reforms is concerned, it appears at first glance that a great deal has been done. For two years, the Supreme Soviet has more or less actively been trying to fill this vacuum. Nor is there a sense that the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 'owes' us anything in this respect. However, such activity in itself does not prove that there exists a thought-out state legal policy. If anything, it serves as an indicator of unconsidered, spontaneous, pseudoreformist activity...

"When the president proposed to set aside the laws passed by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine and declare a state of economic emergency, he in effect admitted that the work done by the Supreme Soviet over the last two years had not been headed in the right direction. Small wonder that more and more frequently we now hear statements to the effect that the Cabinet of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet have only been working the 100 days that have passed since the referendum on independence. As if to say that we had a different Cabinet or a different Supreme Soviet prior to this. The attempt to separate oneself from oneself in the temporal dimension inevitably leads to self-liquidation rather than to rebirth...

"Although there has been much talk about a rule-of-law state, we have not yet begun to create it. The old administrative command system—the antithesis of a rule-of-law state—is still wholly in place.

"It is not surprising, therefore, that almost everything in the republic (except for slogans, appeals, and speeches by political leaders) remains the same as before. As before, we have a Supreme Soviet (whose election was a far cry from a democratic process) instead of a permanently acting parliament. We have changed the name of the Council of Ministers to the Cabinet of Ministers, leaving it with the same powers, the same people, and the right to make irresponsible, unprofessional, and incompetent decisions. We have created a new position and extended to its holder the functions of a puppet. We have not created a judicial power, thereby confirming that we regard the rule-of-law state as a speculative concept. We have not established the separation of powers, and, as a result, have not succeeded in fixing the limits of authority between the highest organs of the government and the administrative branch. We have not set up a constitutional court...

"We could easily continue listing what we have *not* done, but do we really need to do so? We can put it much more simply: The only thing we have done during the two years that this Supreme Soviet has been in office is to proclaim the Declaration of Sovereignty and the Act of Independence. And that is all...

"Society cannot exist in a state of expectation and stagnation for long. If we continue to do nothing to fundamentally strengthen the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, it is safe to assume even at this stage that we will lose both our sovereign (so far in slogans) state and our independent (so far in declarations) Ukraine."

All comments are superfluous. Just as it is pointless to blame the scholars for understanding the situation but saying and doing nothing about it. This is a job for the Supreme Soviet. But it appears that those who currently make up this body still fail to realize that they have already completed their role as "the driving force of progress." All reserves have been used up. All that is left to do is to leave the stage with dignity. Otherwise a new "seaman Zhelyeznyak" will appear and force everyone to dance to the same old tune.

Sevastopol Mayor Opposes Crimea Independence

92UN1111B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 26 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Olga Pronina, PRAVDA UKRAINY correspondent in the Republic of Crimea: "The Third 'Assault' on Sevastopol? Ivan Yermakov Gives an Explanation to PRAVDA UKRAINY"]

[Text] **The fighters for the independence of Crimea, it seems, are attempting to organize a scandal. They say that the Crimea produces every fourth stewing pan in the CIS—consequently, it is possible to live without Ukraine. Sevastopol's special status was fixed back in Catherine's time...**

This time the scandal is being organized around the ukase of President L.M. Kravchuk "Concerning Organs of State Executive Authority of the City of Sevastopol," or rather, around the alleged "extreme negative reaction" to it by the inhabitants of the hero-city.

Now, when the Crimea is on the threshold of a referendum, which could take it out of the structure of Ukraine, the leaders of the RDK [Crimean Republic Movement] are trying to suggest to Crimeans that this ukase will virtually take Sevastopol out of the Republic of Crimea and render the conduct of a referendum on its territory senseless and the inhabitants without rights. The scanty picketing of angered citizens at the Sevastopol City Soviet, which was shown the other day on Ostankino and Crimean television, apparently, was supposed to convince television viewers of the CIS that tension in the struggle for the independence of the Crimea, at least in Sevastopol, continues to grow.

But what, in fact, is occurring in the hero-city. We asked I.F. Yermakov, its mayor, to help us understand this. He has the floor:

"It was not long ago that guests of the Crimea left our peninsula with regret: It was better here with products, and we were not being whipped by the waves of political extremism of various polarities. The manifestations of national discord were profoundly foreign to Crimeans. But, gradually, the 'epidemic' of the illness of the young democracy even reached us. Imperceptibly we became accustomed to rallies, picketing, strikes, and other actions of civil disobedience.

"Today, as never before, you understand that the slow pace of conducting political and economic reforms, both in Ukraine and in the Crimea, does not at all promote stability in the sociopolitical situation. And although the recent series of meetings of delegations of Crimea and Sevastopol with the leadership of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine showed that there is an understanding of the problem of our region in Kiev, knowing the enormous inertia of the state machine it is difficult to hope for a quick implementation of what was planned. But it is now extremely necessary to the Crimea, where the increase in political tension is reaching the limit.

"It is entirely possible to understand the people who are trying independently to find a solution to the very difficult situation that is developing. A certain group of inhabitants of Crimea and Sevastopol associate this step with the holding of a general Crimean referendum. The more than 40,000 signatures collected in our city compel us to treat the idea of such a large-scale action rather seriously. It is all the more vexing when, instead of thoughtful analysis of the developing situation and arrangement of political forces, the mass media are engaged in affixing labels, manipulating public opinion, and stirring up political passions. For example, in a review of 14 March 'Forever under the yellow and blue?' the independent newspaper KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA makes an attempt to represent Sevastopol as a kind of prodigal son of Crimean democracy. Numerous readers are deliberately misled regarding the status of Sevastopol, the impending referendum on its territory, and the mood of its inhabitants. As for the status of Sevastopol as a city of republic significance, to Crimeans this comes as no surprise. This status, considering the strategic significance of Sevastopol, was in fact confirmed from Catherine's time, and it remains unchanged to this day.

"The question of its subordination was submitted to a general city referendum in Sevastopol in 1991, and 93.8 percent of the voters voted for a special status for the city. Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of Crimea ratified the special status of the city in a declaration on the sovereignty of Crimea and the draft of its constitution. The recent ukase of the president, which raised such a clamor among RDK supporters, only defined concretely the application of pertinent articles of the Constitution of Ukraine and gave an interpretation of the structures of subordination to executive authority, but it in no way changed the essence of things, as the supporters of independence are trying to persuade Crimeans.

"Why this question, which the citizens of Sevastopol always treated calmly, is now exaggerated specifically during the period of the campaign to collect signatures to demand a referendum is understandable, I think. Whether senseless or not, the holding of a referendum in Sevastopol has to be determined by Sevastopol's residents. It is another matter that it is possible to dispute the proposed wording on independence for the Republic of Crimea in a union with other states. Such a word combination can lead to a deeper political labyrinth in the event of a referendum. I am also troubled by the fact that until now the official structures of the republic have not defined their attitude to a referendum. As if the collection of signatures, RDK rallies, pamphlets and the like were being disregarded. I repeatedly tried to submit this question for examination at the session of the Supreme Soviet of Crimea, but I did not get the support of the deputies.

"The holding of a referendum is a matter of the will of the people, their reason, and wisdom. But before deciding on such a serious step it is necessary to weigh carefully the pro's and con's. After all, the agitation now for the full independence of Crimea is only working at

the level of emotion. Is it really possible to take seriously the argument in leaflets I saw saying that since the Crimea produces every fourth stewing pan in the Soviet Union, it is also possible to live without Ukraine. No one in the Crimea has conducted a deep economic analysis or calculated what the Crimea is outside Ukraine. How and where raw materials will be obtained for industry, what kind of water will there be to drink, and whose energy systems will be used.

As for the yellow-and-blue banner over the buildings of the local soviets of Sevastopol, let us look at things soberly: Although the Crimea is a republic today, it is a part of Ukraine, and we are all obliged to adhere to its laws, if we want to live in a rule-of-law state.

Conflict Possible if Tatar Rights Denial Continues

92UN1141A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian 3 Apr 92

[Article by Boris Sidorenko: "A Time of Uraza, or How the Crimean Tatars Have Tried and Failed To Find Their Way Out of a Labyrinth Almost Half a Century Long"]

[Text] **Forty years ago I happened to serve my military duty in the Crimea. At that time we used to go out onto the boundless steppes between Feodosiya and Kerch for training. This place, covered with wretched grass, even in May burned under a blazing sun and did not present a happy picture. Yet the numerous gray snakes and varicolored lizards felt right at home in this hundred-kilometer space. What desolate territory!**

Once when we were rushing into the latest "attack" we were suddenly ordered to lie down, and I sank down happily. As I was catching my breath I noticed that I was not lying on the ground exactly but on a round spongy rock, eroded by time, wind, and occasional rain, with a hole in the middle. It did not take a specialist to realize it was an ordinary millstone once used to grind grain into flour. I concluded that people must have lived there once—probably Tatars who might have grown cereals locally. Now it was a bare desert!

Our commanders did not tell us about Tatars in Crimea at the time. But we were reminded of them by the curious place names, so strange to the Slavic ear—Karasu-Bazar, Ak-Monay, Chanda, Ayu-Dag—and by the faint echoes of the frightful punishment meted out against a whole people, who had been deported from their native lands and scattered afar....

Dividing and Ruling

For several years now the Tatars have been coming back to their homeland en masse. But it turns out no one is happy to see them. Their return is generating numerous problems, the knot grows more tangled, and all because no one wants to recognize the Tatars as natives of the Crimea with all the consequences ensuing therefrom. It is necessary to act, to go to the authorities and beg and demand that their rights be recognized at long last, so that land may be allotted or sold to them and they can get help finding housing and jobs. Enough humiliation! This was the origin of the plan called "Action Kiev-92." A large group of Crimean Tatars came to the capital city of Ukraine in search of truth, justice, and protection and recognition of their rights. What came out of this plan will be discussed below.

I met with the group of Crimean Tatars in the park by the Supreme Soviet building, next to the Vatunin Monument, and recorded their stories, which were bitter, but with a ray of hope.

Eredzhep Khayredinov, chairman of the Auditing Commission of the Crimean Tatar National Movement, told me:

"We have come here to get the Ukrainian parliament to recognize the Crimean Tatar nation's right to self-determination, and also to recognize our representative organ the Majlis, which was formed at the Kurultay, the Crimean Tatars' National Congress."

"But would it not have been more logical to secure recognition first from the Supreme Soviet of the Crimean Republic?" I asked.

"We thought so, too. But immediately after the Kurultay the Supreme Soviet of the Crimean Republic met and did not recognize our national Kurultay movement or the Majlis."

"You want to know why?" said Elviz Gafarov, who does various jobs on Prigorodnyy Sovkhoz in Simferopol Rayon. "Because they do not want to. And they are doing everything they can so that others will refuse to recognize not just us but Ukraine as well. There is a civic organization down there, the RDK (Republican Movement of Crimea), which is in favor of separating the Crimea from Ukraine. They are waging massive propaganda. They claim that the Ukrainians are going to wipe out the Russians. They are serious about it. And people believe them. And they are collecting signatures for an independent Crimea."

So no one is thinking up anything new in politics. In the same old way they are going by the principle Divide and Conquer. They are dividing, subdividing, waging false propaganda, and in this way ruling....

"We are convinced," Reserve Colonel Refat Kurtiyev adds, "that the present membership of the Crimean Supreme Soviet is against the Tatars. They will not even get in contact with the Majlis. So we are hoping that the parliamentarians of Ukraine will try to convince the Crimean Supreme Soviet that it is wrong to treat natives this way."

Eredzhep spoke up once more:

"In order to create the impression that the Crimean Tatars are taking part in the work of the Supreme Soviet of the Crimean Republic, yesterday's partycrats are

using the same old repulsive methods: They are selecting certain of our kinsmen who are convenient to them and placing them in state positions. For instance, they formed a culture-mongering society and from there they pushed into the Crimean Supreme Soviet someone like Iskander Memetov, whom the Majlis did not approve for the role. Our ill-wishers are resorting to slick maneuvers like that, claiming that we refused to take part in parliament. But what is there left for us to do if they never take account of our opinions? We do not want anybody to use us as silent stooges. Take a look at the mechanism by which our political opponents in the Crimean Supreme Soviet are operating. Let us say some parliamentary commission has a meeting to discuss an issue affecting us Tatars. In order to maintain the appearance of an objective discussion, they invite one of our spineless kinsmen, who just sits there and listens. Then they hand down some preplanned verdict and tell the public that the resolution of the issue was participated in by representatives of the Crimean Tatar people. Yet we do have our own fully responsible people, chosen by members of our own nation. Anyone who wants them should ask the Majlis, and such representatives will be immediately made available."

Bulldozing the Mosque

"Your attitude towards the Crimean Supreme Soviet is understandable," I agreed. "But what is the attitude of the so-called Russian-speaking population' toward you? How are they treating the new repatriates?"

"Parliament ignores us, and the populace, brainwashed by civic organizations such as the RDK, is very wary of us...."

The conversation was joined by Shefina Khalikova, a nurse who came from Uzbekistan as a delegate of the Crimean Tatar people to "Action Kiev-92."

"It is not just the civic organizations that are spreading all kinds of fairy tales about us. Recently I arrived in the Crimea with hopes of settling there. We looked at homes which people wanted to sell. But as soon as the owners found out that we were Crimean Tatars, they said, Go on home, we will not sell you our house.' We wondered what the matter was. Thank God we found one good soul—a Ukrainian woman, by the way—who invited us into her home and gave us this answer: Before you arrived, special representatives of the village soviet and the militia went around the village and warned people not to let these Crimean Tatars anywhere near their homes.' The village is called Trudovoye, in Sakskiy Rayon."

After such total propaganda, in which Soviet authorities were involved, things really got unbearable for the Crimean Tatars. But the Crimean authorities are not confining themselves to anti-Tatar propaganda. They are also operating with bulldozers. Here is what we were told about this by Shevkhi Seidametov, a vehicle driver by profession, who until recently worked as a gardener in the village of Cheremisovtsy, Belogorskiy Rayon:

"The native people are returning, and meanwhile the privatization and sale of the land is in full swing. But not to the Crimean Tatars, you will notice. And in Sara-Su, the local inhabitants were sent out to our self-built settlement."

Elviz Gafarov added:

"On 2 August 1991, before the start of GKChPism, [State Committee for the State of Emergency] bulldozers razed the homes and mosque we had built in the village of Molodezhnoye in our rayon. But as soon as the bulldozers disappeared, the Tatars began to build again in hopes that no one would touch them this time. But when the 19th came around—the day of action by the GKChPists, they razed all the structures again. I do not think that this would have taken place except by Bagrov's instructions...."

Evidently, I concluded, souls akin to the GKChPists had decided that their time had come. But I asked about something else, namely something I had heard before in the halls of the editorial offices.

"You say that they are destroying your homes, but you do not say that elsewhere in the Crimea, practically in Yalta, two nine-story buildings are being built for you. But the Crimean Tatars are refusing them, because, being village-dwellers, they do not like cities and high-rises. Are these rumors true or not?"

"It's a lie." Khayredinov answered. "No one has built housing like that for us, although representatives of the Crimean Tatar intelligentsia would not refuse it. There are professors and doctors of science among us.... It is true that in Yevpatoriya they began to build something for us, and in Simferopol 25 apartments are to be offered to Crimean Tatars in one building. In addition, plans call for constructing three buildings in accordance with a state program. And there is some construction going on in the villages and settlements, but it is all insignificant compared to the flood of repatriates. There are 180,000 Crimean Tatars living in Crimea now, and about 20,000 are wandering around without residence permits. According to the population settlement scheme, Crimea is supposed to be taking in about 20,000 Tatars per year, but if they are settled at this rate, the repatriation process will never be finished, because the annual natural growth of our people outside the Crimea will exceed that number."

"It looks like your situation is critical in the Crimea. Do you see any way out?"

"We came to the capital city of Ukraine in search of a way out of the labyrinth of continuing problems," said Khayredinov. "We were hoping to find understanding in parliament, hoping to be recognized, because after all, we recognize Ukraine, unlike certain other political forces in Crimea. We decided to attract the deputies' attention to ourselves, and to do this we had to put up our tents as close as possible to the entrance to the Supreme Soviet. So that the members of parliament, as they went to

meetings, could see that we are here, that we are appealing to the public to help us solve our urgent problems. But what happened after our peaceful initiative? When I came up to the place where our boys were trying to put up the tents, we were surrounded by militia and troops armed with gas canisters and clubs. They closed the circle and began to beat everybody indiscriminately and released the gas. Since then, Ava Bikirov has been in the hospital with a broken collar bone, and Dilyara Refatova has a broken rib. These women are pensioners, and in addition one of them is an invalid. Were they really dangerous to anybody? Why this inhuman treatment of people who are seeking their rights in Ukraine's capital city? The only thing that sustains us is that most Kievans treat us well and try to help us if they can...."

This was corroborated by a Kievan woman, pensioner Neonila Volkotrub, who had stood there and listened in on our conversation:

"On that day, the 19th of March, I came here and saw the whole terrible thing. The senior Tatar went into the Supreme Soviet and then returned to Vatunin Monument, where a rally and then a public prayer were held. They hardly had time to get on their feet when they were attacked; the crowd was split up into parts and penetrated to the center. People were beaten for no reason. No reason at all.... It is shameful for us Kievans and for our whole people that we cannot solve the problems of the Tatars through reason rather than resorting to clubs...."

The Ukrainian woman speaks the truth. It was not our people who deported the Tatars from Crimea; we ourselves were deported sometimes. But if we are to be considered an independent state, we must now restore justice by getting rid of the consequences of the evil actions of the masters of the communist empire. Instead of their lawful rights, however, what have the best representatives of the Crimean Tatars received? What they have received from the "democratizers," in fact, are blows across their shoulders and backs.

Is Crimea Creeping Towards Karabakh?

A frightful injustice has been going on for almost half a century, and no one has had the courage to put a stop to it. Even our parliament.

Let us attempt to predict what might happen to all of us from the Crimean Tatars' impasse. If no solution is found to the problems, the conflict in Crimea might get even worse, and this circumstance can result in an irreversible situation in which antidemocratic separatist forces will try to tear Crimea away from Ukraine and "bury" the Crimean Tatar question for decades. Naturally, this will not bring any good either to Ukraine or to Crimea, nor to the Crimean Tatars. The tighter the bowstring is pulled, the deeper the arrow will strike.

The Crimean Tatar people have now entered the time of fasting known as Uraza. For a full month, Moslems cannot take food or even water from sunup to sundown.

"Our people—even those who are picketing—are observing the Uraza," Shefika Khalikova said proudly.

And I thought, the Crimean Tatars have been observing Uraza for almost half a century, starting with that fateful spring day when all of the members of that nation were deported to faraway lands.

"What might all this indefiniteness lead to?" I asked the Crimean Tatars who had gathered around me. Eredzhep Khayredinov answered:

"We will try to make use of nonviolence. We have plenty of opportunities for peaceful struggle. If the Ukrainian parliament does not recognize our demands, our organization will be forced to appeal to the world community for help for this unhappy nation, which was expelled from its homeland and has never had its rights restored. And we will hope that if Ukraine is not able to restore the rights of its lawful children, then someone appointed by the United Nations will do so."

Shevkhi Seydametov added:

"All of this indefiniteness with respect to our situation could very easily result in a Crimean Karabakh. And it will not be our fault."

To be sure, it is entirely possible, although not to be desired. If the Tatars' hopes for a peaceful solution to the problem fade, a Crimean Karabakh looms. And it would not necessarily be the Crimean Tatars who started it. All it would take is a spark.

We are happy today about breaking away from the empire. But have we really broken away? It seems to me that the empire is still on the backs of many of us, and sometimes in our hearts and heads. At this point, I should like to appeal to our parliamentarians as follows:

Our esteemed gentlemen and comrades! It is still not too late; give back to the Crimean Tatars that which was taken away from them by tsars past and present. By doing so you will open the gates and release this persecuted, hounded, freedom-loving people from the tangled labyrinth of artificially created obstacles to a normal life. At long last, the nearly half-century fasting of Uraza must come to an end.

Majlis Chairman on Crimean Tatar Concerns

92UN1141B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 2 Apr 92 p 2

[Interview with Refat Chubarov, deputy chairman of the Majlis of the Crimean Tatar People, by correspondent Olga Pronina; place and date not given: "We Have No Other Land"]

[Text] **In the heat of today's passions over the future of Crimea, fighters for Crimean independence have somehow forgotten that there is also another native people living on Crimean territory—the Crimean Tatars. But it would not be amiss to find out what the people who have returned from exile think about the future fate of their historical homeland, and what they want the fundamental law of the Crimean Republic—the constitution—to look like. Moreover, what is the likelihood of unforeseen consequences in connection with attempts to play the "Crimean card" against their will?**

These are the questions I put to Refat Chubarov, deputy chairman of the Majlis of the Crimean Tatar People. Here is what he said:

The opinion of the Crimean Tatars is set forth in the Declaration of National Sovereignty that was adopted at the Kurultay (congress) in June of last year, in which we state clearly that we are going to restore statehood in our historical homeland. We are not against seeing Crimean autonomy reinstated within an independent Ukraine; what we are against is having this done on a territorial basis. Our people can preserve itself and prosper as an ethos only in Crimea; we have no other land. This is why we want to have state guarantees of our national self-determination within an independent Ukraine.

Today's problems in Crimea took shape, with all their conflicts and insolubility, in late 1990, when the Crimean Tatars opposed holding the referendum, because not all the families of the deported had returned to their homeland yet. To decide the fate of Crimea and all its native peoples by a mere raising of the hand by a majority of Crimeans, it seemed to us, was not right. We warned at the time that the 20 January referendum would be a first step toward destabilization of the situation in Crimea. Unfortunately, that is what happened.

Practically from the moment of deportation of the Crimean Tatars, the local authorities changed, yet the policy remained what it had been. All those years, an artificial stereotype of the Crimean Tatars as enemies was formed. Our return coincided with perestroyka, which to a large extent shook entrenched structures. The old party regime, which was still quite firmly ensconced in its armchairs, began to detect the winds of change. It was not able to undertake to deal with Crimea's social problems and [illegible] win the people's trust, because of its conservati[illegible] inertia. Then the tried-and-true bolshevik meth[illegible] of setting people against people came into play. It was necessary to show an enemy that was preventing a normal life. And the Tatars filled the bill just fine. When elections to the Supreme Soviet and the local soviets were being held, Crimeans were so intimidated by the threat of "Tatarization" that not a single deputy was elected from among the Crimean Tatars to serve in the oblast soviet at the time.

The task is broader now: to nullify the actions of the emerging democratic forces of Crimea which are striving to build a society which can satisfy everyone living on the peninsula, and to make their own rule even stronger—up to and including the creation of an independent republic. At that time, artificially created political parties and movements sprang up all over the place, and, incidentally, the leaders of many of them got quite a lot of support from party structures along with substantial material infusion. They began to play on the nationalistic feelings of Russians living in Crimea. One can trace the ultimate interests of each of the groups in terms of their position. Until democratic processes got started in Ukraine and the country declared its independence, its policies suited many people fine. I do not have any particular names in mind. It is just a whole segment of the nomenklatura, which fairly easily moved from party to parliamentary and governmental armchairs. Given the resulting situation, they chose the only possible variant for themselves: to fight for the complete independence of Crimea, thus guaranteeing them personal prosperity and immunity. I am going into these details so that you will understand that in the final analysis the whole struggle for the interests of Crimea are rooted firmly in the struggle for the interests of the ruling authorities and their nomenklatura, counting on the support of the Russian-speaking population.

And events are unfolding in such a manner that it is simply hard to find the most convenient moment. And so they are trying to bring to the point of conflict the issue of whether Crimea belongs to Ukraine or Russia. But if, God forbid, it should be brought to the point of absurdity, two unresolvable problems will arise: Ukraine will have a hard time implementing its Declaration of Sovereignty, and it will place the Crimean Tatars in a drastic situation with respect to their struggle for self-determination. To broach the issue of to whom Crimea belongs today is to doom ourselves to a situation in which we will not be able to solve any of its problems. The issue of affiliation is splitting Crimeans into irreconcilable groups.

Under these circumstances, only a thoughtful and considered approach to the drafting of the constitution could somehow reconcile Crimeans. In the draft of the constitution which the Majlis worked out, we have tried to embody guarantees of our interests in state structures. Up to now, however, the Crimean Supreme Soviet has acted as if the Majlis did not exist. So far it has not been recognized de jure. In addition, the Supreme Soviet has given it an extremely negative appraisal. Not until 27 January of this year did the Supreme Soviet come to us with the proposal to hold a joint meeting of deputies and Majlis representatives. All the same, as he opened it Supreme Soviet Chairman Nikolay Bagrov let slip that there were a few representatives of the Crimean Tatars present who had proposed an alternative draft. The discussion was lengthy and not easy, but I have to say, with satisfaction, that a number of deputies understand very well that unless the Crimean Tatars' problems are

solved, unless there are guarantees of their representation in the organs of government, it will be impossible to solve the problems of Crimea and place its society on a sound footing.

But when they tried to sum it up, the majority still insisted that the Supreme Soviet proclaim autonomy on the territorial principle, and there is no possibility of compromise.

Given the complex situation, in our opinion, it is necessary to stop the adoption of the constitution, because the Majlis and the Supreme Soviet have failed to reach a consensus. And it is hardly likely they can do so given such positions. The question of deciding the fate of this deported nation will have to be taken up by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and examined in parliament, if, of course, Ukraine seriously intends to build a democratic society. We can see no other civilized way to solve our problem.

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Illegal Use of U.S. Dollars Affecting Economy

92UN1119B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 7 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Georgiy Dolzhenko, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA staff correspondent: "The Dnieper Is Wonderful in Quiet Weather. And the Dollar—Always"]

[Text] Kiev—**Hard Currency Rush in Ukraine—in Pictures and in Specialists' Opinions**

Have you noticed this peculiarity? Life around us is increasingly often tuned to stock exchange summaries. The exchange rates of monetary units continuously rock our well-being; the relationship between the ruble and hard currency determines the price of goods in the stores and the purchasing capacity of the people. And this relationship is as changeable as the wind in May. Only a month ago the dollar bought 230 rubles [R]; now it gets R100 in Kiev, and even less in Russia—R60-70. Such upswings and falls of monetary exchange rates are generally a normal phenomenon in the market environment. What is not normal is the fact that some of our overly smart compatriots check their life's course exclusively against the reference points of the hard currency rates.

Hard currency is flowing into Ukraine through a multitude of streams, but only 20 to 30 million hard currency rubles annually land in the treasury accounts. Last August, the state had to appeal to enterprises for help in providing hard currency to purchase grain, but the latter turned out to be no richer than church rats. The crux of the problem is that the hard currency streams, skillfully directed around the state treasury, settle in the pockets of wheelers-dealers.

One can count on his fingers the number of those wishing to earn a million in hard currency rubles through honest labor. At a Bessarabia market, you may be offered a kilogram of meat for a couple of dollars. In the Borispol airport, taxi drivers unerringly identify the owners of "greenbacks" and lure them to their chariots. Some manage to rent apartments for currency. Some sell them, having first privatized them or bought out their square meters for rubles, and then unload them through a broker for dollars.

The wild privatization of housing in Kiev is gaining speed. Especially active are citizens leaving permanently for foreign countries. And really, why not take a nice round sum with them? Lately, 5,000 lucky ones became owners of apartments in the capital city. Of them, about 100 are foreigners, 200 representatives of Transcaucasian nations, and the rest—our "business" people.

You may become a serious contender for the title of millionaire if you obtain in accordance with proper procedures a license for exchanging hard currency for rubles, or establish with God's help some quiet association for the same purpose. No room in an exchange association—do not despair. Set up an unremarkable brokerage office in any sphere of business: computers, equipment, or, in the worst case scenario, horns and hooves. Find a trusting client, sign a delivery contract with a mandatory prepayment, and promise to deliver to him at the agreed-upon time (the later the better) the desired goods on a gold platter. You put the money to work right away, and several months later, with apologies, refund to the client his prepayment, by now seriously chipped up by inflation.

There are other ways to put together a fortune in dollars. This is what V. Urchukin, president of the Ukrintur [Ukraine Foreign Tours] company, related to me. Hotels of the former USSR State Committee for Foreign Tourism are almost entirely divided between mafiosi groups. The same groups have created almost 800 small enterprises, which by letters of permission place foreigners in hotels for rubles, while appropriating the lion's share of hard currency, leaving the state treasury high and dry. Moreover, some hotels—such as, for instance, Lybid in Kiev—have been turned into centers of crime and prostitution. "I have tried to fight it," says V. Urchukin. "But in the end of December I was accosted near my home and beaten up; they used knuckle dusters and nerve-paralyzing gas. The mafia let me know who is the real master of the situation."

Leaving the scum aside, because of the confusion, chaos, and ineffectiveness of the laws, these methods of obtaining hard currency may be considered legitimate. In the worst case—semilegitimate, not bringing on their heels harsh articles of the Criminal Code. There also are, however, those willing to risk freedom by trying their luck in the sphere of the forbidden. The most harmless of those are commercial trips abroad. One trip, for instance, to Poland brings $200-$250 or more. Despite the price liberalization, everything goes there. Especially considering that there are no more problems with passports. Only novices go through the motion of getting an invitation—usually, a fictitious one. They are too much

trouble, plus the permission is only given for one trip. Business trips are another matter.

"Members of cooperatives are especially experienced in such trips," says V. Shepel, chief of the Visa and Registration Department [OVIR] administration of the republic's MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. Cooperatives are established for this purpose. One or two persons go, but register another ten strangers to go with them. In the end of last year, local authorities closed the border control point at Shegini for those traveling on private business, but there was still a line of about 1,200 cars—almost all company cars.

As is known, demand creates supply, and shortage looks for loopholes. OVIR and customs officials cannot always resist the temptation to "assist" someone for a certain remuneration. Last year, criminal proceedings for abuse of official position was initiated against three OVIR employees, about 20 people were removed from their job, and there was a major case in the Kiev and Zaporozhye customs.

We have taken a detour, though, from the main topic—the study of criminal ways of enrichment for those who want to be the masters of life tomorrow. A hard currency prostitute can hardly count on a cloudless future, since she is selling her health, and there are only illnesses ahead for her. It is another matter for souteneurs, international traders in "live goods." According to Ukraine MVD General G. Sheludko, chief of the Interregional Administration for Combating Organized Crime, our lost sheep are eagerly purchased abroad.

The mafiosi structures have stretched their hands into other profitable endeavors as well—for instance, cars. The militia is currently looking for 6,000 stolen passenger cars. The theft is done on a large scale, with one group stealing, another "welds-over" the numbers on chassis and engines, and the third ships the merchandise "over the hill." There is also a reverse flow of the same kind of goods. The most widely used corridors are between Poland, Hungary, and Ukraine. According to Interpol, half of the cars stolen in Italy and Germany end up in Poland, and then some of them end up here. But this is rough work that involves risk. Hard currency "casters" are another matter. This requires a quick hand and extensive knowledge of psychology.

You come to an Intourist cashier's window, select a dealer who wants to exchange rubles into hard currency, and strike an acquaintance with him: I just came back from a business trip abroad, you say, or international competition, and I do not know how to turn dollars into rubles—at a market rate, of course. Naturally, he gets excited, and you bring him "home." You bring him to the door, and leave him for a moment "to see that there are no visitors." Then you reappear and say that there are indeed unexpected guests in the house, then offer to conduct the exchange right there, on the spot. The client agrees, and you give him a wad of real dollars to count. Then you take it back and ask him to count his money. Then you take it, while handing him a "doll" he had seemingly just counted. At this moment, your accomplice posing as a dvornik or a militia man appears and asks what exactly you are doing. You and the client, naturally, take off in different directions. The trick is accomplished.

This is, of course, just a schematic outline. Everything is much more complicated, but there are other, simpler ways to operate. On the whole, however, listing them is a waste of time. All of them spring from life, from your and my discomfort. For instance, foreigners living in Kiev and other cities, are permitted to exchange Ukraine coupons at a 1:10 rate. At the same time, the dollar already brings R250. So it turns out that the state itself gives a hand to our "shadow economy dealers." And they will do their best, have no doubt.

The whole point is that one dollar is not worth 250, or even 100, of our rubles—"wooden" as they may be. It has been raised to such heights and is being propped there artificially only for speculative purposes.

According to the same V. Urchukin—he holds a doctorate in economic science, used to be deputy chairman of the Ukraine Council of Ministers, and knows the problem inside out—as early as 1990 it was proposed to the then all-Union government headed by N. Ryzhkov to purchase hard currency from entrepreneurs at the rate of R22 per dollar, and permit them to use the remaining 60 percent of the hard currency at R24 per dollar. This would have increased the incentives for the producers to earn hard currency, would have replenished the treasury, but most importantly, the market rate of the dollar would not have exceeded R30. In 1991, however, the following order was established: 40 percent of hard currency earnings were expropriated automatically; of the remaining 60 percent, the enterprises could keep 12, while 4.8 percent went into a local budget and 43.2 to all-Union ministries. In this situation, where would the desire to earn hard currency come from?

We had a chance to see for ourselves that there are more than enough problems with hard currency. They have sprouted shoots, which produced profusely blooming racketeering, machinations, and other social ills. Instead of trying to cure those, however, we should treat the roots that feed the ills.

Vice Prime Minister Lanovyy on Economic Independence

92UN1119A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian 7 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Ukraine Vice Prime Minister Vladimir Lanovyy: "Economic Policy and the Policy of Reforms"]

[Text] Can Ukraine today travel the road of transforming the economic system on the principles of free market economy, regulated by the sovereign Ukrainian state? Yes, it can.

The strategy of this road was set by the current president of Ukraine about two years ago, and the author of these notes was charged with participating in its development. Is there another way?

No, there is not.

The freedom of producers of goods is realized through their realization of the rules dictated to them by the market. The market structure is dynamic to the extent it follows from the self-development of the economy, on the one hand, and on the other, to the extent it is permitted by the state.

By maintaining control over the state of the market, the state, to a greater or lesser degree, restrains structural economic shifts.

Today, the former state—the Soviet Union—has disintegrated.

A multitude of new, politically independent states have emerged. The latter, however, have not yet mastered the entire arsenal of the means of regulating their national economies. All with the exception of one—Russia. The latter not only completely manages the economy within its state borders, but also controls the economic processes in the aggregate of states—former parts of the USSR. In this situation, Russia could not fail to make use the advantages of its dominating position; the regulating state impulses are directed at economic exploitation of the countries dependent on it, to its own advantage.

The whole world is familiar with the methods of foreign economic expansion in the environment of formal independence of the states—it is the method of financial pressure exerted upon them. This method is used as a given by Russia in respect to other states. In addition, Russia has appropriated the right of singlehandedly managing the common money supply.

When the CIS was being formed, the Russian Federation did not offer to jointly regulate the issuance and allocation between the states of the money printed by enterprises it nationalized. The Central Bank of Russia, without consulting with others, releases new installments of credit resources, which go into possession of exclusively Russia's organizations (budget, banks, and enterprises). It is using unilaterally the bank deposits and other loan capital of all states, previously centralized by the USSR Gosbank [State Bank].

As a result of these actions alone, the largest of the CIS states turns to its advantage the correlation between the physical volumes of exported and imported goods, although the value-based balance of foreign trade, for example, between Ukraine and Russia, will show the opposite picture: Ukraine and other states caught in financial and money nets, will show as debtors. They will also be compelled to partially make up for internal and external debts that belong to Russia, which has purchased imported goods with respective means. Using the jointly created gold and hard currency reserves, the Russian state already ensures a higher solvency of the ruble on its territory.

Having created the necessary financial-valuable preconditions, Russia will soon start presenting for the debt obligations of other states for their negative balance in the export-import turnover.

Can Ukraine in these circumstances independently regulate the correlation between goods and money on its territory, stimulate foreign trade activities, stabilize prices, introduce anti-inflation levers, strive for financial stability of enterprises, and maintain the people's standard of living? Can it stimulate structural shifts and the growth of national wealth, an increased inflow of investments, goods, and technologies? No, and no.

There is only one solution: to consistently implement the course towards economic independence expressed by destiny-setting acts of the Ukraine Supreme Soviet in 1990 and 1991, and by "foundations of national economic policy" formulated by the president of our state.

The reasonableness of these approaches has been reaffirmed in personal conversations and discussions with, and expert evaluations by, major politicians and businessmen from the United States, England, Italy, and Germany, by the scientists from Harvard, New York, and Central European universities, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and others. And now we must make a decisive step towards establishing a sovereign economy—through independent money emission, independent credit system, our own budget and borrowing policy, our own control over movement of prices, ensuring the balance between the goods and means of payment, and the customs and hard currency regulation.

What will be the new economic function of the Ukrainian state? It will steadily free the market from its administrative guardianship. In particular, it will be expressed in the following: First, the list of products sold outside state orders, allocations, and other centralized distribution channels will be greatly increased. At the same time, wherever there is competition, the state will not interfere in price formation. Second, budget transfusions into the economy will be considerably reduced, and at the same time direct and indirect taxes will be reduced. The state will loosen the control over the creation and liquidation of enterprises and the sales of property and securities. The national bank will stop issuing directives in what volume and at what price the banks should buy credit resources. Third, the list of goods being reviewed [as published] for export will be minimized, and the number of degrees of freedom in hard currency operations increased. The Ukrainian state will master the methods of indirect influence. Primary among them will be: stimulation with the help of preferential credits, taxes, subsidies, and investment structural restructuring and introduction of new technologies; regulation of the money mass and activities of the banks;

exerting influence on monopolists through taxes, differentiated customs-duty and hard currency stimulation of exports; and encouragement of entrepreneurship and trade.

In addition, our state is the only one that will be able to ensure the economic protection on its territory for both those who produce and those who consume. For this purpose, the state, through economic and financial means, will strive for stability of both the domestic and the external rate of the national monetary unit. At the same time, Ukraine will be adjusting its external rate in respect to currencies with falling value and thus protect domestic prices from exports from respective countries. Using special methods, it will ensure the equivalency of the external hard currency and commodity exchange. Our own border and customs control will relieve us from the disorganized export of national currency and material resources out of the state, while skillful structural regulation of exports and imports will bring about the positive balance of payments for the republic.

Metro's Podolsk-Voskresensk Line Viewed

924A0930A Kiev VECHERNIY KIYEV in Russian 25 Mar 92 p 3

[Interview with A. Volynskiy, director of Kiev Subway Design Institute by correspondent P. Motlyakh; place and date not given: "The Birth of the Podolsk-Voskresensk Line"]

[Text] **For a number of years passions have been flaring around the project for construction of the fourth line of the Kiev metro, the Podolsk-Voskresensk Line. From the very name of this line itself it is evident that it must traverse the oldest district of the city—Podol. This is what sparked the strife: There are still fresh memories of the complications that developed as a result of the laying of the first line through this district to Obolon.... What is the state of design work on the new line today, which variant was selected from the many proposed, and were some lessons extracted from previous experience? Our correspondent speaks with A.P. Volynskiy, director of the Kiev Metro Design [Kievmetroproyekt] Institute about that and many other matters.**

It is already clear to everyone, Anatoliy Petrovich said, that the largest Vigurovshchina-Troyeshchina housing complex in the city and its closest neighbors cannot get by without a link with the right-bank part of the city. More than 350,000 people live here (an entire oblast center!) and building is continuing.

[Motlyakh] There would also be no harm in asking someone about how the development of the city was planned: Large masses of people were housed on the left bank of the Dnieper, while their work remained on the right bank...

[Volynskiy] Yes. It is true. Beside Thermoelectric Power Station-6 and the Almaz Production Association, people have nowhere to work in the northern section of left-bank Kiev. Thank God, the completion in the near future of the left wing of the Syretsk-Pechersk Line eliminates transportation problems in the southern left-bank area—the Kharkov complex, Poznyaki and Oskorki. The establishment of a link between the northern part of the left bank and the rest of the city, however, remains undecided.

[Motlyakh] What about the Moskovskiy Bridge?

[Volynskiy] Everyone knows how well traveled it is: It handles eight bus routes and three trolley-bus routes. Bus loads during peak hours amount to seven to eight persons per square meter. And what takes place mornings and evenings at Petrovka Station?

Today more than 60,000 transportation units cross the Moskovskiy Bridge per day. In ten years this load will double and significantly exceed the handling capacity of the bridge. No other type of transport, except for the metro, is capable of resolving problems of linkage between the left and right banks.

[Motlyakh] But a portion of the load will be assumed by the proposed construction of the high-speed streetcar line along the Dnieper—from Vigurovshchina-Troyeschina to the Kharkov complex with transfer to two metro lines: Svyatoshchino-Brovarsk and Syretsk-Pechersk lines.

[Volynskiy] That is exactly it—a portion. The time it takes to get to the right bank will prove to be too long. The handling capacity of the high-speed streetcar does not exceed 45 percent that of the metro. No matter how you slice it the only solution is one more metro line across the Dnieper.

[Motlyakh] How is it to be brought through Podol, then across Trukhanov Island and Rybalskiy Peninsula and the two rivers—Dniester and Desenka, to say nothing of the Raduzhnoye Lake?

[Volynskiy] The following variant appeared to be the most rational at first glance: From the elevated part of the city the metro line exits to Verkhniy and Nizhniy Val streets near Frolovsk Church and along that street reaches a bridge which must be constructed in the harbor area. A transfer center was planned at Kontraktovaya Ploshchad Station.

[Motlyakh] The public rallied specifically against this variant. There was an extensive discussion in our newspaper as well.

[Volynskiy] That is the problem. If the metro is again built through Podol at a shallow depth then the losses will be nonrecoverable: At a depth of one to two meters here each cubic meter of earth is literally "stuffed" with priceless relics of our history. No one will forgive us for their loss.

There were numerous variants of the metro route through Podol—underground, above ground, on trestles

above Verkhniy and Nizhniy Val streets. Also surface routes in a trench along the street with overpasses at all intersections.

They were all faulty for a key reason—irreplaceable losses to the cultural layer of the most ancient part of the city, violation of the historical entity of Podol or disfigurement of its architectural facade by the concrete monster—the trestle. The inevitable increase in vehicular traffic in ancient Podol, the pollution, the noise—that, after all, also will not help the "well being" of the most ancient structures and architectural monuments.

[Motlyakh] But there were also some roundabout variants?

[Volynskiy] All of the previous roundabout variants provided little relief. It was either necessary to demolish many dwellings and industrial facilities because of the narrow streets, or the "trestle solution" appeared again in an arc from Nizhnyaya Yurkovskaya to the harbor. There would be less demolition, but a trestle in Podol, even outside the historical zone, would not be tolerated by the public. The excessively sharp, small-radius curves would have sharply diminished the speed of blue expresses.

[Motlyakh] Why not build deep tunnels below Podol and under the Dniester?

[Volynskiy] Of course, this would be the best variant. But under our conditions this is impossible. Water saturated sands are on the bottom of Dnieper to a depth of up to 35 meters. Freezing of the ground here does not help. Therefore the building of tunnels here has to be done with caisson chambers under high pressure. Work by a person under such high pressure is prohibited.

Automatic caisson panels for building of tunnels are available at present only in certain foreign countries. The purchase of such equipment and technology would require at least $40 million. We do not have such funds today. Furthermore an underwater tunnel of such a length under our hydrogeological conditions would produce considerable difficulties in operation.

Here is another thought. No matter how you twist and turn at present it is impossible to get by without another vehicular crossing over the Dnieper, even with another metro line. Therefore it was decided to build this bridge in combination with the metro. We will also "save" $40 million.

Work on the technical and economic substantiation of the last variant of the Podolsk-Voskresensk Line has practically been completed at our institute. The draft was prepared by a group of specialists under the guidance of Chief Project Engineer A.V. Kazadayev.

[Motlyakh] What are the main characteristics of the new metro line?

The length of the entire route with 16 stations is 26 kilometers. The metro stations Zhulyany, Aeroport, Sevastopolskaya Ploshchad, Vozdukhoflotskiy Prospekt, and Vokzalnaya-2 will be built in the left wing between the settlement of Zhulyany and Kiev-Passazhirskiy Station.

Further on the route will cross the Ploshchad Pobedy with a station in the vicinity of the circus, the Lukyanovskiy Rynok, the housing complex on Tatarka and will emerge in Podol. After crossing the harbor, Dnieper, and Desenka via the bridge this line will bisect Rusanovskiye Sady and will terminate at the junction of two complexes—Voskresenka and Vigurovshchina-Troyeshchina in the vicinity of the intersection of two prospects, Vatutin and Mayakovskiy, Raduzhnaya Street and Perov Boulevard. Designs of the stations were worked out sufficiently well.

[Motlyakh] What will they be like? Let us take a ride on this metro line...

[Volynskiy] Construction will be carried out, as usual, in segments. It is planned to complete the segment from Vokzalnaya to the end Voskresenskaya Station in nine years. Seven of these years will be spent on the first segment from Troyeshchina to Lukyanovskaya Station, and two years from there to Vokzalnaya Station.

Such a roundabout variant will cost eight to 10 percent more than the initial ones, since the route is lengthened by 1.3 kilometers. But what we will gain and save for this eight to 10 percent!

Demolition is comparatively limited: two dormitories of the Lenkuznitsa plant on Naberezhno-Lugovaya and the Kiev Rechnoy School, as well as several warehouses and coal storage units of the river port, and Woodworking Combine-3 of Stroydetal. That is about all, except for the moving of a few small dacha houses.

[Motlyakh] So, off we go—from Vokzalnaya-2 Station...

[Volynskiy] It will be built on the east side of the railway station and linked with the pedestrian crossing below the tracks. Transfer to the working station from one platform to the other will be possible via four escalators.

The underground Ploshchad Pobedy Station lobby is on the west side of the circus at the intersection of Prospekt Pobedy and Vorovskoy and Volodarskiy streets.

The Dukyanovskaya Station is located at the intersection of Artema and Kosiora streets. The underground lobby is incorporated in the underground passageways. This will also be the transfer point to the station of the same name as the Syretsk-Pechersk Line on which it is being constructed.

The deep-lying metro ends in the vicinity of Tatarskaya Station located at the center of the new housing complex.

Podolskaya Station is located on Naberezhno-Lugovaya Street and partly on the territory of Woodworking Combine-3. This will also be the transfer point to Taras Shevchenko Station which originally was not planned as

a transfer point and will therefore have to be redesigned. This will be accomplished without halting the movement of trains on the Krasnoarmeysk-Kurenevsk Line.

The section between Podolskaya and Sudostroitelnaya stations involves transition from underground to aboveground tracks on trestles and a bridge—over the territory of the freight-handling port, the harbor, and Rybalsk Peninsula. The bridge will be located between the Lenkuznitsa Plant and the old suspension bridge.

This bridge crossing will be linked with Frunze Street via Naberezhno-Lugovaya and Zavodskaya streets, which will allow vehicular traffic to detour around the historical part of Podol. A full bypass around Podol will be created after completion of a superhighway on Zavodskaya Street through Tatarka District in the future.

There are two stations after Podolskaya Station—the aboveground Sudostroitelnaya and Trukhanov Ostrov stations. The first one will be located on a trestle. One of its exits will lead to an escalator to the surface lobby on Elektrikov Street near the Lenkuznitsa plant.

The second station, Trukhanov Ostrov, will also be on a trestle in the northern part of the rest zone. Two of its lobbies were designed below the station itself on alluvial soil. People will go up and down on escalators.

Passing Trukhanov Ostrov we come to another bridge and trestle over Desenka and Rusanovskiye Sady. In some sections the metro will pass through shallow tunnels constructed in alluvial soil. In about the same way as across the Opechen Lake to Obolon.

Raduzhnaya Station is located in Rusanovskiye Sady near the Kiev-Petrovka—Kiev-Dneprovsk Railway Line. Its lobbies will contain transfer points to the electric trains and the high-speed Vigurovshchina-Troyeshchina—Kharkov Complex Streetcar Line.

The last segment is also embedded at a shallow depth. The route will cross Raduzhnoye Lake over an alluvial dam. Voskresenskaya—the end station, is of the ordinary type. Two lobbies and exits leading to underground pedestrian walkways below Raduzhnaya Street and Vatunin Prospekt.

At present preparations are under way at our institute for the further designing of a metro directly through the Vigurovshchina-Troyeshchina complex.

[Motlyakh] Thank you, Anatoliy Pavlovich, for an informative conversation.

BYELARUS

Prime Minister's Negative Remarks on CIS Future Noted

92UN1190A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 16, 15 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Anatoliy Kozlovich, correspondent: "The Belovezha 'Foresters' Could Have Been Taken by the 'Scrufs of Their Necks' That's What Byelarus's Prime Minister Thinks"]

[Text] **Byelarus's extremely unprofessional, uninformative, and uninteresting television suddenly produced a sensation on its late-evening program entitled "Capital."**

Dmitriy Filimonov, this program's leading journalist, reported certain details of a meeting between Vyacheslav Kebich, the Republic of Byelarus's prime minister, and the military. An amateur dictaphone attested over the airwaves how little confidence Byelarus's prime minister has in the CIS. He considers the Belovezha Forest meeting between Yeltsin, Kravchuk, and Shushkevich to be illegal and its decisions—unconstitutional. Kebich told the military with a hint of flattery that all he would have needed was a single one of our companies of assault troops to take this company of "foresters" by the "scrufs of their necks." (By the way, he himself was also in the Belovezha Forest at that time). Naturally, the prime minister took the military further into his confidence by telling them that nothing sensible or worthwhile would come of this CIS and that we must seek salvation beyond its borders—something which Byelarus is already engaged in doing very actively and successfully.

MOLDOVA

Dniester Region Politics Censured

92UN1154A Kiev VECHERNIY KIYEV in Russian 31 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Irina Lukomskaya: "'Russia's Combat Outpost': The Dniester Region through the Eyes of an Eyewitness"—usage of Moldavia, Moldova as published]

[Text] **The political card of the Moldavian Dniester region is eagerly being placed in the same pack with the Karabakh and Yugoslav cards, and the inevitability of interethnic conflict in disintegrating states is thereby affirmed. This point of view remains predominant in the central media, and it is rather "promising" as an instructive example for others who do not think too highly of the idea of various commonwealths of states—"See, that is the way it will be here."**

So, what is happening in the Dniester region? The officially recognized version is common knowledge—that the interethnic conflict is caused by the non-Moldavian population's fear that Moldova will be joined to Romania. Another version remains unheard, one that does not have a spokesman in today's mass media. It is expressed by B.M. Shcherba, leader of the civic movement "Dignity"—a movement that opposes the idea of statehood for the Dniester region:

[Shcherba] In order to understand just what the Dniester Republic is, it is necessary to listen to Tiraspol radio, to read Tiraspol newspapers, and to observe the innovations of the leadership of this republic.

The beloved heroes on Tiraspol radio are Makashov, Zhirinovskiy, and Nevzorov. In one of the broadcasts a message from Nevzorov was transmitted to the citizens of the Dniester region: "Stand firm, brothers." And somewhat earlier, a revelation of the same author: "In the Baltics it was necessary to take not the television center but the parliament." The "combat outpost of Russia"—this is what one of them nicknamed the Dniester region.

Undoubtedly, there are other interesting leading characters as well.

On 19 August the leadership of the Dniester region welcomed the telegram of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of the Emergency]. The composition of its leadership has almost been unchanged since that time.

President Smirnov declared at one of the meetings: "Some hurried to toss away their party cards. I always have my party card on me."

In a television interview Colonel Kitsak, commander in chief, called Gorbachev a "turncoat," saying: "All honest-minded people want everything to be like it was before the 1980's."

Cossacks from the Don appeared in Tiraspol in the fall. They were settled in the "Friendship," the best hotel in the city, and they paid 60 rubles [R] each per day. They immediately began to get the Dniester region Cossacks together. At present, the Cossacks receive R1,750 a month, not counting their food. They are actually mercenaries—who are charged by the command to be armed and ready. But these are people who like to drink. Imagine: Drunk, and not just one, and with weapons.

According to an ukase of President Smirnov the Cossacks will be in charge of the customs service. According to his ukase, they have been raised to the rank of officials. If you look in another document, it indicates there that citizens of the Dniester Republic are obligated to fulfill the instructions of officials.

Exasperation with the Cossacks compelled the people to unite. On the side of the newcomers from the "public" were the united council of labor collectives and the women's strike committee headed by Galina Andreyeva.

The first cherishes the idea of "new Russia"—from Tiraspol to Rostov. True, not long ago it was wide of the mark: In its message to the UN committee for the protection of human rights it called the Dniester region "age-old Russian lands." Having "lost" sight of the fact

that this is absolutely ignorant from an historical point of view—these always were diffuse Ukrainian-Moldavian territories.

But the women's strike committee (incidentally, what this name expresses is not clear) was celebrated at first because, sitting on the railroad tracks, it blocked the movement of trains at a time when it simply was necessary to export tomatoes—the whole crop was lost. But after that it spent R31,000 on a new year's evening party for the Cossacks. The slightly tight Cossacks had a row with a patrol, after which they were taken to the police; however, G. Andreyeva made a "resolute demand," and those who were at fault were released.

It is entirely possible that the women's strike committee learned to resolve questions in such a "resolute" way from the leadership of the republic, which in the very same style began transferring everything to its jurisdiction after the referendum. Among the first—symptomatically—are the police and the procuracy. How?

An armed man came to the police and said: Sign. One of my acquaintances complained: "I recently filed a report against him... The procuracy held out the longest of all, but it also yielded under the threat of unemployment. For greater cogency, before reporting to those "who fall under the jurisdiction," they were informed: Those who do not transfer will be declared outside the law. But—what law? The old ones are not in effect, and there are no new ones. Anarchy.

However, on what, other than force, is this "phantom-republic" based. On what?

The trump card is intimidation with the Romanian threat. That is, with the fact that the present leadership of Moldova, it is said, intends to join the republic to Romania. It is understandable that the non-Moldavian population gives a hostile reception to such a prospect. The threat is deliberately exaggerated, which arouses opposition to it, and on this basis people gather under their own flags.

But the whole problem is that the idea of joining Romania is very unpopular among the population—it is professed only by the leadership of the People's Front. As for President Snegur, he declared: "We did not pull our head out from under Moscow in order to place it under Bucharest." His program, which is oriented on independence, passed verification during the presidential elections of 8 December last year. An overwhelming majority of parliament supports it, including representatives of the People's Front.

But the Tiraspol leaders represent the matter in such a way that those who do not agree with them are nationalists who are fighting to join Romania. This is understandable. I am also among the nationalists, a teacher of Russian literature, who is half Ukrainian. The label sticks so firmly that even people who have known me for many years, after reading about me in the newspapers or hearing about me on the radio, ask if I really am for unification with Romania.

The second strong column supporting the building of Dniester statehood is fear. "Who is not with us is against us." It is impossible to assemble legally. Imagine, our coordination council meets, and a militia man appears immediately—all of us in the settlement have known each other for a long time, this is what is unpleasant—and he says that he is ordered to report who was here, and to disperse them. My telephone is monitored shamelessly (I know a fellow who is assigned to record my conversations on a tape recorder—he, lifting the receiver, breathes heavily and noisily). My movements are continuously followed.

On one occasion the school director assembled us, and, blushing, proposed that we sign a document, sent from above, with the words: "We, the undersigned, fully approve," and so forth in this spirit. It was very funny, but the administration signed it, nonetheless. The very same day it was announced on the radio: "One female employee in the rayon finance department did not sign such a document, and she now thinks: Sign it anyway or start to look for a new place of work, and a place to live at the same time."

The administration of three vocational schools located on the territory of Tiraspolskiy Rayon decided to stand firm. Then an order of the president came out about disbanding these schools. The official reason—the Dniester region does not need builders(!). Of course, the ukase was canceled after a certain time.

As for the educational policy of the politicians, starting next year a new subject will be introduced in the schools (the old one is not yet forgotten well enough)—basic military training. The left bank has no plans to switch the Moldavian language to the Latin script, as is done in Chisinau, but to soften the impression from its actions it is thinking of conducting a referendum on this score. Thus, a deliberate blow will be inflicted on the Moldavian language, which in the future will lead to the disappearance of its users in this region.

Chisinau's training programs, which are more advanced and modern, also are not recognized. The weight of the argument in favor of the Dniester region: Either do it the way we do, or we will stop financing you.

Tiraspol already has its own university. Ten professors will teach in it, and a doctor of juridical sciences has been appointed rector. It is true that all of them were dismissed from other VUZ's [higher educational institutions] that specialized in Marxism-Leninism. Practicing physicians will be invited to lecture at the medical faculty. The university is not yet a legal entity—this means that its diplomas will be invalid.

One detail: The new educational institution is being financed from the Russian fund. The fund actually has the right to finance various projects on the territory of

other states, but with the concurrence of those states. Nobody asked Moldova. But, of course, if the Russian fund has already recognized the statehood of the Dniester region.

As for the money, the residents of the left bank are very interested in where it is coming from. For example, my mother's pension is R800. Wages are correspondingly high also: They are increased for everyone on the first request: Where does such money come from—after all, the Dniester region is not trading with anyone yet. The official version: They opened their own bank. This is not very believable. Many suspect that it is the very same party millions that were lost.

Also puzzling is the appearance of weapons—everyone knows that the 14th Army, which is deployed on inflammable territory, is really observing neutrality, and that the arms are not from its stores. The Cossacks also admit this, verifying that they buy arms on the market; however, they refuse to demonstrate this very interesting process.

Now a so-called conciliation commission is working here. But, however paradoxical this may be, it is not interested in settling the conflict. After all, if the situation normalizes, the fog will be lifted, and the current figures will have to leave, and the people will not forgive them.

...Incidentally, virtually not one street has been renamed in recent years. One Japanese journalist was perplexed at first—the ideological changes, judging by the flags, slogans, and names, have not affected this part of the former USSR at all. But suddenly, moving along October 25th Street and seeing the building of the rayon executive committee in front of him and armed guards at the entrance, he laughed suddenly: "But this is the big museum of Bolshevism! Do not get rid of it. Show it to the tourists—and you will have a lot of money."

From the sidelines, all of this really looks comical. But I have to live there, and I get a little sick from this thought.[end Shcherba]

Last week Ostankino TV reported that half a squadron of Siberian Cossacks was heading for the Dniester region, and, it is said, if they choose to they will assemble still more. On what kind of a basis are citizens who are not even from an adjacent state interfering in the internal affairs of Moldova? It is very simple: The Cossacks have this kind of order—a local leader reported in a local television interview that if "they are beating our own," Cossacks come immediately from everywhere to help. Never mind the laws, never mind noninterference, especially if the country of which you are a citizen keeps quiet.

And Russia is persistently quiet, as if following its own tradition that was worked out over the course of recent years—January of last year in Lithuania, the December events in Tbilisi, and at times the indiscreet expression of words in support of the Russian-speaking population of the Crimea, but also the secret February instructions of R. Khasbulatov to the directors of Moscow hotels "not to give accommodations to persons of Chechen nationality" (IZVESTIYA wrote about this). Official Russia, as was recognized during the Kiev meeting of heads of state of the CIS, never forgets its national interests, even if it is difficult to reconcile them with the concept of justice with respect to other states.

Ukraine, echoing the character of its president, was silent for a long time. Immediately after the actual recognition of the coup d'etat in Georgia it still did not decide to express itself with respect to the Dniester region. As if it forgot that actions were taking place on its borders.

However, the Dniester region thought about itself: The war was threatening to spill over into Odessa Oblast. In the end the president decided to publish an ukaze on strengthening security on the border with Moldova. Later, a recommendation followed to the oblast executive committee to establish a commission for the reception of refugees. Afterwards came the ban on the transit of armed formations through Ukraine heading in the direction of Moldova. And even though after the last one a bus with Krasnodar numbers had already been seized, and its passengers were disarmed and sent back to where they came from, many are inclined to see first and foremost a political aspect in this step of the Ukrainian president (including Chisinau and Bucharest). In the end, Ukraine, albeit indirectly, recognized the fact of interference of representatives of Russia in the internal Moldovan conflict. In addition, it actually announced that it does not intend to take even an indirect part in all of this.

It is worth repeating that an important political announcement was made indirectly, on the sly, as if not to frighten or offend anyone. Meanwhile, not only the Cossacks did not catch it but even citizens of Ukraine. And that is why recruiters are coming to Kiev, bringing an official invitation to our lads to do battle, on a form with a double-headed eagle. Having no view on the events other than the "Russian view," some are going.

Thus, perhaps this really may not be a case when silence is golden?

Pro-Rutskoy Position on Dniester Events

92UN1156A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 Apr 92 p 4

[Article by S. Karkhanin: "Gunshots and Applause"]

[Text] Misfortune brings people together, and inhabitants of Dubossary, a frontline city, are listening to the radio broadcasts from the congress of Russian deputies all together—in the city soviet executive committee building. The day when the decree adopted on the Dniester region was broadcast, thousands of people greeted it with applause.

Chisinau continues, meanwhile, the tactics of threats. President of Moldova M. Snegur has unequivocally made it understood that he intends "restoring order" on

the left bank at all costs. The People's Front is organizing protest meetings against the position of the Russian authorities, and one such resolution addressed to President B. Yeltsin was sent by students of Chisinau Secondary School No. 6.

The declaration of the foreign ministers of Moldova, Russia, Romania, and Ukraine, which deals with the problems of the Dniester region, is being discussed extensively. Many residents of the left bank have noticed that general phrases are predominant in this document and that it was discussed in the absence of representatives of the Dniester Republic. As far, however, as the clause concerning "withdrawal from the conflict zone of foreign citizens participating in it" is concerned, the idea—sending the Don Cossacks home—is hardly practicable. Yu. Grigoryev, chief of staff of the Cossack association in Dubossary, said in this connection: "We have but one law—the decision of the group and the ataman. If, however, we receive from Moscow a 'decree' requiring us to leave our brothers and primordially Russian land in the lurch, we will respond in the spirit of the letter of the Zaporozhye Cossacks to the Turkish sultan."

Hundreds of telegrams are being sent to the command and officers of the 14th Army, whose position is just about the main factor of stability on the boundary between the antagonists. One such telegram was sent by the Officers Union: "The furious, pro-Romanian leaders of Moldova have resolved to wipe out the freedom-loving people of the Dniester region, who are drawn toward Russia, and forcibly drag them together with all of Moldova into Romania," the telegram says. "We will not allow officers and their families and other citizens to become hostages and victims of the criminal actions of some and the no less criminal inaction of others."

The inhabitants of the left bank confirm that the speech at the Congress of Russian Vice President A. Rutskoy was completely truthful and that the abrupt tone is explained by the outrages of the terrorists who have been sent from the right bank and who are raging in the Dniester region. Having visited the left bank, A. Rutskoy could see for himself on whose side the truth lies and who is defending a just cause. The list of those martyred by the Moldavian [as published] police has been supplemented by the name of one further peaceful inhabitant—Sergey Velichko. Having raped his wife, the patrol subjected Sergey himself to sadistic torture.

D. Postovan, prosecutor of Moldova, sent SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA a letter, incidentally, whose import amounts to the fact that "the paper is reflecting events unobjectively" and that the true culprits of the tragedy on the Dniester are the "separatists," whom the "resistance movement" is combating. The prosecutor preferred to gloss over the fact that the fighters of this "movement" are, for the most part, former criminals clothed in police uniform and armed with Romanian and Belgian assault rifles and that they are "resisting" by terrorizing, in the main, the peaceful inhabitants of Dniester villages....

Meanwhile the gunfire over the Dniester is unabating. Relying on the Cosnita and Kochiyerskiy beachheads captured on the left bank, armed detachments of Moldova are once again regrouping, preparing for a broad-based invasion of the Dniester region. Subunits of a Moldavian [as published] army are being formed in Chisinau, armored equipment for them has been taken from the arsenals of the CIS forces, and a callup of reservists has begun, and papers are being received, what is more, by Russians and Ukrainians living in Moldova, as a rule. Special terrorist groups have torched three eight-apartment houses in the village of Korzhevo near Dubossary, the majority of residents of these houses being Russians. Random firing is clattering out in Bendery, as before.

Cossack Influence in Dniester Region Noted

92UN1181A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian 1-7 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Sergey Ivanov: "Cossacks in the Dniester Region—Who, Wherefrom, and Why"]

[Text] The appearance of Cossacks in the armed order of battle of the guards of the Dniester Moldavian [as published] Republic (PMR) gave the conflict an additional sharpness, and, along with this, it introduced a bit of romanticism.

It is not being reported exactly how many Don and Kuban Cossacks arrived. A figure was cited for me in the Chancellery of the prime minister of Moldova: According to the status in the first 10 days of March, the number that arrived on the left bank of the Dniester and, moreover, armed people, was on the order of 10,000.... Cossacks, or hired professional soldiers who assumed their appearance? was the question raised by Prime Minister V. Muravschi. Even if they are Cossacks, what are they doing on the territory of independent Moldova?

I decided it was better to see for myself one time. And so, I am in the Tiraspol House of Soviets—the government of the PMR is located here now. One of the rooms is used as Cossack headquarters. A sentry, armed with a wooden club, is posted at the door to maintain orderly routine (the guard at the building itself is far more imposing). My documents are examined critically (like nowhere else) by a man in a tall Astrakhan hat and a field Afghan jacket with colonel's epaulets, and, afterwards, Aleksandr Vasilyevich Kucher, ataman of the Black Sea Cossack troops, introduces himself.

The conversation is constantly interrupted. A long silent telephone livens up, and operational summaries pour in from the field one after another. Duty officer responsibilities are performed by veteran-activists of the Cossack movement under the command of Hero of the Soviet Union I. Pashchenko. The veterans do not restrain their

emotions: "The generals are betraying us and selling us!" This is in regard to the "neutrality" of the 14th Army. "And also these chiefs of yours in Moscow...." The strength of the expressions eases somewhat with the arrival of women, they brought provisions assembled by the local residents for the Cossacks.

Sturdy mustachioed Cossack muzhiks come by. Those who are dressed in field clothes sign in their firearms—they returned from patrol in the area of Dubossary. Others in Cossack clothes and regalia gloomily started to smoke—these returned from a funeral in one of the villages.... They enter into an energetic male conversation of an operational nature with chief Kucher; not for a stranger's ears! The women and the correspondent have to withdraw....

We continue our conversation in the empty meeting hall. My interlocutor is B. Belokopytov, deputy of the city soviet and a lieutenant colonel in the reserve. He was "recruited into the Cossacks recently," and he was chosen to be the commander of a Cossack camp of the Tiraspol circle. In the words of Boris Petrovich, practically any of the local residents who desire to can "fill out a questionnaire," and the ataman soviet will decide further

The recently started process of Cossack revival did not leave out the Dniester region either. The tasks of the movement—re-creation of the age-old Cossack spirit, from which come an inalienable patriotism and an exemplary attitude to the performance of military duty.... The Black Sea Cossack troops are one of some dozen and a half that exist, and it includes Cossacks of the Dniester region and Bendery (Tiraspolskiy, Dubossarskiy, Slobodzeyskiy, and other districts). Naturally, these structures are set up in rayons in which Cossacks have been living for a long time.

It was proposed to invite experts on Cossacks from the shores of the Don to restore Cossack traditions. But plans had to be changed: The events began, and two Cossack platoons were formed urgently from locals under the command of their own atamans. There are a few.

About those who came "to the war." These, by the way, are not only Cossacks. Ordinary volunteers are coming, alone and in groups. Recently, a detachment of Gagauz came, setting an example of mutual assistance: In 1990, people from the Dniester region helped them defend Gagauziya from the incursions of "volunteers" on the side of Chisinau. Nonetheless, the government of the PMR found it more expedient to do business with help along the Cossack line, which is the most organized: The people carried documents, certifying as to authority and qualifications. These can be trusted with weapons and sent to the "front lines...." As they told me, order has been brought in this matter! And, incidentally, the decision on rendering such support was made by the leading organs of the Russian Cossack movement last fall, when it became clear that events were approaching...

There was one more competent interlocutor—Valeriy Litskay, the official representative of the Dniester region administration. Thus, administration on the military question is oriented on subunits of professionals—everyone sees what tragic consequences the "people's war" led to in the well-known Karabakh. The presence of Cossacks instills confidence in the guards. On its part, at the beginning of the year, the Supreme Soviet of the PMR passed a law on the Cossacks, stipulating their special status—this does not even exist on the Don.

Where is the Cossack force employed? On the most dangerous sector of the left bank—close to the Dubossary bridge. Also dangerous are zones at other bridges, and that is why they have already mined them and even tried to blow them up. The Dniester River is swift, and the shores are not accessible—this is what gives the bridges a special significance, and in this case, unfortunately, not only economic. There are also other circumstances: The rayon of Dubossary is the "slender waist," a narrow place approximately in the middle of a long and not wide left bank zone, and the Moldavian people (who make up more than 60 percent of the population in Moldova, and about 40 percent in the Dniester region) is concentrated mainly right in the villages hereabouts. There is no need to prove how important it is to Chisinau to establish control specifically over this zone, but for Tiraspol, accordingly, not to allow this. The interests of the parties came into opposition here. This is why agreements on a cease-fire are achieved here with such difficulty and are violated with such ease. And so Cossacks and other armed people will perish, and, as it happens, unarmed people also.... I suppose: The Cossacks appeared here, because they were moved by a sincere effort to defend the Russian people. They are by no means "blue helmets," either in their status or, what is more, in their manner of behavior, and from the standpoint of the so-called "grand policy," their future stay and activity with weapons in hand will hardly resolve the problem that has arisen. It is more likely that they will aggravate it... But inasmuch as the problem exists, then its resolution is the prerogative of official representatives who are given the political responsibility and diplomatic capabilities.

Let it be so. But no clear answer has been given to too many important questions. But, after all, it would seem that there are politicians for this!... "Snegur's team" proceeds from the concept of "an independent Moldova in internationally recognized borders," but the opposition and powerful People's Front, as if nothing were wrong, is leading the matter to a "Romanian merger." These are two big differences, as they say in the vicinity and in Odessa. But what will you say the position of Chisinau should be? Well, they decided in the Dniester region that, under the cover of the first, preparations are being made for the second. Now imagine the attitude of these people toward a possible reward of fate—while not moving from the spot, to end up suddenly in the position of a "second-rate foreigner," dumb and not wanted.

Politics of Left, Right Bank War Analyzed

92UN1202A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 11, 15 Mar 92 p 9

[Article by Aleksandr Kakotkin: "Moldova: for Each Republic Its Own Karabakh?"—usage of Moldova, Moldavia as published]

[Text] **The majority of indications of the "Karabakhization" of the conflict in the Dniester region are already in evidence. It has its own Khankendi-Stepanakert, that is, Dubossary, which Chisinau officialdom has renamed Dubesar, and its own Shusha in the form of the neighboring village of Kochiyery, where the main forces of Chisinau's supporters on the Left Bank have settled. There are sufficient weapons and armored equipment on both sides. The mutual hatred, stoked by hardened propaganda, has reached a critical point. There is a fundamental difference also, it is true: The conflict between Chisinau and Tiraspol is more of a political than interethnic nature.**

Left Bank

Thirty-nine percent Moldavians, 26 percent Ukrainians, and 24 percent Russians live on the left bank of the Dniester. Chisinau, which believed that in an era of militant nationalism the Dniester Moldavian Republic [PMR] would fall apart of its own accord, manifestly underestimated the Tiraspol politicians. The leaders of the PMR, technocrats and shop floor workers in the main, have operated amazingly methodically and resourcefully. For a start they underpinned independence with a substantial economic base. Wages on the left bank are higher than on the right, and there are far more allowances for the needy strata of the population. Last year the PMR, having spent approximately 400 million rubles [R] on social needs (given a population of 750,000), armed a sizable army and transferred R180 million to Chisinau, contrived to put together a budget showing a R140 million profit. Thanks to a well-considered tax policy, the decline in production this year on the left bank has constituted only four percent, on the right bank, 25 percent.

The leaders of the Dniester region have introduced three official languages, created a three-faction chamber of nationalities with each faction's right of veto, and given careful thought to personnel policy. And have achieved an improbable result: The vast majority of left-bank Moldavians support Tiraspol. And they constitute one-third of those who have fallen in the conflicts with Tiraspol.

The PMR armed forces includes the "Dniester" battalion, approximately 600 men strong, a 1,500-man guard with about 30 armed vehicles and approximately 1,500 militia officers equipped with automatic weapons. There are also several hundred armed defense squad volunteers and Don Cossacks, and a detachment of volunteers recently arrived from allied Gagauzia. There are in the reserve as yet unarmed fighters of territorial-rescue detachments (approximately 3,000 persons).

Tiraspol's political demands began with a free economic zone and, in proportion to the blood shed, grew to subject of a federation which Moldova proper, Gagauzia, and the PMR would join as equals. The PMR does not intend breaking away from Moldova: It has thought about this and concluded that this would be economically disadvantageous. Separation is possible in the event of Moldova reuniting with Romania.

Right Bank

The nationalist intoxication which accompanied Chisinau's actions has manifestly subsided of late. Parliament even attempted to democratize the Language Act, falling just 10 votes short. And had the deputies from the left bank been in attendance at the session, the outcome of the voting would have been quite different. On 6 March President Snegur offered the left bank a free economic zone. But, alas, the train had, apparently, already left.... The mutual mistrust has gone too far. The left bank is sure that Moldova is on the point of running to Romania, and the right bank maintains that, should the separatists be given free rein, they would immediately affiliate with Ukraine. Both Prime Minister Valeriu Muravschi and Supreme Soviet Chairman Aleksandru Mosanu told me that all the provocations and conflicts are being organized by Tiraspol in order to impede the process of Moldova's entry into the world community. Indeed, it is Tiraspol which is benefiting from the conflicts, in the main: The population is coming together, the authority of the leadership is strengthening and in the eyes of the world community Moldova appears to be a little empire. But the last two clashes occurred on the eve of Moldova's entry into the CIS and the United Nations, which the PMR did not oppose. And in Moldova there is the People's Front, which is oriented toward reunification with Romania and which is disadvantageous to both. But both leaders rejected the suspicions leveled at the People's Front of Moldova out of hand. They saw nothing odd in the coincidence of the fighting in the Dniester region and the departures from Moldova of the president. In their opinion, the president is fully in control of the situation in the republic, and the People's Front of Moldova is too weak to prevent him. But Valeriu Muravschi said that the tension is beneficial to "certain forces," which could operate via the hands of the People's Front.

The prime minister and the speaker of parliament declared that they conceive of the future of the PMR as a separate region with free economic zone status. Aleksandru Mosanu was quite candid: "Were we to arrange a federation, it is us who the next day would be swept away here." But who precisely would be doing the sweeping, he did not specify. And to my question concerning the possibility of an understanding somehow being reached with the leaders of the PMR Valeriu Muravschi replied: "It is possible. But not with these people."

Everyone suspects everyone else of everything. Mosanu declared that for him Russia's interference in the conflict was obvious and he hinted that it was beneficial to Ukraine. Muravschi discerned powerful imperial forces behind the Dniester region. And Oazu Nantoy, director of the Policy Analysis Service, accused the bitterest enemies—the People's Front of Moldova and the PMR—of a secret alliance: "Mircea Druc could pay Smirnov's wages, and the latter, Druc's." True, everyone declared that he would solve Moldova's conflict exclusively by peaceful means and with the enlistment of forces of the world community, possibly.

What Will Happen?

I fear that there will be great bloodshed. Whereas it took Karabakh years to switch from individual exchanges of fire to fighting with the participation of armored vehicles, in Moldova such "progress" has been made in just four months. It is still not a fact that the enemies will succeed in getting out of the confrontation easily. I have already spoken about the left bank, and there remain on the right bank approximately 3,000 police officers and Special Militia Department forces and approximately 20 armored combat vehicles. Several hundred supporters of Chisinau are on the left bank, holding on to the "Kochiyery beachhead."

Both banks are accommodating themselves to the military units for, as the events in Kochiyery showed, the 14th Army, torn to pieces, has been incapable of protecting itself even. Cossacks have appeared on the left bank, consequently, Romanian volunteers should be expected on the right bank. Given this accumulation of nonprofessional fighters, one chance shot, a deliberate provocation even more, and events could slip completely out of control. A carnage in which the adversaries are without a moment's hesitation using against one another modern weapons captured from the army is beginning. And Moldova has the highest density of population of all the republics of the CIS. There will be many casualties, quite futile, moreover, for the foes lack the strength to gain a victory over one another, but there is, one other hand, a great surplus of hatred. Whereas at this time the armies are being kept apart, we will not have long to wait for the next twist to the spiral: the Reunification Committee is together with the People's Front of Moldova planning to hold all-Romania parliamentary elections in May. I told the leaders on both banks this and was struck by their Olympian composure. Almost everyone responded roughly thus: "Regrettable, of course, but what can you do!"

KAZAKHSTAN

Problems of Kazakh Self-Sufficiency Reviewed

92US0379A Alma-Ata YEGEMENDI QAZAQSTAN in Kazakh 17 Dec 91 p 2

[Article by Nurtore Zhusip: "Who Is Going to Receive, and Who to Provide?"]

[Text] **The republic parliament has reviewed questions concerned with the current budget system, and the 1992 Republic of Kazakhstan budget, and has specific sources for survival. Hitherto Kazakhstan has been a raw materials' zone. As a result, raw materials produced have been sold cheaply, and we have paid dear for products manufactured from them. If we do not achieve radical change, that is to say, if we ourselves do not produce all the kinds of products needed by the people's economy and by the people, then no matter how well we structure things, there is no way for us to mend the "holes" in the budget.**

"It is difficult for Kazakhstan to live on its own. It cannot get very far with raw materials alone. This being the case, how can it be a part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (whether it is a renewed union or not, or a "Slavic" union, it makes no difference)? However, other than that, where will its strength come from?" This prevailing viewpoint is heard every other day.

"Kazakhstan has endowed no one. Has it become rich by providing a little grain? Its production is weak, and it has repeatedly received subsidies from the center. You are crazy." Kolbin in his time said this sort of thing. One-sided pronouncements of this kind are being heard again now that the former union republics have achieved their sovereignty. Who is to receive, and who is to provide? This is a question we do not wish to pose. Republic President Nursultan Abishuly Nazarbayev once said: "There is no need for there to be a connected giving and taking of one from the other. If there is, we will easily fall into unending bickering. Also, what need is there to exhaust tendencies of our nation complex in its economic relations." In saying this we realize that he was summoning us to difficult work. In touching upon such momentous words, we should not notice the one-sided ideas. However, things are turning out more and more differently as events progress.

We have no interest in raising these issues. This should be stated openly. It has been Russian publications that have screamed out loud about "who will give what to whom, and whom will receive what," and which have published information about whom is producing what, and whom is providing what. "Most of the republics which have achieved sovereignty have declared their independence. They now would consolidate political independence through economic independence. Looking at the statements of the republics, all are critical of the center since, it would seem, they give too much and get too little in return, but is this really the way things are?" So they say, and the Russians have begun not to take into consideration what the sovereign republics produce and provide. It is like doing a good job in fleecing a docile camel. The joke is on Kazakhstan.

According to statistics, some 6.5 billion rubles worth of consumer goods were brought into Kazakhstan from other regions and from foreign countries in 1990. However, the region itself supplies 1.2 billion rubles worth of goods (not including grain and other raw materials). The difference between exports and imports is considerable: it is nearly 5.4 billion rubles. Within this, the figure for consumer goods brought in from other regions is 3.5 billion rubles.

More specifically, we import fish and fish products, and canned fruits and vegetables, vegetable oil, margarine and sugar from outside. Our primary supplier of fish and fish products is Russia. Vegetable oil comes in from Russia, Uzbekistan and Moldova. Among consumer goods, almost 50 percent of non-food consumer goods seem to be brought in from outside. Among these consumer goods, televisions, home refrigerators and freezers, sewing machines, motorcycles and motor scooters, pianos and grand pianos, photographic equipment and home equipment and appliances, in addition to other varieties, are brought in from outside. Kazakhstan gets motorcycles, motor scooters, televisions, pianos, and grand pianos from Russia, the Ukraine and Byelarus. Among those providing refrigerators and freezers is Russia. It turns out that light vehicles and conveniences are primarily supplied by Russia and the Ukraine, and that sewing machines are supplied only by Russia.

At the same time, it turns out that Russia in 1990 supplied Kazakhstan with 63 percent of its rolled iron, 89 percent of its construction glass and 98 percent of its calcium soda.

The by-stander might think that these figures have nothing to do with daily life in Kazakhstan. However, if we bear in mind that all of these figures have been chosen with only one aim to mind, namely to show that Russia is "the people's benefactor in everything," then everything becomes clear. Here we are "forgetting" to reveal certain important facts given below.

First of all, the fact that the former USSR economy was centralized and administered according to a general administrative-governmental system has been intentionally forgotten. Second, the fact that the economies of republics like Kazakhstan have been purposely directed at the production primarily of raw materials has not been taken into account. Third, the kinds of prices (to be sure very low) at which the raw materials have been sold, and the prices (very dear) at which they have been resold, have been forgotten maliciously.

In any case, much like the proverb: "if a kettle has a handle, the cook his opportunity," one can hush up the real state of affairs as much as one wishes. At present there is no need to dispute about who gives to whom, and who supplies what. About this there is, to be sure, the

document prepared for the purvey of the republic president by Novosibir scientists and experts. We would like to recall that it was stated that the problem would not be resolved in favor of Kazakhstan. We think it necessary that the public of the republic become aware of the details of the question, and that the people become informed about them.

The essence of the question under discussion here is not who gives to whom, and who takes from whom. The question is a matter of resistance to feelings of superiority, of feelings that "we are superior to you," through specific acts. Whatever the quantities of raw materials produced by Kazakhstan, it remains poverty stricken. "If the mouth eats there is blood, and if it does not eat there is blood." Just as the proverb suggests, we must be free of the view that someone is bad, that Kazakhstan is bad. However, to achieve this....

To achieve this, Kazakhstan must provide everything itself, must produce everything itself. Kazakhstan must produce and manufacture everything, from shoes to automobiles, from matches to aircraft, from suits and trousers to combines. Only through this will we consolidate economic independence.

Kazakhstan can survive on its own. Thanks to God, Kazakhstan provides its grain freely to all republics, including grain-rich Russia, Uzbekistan, Moldova, Qyrghyzstan, its groats to Russia, the Ukraine, Byelarus, Uzbekistan and Qyrghyzstan. Some 41 percent of Kazakh coal is delivered without complaint to areas outside the republic, and what fine coal it is!

We are obligated to say that Russia provides us with most combines to collect the grain, trolley-buses, electric trains and road construction equipment. We must now produce all of this ourselves.

However, it is not true that Kazakhstan imports only and provides nothing itself. During a nine-month period, Kazakhstan exported 10.5 million rubles' worth of products. Among these products, products worth 9.5 billion went as exports to other republics, and 1 billion rubles' worth went as exports to foreign countries. Russia takes some 60 percent of our raw materials and products.

There are not a few industrial products produced by Kazakhstan and exported abroad. For example, during the nine-month period we delivered 155,000 tires intended for automobiles and agricultural equipment, 19.2 million square meters of ceiling covering materials, 145.5 million standard slate units, and 333,000 tons of mineral fertilizers.

If we had not provided the required tires, would the automobiles and tractors have been able to run? If we had not delivered similar required raw materials, would the promised products reach us?

In conclusion, what we are saying is this: Whether there is a union or not, whether we are divided, or not divided, is not the issue. The issue is our producing our own products, and our strengthening our own budget. In this connection, we think that the republic president should draw up a program for things to be done immediately, and assign specific tasks. If we are to be hungry, let us be hungry. However, this will only last for a time. During this time we need a specific program saying we will do this and that, and good edicts. Without such a program and edicts, the reforms that have been begun will show no swift return. For example, in only a short time the spring planting season will begin. We are standing around complaining about lack of tractors on the one hand, and lack of propellers on the other. We know that Kazakhstan alone, without anyone's help, must produce everything needed, starting, above all, with equipment and devices intended for all enterprises involved in carrying out the coming year's planting. We know that we must ourselves make a very good beginning in this effort.

TAJIKISTAN

Confusion Over Rumored Presence of Kazakhstan Troops Explained

92US0413A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 16, 15 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Samoylenko, correspondent: "Nabiyev's Opposition Teaches Nazarbayev: How a Kazakh 'Landing' Was Made in Dushanbe"]

[Text] **A political meeting is a political meeting, and—as a rule—it is impossible to ascertain how information finds its way into the crowd. But it does find its way, and how! On 7 April Tajikistan shuddered. Internal troops of the Republic of Kazakhstan had arrived in Dushanbe!**

According to information received in Alma-Ata from the Tajikistan Ministry of Internal Affairs, this "false rumor" was launched at a political meeting in Dushanbe by Yusupov, the chairman of the Democratic Party. Naturally, the meeting was filled with indignation, and the leaders of the opposition shot off a telegram to N. Nazarbayev demanding an explanation, the immediate withdrawal of his soldiers, and stating that this was interference in the internal affairs of an independent state. This "false rumor" could have been shot down without delay, as soon as it flew over the square in Dushanbe where the meeting was being held. But—strange as it may seem—Tajikistan's leaders did not react at all to Yusupov's sensational statement. Why not? Could it be that they hoped that this version would thoroughly intimidate the opposition leaders and would result in the complete dispersal of the stubborn meeting?

The inscrutability of Tajikistan's official authorities and the wrathful haste of the Democrats heated up the square in Dushanbe and Kazakhstan's public pretty well. And it was not until the "false rumor" flew into the major newspapers that V. Gordeyev, the commander of Kazakhstan's internal troops, issued a statement to the following effect: This was a provocation; all troop units of

the Republic of Kazakhstan were within their proper areas of deployment; and there had been no orders by N. Nazarbayev to "render aid to Tajikistan's authorities."

The political meeting in Dushanbe greeted the announcement by the opposition leaders concerning their telegram to N. Nazarbayev with a feeling of profound satisfaction. All that remains to be said is that the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan received no dispatches of any kind from Dushanbe...

TURKMENISTAN

Security Chief on New Functions

92US0409B Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 24 Mar 92 p 2

[Interview with Major General A. Ovedzhov, chairman, Turkmenistan Committee for National Security, by journalists, place and date not given: "State Security: New Tasks"]

[Text] **As already reported, a press conference for journalists was held in the Turkmenistan Committee for National Security. Major General A. Ovedzhov, the committee's chairman, gave detailed replies to questions put to him by representatives of the mass media.**

[Journalists] Two basic directions or trends—intelligence and counterintelligence—have taken shape and become specific in the work of the present-day Turkmenistan Committee for National Security. But, of course, they also existed previously. Just what has changed in their functions?

[Ovedzhov] Previously all our subdivisions and units, including intelligence and counterintelligence, were subordinate to the central apparatus of the USSR KGB. This central authority made all the decisions on their own and merely assigned us the task of carrying them out. Moreover, the interests of our republic were not taken into account as a rule. Nowadays the situation is different. Having found our independence, we have subordinated the activity of these services to developing Turkmenistan's foreign economic ties. We have keyed our efforts on obtaining corroborating information with regard to possible subversive acts. Intelligence now serves to discover smuggling and hard-currency operations crossing our state border. We are alarmed, for example, by the smuggling of drugs, which are penetrating into Turkmenistan from the territory of neighboring states. Turkmenistan is rich in natural resources and raw materials which have attracted the attention not only of our neighbors, but also of other powers. All this must be taken into consideration. In short, it's high time that we stopped relying on someone else and took care of our own security ourselves.

[Journalists] Has the work of the KNB [Committee for National Security] become more complicated in connection with the fact that Turkmenistan's borders with its neighboring states have become open in many respects?

[Ovedzhov] Our government itself has proceeded to expand contacts. Generations of Turkmens have dreamed of communicating and visiting with their relatives who live on the other side of the border. In order to furnish people with such opportunities, we have opened up points where the passage across the state border has been simplified. This is a good cause and a necessary one, but the policy of open borders does not mean a policy of open doors. We must not forget that a border can also be used for other purposes—those which are unacceptable for our society. We will continue to welcome the development of economic ties just so long as they are not harmful to our state's interests.

[Journalists] Will the Border Troops Administration be included within the KNB?

[Ovedzhov] It's hard to say. This matter will be resolved at the level of the Turkmenistan government. But I can assure you that—just as before—we will be working in close contact with the border troops.

[Journalists] Is mutual cooperation being proposed by the Turkmenistan Committee for National Security with the Commonwealth states and with the corresponding special services of foreign neighboring countries?

[Ovedzhov] Our mutual relations with the Commonwealth states will most likely be built on a foundation of an agreement or treaty. And as to cooperation with our foreign neighbors, practical life itself will compel us to set up and fine-tune contacts for the joint struggle against international terrorism and the illegal drug business.

[Journalists] In connection with the disintegration of the USSR, the Turkmenistan Committee for National Security will hardly send its own staff members to study in the other republics. But personnel training is a necessary condition. Wherein do you see the solution to this problem?

[Ovedzhov] Indeed, with the elimination of the USSR KGB, we have found ourselves in an extremely difficult position, inasmuch as we do not have our own training center. Serious personnel changes have occurred within the KNB; most of our staff members are young persons, and they need training. As of now, we see the following three directions which can be taken here: instruction and training within the committee itself, drawing upon experienced officials and veterans of the state security organs, concluding agreements with those CIS countries where our staff members used to be trained in a centralized manner; and creating our own school here in Turkmenistan. Let's see which variant will be the most acceptable.

[Journalists] A division for combatting organized crime has been set up within the committee's structure. But

there is also just such a unit within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. How will your mutual relations be structured and arranged?

[Ovedzhov] We will operate in close contact, supplementing each other's efforts. Our common task is to fight against the recently sharply increasing criminal gangs, to reveal deeply conspiratorial criminal formations, and to expose corrupted elements. We have a single, common cause—to safeguard the new and peaceful labor of our inhabitants, to protect and defend the interests of a sovereign Turkmenistan. We will never be divided by any sort of quest for glory. There is work to be done.

[Journalists] In its previous form the KGB was quite a "silent," i.e., "uncommunicative," organization. Secrecy, secrecy, and more secrecy. It was extremely rare that information regarding the activities of the state security organs ever appeared in the press. Can we count on a more open and public explanation of the activities being carried out by Turkmenistan's KNB?

[Ovedzhov] The requirement and need for secrecy is not a mere whim or caprice. The most dangerous thing in our work is a leak of information. Data which has not been verified or which has been distorted by a journalist, a confidential conversation "not for publication" but which, nevertheless, is splashed all over the pages of the press can be detrimental to the interests of our state. However, we are in favor of cooperation with the press. For this purpose, the KNB has an operating public relations group. Furthermore, journalists who wish to write about the KGB's past, about the most interesting operations carried out by the staff members of the state security organs, can obtain access to our archives.

Transcribed by V. Zarembo

Relations With Mexico Established

92US0409A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 31 Mar 92 p 1

[Report: "Turkmenistan Has Established Diplomatic Relations with Mexico"]

[Text] Ashkhabad, 30 Mar (Turkmen PRESS)—Turkmenistan has established diplomatic relations with the United Mexican States. The appropriate protocol document was signed on 27 March by N. K. Nurklychev, the Turkmenistan government's permanent representative in Moscow, and by Carlos Tello, Mexico's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Russian Federation.

The document declares that the establishment of diplomatic relations is in the interests of both states and will facilitate the development of cooperation between Turkmenistan and the United Mexican States in the political, economic, commercial, scientific, and cultural fields.

The Mexican government has entrusted the task of representing the interests of the United Mexican States in Turkmenistan to the Mexican Embassy in Russia and its ambassador, Carlos Tello.

UZBEKISTAN

Resolution on Measures To Control Oil Spill, Protect Population

925D0326A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 19 Mar 92 p 1

[Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Urgent Measures for the Localization of the Oil Spill at the Mingbulak Deposit in Namangan Oblast, Social Protection for the Population, and Efficient Utilization of Natural Resources in This Region]

[Text] The Cabinet of Ministers resolves:

1. For a prompt solution of all problems connected with the installation of equipment for the oil spill at the Mingbulak Deposit, its efficient utilization, and the population's protection to establish a republican headquarters.

To agree with the top-priority measures implemented by ministries and departments jointly with local bodies of management for the localization of the oil spill at the Mingbulak Deposit in Namangan Oblast.

2. To appoint the Uzbekneft Production Association as the client for the construction of a complex of facilities at the Mingbulak Deposit.

The republic's banks must finance the facilities on preferential terms. Payment should be made according to the estimates for actually performed jobs. 3. The Uzbekneft Production Association must work out planning estimates within a 10-day period and the general contractor—the Ministry of Construction of the Republic of Uzbekistan—before 1 May 1992 must ensure the construction of a 15-km long oil pipeline with an oil-loading rack at the Turakurgan Station.

The Administration of the Central Asian Railroad before 20 April 1992 must plan and build railroad tracks to the oil-loading rack and reconstruct the Turakurgan Railroad Station for the purpose of ensuring a simultaneous loading of the rolling stock.

On 26 March 1992 the Sredazneftegazstroy Production, Construction, and Installation Association must begin laying the oil pipeline and complete work before 25 April.

The Bridge Building Trust No 7 must ensure the construction of piers across th. Syrdarya River before 20 April.

4. Uzkontrakttorg must provide facilities connected with the localization of the oil spill at the Mingbulak Deposit and the utility systems under construction with all the necessary material and technical resources, bought-in

components, and equipment. Within a 1-week period it must ensure the delivery of 15 km of metal pipes to the Sredazneftegazstroy Production, Construction, and Installation Association for the construction of the oil pipeline.

5. In 1992-1993 the State Committee on Geology of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Uzbekneft Production Association must complete the first stage in geological surveying at the Mingbulak Deposit, determine commercial and hypothetical oil reserves in the region, and—jointly with the Committee for Forecasting the Prospects for the Development of Uzbekistan and the Fergananefteorgsintez Production Association—submit to the Cabinet of Ministers proposals on the advisability of the expansion, reconstruction, and retooling of Fergana and Altyaryk oil refining plants and the establishment of additional capacities for oil at these plants.

6. The Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Seismology, jointly with the State Committee on Geology of the Republic of Uzbekistan, must immediately launch work on the study of the seismic state of the soil in regions adjacent to the Mingbulak Deposit and submit proposals within 2 months.

7. To establish that as of 1 March of the current year a 30-percent salary increase is introduced for all workers, employees, engineering and technical personnel, and managers of ministries, departments, enterprises, and organizations performing jobs at the Mingbulak Deposit for the period of elimination of the oil spill.

8. To recommend to the State Committee on Geology of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Uzbekneft Production Association, and the Sredazgazprom Production Association:

—as of 1 April 1992 to increase up to twofold the wage rates and salaries of workers, employees, and engineering and technical personnel directly engaged in well drilling and in oil, gas, and water production, as well as in the elimination of the flows occurring in the process;

—to ensure the indicated increase in wage rates and salaries at enterprises and organizations within their jurisdiction and, at the same time, to preserve existing ratios in rate and salary scales within personnel categories; to increase wages within the cost-accounting income of enterprises and organizations.

The Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Uzbekistan, when necessary, must submit to the Cabinet of Ministers proposals for a differentiated reduction of up to 12 percent in the rates of income tax on the indicated enterprises and organizations.

9. The Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Uzbekistan and Uzgosstrakh [the Uzbek Main Administration of State Insurance]: according to the submitted calculations of the Uzbekneft Production Association must compensate for the incurred expenditures connected with the oil spill at the Mingbulak Deposit;

—within a 3-day period must ensure the rendering of one-time assistance in terms of 500 rubles per family residing in the zone of the oil spill;

—within a 15-day period, jointly with local bodies of state management, must determine the damage done to the population and to farms and ensure appropriate compensation for them.

10. To take into consideration that Uzbekistan's Trade-Union Federation Council allocates from its funds 200 rubles to every family residing in the zone of the oil spill.

11. The Ministry of Health of the Republic of Uzbekistan must ensure medical examination and preventive treatment for persons engaged in restoration work and for the population in adjacent regions and establish effective control over the region's sanitary and epidemiological situation.

When the maximum permissible concentrations of harmful emissions are exceeded and a threat to the health of the population in adjacent regions arises, the khokim [governor] of Namangan Oblast, jointly with the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Uzbekistan, must solve the problem of the boundaries of residential tracts and periods of the population's temporary resettlement.

12. The State Committee for the Protection of Nature of the Republic of Uzbekistan, jointly with appropriate ministries, departments, and bodies, within a 3-day period must work out measures ensuring ecological cleanliness of regions, water basins, and land adjacent to Mingbulak and realize them.

13. The Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Comrade Giniyatullin) and the State Committee for Water Resources Construction (Comrade Baymirov) with the forces of their planning organizations must determine the volumes of work, including excavation work, on conveyance to the wellhead connected with the prevention of pollution of the Syrdarya River and other water arteries and carry it out within a 10-day period.

14. The Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Uzbekistan and Uzbekbrlyash, jointly with local bodies of management, must provide workers at facilities with hot food and day-to-day goods and increase the norm of sale of detergents, necessities, and building materials to the population in adjacent regions.

15. The Committee for Forecasting the Prospects for the Development of Uzbekistan and the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Uzbekistan must allocate the necessary capital investments for the production of the envisaged volumes of construction and restoration work.

16. The Uzbek State Bank, the Uzbek Industrial Construction Bank, and the Uzbek Agro-Industrial Bank must allocate the necessary credits to enterprises and

organizations carrying out the construction of facilities connected with oil production, transportation, and refining and elimination of the consequences of oil spills.

17. The Uzbekneft Production Association and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Republic of Uzbekistan within a 1-month period must elaborate and submit proposals for drawing foreign firms and specialists into the activation of work on the exploration and development of oil fields.

Within a 1-month period the general economic complex must solve the problem of currency financing for surveying and the development of the Mingbulak Deposit according to the calculations submitted by the Uzbekneft Production Association.

18. The State Committee for the Supply of Petroleum Products of the Republic of Uzbekistan must ensure a regular delivery of fuels, lubricants, and production materials for operating machinery.

19. Khokimy [governors] of Namangan, Andizhan, and Fergana oblasts must form commissions for a prompt solution of problems connected with social protection for the population residing in the zone of the oil spill and adjacent regions.

20. Within the shortest period the Sredazgazprom Production Association must draw specialists, machinery, and the necessary material resources into construction, installation, and restoration work.

21. The Ministry of Power and Electrification, the Ministry of Communication, the Administration of the Central Asian Railroad, the Ministry of Housing and Municipal Facilities, and the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Uzbekistan must ensure the development of engineering utility systems in the zone of construction of facilities connected with oil production, transportation, and refining, as well as in settlements of adjacent regions.

22. The Ministry of Motor Transport, the Ministry of Highways, the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Administration of the Central Asian Railroad, the National "Uzbekiston khavo yullari" Airline, Glavtashkentstroy [Main Administration for Housing and Civil Engineering Construction in the City of Tashkent], and other ministries and departments within a 3-day period must place at the disposal of the Uzbekneft Production Association the maximum number of oil product tankers for the purpose of substantially increasing the volumes of oil transportation from the Mingbulak Deposit. They must ensure a regular transportation of material and technical resources and personnel at superintendents' request.

23. The Ministry of Highways of the Republic of Uzbekistan must ensure the construction, reconstruction, and improvement of highways, bridges, and crossings in the region of the Mingbulak Deposit and the adjacent territory.

24. Goskomtekhnadzor [the State Committee for Supervision of Safe Working Practices in Industry] (Comrade Akhmedbayev) and managers of the republic's ministries and departments must increase the responsibility of managers of enterprises and organizations for the fulfillment of the developed measures to ensure work safety during the elimination of the flow.

25. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan must ensure fire safety in the zone of the oil spill, road traffic safety, and preservation of public order in adjacent regions.

26. The State Committee on the Press of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the National Information Agency, and the State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company of Uzbekistan, with the enlistment of local mass information media, must organize a press center for effective coverage of the course of work at the Mingbulak Deposit.

[Signed] I. Karimov, chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers

ARMENIA

Nuclear Power Station Fate Examined

924A0948A Yerevan EPOKHA in Russian No 11, 12 Mar 92 p 5

[Article by Em. Mkrtchyan: "The Nuclear Power Station Takes Its Revenge on the Politicians. The Politicians Take Their Revenge on the Nuclear Power Station. The Nation Suffers"]

[Text] As long ago as 10 January this year by decision of the government a commission was set up to study the condition of the Armenian nuclear power station [AES]. It included department and section chiefs who one way or another were involved directly or indirectly in this truly painful problem. State minister of the Republic of Armenia Vigen Chitechyan was appointed chairman of this commission, and state minister Grigor Areshyan as his deputy, and the members included Andrey Amatuni, director of the Physics Institute, Ara Babloyan, minister of public health, Stepan Badalyan, chief of the emergency situation department, Karine Daniyelyan, minister of ecology, Ashot Safaryan, minister for industry, and Sepukh Tashyan, minister of power, and others.

Having done its work, the commission reached definite conclusions that it was decided to share at a press conference that took place recently in the meeting hall of the Republic of Armenia Supreme Soviet.

The right to speak first was assumed by Grigor Areshyan, who in the recent past was one of the best archaeologists in the republic and has now taken on the enormous burden of chief state ideologist. He explained the reasons why it was necessary for the government one way or another to take another look at the AES. They were clear as day. The very viability of the nation was being placed in question. The profound energy crisis is paralyzing the republic's entire economic life and placing a large question mark over the future. On the other hand, as he said, if certain work is not done today at the AES, regardless of whether or not it will be started up, it will become a very dangerous object, and in another year or two may become a tragedy.

"It is essential to take note of two important circumstances," G. Areshyan said, moving into the field of political analysis and ideological support for the AES problem. Since he is not so sophisticated in this important state field he allowed himself to say a few things that resulted in him being forced throughout the meeting to fend off attacks from our colleagues representing the opposition press. Namely: He accused of irresponsibility certain political forces that are today speaking out and saying that the "alleged" shutdown of the AES took place out of political considerations, and that the forces that did this were trying to destabilize the political situation in the republic.

He was convinced that the debates about the closure of the AES had nothing to do with the process of the replacement of the authorities or with the advent of a new leadership. "In this ill-considered step the guilty are first and foremost the former first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, Suren Arutyunyan, and the former communist leaders of the republic." We will not argue with Mr. Areshyan, particularly since the dispute is pointless. What is done is done, and how and why it was done we leave to the consciences of those who did it.

As far as the specific matter is concerned—whether or not to shut down our AES—this was not discussed at the press conference. No one spoke "in favor" or "against." However, the talk did move in certain directions, and it was clear that the commission had also been set up finally to convince the republic of the need to open it. We should be aware that the world prices for energy sources are growing and that in 10 or 15 years will have grown so significantly that we will not be able to get by without the peaceful atom, Grigor Areshyan stated. But he forgot to mention that in 10 or 15 years, if the AES is soon opened, it will be time to shut it down again. What should be done? Build a new one; this was the conviction of the minister of power, Sepukh Tashyan.

In his speech the commission chairman, Vigen Chitechyan, noted three important circumstances that have forced us to return to the question of the fate of the AES. First, the nuclear power station should be brought on line in 14 to 18 months. And we will have a power source rated at 400 megawatts of electric power. This, of course, will not cover all the republic's needs but it will provide us with an existence without crisis. Second, he was personally convinced that the decision on the AES should have been made long ago (it is difficult to disagree with this), because if we delay, when we move to start it up we shall encounter even greater technical, financial, and social difficulties and "next winter will not be the best" (?). Third, operation of the AES is one way or another connected with a certain risk. This circumstance should not be ignored. And therefore if it is decided to start up the station for a second time, preparations must be made for it in the most careful manner.

The commission concluded that it is necessary to bring in experts from abroad to work on the AES. On the order of 300 to 400 people should present their conclusions on the suitability of the station for startup, and study the condition of the equipment, the engineering networks, the metal, and the seismic status. And if all the necessary steps are taken, it will be possible not only to reach design level for safety at the AES but also exceed it. But in any event it will not meet today's safety requirements.

According to preliminary economic calculations, using the AES the republic will be able to obtain relatively inexpensive electric power. However, the costs for the second startup will total about 1.2 billion rubles [R]. It is obvious that we will be unable to manage without outside help. Otherwise, Vigen Chitechyan noted, the republic will each year be forced to acquire energy

sources costing R24 billion, or $610 million at world prices, which we are moving toward today, to provide for its energy complex.

At the press conference there was great interest in the problems of utilizing radioactive waste, and in the seismic stability of the station. The answers provided were quite vague. In the first case V. Chitechyan limited himself merely to a statement to the effect that it must be taken outside the republic, but he did not go into any detail, presumably so as to avoid giving the press a pretext for raising a "rumpus" before the time. Geologist Ashot Karapetyan talked about seismic safety. He was not inclined to regard as final the conclusions of several commissions that had visited the AES and returned with a verdict of 8.5 to 9 on the scale.

The question of guarantees evoked a number of unclear answers. And this is understandable. A French delegation that recently visited the AES has stated that no European government would permit such a station because it cannot be brought up to the safety standard. "Well, that is their opinion," Chitechyan remarked. "We are taking it into consideration." And let me add that they are naive people, these Frenchmen, we should have the worries they do.

It seems to us, however, that the most important problem connected with the second startup of the AES is who exactly will assume the responsibility for saying "yes." The government along with the parliament, or the people through a referendum? Grigor Areshyan was personally convinced that with the approval of the government the question should be resolved by the parliament.

And what, may one ask, about last year's decision by that same parliament, according to which the AES can be opened only with the agreement of the people? Will they risk it?

Revival of Republic Communist Party Viewed

92US0405A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Apr 92 p 3

[Article: "Communists for Independence of People's Karabakh: Second Birth of the Armenian Communist Party"]

[Text] The Armenian Ministry of Justice officially registered the 23d sociopolitical organization. It is the revived Communist Party of Armenia.

In August 1991, after the failure of the coup, its leaders, who already had an independent status and were disassociated to a significant degree (at least in words) from the CPSU, announced its self-dissolution. It was concurrently announced that a new Democratic Party with a social-democratic orientation was to be formed out of its "fragments." And so it happened, though far from all communists consented to such mimicry. Convinced communists headed by the venerable secretary of the Yerevan City Committee, Sergey Badalyan, firmly resolved to fight for the revival of their party under its former name, with its former charter and program.

Their half-year fight has now been graced with success. The Ministry of Justice was unable to find grounds for rejecting registration of the organization, which deleted the principles of the class struggle from its program long ago, and which calls itself a national party, despite the fact that it proclaims itself to be the successor of the better traditions of the Communist Party of Armenia.

As is required, the Communist Party Central Committee published an appeal to all laborers of the republic in which it explained the goals and objectives of Armenian communists to its potential allies. We find that its fundamental principles include fighting for a strong, flourishing, independent Armenia. The Communist Party will guide itself chiefly by the interests of national unity. The communists favor the fastest possible recognition of the independence of the Republic of Nagornyy Karabakh, and they ask the government to use all means to ensure dependable defense of Armenia. They also favor a strong military, political, economic and cultural union with Russia, and in the area of foreign policy they are prepared to defend the idea of recognizing genocide of the Armenians in 1915 by Turkey. The social program of the CPA includes an appeal to restore the zone of the 1988 earthquake as quickly as possible, to heed the interests of refugees, and to "surmount the errors made in the process of privatization." The communists proclaim themselves to be proponents of all forms of ownership.

The Central Committee hopes to restore its authority among the masses in short time. It is believed however that the Communist Party would hardly be able to assume a prominent place on Armenia's political scene in the immediate future, although its leader Sergey Badalyan asserts that the Communist Party will soon have a membership of tens of thousands, while there are also hundreds of thousands who instinctively lean toward the communist ideal.

Nonetheless the left flank of sociopolitical life is already firmly occupied by socialists represented by Dashnaks, social-democrats represented by the Gnch Party, and that same Democratic Party, which has recently been activating its efforts among the intelligentsia. Judging from everything, the reborn communists understand this quite well. Sergey Badalyan asserts that the Communist Party is prepared for close cooperation with all traditional enemies—the "Dashnaktsutyun" Party, as well as with all other opposition forces. If the left-wing parties are able to achieve tactical unity, their united front will be capable of successfully competing with the Armenian National Movement. But the question is this: Will Dashnaks agree to an alliance with those who persecuted them yesterday?

Poll on Armenian Emigration to U.S.

92US0389A Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA in Russian 12 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Gevork Pogosyan, director of the Sociological Research Center of the Armenian Academy of Sciences, under the rubric "Sociological Survey": "Let's Go to America!"]

[Text] The city which ranks second in the world with respect to size of Armenian population—Los Angeles—is threatening to become the first. As we know, quite recently the United States raised its migration quota with respect to the former USSR from 20 to 300 thousand per year. In the order of first priority they will be accepting citizens of those countries with which diplomatic relations have been established. And so, something on the order of 20-30 thousand people will get the opportunity annually to leave Armenia for permanent residence there, perhaps even more. There has never been any shortage of people desiring to leave the republic for the United States. Even if a ticket there at today's prices costs an entire fortune.

Our survey among Yerevan residents was conducted a couple of weeks prior to the decision by the U.S. Government to increase migration quotas. The survey results may therefore be perceived as preliminary and somewhat modest.

As always, the survey was conducted among representatives of all social segments of the capital's population. Of 1,200 individuals responding to the question on the survey sheet—"If you had the opportunity, would you leave for permanent residence in the United States or some other country?"—28.9 percent responded "YES"; 44.3 percent—"NO." Seventeen percent stated they were still thinking about it, and 9.7 percent replied that they were unable to answer. The younger generation (ages 18-30) is the most favorably disposed towards leaving, which fact is apparent from the table.

If you had the opportunity, would you leave for permanent residence in the United States or some other country?

	YES	Still Thinking	NO	Unable to Respond
Total	28.9	17	44.3	9.7
Men	28.5	18.5	40.7	12.3
Women	29.2	15.9	47.1	7.7
Ages 18-30	36.2	13.6	40.1	10.4
Ages 30-45	19.6	21.2	47.2	10.9
Ages 45-60	20.1	9.1	47.9	22.9
Age 60 and over	26.3	14.6	45.8	3.3
With High School Education	30.4	15.3	45.9	8.4
With Higher Education	24.5	16.7	48.2	10.6
Workers	28.2	14.9	46.4	10.5
Office workers	23.4	12.8	54.6	9.2
Intelligentsia	22.9	19.7	45.7	11.7
Students	29.8	11.8	50.6	7.9
Pensioners	34.6	13.1	38.3	4.6
Unemployed and Housewives	35	15.5	44.3	5.1
Members of Cooperatives and Business People	22.6	25.2	40	12.2
With Families	25.3	16.9	48.4	9.4
Without Families	33.1	14.9	44.5	7.5

People of middle and older age (30-60) are not very inclined to leave (47 percent unambiguously responded "NO"). Those having the greatest difficulty responding were middle-aged people (22.9 percent); those having the least difficulty, strange as it may seem, were the elderly (3.3 percent). The hypothetical desire to leave was expressed most of all by the young and by the old—pensioners and the unemployed. Whereas the former may still consider that they have the opportunity to realize their intentions, for the latter (the elderly) this is more a theoretical possibility. Although it should be stated that those who actually leave for permanent residence in the United States include quite a great number of elderly. Moreover, the elderly there are paid a good healthy pension.

It is also interesting that members of cooperatives and business people, as well as office workers and the intelligentsia, do not manifest any particular desire to leave. This is very important since the "brain drain" and outflow of culture, the departure of business and enterprising people, will cause irreparable damage to the republic. If overall deterioration of the social situation continues, which is more than likely, sentiment favoring

emigration will grow. In this case it is precisely that social base which comprises the single necessary element capable of supporting revival of the national economy, of developing national culture and science, which will "vanish" abroad. According to the most modest calculations, the number of people throughout the republic desiring to leave may amount to about 500,000. And a still greater number of people desire to leave for temporary, seasonal jobs. Consequently, the main able-bodied portion of the population, energetic and enterprising, will be seeking ways to travel abroad.

It is already impossible to suspend departures or prohibit them altogether. The Stalinist iron curtain has long been abandoned. The country is transitioning towards an open economy and "open door" policy in order to integrate itself smoothly into the civilized world community. Consequently, we cannot be thinking about how to hold people back or prevent them from going abroad, but rather about how to regulate this flow, how to use it to the advantage of the nation. To date not only does our republic lack a national program or state approach to this question, neither is there any organization, committee, or institution which would be engaged more or less professionally in the issue. It has been left to drift along its own course, as they say. There are countries, in fact, in which emigrants and so-called "gastarbeiters" [guest workers] account for a significant item of the national income.

Pannational Movement Chairman on Leadership, Role

92US0389B Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA in Russian 13 Mar 92 p 2

[Interview with Ter Iusik Lazaryan, deputy of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet and chairman of the Armenian Pannational Movement, by Zara Nazaryan; place and date not given: "AOD: On the Eve of the Congress"]

[Text] As has already been reported, Ter Iusik Lazaryan, deputy of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet, was recently elected chairman of the Armenian Pannational Movement (AOD).

[Nazaryan] How do your new responsibilities as head of the Armenian Pannational Movement go along with your professional activity, and what will you be accomplishing in the near future?

[Lazaryan] For two years now I have been combining work in the church with work in the Armenian Pannational Movement. Today, of course, things have become far more complicated. There is not a single day of rest. The AOD Congress will begin 20 March in the SKK [not further identified] and will continue three days, we expect. The Fourth Congress must examine questions involving the program, the statutes of the Armenian Pannational Movement, and the Artsakh issue. Documents will be approved on external and internal policy and a new board elected.

[Nazaryan] Does it not trouble the AOD that more and more of its members are going over to state structures?

[Lazaryan] There are two problems here—on the one hand, we understand that with the transfer of many AOD representatives to state structures, the movement itself becomes weakened. On the other hand, not being in contact with state structures would prevent us from working the way we aspire. The movement has sufficient potential so as to continue "placing" cadres. After all, the most important thing is the interests of the state, and the goal of AOD has never been simply its own consolidation.

[Nazaryan] What was the reason for transformation of the parliamentary faction "Anrapetutyun" into the AOD faction?

[Lazaryan] If you recall, elections to the parliament were conducted not so much according to the party principle as according to the principle of majority. We therefore believed that factions in the Supreme Soviet would also be formed more in accordance with the principle of one or another general goal than in accordance with party affiliation. It is precisely for this reason that the "Anrapetutyun" faction was created, which included, in addition to AOD members, representatives of various parties and a few former communists. But as parliamentary work progressed, party factions began to emerge: Dashnaktsutyun, Ramkavar Azatakan, and others. Naturally the question arose—if many people have formed the impression that AOD has a majority in parliament, then there must be a clarification as to who constitutes its membership. This is one of the main reasons the "Anrapetutyun" faction was dissolved and another emerged—the faction of the Armenian Pannational Movement. On the other hand, AOD should have been represented in the parliament precisely in the form of a discrete party faction, capable of discussing and voting for these or those issues and then presenting its decisions to the Supreme Soviet.

[Nazaryan] Does this mean that AOD is becoming a party? And when may this take place?

[Lazaryan] The question as to whether or not AOD will become a party is not being specially raised. If it happens, it will have been dictated by vital necessity, and not by abstract discussion. In the meantime, AOD remains a movement, in any case until such time as state structures are put in order and it becomes clear what type of party Armenia needs. I repeat—the main goal of the movement is the establishment of a powerful independent state.

Pannational Movement Member on Popularity, NKAO

92US0397A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Apr 92 p 3

[Interview with David Shakhnazaryan by Liana Minasyan; place and date not given: "They Negotiate

Only With the Strong, says David Shakhnazaryan, a Member of the Governing Body of the Armenian Pannational Movement and a Possible Candidate For the Post of Chairman"]

[Text]

[Minasyan] After coming to power, the movement began to noticeably lose its popularity. That is natural, is it not?

[Shakhnazaryan] Before coming to power we were prepared for ideological struggle and not prepared for economic reforms. There are objective reasons for this—Armenia continues to be a part of the economic expanse of the CIS. Armenia does not have the economic protection that all the other states of the Commonwealth have; therefore, it cannot conduct an absolutely independent policy and is forced to coordinate its reforms with the processes taking place in other countries. Thus, the economic breakdown, as distinguished from the ideological, was not to be very difficult—perhaps it was even impossible. There is yet another reason—the cadre. We have our own group, which is making its own recommendations to the political leadership of the movement. Last year we were the initiators of land privatization, and right now we have presented to the government a proposal on privatization of production. And the government cannot but take our proposals into consideration—if only because the Armenian Pannational Movement [AOD] has a majority of its representatives in the parliament; not to mention other methods of influence.

[Minasyan] Do the positions of the AOD and the Armenian authorities on the Karabakh question wholly coincide?

[Shakhnazaryan] They do. The Karabakh situation arose because the rights of the people to self-determination were trampled. The beginning of the movement in Karabakh was constitutional, but Azerbaijan responded to it with force, owing to which armed actions began.

Conflict in any event should be resolved by peaceful negotiations between Nagorn0-Karabakh and Azerbaijan. Even now, intermediaries would like to conciliate Azerbaijan and Armenia. But this is at root an unacceptable approach, since Armenia is not a party to the conflict and has no territorial pretensions whatsoever against Azerbaijan.

All the intermediaries are fighting to expand their own influence in the region: Iran and Turkey are quite obviously competing with one another. And that is precisely why Turkey's Western allies wish to present the Iranian peace mission in a poor light, to a certain extent. In Yerevan, however, Iranian mediation is given preference, since Turkey was unable to maintain complete neutrality.

The AOD has always declared the well-known thesis that there are no permanent enemies and friends; there are only national interests. The movement has assumed a weighty mission—to reorient the policy of Armenia toward reality. However, the continuation of military actions could undermine these efforts. Therefore our chief goal is not to allow the conflict to grow.

The Commonwealth has no mechanism for pacifying such conflicts. In the best case, with time the CIS will turn into something like the European Community. But even if it only ensures the bloodless disintegration of the empire, that suits us fine too.

[Minasyan] And do the policies conducted by the Armenian authorities and the NKR [Nagorno-Karabakh Republic] coincide?

[Shakhnazaryan] The NKR is independent in its policy, and as far as our approaches to various questions are concerned, they could hardly coincide all the time, nor should they. Sometimes it turns out that way. However, the foreign policy of Nagorno-Karabakh should become more active, and we are prepared to agree in advance to any treaty which it concludes with Azerbaijan. Armenia must recognize the independence of the NKR, but only at the time when such recognition is to its advantage.

[Minasyan] Do you associate the increased international attention to Karabakh with the fact that the military situation there has changed since January?

[Shakhnazaryan] Only by demonstrating its defensive capability was Karabakh able to force the international community to take up this problem. That and only that. They negotiate only with the strong.

[Minasyan] What do you think of Yeltsin's decision to transfer troops in the Transcaucasus to Russian jurisdiction?

[Shakhnazaryan] After the Union disappeared, Russia, whether it wanted to or not, assumed certain obligations of the former Center, that is, the empire. That decision was one of the manifestations of such an attitude. Those troops which begin to move across the territory of Armenia without the consent of its government will be nationalized.

AZERBAIJAN

Causes of Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Examined

92US0335A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Mar 92 pp 4-5

[Article by Sergey Lezov: "In and Around Nagorno-Karabakh. An Experiment in Interpretation of Mythical Thinking"]

[Text] **Sergey Vladimirovich Lezov is a historian and associate of the Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the author of a number of works on the history of modern Christian theology in the West. For several years he has edited the section devoted to Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh in the law enforcement weekly EKSPRESS-KHRONIKA (Moscow) and worked on the bulletin VESTI IZVESTIYA SSSR (Munich), and at the present time he is the Moscow representative of the journal STRANA I MIR (Munich). This article, which presents a view of the problems of Karabakh and its "environs," is the result of four months of work of the independent researcher. The editors do not completely share this view but consider it necessary to familiarize their readers with it.**

There are no bad peoples... (from the newspapers)

Every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way (A great writer of the Russian land)

At the beginning of March 1992 I was talking with some pilots at the Yerevan airport, Erebuni. It is a dirty, cold building. We were sitting in the office of the person in charge of shipments to Karabakh. There were no departures on that day—"helicopters cannot fly in this weather." And in general "there are more journalists than are needed in Karabakh: We see our boys in NOVOSTI every day. They are soldiers, not movie stars. What do you journalists want? Only one thing is important to you—to sell your tapes for as much as you can." (One pilot said all this, the rest of them yawned approvingly.)

I wanted somehow to separate myself from the "incorrect" journalists: "I do not even have a camera with me, I am not a reporter, my work is to write and analyze the situation."

This reply followed: "You mean you do not understand what is going on? You do not know that one people is fighting for freedom and the other will not let them be free?"

I was reminded of that simple formula. In fact, when you are outside the intellectual establishment there is nothing to stop you from telling the truth: Nobody will condemn you for taking an unbalanced approach to this complex problem.

I think the wording used by the person with whom I was speaking is the truth, but it reduces the problem to the "right of the peoples to self-determination"—which theoretically is everywhere recognized and "secured" but in practice, unfortunately, it depends completely on the specific alignment of political forces and interests.

Yet can one describe what is happening on the purely historical plane, without reference to legal definitions and moral assessments.

Let us look at a map of the Caucasus and the threshold to Asia. Let us note on it the regions of dense Armenian population at the beginning of the 1910's. Not having their own statehood, the Armenians lived in communities in the Russian or Ottoman empires on the expanses from the Asia Minor coastline of the Mediterranean Sea (Kilikiya) to Tiflis and the Northern Caucasus, from Baku to the Black Sea. The Armenian population in Turkey reached more than 2.5 million, the majority living in the six Asia Minor vilajets. (It is important to note that today, 80 years later, the population of the Republic of Armenia is approximately the same.) "Up until World War I a large share of the Armenians (about 4 million) lived densely on the territory of the historical Armenia: About 1.5 million of them were in the Russian empire and the rest in Turkey" ("Peoples of the World. A Historical-Ethnographic Reference," Moscow, 1988, p. 69). Historical Armenia is usually understood to mean the space bounded by Lake Sevan (in the east), Lake Van (in the southeast), and Lake Urmia (in Yugoslavia).

With this kind of descriptive-demographic approach, the history of the Armenians in the 20th century extended over the decades like a national catastrophe which threatens to end up in the complete destruction of this people.

Indeed, let us recall the following facts.

As a result of the genocide of the Armenians in the Ottoman empire, Western Armenia (the eastern part of modern Turkey) practically lost its indigenous population: During 1915-1916 from 1.5 to 2 million Armenians were deprived of their civil rights, deported, and, finally, destroyed "on the sly" during the world war. It will be easy for the reader to see in the subsequent events the model of the physical destruction of entire social groups, which was then to be applied repeatedly in our century. That is how the communists destroyed the exploiting classes, and the National Socialists—the Jews.

Here are the results: There are only about 100,000 Armenians in Turkey now and they live mainly in Istanbul and other large cities. The majority of them are strongly assimilated and deny—in keeping with the official Turkish version of history—the genocide of 1915 and emphasize their loyalty to Turkey. And throughout the world the overall number of Armenians has increased only insignificantly during the eight decades since the genocide: The consequences of this event are being felt to this day.

The catastrophe in the Ottoman empire was followed by a slaughter of Armenians in Nakhichevan, Baku, and Shusha (1918-1921). At the end of 1920 the independent Armenian republic, which lasted for less than three years, fell under attacks from the Turkish and Russian armies. The Armenian territories were divided up between Kemalist Turkey and communist Russia. The Moscow Treaty signed on 16 March 1921 confirmed Turkey's right to the Kara area and certain other Western Armenian territories seized by Russia during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and incorporated by it in keeping with the Berlin Treaty of 1878. (Russia

relinquished these territories for the first time in the Brest-Litovsk treaty.) According to that same Moscow Treaty, the Nakhichevan area, which is a part of the nucleus of the historical Armenian territories, was turned over to the protectorate of Azerbaijan. This treaty became the legal basis for the formation of the Nakhichevan ASSR as a part of Azerbaijan. The well-known decree on the inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh in Soviet Azerbaijan with the rights of an autonomous entity, adopted by the Caucasian bureau of the RKP(B) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] on 5 July 1921 was also conditioned by attempts on the part of the Bolsheviks to find a common language with Turkey, which then, as today, was aspiring to be the protector of the Azeris.

In Nakhichevan we see the same result as in Western Armenia: In 1917 Armenians composed about 40 percent of the population, in 1926 their numbers had decreased almost five-fold, and by the beginning of the eighties there were only two Armenian villages left in this Armenian autonomous entity of Azerbaijan, that is, the Armenian community of Nakhichevan no longer exists. Only the Armenian name of the area is left, as is the case with Asia Minor.

During the 50 years preceding the current Karabakh crisis, the proportion of the Armenian population in the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] and regions of Azerbaijan adjacent to the oblast (Shaumyanovsk, Dashkesan, Khanlar, Shamkhor) has continually decreased. According to numerous pieces of evidence, verbal and literary, the Armenian and Azeri communities in Karabakh under Soviet power lived in a condition of "frozen war"—mutual hostility, from time to time breaking into bloodletting.

By questioning specialists in ethnography and Georgian Armenians (there were about a half million of them by 1988) I learned that the existence of the Armenian community in Georgia was ultimately threatened. This subject is not discussed much because, out of political considerations, one does not speak about it too loudly. Here there has also been deep animosity which broke through to the surface as the Georgian national liberation movement rose. Armenian cultural institutions were closed down and Armenians were assigned the status of "guests" who were faced with a choice: assimilation or emigration. Under Zviad Gamsakhurdia this attitude toward the Armenian minority actually became state policy. Georgian Armenians are leaving for the Northern Caucasus and Russia, and there are also many of them among the candidates for emigration to the United States.

Alas, during the course of the conflict "in and around Nagorno-Karabakh" hundreds of thousands of Armenians were driven out of Baku, Kirovabad (Gyandzhi), and also Khanlar, Shamkhor, Dashkesan, and other rural regions of Azerbaijan. There is no need to speak in detail here about the Sumgait carnage, the Kirovabad pogroms in November 1988, or the Baku pogroms in January 1990: Everyone interested in this will remember well the events which resulted in the fact that there are no Armenians left in Azerbaijan.

I repeat: We are speaking not about a moral assessment but about a description of the historical process which, it seems, is proceeding with the irreversibility of a geological shift. It is terrible to say it, but even the earthquake of 7 December 1988, which destroyed half of Armenia, is not out of place in this picture.

And against this background the Karabakh movement might be understood as a final spasm of an ethnic group trying to cling to life, to break this tendency, and not to allow it in the future. For understandable reasons the concepts I have used evoke unpleasant associations, but this is precisely about a struggle for living space. For anyone who is familiar with Yerevan, which has grown monstrously over the past two or three decades, anyone who has had occasion to travel through Armenia, knows that this tiny mountain country which suffers from all the diseases of the Third World is not in a condition to feed its own population, not to mention accept hundreds of thousands of refugees.

Thus the "Karabakh problem" amounts to the instinctual desire of a people to survive, to cling to its last chance. This is the instinct for self-preservation which is "beyond good and evil," which lies outside morality, as does the very national principle understood in the biological-ethnic sense.

The threat of persecution and destruction is a constant of Armenian history which is most clearly expressed in the 20th century but which appeared much earlier. This is what contributed to the final completion of the model for the interpretation of history which might be called the **Armenian myth.**

Dozens of definitions of the concept of myth have been developed in the humanities. I will use their common element: Myth is the nonscientific knowledge that makes it possible for an individual included in a particular community to interpret his life. Myth does not have the significance of truth, that is, it cannot be true or false, it cannot be proved or disproved. A myth prescribes the norms and values for an individual, his main characteristic—his effectiveness. If a myth is unable to give meaning to the lives of the members of the society it becomes ineffective, loses its social function, and disintegrates. In this case it is replaced by another myth. So the myth contains—in its undismantled form—religious, philosophical, legal, and moral components. For example, in the Russian society that has now been formed, the myth of social justice is being replaced by the myth of human rights and a free market.

A key symbol of the Armenian myth is the state of being civilized. Behind this word-figure stands the idea of the Armenians as an ancient people with a 3,000-year history, the legacy of a truly ancient culture, and the spread of its civilizing influence to other peoples. The concept of being civilized, which distinctly singles the Armenians

out from other peoples, is functionally similar to the concept of people being selected by a single God, which is at the center of attention in the Jewish myth.

A second most important element of the Armenian myth is the idea of the Armenians as a Christian people, an outpost of the Christian world in the East.

Linked to these two elements of the myth is a third—the self-perception of the Armenians as an eternal defenseless victim in the hands of uncivilized adherents to different creeds and as a people betrayed by the West in the name of incorrectly understood political interests. The Armenian people is doomed to suffering in innocence like Christ himself. Armenian history includes a kind of lesson which the Christian world does not want to learn.

It was these ideas that made it possible for the Azeri writer Anar to speak of the "Armenian masochism," about a cult of suffering that inheres in Armenians.

This myth was given final form in Soviet Armenia during the past 25 years, where it is now more effective than it is in the Armenian Diaspora. In the sixties Soviet Armenians gained the right to observe the day in memory of the victims of the genocide—24 April—and since that time an extensive genocide literature has appeared in Armenia. The image of the actions unrecognized and undiscussed by the world had a decisive influence on the Armenian cultural consciousness: Along with the cult of suffering there is arising a cult of the hero-fedayeen, the fighter against the Turks.

It is easy to note that all elements of the myth contribute to the isolation of the Armenians, for it consistently sets this people against its "neighbors," that is, the Turkish and other Muslim peoples. (This reminds me of my friends from Stepanakert who instead of "Azeris" or "Turks" always say descriptively: "our neighbors.") In essence, the myth forms the identity of the Armenians as "anti-Turk." Obviously, this isolationist myth is alien to the modern West: The liberal world view that prevails in Western Europe and the United States is based on secularism and universalism. In other words, the Armenian myth does not submit to an adequate translation into the language of the human rights myth.

As for the "Moscow friends of the Armenian people," they, unfortunately, have frequently engaged in actualization and rephrasing of the Armenian myth over the past four years. Here one must clarify what is really on the minds of the people to whom the fate of Armenia is important and not the Slavophiles from among the "so-called democrats" who at one time took advantage of the Armenian theme and the gullibility of the Armenian people as a springboard for their careers. I am convinced that these latter understand the meaning of their own treachery. I hope they sometimes feel ashamed.

According to my observations, the "Moscow friends" frequently achieved an effect with the help of a forbidden device: Appealing to the Armenian audience, they took advantage of the deeply entrenched anti-Turkish and anti-Islamic feelings of the Armenians, that is, they degraded to propaganda the national and religious hostility in another country, referring to Armenians as "our little brothers" with whom they could and had to speak precisely in a racist language. The "Moscow friends" are strengthening those very elements of the Armenian myth that isolate the Armenians from the neighboring peoples and give them an "anti-Turkish" identity.

People could object that I am exaggerating the influence of political myths on the development of the conflict. But here is another observation: The Armenian leaders and the mass media, as a rule, suppress the information that contradicts the myth. In my view, one of the decisive events that finally turned the conflict into a battle to the end, that is, to the physical destruction or expulsion of one of the ethnic groups, was the deportation of the Azeris from Armenia in November 1988. According to my information, more than 100,000 Azeri Christians were driven out (mainly from the Gugarskiy, Gorisskiy, and Stepanavanskiy Rayons of Armenia) in a couple of days and dozens were killed. The leaders of the Karabakh movement of Armenia at the time (now many of them are state leaders) have not announced publicly that the Armenians are guided by the caveman principle of blood revenge and collective liability which is typical of "uncivilized" peoples. What happened was not the subject of public discussion and interpretation. It was not perceived as the national disgrace of the Armenians. Instead of this, people were vaguely given to understand that the Armenian Azerbaijanis were to blame for everything themselves because they were disloyal. Nobody in Armenia would dare to undertake demythologization.

As the Azeri society awakened, a "countermyth" about the insidious Armenians and the naively credulous Azeris was formed here (out of already prepared blocks) and became a public factor. It is typical that instead of demythologization the mass consciousness is offered a battle of myths. And in Azerbaijan confidence is increasing in the idea that the Russian and Western public would not refrain from dual standards: The Christian world will be on the side of the civilized people in any case, displaying its inherent Eurocentric racism. The lack of sensitivity of the Western consciousness to the sufferings of the Palestinian people is there for all to see. For in the modern Western consciousness the role of sufferers has been permanently assigned to the Jews (incidentally, the bearers of the Armenian myth also experience jealousy toward them, and until the Western intellectual community finally becomes tired of the subject of the guilt of the Christians before the Jews for the Holocaust the Christian conscience is not likely to burden itself with new concerns of that kind. "Bolivar cannot carry two.")

As for the "Moscow friends" of the Armenians, in the face of such events as the exile of the Azeris from Armenia, they were either proved to be bloodthirsty fans of their team or displayed a helpless confusion or even disenchantment with the civilized Armenians: "How is such a thing possible?" All this was especially clearly manifested after the publication of the reports on the mass murders of the Azeri population during the storming of the village of Khodzhaly at the end of February 1992.

And the attempts at an "objective approach" in the central and (later) Russian press could not be called objective either: Since the autumn of 1988 they have been printing both the Armenian and the Azeri versions of the events in adjacent columns. But the "inability to find and tell the truth" (V.L. Pasternak) cannot be made up for with this kind of objectivity.

Here we are entering on a narrow path. For it is obvious that to be a "fan" is immoral and to adopt (expressed in obscure form) the principle of collective responsibility is impossible. But even the liberal dogma to the effect that there are "no bad peoples" (that is, on average "all peoples are the same") does not contribute to an understanding of the situation and sometimes causes direct harm to the cause.

What I find it important to express is very close to the words of the French Catholic writer George Bernanos written in November 1943 in a dispute with an American journalist: "Dear Thompsom considers it unfair to attribute to all German people the responsibility for the crimes committed by the fascists. And I consider it just as unfair to exclude the fascists from the German people, thus not accounting for the circumstances that mitigate their guilt, that is, the inherited nature of the environment and cultural and moral traditions. Yes, there were maniacs and sadists among the Germans... But there is one category of Germans, the largest, who, although they are neither maniacs nor sadists, nonetheless look on cruelty and violence differently from the way we do."

Recently an American friend accused me of racism for the words: "In Russian culture human life is not included among the basic values." He probably responded to these words in approximately the same way as I would assess the standard accusations against the "Georgians" heard somewhere in a waiting line in Moscow ("Their entire nation is like that," and so forth). But: We know that various peoples look on cruelty and violence in different ways, just as various peoples take different attitudes toward human life.

In the fall of 1990 I spent a week in the home of a friend of mine in Askeran. Several times a day he took me in his Zhiguli from Askeran to Stepanakert and back. The direct road runs through Khodzhaly, and one time stones were thrown at an Armenian vehicle traveling in front of us. On the days after that the Armenian drivers preferred the roundabout road, which was harder to drive on. Regarding this I heard: "If we had burned down a couple of houses in Khodzhaly in the spring of 1988 the Azeris would have left of their own accord."

Here it is appropriate to recall that the first campaign of the pogrom mob from Agdam to Askeran was on 22 February 1988, two days after the special session of the NKAO Congress of People's Deputies which petitioned to the Supreme Soviets of the two republics to have the NKAO transferred from the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian SSR. This campaign was the first attempt at violence by the Azeris since the beginning of the Karabakh movement and at the same time it was the first publicly significant reaction of the Azeris to the decision of the Karabakh Oblast Soviet. On the way, the mob beat Armenians and destroyed buildings. The people participating in the pogrom were stopped by police bullets on the outskirts of Askeran—where four years later, at the beginning of March 1992, Azeri armed personnel carriers forcing their way through to Askeran were stopped.

The second reaction of the Azeri society to the aspiration of the Karabakh residents to freedom was the Sumgait pogrom of 27-29 February 1988.

Looking at all these various episodes together, I shall try to make two arguments.

First, the attitudes toward violence in the Azeri and Armenian political cultures are indeed different. It is difficult for me to imagine that a neutral historian could find arguments to refute such an assertion. A pogrom and mass slaughter—this is precisely the response which could naturally have been expected in February 1988. It is precisely these expectations that followed from all the experience of the coexistence of the Armenians and the Turks during critical moments of history. The threat of slaughter (the so-called "Azeri factor") indeed has been a political argument from the very beginning of the conflict.

In the second place, level of political morality set by "Sumgait" is convincing everywhere in our country—and not just in Transcaucasia. (This has not been a common assertion among authors analyzing the dynamics of the mass violence in the age of the disintegration of the USSR.) The Armenians also successfully mastered the argument of violence: Nobody will protect you, therefore kill the opponent and take over his position unless you want to remain a vulnerable victim. Such is today's conclusion from the appeal "Sumgait must not be repeated," and it is precisely in this sense that I understood the wish of many of my acquaintances in Askeran about the missed opportunity to drive the Azeris out of Khodzhaly. Were it not for the stubborn armed resistance of the Armenians, there would have been a "final solution" to the Karabakh question long ago through the destruction of the Armenians.

Unfortunately, attempts to resolve disputes by "civilized" means, that is, through mutual concessions and compromises, have had almost no success, partly because of the helplessness and incompetence of the central authorities, but that is not all. The possibility of

a compromise was noted at the time when Arkadiy Volskiy was governing in Karabakh (the summer of 1988 through November of 1989), first as a representative of the Communist Party Central Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet and then as the head of the special government committee responsible to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. But what he tried to do and had already done was destroyed by the joint efforts of Azerbaijan and Armenia. In both republics forces that were not ready for compromise were in charge of the situation.

Incidentally, this is not surprising: Even in Europe the new world order, which is based on the exclusion of force as a major political factor, is only beginning to assert itself. The disintegration of Yugoslavia also raised questions about the fate of ethnic minorities (for example, the Serbs in Croatia). Europe united could not stop a civil war, carnage, and expulsion of the population there.

Or here is another kind of example. As soon as Vaclav Havel became president of Czechoslovakia, in one speech he tried almost to problematize the postwar universal deportation of Germans from Sudetenland. He was not talking about the legal justification for this event (he had no advances toward Germany in mind): Havel just doubted the moral magnitude and beauty of this act. His speech evoked a stormy negative reaction which clearly showed that many Czechs subscribe to the principle of collective responsibility.

The understanding of the situation proposed here leads to the following prognosis. In solving the Karabakh problem, apparently, this is the only alternative: The Armenian community of Karabakh will be destroyed (possibly, with a military defeat, the remainder will be saved by fleeing) or Karabakh will gain actual independence (whatever it may be called). As for the plans for "real autonomy" within Azerbaijan, they are apparently hopeless if Azerbaijan has any control at all over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Now events are developing in such a way that the probability of the first outcome is much greater. Obviously, with the present state of affairs, the fact that Azerbaijan's military potential is many times greater will be seen, and aid to Karabakh from Armenia is insignificant. The "air bridge" is unreliable; it can be destroyed very quickly. The rural population of Karabakh is eating up their last supplies and they are already close to a real blockade famine. Trying to reinforce their positions, the Karabakh residents are almost sure to storm Shusha and this will bring the end closer.

The first large military defeat of the Karabakh residents will mean universal slaughter of the population. If they break through the Karabakh front, the Armenian Government, even if it is left in complete isolation, will come to the aid of Karabakh, and Armenian armed formations will try to cut an infantry "corridor" to Nagorno-Karabakh through the region of Lachin. In the words of the high Armenian officials, there will be no possibility of doing anything else in such a situation. A failure to take resolute measures would mean a loss of power.

One must keep in mind that there are tensions and contradictions between the authorities of the Republic of Armenia and the leadership proclaimed on 2 September 1991 of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). Leaders of the national liberation movement of Armenians in Karabakh have never depended on Yerevan and it is quite wrong to think of them as "henchmen" of the Armenian political forces. With the passage of time and the loss of illusions the influence of the Armenian authorities on the people of Karabakh will quickly decrease. From my experience, having traveled to Karabakh and been in constant communication with the people of Karabakh, I have received the impression that they are aspiring not so much to merge with Armenia as to get out from under the control of Baku: They consider actual independence form Azerbaijan to be a prerequisite for maintaining their community. In February 1988 "mnatsum" (unification with Armenia) was considered to be the only constitutional possibility of getting out from under Azerbaijan's thumb. Incidentally, all participants in the February events, including the oblast party-soviet elite, understood quite well that through their actions they were burning their bridges once and for all: There will never be a pardon. Therefore the February resolution of the session of the oblast soviet and the decree with the same spirit of the plenum of the Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan should be considered acts of great courage.

And when the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 28 November 1989 abolished the special government committee of the NKAO and again placed Karabakh completely at the disposal of Azerbaijan authorities, leaders of Armenia and the NKAO took a desperate step in order to influence the Center somehow: On 1 December 1989 in Yerevan a joint session of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia and the National Council of the NKAO proclaimed the creation of a unified Armenian republic, which includes Nagorno-Karabakh. This decision had no consequences but the new, postcommunist authorities in Armenia prefer not to take responsibility for it. Yet at one time it was the Armenian Pannational Movement (AOD), which came to power in 1990, that developed a draft of the decision and assigned its implementation to the old Supreme Soviet. Moreover, the AOD appeared and achieved its first successes precisely with "Karabakh" slogans, which it scuttled as it came closer to power. (Perhaps the reader will remember the since the spring of 1988 the AOD leadership has been known as the "Karabakh committee.") This inconsistency generates distrust of Yerevan among the Karabakh Armenians. And vice versa: The stubbornness of the people of Karabakh and their desire to survive on their own land is likely to hamper the new leadership of the Republic of Armenia in establishing good relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. One must understand that in

Armenia it is not so much the government as the opposition, mainly the Dashnaktsutyun part, that handles aid to Karabakh.

The attempt to open up the "Lanchin corridor" would mean war along the entire front between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The outcome of this war would depend on the position of the neighboring states and therefore cannot be predicted. One thing is clear: Unlike Azerbaijan, Armenia now has no real allies and therefore this is no longer a matter of Karabakh alone but of the existence or nonexistence of Armenians in the Transcaucasus. On the horizon is the threat of another genocide.

The logical possibility of avoiding such a development is the recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic by the international community. But today, apparently, nobody is prepared to make such a decision.

Ex-President on Nagorno-Karabakh, Presidential Elections

92US0378B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Apr 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Ayaz Mutalibov, former president of Azerbaijan, conducted by Dana Mazalova; place and date not given: "'I Am a Humanist, At Heart,' the Ex-President of Azerbaijan Says of Himself"]

[Text] **Czechoslovak journalist Dana Mazalova has been studying problems of the Transcaucasus for 10 years now. Ayaz Mutalibov granted her alone an exclusive interview a month after his resignation. She, in turn, offered it to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA.**

[Mazalova] How do you feel?

[Mutalibov] Now, normal, although at first, after the session, I was told that I was in bad shape.

[Mazalova] What was the reason for your resignation?

[Mutalibov] My resignation was involuntary—I had had no thought of resigning but, realizing that everything had been properly stage-managed and that the right had joined forces with the left against the president, I decided to avoid a confrontation. Although I had legitimate opportunities for this (and the world would have supported me because I was the constitutional president elected in a national ballot).

It seems to me that Azerbaijan's image was thereby damaged, although we have shown that we differ sharply in this respect from Georgia. Yes, in the presidential entourage there was, as in any "royal court," a multitude of intrigues. But it was my job. Having shown the legitimacy of power, to have brought Azerbaijan into the international community. Sentiment in the West is not in favor of what happened. There is now no recognized personality in Azerbaijan, whereas in the past six months, as a result of my modest international efforts, there was shaped a political image which, at the risk of this sounding immodest, was noticed. But now people come up to me and ask: With whom should we be dealing here? But I do not know now what anyone has in mind. I had a clearly arranged program, but what is theirs? But my opponents consider this factor immaterial for some reason or other. They played on it in order to put me in a difficult position.

I understood the geopolitical situation in which Azerbaijan finds itself today, I knew its place in the former Union, and I knew the problems of the CIS. I advocated the constructive and consistent realization of independence, which does not come all at once, instantaneously. As a politician and an economist, I always believed that if one forged ahead regardless and failed to take account of life's realities, both democracy and the degree of independence which we had achieved could have caved in. Unfortunately, the Azerbaijan People's Front has set another task. They believed that participation in the Commonwealth was totally unnecessary for us, as was participation in the joint command of the armed forces also. This was a serious mistake, which enabled certain forces to avail themselves of this position of Azerbaijan's and aggravate the situation. We are not Ukraine—not yet, in any event—and we should not be compared with it. Let us compare ourselves with Georgia, with Moldova. Had I not gone to Alma-Ata (where, incidentally, no one was expecting me), the process of Azerbaijan's recognition would have dragged on, and there would have happened with us the same as has happened in neighboring Georgia.

I attempted to balance the interests of right and left, and now the communist regime is coming to be replaced by an Azerbaijan People's Front regime. It is a regime. It is not democracy.

I did not recognize this word—front—from the very outset. Front against whom? This was an invention of Gorbachev or his ideologues. In terms of its extremism, form, and structure it is a communist, Bolshevik movement. They have support cells, functionaries—they have invented nothing new other than the name. The Azerbaijan People's Front has become a most veritable supernationalist movement.

On the day of the session I made an analysis of the mistakes we had made on account of the domestic political power struggle. I proposed a compromise—a coalition government in accordance with the prevailing status quo in Azerbaijan. Having enacted a law on parties and having created equal conditions for political struggle, we would have formed a new parliament, having dissolved the old one. And the party which obtained a majority in it would have formed a government of popular trust.

[Mazalova] Why did they not agree to this?

[Mutalibov] I do not know. I assume they were afraid of not obtaining a majority among the people. It was for this reason that they opted for a revolutionary version similar to the Romanian one: they came to power by

having removed the president, seized the key positions, and oppressed members of the opposition.

[Mazalova] Would the Georgian version have been possible here had it not been for Karabakh?

[Mutalibov] No. Nor would it there had it not been for Ossetia. This is a detonator causing tension in society and moral depression, which has to have some kind of outlet. Dogs are set on the victim.... But who is the victim? Power, the president.

[Mazalova] But, on the other hand, the war is distracting attention from the domestic political situation.

[Mutalibov] I was in these two years one of the few people who sincerely did not want a war, which neither we nor the Armenians need. I said: We are taking the path of independent development, we need to be involving ourselves with the economy. What are we doing?! Public money is being thrown to the wind, we are bleeding ourselves white and could reach a point where we have become indigent once again. And then some third party will come and say: "I will save you."

[Mazalova] Some observers believe that, following your resignation, the Karabakh conflict will be used in the domestic political struggle in Azerbaijan and that it cannot be stopped.

[Mutalibov] These fears are not inappropriate. The Azerbaijan People's Front accused us of being unable to solve the Karabakh problem. They must now give the people assurances that they can do so. There are two ways: either more decisive actions (inasmuch as I was accused of indecisiveness) or compromise.

[Mazalova] Via the CIS?

[Mutalibov] Yes. But they reject the CIS. They reject compromise. They are opposed to the restoration of the autonomous oblast within the previous borders. There then remains just one way—waging war until a victorious outcome. But I said continually: the world will not allow this because the Karabakh problem has already gone far beyond the confines of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Having assumed the commitments, we have joined the United Nations and the CSCE. Armenia also.

Let us assume that the opposition adopts a decision to restore the status quo. It would then be repudiating itself and would have to explain to the people why it prevented Mutalibov from doing this. They have painted themselves into a corner, where nothing is left but to buzz around [shmalyat]. Let us assume that they mobilize all our forces. This could grow into a big war, and it is not known who would win, although no one any longer wishes to fight here.

If we are victorious in Nagorno-Karabakh, we will acquire a new Karabakh in Nakhichevan. When I went there in 1990, I told the people of Nakhichevan: My brothers, do not listen to what is being said in Baku. Baku is a long way away from Armenia, but you are next door, you should have a different policy.

[Mazalova] The Karabakh conflict has now reached the bloody stage where it is very difficult to stop it. How might it develop, in your opinion, if the interests of third parties: Turkey, Iran, Russia, are considered?

[Mutalibov] Everyone is now trying to get in on this conflict and display initiative, proceeding from his own ambitions. Turkey and Iran are competing in terms of the degree of influence on Azerbaijan. Russia, on the other hand, has not, unfortunately, disavowed the line which prevailed under Gorbachev. And I believed that, upon coming to power, the democrats in Russia would use all their influence to put an end to the conflict, not farm it out to the belligerents.

But what might happen now? Our people are hoping that Turkey might help in some way. But, proceeding from its own political purposes, it will not become mixed up in the conflict on account of Azerbaijan. This is not part of its plans. Nor is Turkey on its own, it is part of a bloc system. There is a general policy there, and there are economic strings to which it must adhere. I warned that the development of the Karabakh conflict would cause popular unrest against the country's leaders in Turkey itself. This has, unfortunately, been the case—disturbances in Ankara, Istanbul, they are shouting for resignations there also. Demirel has declared that he has to take heed of the opinion of the people, who are demanding intervention. What does this mean at the end of the 20th century?

This is not the way we should be acting. We were making progress on the path toward independence and had joined the United Nations. The next stage was a sound economic program and privatization. The rest would come. Domestic problems were the second question. But this concept of mine was unremunerative because it was correct and was understood by the people's masses. Where, then, was the excuse for a power struggle? They needed all or nothing.

[Mazalova] What do you think about a Yugoslav version of a solution of the national conflict—republics acquiring independence in defiance of the principle of the inviolability of borders—in respect of Nagornyy Karabakh?

[Mutalibov] This is a delayed-action bomb, which will be going off constantly. It is a violation of the generally accepted rules, and the party which considers itself injured would never forgive anyone this. And the resulting tension could be used by any forces.

The Karabakh model could be applied in any region. The first international use of the Karabakh experience was in Kosovo. This model is now being developed in Crimea, which both Russia and Ukraine consider their primordial territory.

[Mazalova] Did you and Ter-Petrosyan have any appreciation of one another's attributes?

[Mutalibov] He perceived my refinement. And I understood and perceived his refinement, his political essence. Many people thought that we made no contact. Yes, we did. But I always endeavored to define the point of contact of interests from which we could go further. I was continually proposing that we regulate the situation and ensure peace together, without third parties—we would then both go down in the history of our peoples.

[Mazalova] What might the world community do for peace in Karabakh? Commissions, observers are coming.

[Mutalibov] International commissions should restore the status quo, bringing the situation to the starting point. Currently, according to a decision of our parliament, the autonomy does not exist. They, in turn, have formed the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, with which we cannot, naturally, agree—this means secession from Azerbaijan. For compromise to be achieved Armenia must officially announce that it considers annulled all decisions on the annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh, regardless of their legal basis. And our parliament should reverse the anticonstitutional—there is no new constitution as yet—decision on the dissolution of the autonomy and restore it within its former boundaries. After which, negotiations would be conducted by the communities of Nagorno-Karabakh—Armenian and Azerbaijani.

[Mazalova] Now, when there is no Union, what do you think of the role which is being performed in the Karabakh conflict by the CIS forces? On the one hand there is talk of an endeavor to halt the conflict. But, on the other, how, for example, were the Azerbaijanis able to "conquer" a Transcaucasus Military District supply terminal in Agdam which was intended for the contingency of war and which had a control system about which only the generals knew?

[Mutalibov] I did not even know that the supply terminal had been taken and plundered. But how were the Armenians able to steal 150 flamethrowers? Disintegration is, you know, disintegration. Tacit consent.... I always called this an outrage. When it was demanded that I create national armed forces, I realized that desire and possibility are entirely different things. We have no legal sources for acquiring weapons. Back in October I officially raised the following matter with Shaposhnikov and Gorbachev. We wish to form our own armed forces of a maximum of 20,000 men. In allocating weapons legally for a national self-defense force we would be forestalling the possibility of their spontaneous seizure from the Soviet Army, as happened in Armenia in 1990. I said: If you are worried about Armenia's reaction, give them the same quantity. The following principle operates in world practice—either two states sign a neutrality treaty or there is military parity between them. But we do not have parity, consequently, you yourselves are pushing us into the plunder of Army units. I foresaw this.

On the one hand there was a tremendous desire to preserve the Army in all the republics, on the other, the anti-Army mood following the proclamation of independence. Since we have independence, we should, consequently, have an independent army also. We would always have negotiated its status and given thought to jurisdiction and dual subordination according the head of state rights in the event of aggression. This was not done either.

[Mazalova] Do you not think that you made a mistake in not signing in Minsk the agreement on the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS?

[Mutalibov] I do. I, as president, should have availed myself of this right.

[Mazalova] What do you think about the events in Khodzhaly, after which you resigned? Corpses of Khodzhaly inhabitants were found not far from Agdam. Some people had initially shot them in the legs so that they could not get far. Then procured an ax. My colleagues photographed them on 29 February. At the time of new photographs on 2 March these same corpses had been scalped. A strange kind of game.

[Mutalibov] As the Khodzhaly people who escaped say, all this was organized in order that there be a pretext for my resignation. Some force was operating to discredit the president. I do not believe that the Armenians, who are very precise and knowledgeable about such situations, could have permitted the Azerbaijanis to have obtained documents exposing them as having perpetrated fascist actions. It may be assumed that some people had an interest in subsequently showing these closeups at the Supreme Soviet session and focusing everything on myself.

If I state that the Azerbaijani opposition was to blame for this, it could be said that I am slandering them. But the overall background of the arguments is such that the corridor by which people could leave had, for all that, been abandoned by the Armenians. Why would they be shooting in that case? The more so on territory close to Agdam, where by that time there were sufficient forces for moving out and helping people. Or simply arranging for the peaceful inhabitants to leave. This was continually the practice.

I was being told all the time that the Khodzhaly people would hold on and that they needed help with weapons, people, and food. I gave instructions for this to be done by helicopter. But the pilots, it was explained to me, refused to fly there inasmuch as they lacked the special instruments enabling them to evade the Stingers. This went on for almost a whole week. Deprived ryat at hand, however, was the Agdam grouping, which was required to continually monitor the development of events. As soon as the equipment had ringed Khodzhaly, the populace was to be evacuated. Even earlier I had given the same instructions in respect of Shusha: not to save the men but to bring out the women and children. These are also the laws of war: they have to be saved. My conduct was

will be celebrating his 70th birthday in two years, could not be a part of the election struggle unless this clause of the law were to be revised in the next few days.

Presidential Registration Procedures Begin

92US0398A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Aydyn Mekhtiev: "Cadre Changes Continue: Registration of Candidates for President Has Been Permitted Since Yesterday"]

[Text] Three days after the resignation of Prime Minister Gasanov, yet another state figure of Azerbaijan was relieved of his post "by his own wishes" by decree of acting President Yagub Mamedov. Leaving his post is 66-year-old State Secretary of Azerbaijan Mitat Abasov. Whereas local observers associated the 4 April decree of Yagub Mamedov on relieving Prime Minister Gasan Gasanov from his post with the circumstance that the latter might become a serious rival of the acting president in the forthcoming election campaign, the resignation of Mitat Abasov was interpreted as a "purge" of the cadres at the leadership of the republic, who were chosen by former President Mutalibov. As is well known, Mitat Abasov, vice president of the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences, was appointed state secretary of the republic after his predecessor in that post, Tofik Ismailov, perished as a result of a helicopter accident in Karabakh on 20 November of last year.

Taking into consideration the fact that the structure of presidential authority in Azerbaijan does not provide for the post of vice president, one may draw the conclusion that Yagub Mamedov looks upon the figure of state secretary as one of the key positions.

In spite of the fact that in accordance with the law on elections, registration of candidates to the post of president begins on 7 April, not a single political figure in the republic has yet been officially put forward. This is explained not only by the fact that the candidates have not yet managed to gather the 20,000 signatures required for registration. The reason for the temporizing position of the candidates lies in the fact that the leadership of the republic and the People's Front have not yet reached agreement on the question of the conditions for conducting the presidential campaign. The People's Front hopes to enlist the support of the voters for holding a proposed broad-scale campaign with the goal of securing the agreement of the heads of administrative power in the localities to changes in the membership of local electoral commissions, and including members of the NFA [Azerbaijan People's Front] on a parity basis. Apparently it was not by accident that on 6 April Yagub Mamedov held an expanded session with the participation of the heads of the rayon administrations, at which special attention was devoted to the tactic of local organs of power in the period of the forthcoming election battle with the opposition.

Incidentally, there is no unity in the opposing camp on the question of participating in the presidential campaign. For example, the movement "For Democratic Reforms in Azerbaijan and in Defense of Human Rights" recently issued an appeal in which it called upon political forces to refuse to take part in the presidential election. The document points out that "holding elections for the president of Azerbaijan should be preceded by the adoption of a new Constitution, holding parliamentary elections ahead of schedule, and the establishment of a Constitutional Court." The appeal goes on to say that "in accordance with international legal norms, in a state in which part of its territory has been engulfed by war and is in fact occupied, holding elections for president is not considered possible." Lala Gadzhieva, leader of the movement, who has just returned from a trip to a number of regions in Karabakh, told a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent that "holding elections is also impossible because to this day the status of the more than 350,000 Azerbaijan refugees from Karabakh has not yet been determined." "If even our people are forced to take part in these traitorous elections," Gadzhieva continued, "then I, knowing full well the apportionment of political forces, along with the lack of a base and presidential structures, am deeply convinced that this experiment will last no longer than six months."

Possible Presidential Candidates Viewed

92US0417A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Aydyn Mekhtiyev: "There Are the First Presidential Aspirants; Age Has Gotten in the Way of Geydar Aliyev"]

[Text] By a majority of votes, the session of the APF [Azerbaijan People's Front] mejlic which has been concluded in Baku has accepted the decision to nominate as the presidential candidate of this party, which is an influential political force in the republic, the APF chairman—a 54-year old candidate in philological sciences, Abulfaz Elchi-bey. The mejlic session ratified the lists of initiative groups for gathering signatures in support of Elchi-bey submitted by local sections of the front.

On that same day, the nomination of one other candidate for president was announced. The leader of the National Independence Party, which is not part of the APF, Etibar Mamedov, who a week ago had celebrated his 37th birthday, was nominated at the conference of the labor collective of the Baku Oil Processing Plant.

Thus, the opposition forces have decided to participate in the elections, and this is associated with the fact that the republic's leadership has fulfilled the main demand of the People's Front: By decision of the National Council, the powers and authorities of the Central Electoral Commission have been rescinded. This commission consisted mainly of former communists, and its chairman, Ali Kerimov, was relieved of his duties. The

Azerbaijan parliament formulated a new Central Electoral Commission, which includes representatives of the opposition.

Of the current republic leadership, Supreme Soviet Chairman Yagub Mamedov can realistically aspire to the office of president. However, having become carried away with cadre reorganization in the upper echelons of power, he is in no hurry to include himelf in the electoral struggle.

One of the most popular politicians of Azerbaijan, Geydar Aliyev, will evidently not be able to participate in the campaign. The age limit specified for presidential candidates has taken the leader of the Nakhichevan autonomy out of the struggle. Nevertheless, on 9 April the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic Supreme Medjlis, in which Aliyev's influence is absolute, did not take seriously the demands of a number of deputies to boycott the presidential elections. By decision of the Nakhichevan parliament, the electors of this autonomy will participate in the elections for president of Azerbaijan.

Nevertheless, in the past days the topic of the upcoming electoral battles has not been the main one. Republic residents observed with alarm the acute complication of relations between the Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense and the commanders of the CIS 4th Army stationed in the republic. As a result of a clash between soldiers and officers of the national army and paratroopers of the 4th Army on 8 April, two Azerbaijanis died, two more were seriously wounded, an- 1 Azerbaijani servicemen were taken away to an unknown destination. The conflict occured after a group of Azerbaijani officers and soldiers was sent to the storehouses of the CIS united armed forces to the village of Uch-Tape (17 kilometers from Baku) for the purpose of stopping fuel and lubricant materials from being taken out of there. However, after several hours, a group of about 25 paratroopers came to the storehouses. The Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense issued a statement accusing Lt. Col. Zolotov, who headed the paratroop operation, of giving the order to fire on the unarmed Azerbaijani military servicemen

Age Factor in Possible Aliyev Candidacy for President

92US0388A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 14, Apr 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Is Geydar Looming Up Ahead?]

[Text] Reports have appeared recently regarding the possible return to power in Azerbaijan of Geydar Aliyev, former first secretary of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party

It is noted here that Aliyev will mark his 70th birthday in two years. And this observation is not made by accident—elections for president of Azerbaijan are scheduled for 7 June of this year. According to the Azerbaijan Constitution, however, the president must be an individual younger than 65. Although 68 is a good way away from 65, Aliyev expects that with help from his adherents he will be able to eliminate this point of inconvenience to him, which was adopted, incidentally, exclusively "for his sake."

In actuality, things are even more complicated still. It turns out Aliyev will celebrate his 70th in just one month. Although Aliyev himself cites documents with 10 May 1923 as his date of birth (but says—1924), he was in fact born in 1922. This was established several years ago by the party control committee of the CPSU Central Committee, whose representatives found an application in Nakhichevan archives which he filled out upon entering the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League]. Aliyev simply forgot about this application. As far as other documents citing his year of birth are concerned, he personally destroyed these prior to departing for work in Moscow at the beginning of the 1940's. Why it was necessary for him to do this remains a riddle. Is it possible he could predict back then that he would be running for president in 1992?

Presidential Adviser, Deputy Premier on Kiev Meeting

92US0417B Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 31 Mar 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with S. Gadzhiyev, state presidential adviser on state-legal policy, and A. Azizbekov, deputy prime minister of the republic of Azerbaijan and chairman of the Azerbaijan Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply], conducted by E. Abaskuliyeva: "Proceeding From National Interests"]

[Text] **We have already reported on the meeting of the heads of the CIS member states held in Kiev on 20 March of this year, and have also published the documents adopted at this meeting. Yet among the questions included on the agenda of the Kiev meeting were also those on which the representatives of Azerbaijan had their own specific opinion, as a result of which a number of documents were not signed by them. What documents were these, and what is our position on each of them? We asked two meeting participants—S. Gadzhiyev, state presidential adviser on state-legal policy, and A. Azizbekov, deputy prime minister of the Azerbaijan Republic and Gossnab chairman—to answer these questions.**

[Correspondent] Sabir Muallim, how would you explain the fact that an entire packet of proposals associated with problems of armaments was not signed by you?

[Gadzhiyev] I believe that the answer to this question does not require lengthy explanation primarily because the proposed documents concerned questions of the CIS unified armed forces which we, as you know, did not enter along with the Ukraine and Moldova. We repeatedly stated that we consider it necessary to create our own army, and rejected participation in the CIS unified armed forces. And thus, it is natural that we did not place our signatures under that which does not relate to us.

[Correspondent] Ayduy Muallim, questions of economics are of particular importance for us today because, it seems, it is no accident that our readers are interested in the problems which were discussed at the Kiev meeting.

[Azizbekova] Two important economic questions were discussed at the meeting of the Council of Heads of CIS Member States: the agreement on legal succession in regard to contract agreements, all property, state archives, debts and statutes of the former USSR, and the agreement on the division of assets and liabilities of the former USSR State Bank between the central banks of the CIS member states. Russia was opposed to the adoption of these agreements, and the discussion was concluded with the signing of standard protocols on the creation of commissions.

However, the heads of the governments concentrated their attention on extremely important problems associated with the draft of the agreement in the sphere of price formation. On 14 February in Minsk we posed the question of the need to agree that the price policy be conducted in a coordinated manner, i.e., in order to determine the balance from each of the republics, it is necessary to decide what the dollar is equal to in rubles. This would serve as protection for the Azerbaijan market. Then we know conditionally in world prices what corresponds to what in our mutual accounting with other CIS states. Let us say, for example, Azerbaijan imports $6.4 billion worth of goods and exports $6.2 billion.

But then this question turned out to be open, and already in Kiev Russia announced that it is releasing prices, including also on power sources. Naturally, those states which have no power sources, including also the Ukraine, were against this. The argument flared up primarily between others, but since the interests contradict each other, once again the documents were not signed, but only a protocol on creation of a commission.

We are in favor of having the pricing policy conducted in a coordinated manner, and that is specifically how we are building our relations with other states—the former USSR republics. Here too some contradictions arise. Let us say, for example, the Ukraine sells butter not according to the relation of the dollar and the ruble, on which we had agreed, but at a more expensive rate, because everyone needs butter, and buys diesel fuel here cheaper because others have it too, and the prices on it have dropped.

Due to lack of coordination of prices in the CIS, the prices on fuel and cotton have dropped on the world market. After all, now each one of the CIS members enters the market independently, and as a result the prices are dropping to our common detriment.

Non-acceptance of each other's interests leads to nonfulfillment of the decisions adopted at CIS meetings and to a deterioration of the economic position. The question of coordinating agencies for CIS railroads was also discussed at this meeting. Everyone signed this document except us. What are we talking about here? That the work of the Ministry of Railways must be coordinated, which, as proposed by Russia, is what the coordinating council will do. The documents ratified here are important for everyone.

We had our own variant. Naturally, we also favor coordination of railroad activity. But since we are an independent state, it is principally incorrect to have some council over us, which would obligate us to act in one way or another. We proposed that this council not ratify, but rather coordinate joint actions, which go into effect on the territory of one state or another only after its ratification by the republic's parliament or leadership. The Ukraine supported us. However, the document proposed by Russia is effective only until December of 1992.

The heads of state also reviewed one other question in Kiev—the agreement on organization of economic relations and the principles for resolving economic disputes. The discussion centered around the creation of a CIS economic court—a court of arbitration. I was opposed to this. Why? Let me explain. Each republic has its own court of arbitration, where enterprises of states bound by agreement relations may turn. If such an economic dispute is not resolved, they may turn also to a third-party court, which they may select by agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant.

This document was prepared at the meeting in Moscow back on 13 March, at which Azerbaijan was absent in connection with its participation in the work of its own extraordinary session. Therefore, we did not place our signatures under this agreement in Kiev. Others agreed with us, and the document was put off for further study.

As for the other documents which we supposedly did not sign, there is some inaccuracy here: the agreement on principles of customs duty policy, on the coordination of bank activity, on the inter-state commission on import of food products, on the guarantee of rights to citizens of CIS member states in the sphere of pension provision, and the agreement on standardization were discussed on 13 March in Moscow. As I have already stated, we were not present at that meeting. These documents are currently being studied.

ESTONIA

Government Reviews First Month in Office

92UN1188A Tallinn THE BALTIC INDEPENDENT in English 20-26 Mar 92 p 2

[Text] The need for quick monetary and ownership reforms was stressed by the Estonian Prime Minister Tiit Vähi in an article in the government daily paper RAHVA HAAL on March 12 summing up the first month in office of the new government.

Mr Vähi said that the government would make every effort to carry out the monetary reform at the earliest opportunity, at the same time making sure that "the people would not be disappointed" by it. However, he did not elaborate on the details.

Two of the most urgent domestic policy tasks of the government cited by the Prime Minister were the need to strengthen legislation and fight corruption. As a move in the right direction, Mr Vähi mentioned the doubling of the salaries of tax and customs officials and the tightening of their work standards.

The freeing of prices is seen by Mr Vähi as an inevitable step in the transition to a market economy. As one of its first acts, the government raised the minimum wage from 400 to 1,000 roubles (from $3 to $12). Salary increases would continue so that by the end of the year the minimum wage would be US $100, the Prime Minister predicted.

Mr Vähi emphasised the inevitability of the recent sharp increases in rent and the cost of water, electricity, heating and gas, which were caused by the increase in the price of fuel imported from Russia. In cases where such expenses made up more than a quarter of a family's income then the state would cover the rest, he promised.

With regard to foreign trade, the prime minister pointed to the need to overcome dependence on trade with Russia. Western investments in Estonia should be encouraged through creating new investment incentives and lessening the red tape, he said.

Among the incentives for foreign investors, Mr Vähi mentioned the possibility of selling land to foreigners, which is prohibited under present legislation. "The sale of small plots of land to foreigners does not endanger Estonia in the least," Mr Vähi said. "On the contrary, this could earn us the hard currency we desperately need to tide us over the next winter when we will have to buy all our fuel at world-market prices." In order to cope with this, Estonia needs "tens of millions of dollars worth of foreign investment," the prime minister explained.

According to Mr Vähi, the state revenue for the first half of 1992 is planned at US $20 million, compared to the $3 million earned in 1991.

The Prime Minister stressed the need for Estonia to also start acting as an independent state in the sphere of the economy, which he interprets as selling Estonian resources as expensively as possible. As an example, Mr Vähi cited the government decision to raise twelve-fold the cost of Estonian electricity being sold to Latvia. The effectiveness of this policy has, however, been questioned in some quarters. Latvian officials have already said they are looking for cheaper energy suppliers.

Banking Problems With Moscow Continue

92UN1188B Tallinn THE BALTIC INDEPENDENT in English 20-26 Mar 92 p 3

[Article by Kaja Kell]

[Text] In a relatively new development for Estonia the holders of individual savings accounts and companies making bank deposits have started to comprehend that a high inflation rate is not the only factor to make you lose your savings. Banks can make mistakes and go bankrupt—here and now. And political controversies can make hard-earned currency resources virtually unavailable.

The savings bank organization of the former Soviet Union was a typically centralized structure with Moscow calling the shots. The deposits accumulated in central accounts in Moscow and interest was handed out from there as well.

A number of years savings having accumulated in Moscow, the deposits belonging to individual account holders from Estonia now amount to more than 2 billion roubles.

"One mustn't think that Moscow is unaware or unable to understand what is going on in Estonia. As soon as the campaign aimed at persuading individual account holders to withdraw their accounts from the All-Soviet Savings Bank system was launched, Moscow reacted by threatening to freeze deposited savings," said President of the Bank of Estonia Siim Kallas.

At the end of last year Mrs [as printed] Kallas and the Chairman of the Managing Board of the Soviet Central Bank Viktor Gerashtchenko signed a document, declaring that the money deposited in individual savings accounts belongs to the people of the Republic of Estonia. All the technicalities concerning the handing over of the deposits should have been resolved by special negotiations. These negotiations have not yet taken place.

The economic situation in the rouble zone being what it is, Moscow is applying every possible kind of pressure to compel the former republics to assume a responsibility for the internal debts of the old Soviet Union. Four billion roubles is the estimated amount that Moscow would like Estonia to contribute. Estonia, on the other hand, has never agreed to the whole idea.

"We are facing some very difficult negotiations. Dividing the liability for the debts of the former Soviet Union has become a matter of controversy—both openly and behind the scenes," said Mr Kallas.

One of the moves in this game of moves and counter-moves was the freezing of the hard currency accounts of the former Soviet republics in the Moscow Vneshekonombank. The Bank of Estonia has recently been criticised by local politicians for failing to transfer the hard currency deposited in its Moscow correspondent account to its Western accounts in time. The Bank of Estonia maintains that the critics are not aware of all the facts.

Mr Kallas said that his bank has been transferring the hard currency from its Moscow account all the time. At the beginning of December 1991 there was only about US$1 million in Estonia's Vneshekonombank account. By now the accumulation of money from various hard-currency transactions has increased from that amount up to an estimated US $14.5 million. "We do not have the exact numbers at our disposal because the inadequate accounting system of the Moscow bank makes it impossible for them to give their clients up-to-date figures," said Mr Kallas.

Officials stress that it was impossible for many businesses to use an alternative banking system. "Soviet export organisations had only one banking system available to them. And in some cases the companies couldn't even stop using the services of their agents because they had signed long-term contracts," said Mr Kallas. According to Estonian officials, the only real solution for companies with hard currency resources locked in Vneshekonombank accounts is to find a way to use their hard currency for transactions on the internal Russian market, which is still possible under the Moscow banking system.

"The Bank of Estonia is going to guarantee all the individual savings deposited in Estonia's state-owned Savings Banks," Mr Kallas said. That covers most of the savings accounts in Estonia, but there are still numerous accounts in various commercial banks which don't have a state guarantee.

Last week an Estonian weekly paper published an article about the Savings Bank losing 30 million roubles in an unfortunate credit operation. A local commercial bank had found a way to turn the unpredicted rise of the rouble's exchange rate against the dollar to its advantage, by declaring that it was unable to repay its principal and would have to hand over the security in the form of a previously fixed amount of US dollars. There is no legal mechanism to compel this bank to pay back the roubles.

The state will bear the burden of this oversight, but it is well known among the business community (and admitted by the president of the Bank of Estonia) that the Savings Bank has not been the only one to bear losses whilst learning to operate in the new market conditions and within a framework of inadequate legislation.

Mr Kallas said that a new credit information and credit risk assessment system for banks would soon come into operation, but until now every depositor has had to look after himself. If the economy is experiencing difficulties then the banks are experiencing them as well. All the well-known technical excuses for long delays in fulfilling clients' requests for transferring funds can only be a cover-up for lack of funds, the President argued.

"We shall probably need something like the US federal deposit insurance system in the long run, but a special reserve fund for insuring small savings deposited in commercial banks will soon come into being," Siim Kallas said.

LITHUANIA

Government Stops Salaries for Budget Officials, Deputies

92UN1161A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 9 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by correspondent V. Zarovskiy: "Government Vouchers. Granddaughters of Kerensky Provisional Government Bank Notes"]

[Text] Vilnius—The unexpected is always alarming. Why the heck did first the Prime Minister of Lithuania G. Vagnorius and then the Chairman of the Supreme Council V. Landsbergis sign the appropriate documents and deprive workers of all budgetary organizations, as well as the deputies, of their salaries? To bring about order? Ha! Who is it that is causing problems right now? It seems the Communists are gone, as well as the underground and Russia, just as everyone around, is a friendly country.

Just recently increases in wages, pensions, and grants in the republic were taking place almost every month. Outstanding students got a stipend of a 1,000 [currency not specified], pensioners more than 1,000, workers (almost all) 3,000-4,000 and higher. Plus free government vouchers.

The government keeps extending their life now until May. In the current Lithuanian salary they have little meaning. The maximum that may be purchased with them is two and a-half kilograms of pears. This means only one thing: The Lithuanian Government does not have cash (roubles) in order to buy back its "progeny" from the population. Moreover there is no "wooden" money to pay salaries and pensions. The enterprises are without cash. The service of Z. Vaisvila, the deputy prime minister of Lithuania and also chief of state security, finally abandoned the search for KGB agents and a Marxist underground and caught a group of the Lithuanian-Estonian mafia. Unfortunately, however, that was too late. They managed to conspire with Lithuanian savings bank workers and steal 80 million roubles in cash from accounts in Lithuania.

Perhaps I am exaggerating, and even here, in Lithuania, I will be accused of rumor mongering, but experts are almost unanimously stating that the decision regarding nonpayment of salaries to officials and deputies means only one thing—the early introduction of our own currency.

Membership of Parliamentary Factions Listed

92UN1115C Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian 10 Mar 92 p 3

[Unattributed report: "What Kind of Parliamentary Factions Do We Have?"]

[Text] Factions, a normal phenomenon in the civilized world, began to form themselves in the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania only in the summer of 1990. The first one of them was the Sajudis Center faction, announcing itself on 21 June 1990. The last (or is it really the last?) Sajudis Accord faction was formed quite recently. At present, there are 9 factions in the Supreme Council to which 111 deputies belong, 29 deputies do not belong to any faction. Most factions were registered by the Supreme Council Presidium on 8 May 1991, when the permanent statutes of the Supreme Council came into force.

The LDDP [Democratic Labor Party of Lithuania] faction was established on 25 September 1990 as the faction of the Left; 10 deputies, members of the LDDP, belong to it. The faction of the Left had more members, including the deceased deputy Valerijonas Sadreika. The Moderate faction was created in March 1991 as the Seventh faction.

The Tautininkai [Nationalist] faction, established in January 1991, has split into two: the Reorganized Tautininkai, which includes most of the members of the Lithuanian Tautininkai alliance, and the National Progress faction. The latter (and, in part, the former) have attracted many members of the Sajudis joint faction.

The Sajudis Joint faction, formed in December 1990, was, for a long time, the largest one (36) members; with the secession of the "progressives" and with the formation of the Sajudis Accord faction, it shrank to 15 deputies. It includes deputies who are leaders of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and several members of the Independence party, its chairman excluded.

The Sajudis Moderate Radical and the Free Democrat factions, established in September 1990, disintegrated six months later: the "radicals" dispersed to various factions and many of the "democrats" went over to the Liberal faction, which was formed in April 1991. Its members are mostly active in the Lithuanian Liberal Union.

Various changes are taking place at this time in the largest, the Sajudis Center, faction, which has 20 members: some joined the faction, and others (more numerous), left it, mostly for the Moderate faction. The Center faction is based on the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania, the first one to receive international recognition, which returned to the Socialist International in 1990.

Only one faction has remained unchanged, the Polish faction, which consists of 8 deputies, mostly members of Lithuania's Polish Union. This faction required a special Supreme Council resolution for its establishment. According to the statutes, a faction must have no less than a 1/15th portion of all the deputies.

To which factions do other well-known members of Lithuania's political parties belong? Currently the Democrats belong to the Sajudis Accord faction. The greens, at present, are scattered throughout various factions. The Moderate faction deputies are still gathered together in the Citizen's Charter Club. The deputies who are active in the Future Forum of Lithuania have neither an organized separate faction nor have they established their own club.

And, finally, about those who do not belong to any faction: they are deputies of various political persuasions, among them, three ministers.

We apologize in advance to our esteemed deputies, if we listed their affiliation incorrectly.

LDDP Faction (formerly the faction of the Left - 10 deputies)
Vladimiras Beriozovas
Algirdas Brazauskas - (faction leader) - LDDP chairman
Bronislovas Genzelis (Ld)
Ceslovas Jursenas
Jokubas Minkevicius
Petras Papovas
Algirdas Razauskas
Kestutis Rimkus,
Benediktas Rupeika
Mindaugas Stakvilevicius

Polish Faction (8 deputies)
Stanislavas Akanovicius
Zbignevas Balcevicius
Leonas Jankelevicius
Risardas Macejkianecas - (faction leader)
Ceslavas Okincicas
Stanislavas Piesko
Valentina Suboc
Edvardas Tomasevicius

Liberal Faction (10 deputies)
Kestutis Glaveckas (Ld)
Algirdas Kumza (Ld)
Vytautas Kvietkauskas
Arvydas Lescinskas (C)

Bronislovas Lubys
Donatas Morkunas
Virginijus Pikturna (Ld)
Jonas Tamulis (C)
Rimvydas Valatka (C)
Eduardas Vilkas (Ld) -
(faction leader)

Moderate Faction (formerly the Seventh Faction - 16 deputies)
Vilius Baldisis (C) -
chairman of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania
Juozas Dringelis (Nr) -
deputy speaker of the Supreme Council
Eugenijus Gentvilas (Nr) -
speaker of the Supreme Council
Eimantas Grakauskas (C)
Valdimiras Jarmolenka
Virgilijus Kacinskas (C) -
(faction leader)
Stasys Kropas (C) -
chairman of the Supreme Council Local Governments Commission
Bronislovas Kuzmickas -
deputy chairman of the Supreme Council
Nijole Ozelyte-Vaitiekuniene (C, Li)
Vytautas Paliunas (S)
Kazimieras Saja (S)
Saulius Saltenis
Albertas Simenas (C) -
minister of economics
Jonas Simenas (C) -
chairman of the Supreme Council Environmental Protection Commission
Birute Valionyte (S)
Emanuelis Zingeris

Reorganized Tautininkai Faction (10 deputies)
Irena Andrukaitiene (S)
Klemas Inta (T) -
deputy speaker of the Supreme Council
Jonas Liaucius (S)
Jonas Macys (Nr, T)
Leonas Milcius (T)
Rasa Rastauskiene (T)
Algimantas Sejunas (T)
Mecislovas Treinys (T), -
(faction leader) - chairman of the Supreme Council Agriculture Commission
Algimantas Ulba (Ld, C)
Povilas Varanauskas (T)

Sajudis Center Faction (20 deputies)
Vytenis Andriukaitis
Leonas Apsega
Mykolas Arlauskas
Egidijus Bickauskas -
member of the Supreme Council Presidium
Miglute Gerdaityte
Gediminas Ilgunas -
chairman of the Supreme Council Education, Science and Culture Commission
Albinas Januska
Jurgis Jurgelis -
chairman of the Supreme Council Citizens' Rights and Nationality Affairs Commission
Stasys Kasauskas
Ceslovas Kudaba
Nikolajus Medvedevas -
chairman of the Supreme Council Mandate and Ethics Commission
Romualdas Ozolas -
chairman of the Supreme Council Presidium State Commission for Problems of Eastern Lithuania
Eugenijus Petrovas -
member of the Supreme Council Presidium
Vytautas Pleckaitis (Nr)
Jonas Prapiestis -
chairman of the Supreme Council Legal System Commission
Gintaras Ramonas
Audrius Rudys -
chairman of the Supreme Council Budget Commission
Aloyzas Sakalas
(faction leader) - member of the Supreme Council Presidium, chairman of the LSDP
Petras Vaitiekunas
Alfonsas Zalys (Nr)

Sajudis Joint Faction (15 deputies)
Julius Beinortas
Ruta Gajauskaite
Balys Gajauskas -
chairman of the Supreme Council Commission for Investigation of KGB Activities
Romualda Hofertiene
Gintautas Iesmantas
Juozas Karvelis
Stasys Malkevcius -
(faction leader)
Vytautas Puplauskas
Antanas Racas
Narcizas Rasimavicius
Alfonsas Svarinskas
Zita Slicyte
Praciskus Tupikas
Gediminas Vagnorius -
prime minister of the Republic of Lithuania
Zigmas Vaisvila -
deputy prime minister of the Republic of Lithuania

Sajudis Accord Faction (11 deputies)
Povilas Aksomaitis (S)
Nijole Ambrazaityte (S)
Rimantas Astrauskas (S)
Petras Giniotas (S)
Egid Jarasiunas (S) -
(faction leader)

Zenonas Juknevicius (S) -
first deputy minister of Justice
Alber Miskinis (S) -
chairman of the Supreme Council Defense and Internal Affairs Commission, chairman of the Democratic Party of Lithuania
Liudvikas Simutis (S)
Gediminas Serksnys (S)
Kazimieras Uoka -
state controller of the Republic of Lithuania

Nation's Progress Faction (11 deputies)
Aleksandras Ambrazevicius (T) -
member of the Supreme Council Presidium
Audrius Butkevicius -
minister of National Defense
Arunas Degutis (S, T)
Kestutis Grinius (T)
Egidijus Klumbys (S) -
first deputy minister of Transport
Vytautas Kolesnikovas (Nr, T)
Birute Nedzinskiene (S)
Algimantas Norvilas (S)
Rolandas Paulauskas (T)
Vidmantas Povilionis (S) -
chairman of the Supreme Council Foreign Affairs Commission
Aurimas Taurantas (S) -
chairman of the Supreme Council State Restoration and Constitution Commission

Deputies not belonging to any faction (29 deputies)
Aleksandras Abisala -
minister without portfolio
Laima Andrikiene (S)
Kazimieras Antanavicius (C) -
chairman of the Supreme Council Economic Commission
Virgilijus Cepaitis -
chairman of the Independence Party
Medardas Cobotas -
chairman of the Supreme Council Health Care and Social Affairs Commission
Algirdas Endriukaitis -
deputy secretary of the Supreme Council
Romas Gudaitis (C) -
member of Supreme Council Presidium
Vidmante Jasukaityte (Ld)
Antanas Karoblis (S)
Valdemaras Katkus -
first deputy minister of Foreign Affairs
Vytautas Landsbergis -
chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, honorary chairman of Lithuanian Sajudis
Kestutis Lapinskas (C) -
chairman of the Supreme Council Temporary Commission for the Preparation of the Draft Constitution
Mecys Laurinkus -
member of Supreme Council Presidium
Kazimieras Motieka (ATP) -
deputy chairman of the Supreme Council, chairman of the Citizenship and Amnesty Commission
Justas Paleckis (K)
Jonas Pangonis (Ld, K)
Algirdas Patackas
Sergejus Pirozkovas
Petras Poskus
Kazimiera Prunskiene
Saulius Razma
Romualdas Rudzys (K)
Liudvikas Sabutis -
secretary of the Supreme Council
Algirdas Saudargas -
minister of foreign affairs
Ceslo Stankevicius -
deputy chairman of the Supreme Council
Rimvydas Survila -
minister of agriculture
Lionginas Sepetys
Vladas Terleckas
Vidmantas Ziemelis (T)

Notes:

Abbreviations: AT—The Supreme Council, ATP—Supreme Council Presidium, C—Sajudis Center faction, K—LDDP faction (formerly, the Left faction), Ld—the former Free Democrat faction, LDDP—Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party, LDP—Lithuanian Democratic Party, Li - Liberal faction, LSDP—Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, Nr—the former Moderate Radical faction, S—Sajudis joint faction, T—the former Taufininkai faction.

* * *

The names in bold print belong to the nine suspended Supreme Council deputies (no right to vote, etc.).

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This report was prepared by the editors, using data published in TIESA and LIETUVOS AIDAS, the publication "Who's Who in Lithuania—92," and in consultation with some Supreme Council deputies.

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